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NAOKO YAMAGATA

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BY

NAOKO YAMAGATA

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To the memory of
J.T. Hooker

ἦ τοι μὲν ταῦτα φίλα φρονέων ἀγορεύεις,
ὥς τε πατὴρ ᾧ παιδί, καὶ οὔ ποτε λήσομαι αὐτῶν.

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PREFACE

Throughout my exploration of Homeric morality, two books have been constantly in my mind, both as guides and models and as opponents and authorities to be challenged. These are H. Lloyd-Jones' *The Justice of Zeus* and A. W. H. Adkins' *Merit and Responsibility*. Although I have tried to learn directly from Homer, the end-product has turned out to be a sustained critique of these two books. In this way, I am deeply indebted to them, and hope that this book may similarly contribute to future debate on the subject.

This book is an attempt to answer two questions on Homeric morality. One is whether or not the Homeric gods are concerned with 'justice' in human society, and the other is what mechanism controls the social behaviour of Homeric man. In Part I, it is shown that the gods distribute good and bad fortune to men not in response to their moral behaviour, but as required by fate, and therefore do not function as the guardians of justice in the human world. Men, however, *believe* that the gods are concerned with human morality. This is where I differ most from Lloyd-Jones. Part II describes various forces and motivations that affect human behaviour, such as fate, honour, revenge, shame, respect and pity. It is shown that human behaviour is restrained not only by man's faith in the moral gods, but by an assortment of many different forces, both social and emotional. In this part I have tried to offer a more systematic account of Homeric morality than Adkins. How far I have been successful in reinforcing, modifying, refuting or coordinating existing views of various aspects of Homeric morality is for the readers to judge.

The methodology of investigation employed in this work probably needs some explanation. Firstly, throughout this book, the evidence from the *Iliad* and from the *Odyssey* is treated together. No attempt is made to distinguish between the Iliadic and Odyssean moralities. This does not presuppose, however, that Homeric morality is uniform throughout the two epics, but merely reflects the fact that Homer *was* treated as a unity by later Greeks. The main purpose of this study is to attempt to describe how Homeric morality as a unity (however inconsistent it might be) would have appeared to critical readers of later Greece. This, I believe, will have more significance

in the light of the history of Greek thought, than any fine distinction between the two epics. However, I also believe that this book will prove that there is no fundamental difference between the two.

Secondly, I have conducted an exhaustive lexical survey of most of the key terms which express important moral concepts. I aimed at a literally exhaustive survey, referring to every single occurrence of chosen words and their main derivatives. A sensible reader might wonder why I could not do without lengthy citations by simply referring to lexicons, especially now that *Lexicon des frühgriechischen Epos* covers many of the terms discussed in this work. I did consider this option at one point, but it soon became clear that it would not serve my purpose. Firstly, in order to demonstrate what each key word exactly means, I had not only to locate, but also to *discuss* the context of each occurrence, something which lexicons by their very concise nature do not undertake in detail. Secondly, and more importantly, I did not always agree with the lexicographers. This made it all the more necessary to present my own version of lexical analysis in order to explain why I disagreed with the authorities. And thirdly, the problem of over-simplification resulting from selective discussions of key words that had plagued my predecessors, most notably Adkins, had to be avoided. Especially in order to refute Adkins' notion of ἀγαθός and κακός, I found it absolutely necessary to present the quantity, as well as quality, of occurrences of the particular usage of each word. Those who prefer more concise definitions of the terms in question are advised to refer to the lexicons.

This book, which started its life as a doctoral thesis submitted to the University of London in 1990, owes its existence to many people. First of all to my thesis supervisor and most supportive mentor, the late James T. Hooker, to whom I owe much of my Homeric scholarship. He read two drafts of the original version of this work, made many valuable comments, and enabled me to eliminate many inaccuracies and inconsistencies. I am ever grateful for his patient and unfailing encouragement since October 1985, when I started studying under his supervision as an MA student. It is my deepest regret that he has not lived to see this book, which I gratefully dedicate to his memory.

I also cordially thank Herwig G. T. Maehler, my other long-time mentor and one of the thesis examiners. I have learned much from his meticulous reading of Homer through his class in 1985-86 and

from our occasional conversations over the years, which have often been the source of new ideas and inspirations. He has read and commented in great detail on both the thesis and the penultimate versions of this book, which has led to its great improvement.

Special thanks are also due to Dr. Christopher J. Gill, my external thesis examiner, who made a copy of his extensive examiner's report on my thesis available to me in order to assist its revision. I benefited greatly from his fair and understanding advice and criticism. I am particularly grateful for the practical and moral support that he freely gave to me at the time when I was struggling to continue my academic career. This is a mark of his exceptional generosity, considering that I have never been his pupil.

Many thanks are also due to other scholars who have kindly read and commented on the whole or part of earlier versions of this work: Professor Shigenari Kawashima, Dr. Richard A. S. Seaford, Professor Malcolm M. Willcock, Professor Shigetake Yaginuma, and an anonymous referee for the *Classical Quarterly*. I also thank the *Classical Quarterly* for their kind permission to incorporate Chapter 4, a version of which has already been published by them (see note 1, Chapter 4). I must also thank E. J. Brill for their patient cooperation and for the comments of their anonymous referee, from both of which the final version greatly benefited. It goes without saying that I alone am responsible for any remaining errors.

I am also indebted to the Ishizaka Foundation, which funded my study at University College London from October 1985 to September 1987, and to the Department of Classics of the Australian National University, who most generously hosted my study leave in Canberra in 1989, and provided me with a most welcoming and stimulating environment. Thanks are also due to the British Academy for awarding me one of their Postdoctoral Fellowships from October 1992, which has afforded me the badly needed time to update this work as well as to continue my investigation further into the world of Homer.

I must thank my family for their moral as well as financial support, especially my late father, who bore the burden of my expensive education for more than two decades until his death in 1988. I am also deeply grateful to my husband, Ian Crawford, for always being my best friend and adviser. Without his constant support and encouragement, I would not have been able to continue my classical career to this date.

Finally, I feel obliged to express my gratitude towards Sir Maurice Bowra for writing a popular book called *Classical Greece* which once caught the imagination of a fourteen-year-old Japanese girl whose life was to be devoted to studies of Greek civilisation ever since. It is my conviction that in this world today, in which global communication has put everyone under the influence of many different cultures, and in which we have come to talk more about 'our planet' and less about 'my country' and 'their country', the classics of every part of the world belong to every member of humanity, more so than ever in human history.

Naoko Yamagata
University College London
January 1993

PART ONE

MORALITY OF THE HOMERIC GODS

CHAPTER ONE

MORAL FUNCTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO THE GODS

As many critics have observed, the Homeric gods do not appear to be interested in morality or justice in the human world.[1] Moreover, they are notorious for deceiving each other or committing adultery among themselves or with mortals. Strangely, however, we find a number of passages in Homer in which it is said (mostly by human characters) that Zeus, θεός or θεοί watch over human morality in some ways.[2]

In this and following chapters, we will examine such passages in order to see what sort of moral functions men expect to be fulfilled by the gods, and which ones are actually fulfilled by them. By doing so, we hope we will find the relation between human and divine morality in Homer.

Zeus and other gods

We examine the examples with Zeus in particular, and the cases involving the gods in general, together because, when Homeric man talks about Zeus, he often thinks of him as the representative of the will of the gods as a whole. On the other hand, when he talks about 'the gods' he cannot but have in mind the pantheon with Zeus as its

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[1] E.g. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951), p. 32: '. . . I find no indication in the narrative of the *Iliad* that Zeus is concerned with justice as such.'; A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960), p. 62: '. . . the gods as portrayed generally in the Homeric poems are far from just. Though right triumphs in the main plots of both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, it does not do so *because* it is right.'; For other literature cf. E. Ehnmark, *The Idea of God in Homer* (Uppsala 1935), p. 87.

[2] Cf. B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind* (*Die Entdeckung des Geistes*[2], Hamburg 1948, tr. by T. G. Rosenmeyer, Oxford 1953), p. 25: 'And could anyone deny that, when all is said and done, Zeus upholds the sacred order of the world?'; G. S. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge 1962), p. 291, referring to the *Odyssey* in contrast with the *Iliad*: '. . . the gods are frequently referred to as rewarding the just and punishing the unjust . . . .'; H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1971, 2nd ed. 1983), p. 27: 'He [Zeus] defends the established order (*dike*) by punishing mortals whose injustices disturb it. . . .'

head. Hence we often find such expressions as 'Zeus and other gods'.

The interchangeability of 'Zeus' and 'the gods' is well illustrated in the following passage (*Il.* 3. 318-23):

λαοὶ δ' ἠρήσαντο, θεοῖσι δὲ χεῖρας ἀνέσχον,
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε·
'Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ἴδηθεν μεδέων, κύδιστε μέγιστε,
ὁππότερος τάδε ἔργα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἔθηκε,
τὸν δὸς ἀποφθίμενον δῦναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω,
ἡμῖν δ' αὖ φιλότητα καὶ ὅρκια πιστὰ γενέσθαι.'

We can safely assume that, in effect, the Achaeans and Trojans all prayed to Zeus—above all in the capacity of Horkios—but it did not matter to the poet either to refer to Zeus as himself or as 'the gods'. Similarly we can see 'Zeus' and 'πᾶσι θεοῖσι' exchanged at *Il.* 7. 411-2 and *Od.* 17. 50-1 = 59-60.

Zeus Xeinios

The moral function of the gods, especially Zeus, referred to most often is that of the guardian of hospitality, that of Zeus Xeinios. In the *Iliad*, Menelaus appeals to Zeus Xeinios for the punishment of Paris who betrayed Menelaus' hospitality by abducting Helen (3. 351-4) and rebukes the Trojans for not having feared the wrath of Zeus Xeinios (13. 623-5). This is the ultimate justification for the expedition of the Achaeans, and for which Diomedes can confidently declare that they have come with a god: σὺν γὰρ θεῷ εἰλήλουθμεν (*Il.* 9. 49). They have also been given a good omen at Aulis for the outcome of the war (*Il.* 2. 324-9).[3]

In the *Odyssey,* Zeus as Xeinios is referred to more often. It is said, 'πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες / ξεῖνοί τε πτωχοί τε,' by Nausicaa (6. 207-8) and by Eumaeus (14. 57-8). The latter also says that he entertains his guest (the disguised Odysseus) because 'Δία ξένιον δείσας

[3] A passage quoted by Plato (*Alcib.* ii 149 d) located at *Il.* 8. 550-2 also implies the wrath of the gods at the Trojans being in the wrong:

ἤδειαν· τῆς δ' οὔ τι θεοὶ μάκαρες δατέοντο,
οὐδ' ἔθελον· μάλα γάρ σφιν ἀπήχθετο Ἴλιος ἱρή,
καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐϋμμελίω Πριάμοιο,

though it overgeneralises the situation. Some gods—Apollo, Artemis, Leto, Aphrodite, Ares and Xanthus (cf. *Il.* 20. 38-40), at least—are in favour of the Trojans.

αὐτόν τ' ἐλεαίρων' (14. 389). It is notable that the humanitarian motivation goes side by side with the divine sanction. Similarly, when Menelaus scolds his herald for asking his master whether he should welcome the strangers or send them away, he reminds his herald that they themselves have benefited from the hospitality of others during their journey and hints that Zeus can change their fortune again (*Od.* 4. 31-5). A purely human sense of reciprocity and the fear of divine sanction are seen side by side.

The belief that Zeus protects strangers and guests and punishes those who do not observe the rule of hospitality seems to deter potential offenders. In his false story (but without doubt a credible one), Odysseus, in disguise, says that an Egyptian king protected him because 'Διὸς δ' ὠπίζετο μῆνιν / ξεινίου, ὅς τε μάλιστα νεμεσσᾶται κακὰ ἔργα' (*Od.* 14. 283-4). It is interesting to see here that the authority of Zeus Xeinios is thought to be valid even in non-Greek societies. It is consistent with the recurrent theme of a traveller just arrived in a foreign land wondering if the residents there are 'φιλόξεινοι καί σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής' (*Od.* 6. 121, 9. 176, 13. 202; cf. 8. 576). The phrase virtually equates 'guest-welcoming' to 'god-fearing'. The underlying thought is that travellers are supposed to be protected by the gods everywhere in the world.

When Antinous has thrown a foot-stool at Odysseus (in disguise), Odysseus curses him saying (*Od.* 17. 475-6):

ἀλλ' εἴ που πτωχῶν γε θεοὶ καὶ ἐρινύες εἰσίν,
'Αντίνοον πρὸ γάμοιο τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.

The syntax is conditional, but it obviously alludes to the widely-believed Zeus Xeinios. Therefore this threat is strong enough to make other suitors reproach Antinous (17. 483-7):

'Αντίνο', οὐ μὲν κάλ' ἔβαλες δύστηνον ἀλήτην,
οὐλόμεν', εἰ δή πού τις ἐπουράνιος θεός ἐστι.
καί τε θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι,
παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας,
ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες.

This is one of the most explicit doctrines in Homer of the moral concern of the gods with human behaviour. It must be noted, however, that unlike Eumaeus or Menelaus, the suitors, who do not have the humanitarian motivation to treat visitors kindly, ignore this doctrine, though they are obviously aware of it (17. 485-7). The awe of the gods does not seem to work efficiently without the support of

purely human goodwill. Do the Homeric gods, then, actually walk around in disguise to punish arrogant men, and reward the god-fearing?

After having entertained Odysseus splendidly, the Phaeacians send him home in their ship. Before his departure, they pray to Zeus so that they can safely send him home (*Od.* 13. 51-2), because escorting a guest home is part of good hospitality (cf. *Od.* 8. 544-5, 14. 517, 19. 315-6). On this particular occasion, however, it incurs the wrath of Poseidon for his personal grudge against Odysseus and they are going to be punished for it, and it is, surprisingly for the believers in Zeus Xeinios, on the recommendation of Zeus himself (13. 154-8). Being pious towards Zeus Xeinios does not help them at all.

When Odysseus and his companions have escaped from the cave of the Cyclops, he taunts the giant from his ship now far out at sea (*Od.* 9. 477-9):

καὶ λίην σέ γ' ἔμελλε κιχήσεσθαι κακὰ ἔργα,
σχέτλι', ἐπεὶ ξείνους οὐχ ἅζεο σῷ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ
ἐσθέμεναι· τῷ σε Ζεὺς τίσατο καὶ θεοὶ ἄλλοι.

He says that the Cyclops has been punished by Zeus and other gods. Certainly, he requested hospitality from the Cyclops appealing to the authority of the gods and Zeus Xeinios (*Od.* 9. 269-71). He and his companions also prayed to Zeus when two of their comrades were being eaten by the giant (9. 294-5). However, the poet does not describe Zeus on Mt. Olympus hearing their cry, nor allows Odysseus to have an encouraging omen from the gods. The hero is left completely on his own to overcome this deadly crisis with his own courage, strength and resources. His desperate situation is described most effectively at 9. 295 even as he is praying to Zeus:

ἀμηχανίη δ' ἔχε θυμόν,

which is painfully ironical for the 'πολυμήχανος' Odysseus.[4] There is no sign of divine aid. Odysseus manages to save his companions and himself by his own devices. If he says that Athena may grant him glory (9. 317), that δαίμων gave him great courage (9. 381), or

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[4] But Heubeck looks at the situation from its positive side: 'The mention of ἀμηχανίη . . . in fact prepares the reader to expect a μῆχος (299ff.) from Odysseus, who is never short of ideas (πολυμήχανος).' Cf. ed. A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey II Books IX-XVI* (Oxford 1989) on 9. 295.

the Cyclops was punished by the gods, it only reflects his piety in attributing his hard-won success to them. But we all know that the gods have played no part in this incident. Even Odysseus himself, recalling it later, says to his companions that their successful escape was due to his 'ἀρετή, βουλή and νόος' (*Od.* 12. 211-2) and says to himself—and therefore this must be what he honestly believes—that his 'μῆτις' rescued him out of the cave of the Cyclops (20. 20-1). Moreover, his justifiable defence against the Cyclops' monstrosity incurs the wrath of Poseidon who is going to send him a host of ordeals over ten years. Zeus, though credited by Odysseus for his successful revenge against the Cyclops, is later said by the same hero not to have accepted his thanksgiving but devised the ruin of his ship and companions (9. 550-5). Zeus does nothing which we would expect from a 'moral' god, such as to remind the furious Poseidon that his son not only violated the code of hospitality, but also insulted the gods by boasting that (*Od.* 9. 275-6):

οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχου ἀλέγουσιν
οὐδὲ θεῶν μακάρων, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτεροί εἰμεν.

No human character would be spared from deadly divine punishment for such a boast, as we know well from the examples of Niobe (*Il.* 24. 602-9) and Ajax the son of Oileus (*Od.* 4. 499-510), but the Cyclops appears to be immune from divine anger.[5] He *is* punished only in the eye of Odysseus; the narrative itself, i.e. the omniscient perspective of the poet, does not show us that the Olympian gods are at all interested in telling him off.

Zeus' own son, Heracles, is also said, in the digression to recount the origin of Odysseus' bow, to have killed his guest once (*Od.* 21. 27-8):

ὅς μιν ξεῖνον ἐόντα κατέκτανεν ᾧ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ,
σχέτλιος, οὐδὲ θεῶν ὄπιν αἰδέσατ' οὐδὲ τράπεζαν.

Since the word 'σχέτλιος' often has a reproachful tone,[6] we may

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[5] Another interesting example is Heracles whose case we will examine next. He is not punished for competing with the gods in archery, while another human challenger, Eurytus, is punished by Apollo (*Od.* 8. 224-8).

[6] E.g. *Il.* 5. 403, 'σχέτλιος, ὀβριμοεργός, ...'; *Il.* 8. 361, 'σχέτλιος, αἰὲν ἀλιτρός ...'; *Il.* 16. 203-4, 'σχέτλιε ... νηλεές'; *Il.* 17. 150; *Il.* 24. 33, 'σχέτλιοι, ... δηλήμονες ...'; *Od.* 4. 729, 5. 118, 9. 351, 478, 12. 279, 23. 150. The fact that σχέτλιος is often coupled with other reproachful terms may mean, however, that

take this passage as one of the poet's rare moral comments.[7] Heracles killed his guest in his own house, and it was a monstrous deed. The poet, however, does not tell us that he was punished for it by Zeus Xeinios. Instead, we are told in the *Iliad* that he died due to Hera's wrath, which can be nothing but her old grudge against his mother Alcmene and Zeus' love for her (18. 117-9):

οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ βίη Ἡρακλῆος φύγε κῆρα,
ὅς περ φίλτατος ἔσκε Διὶ Κρονίωνι ἄνακτι·
ἀλλά ἑ μοῖρα δάμασσε καὶ ἀργαλέος χόλος Ἥρης.

We also know that, despite the murder of his guest, he remained 'dearest' to Zeus until the end of his life and even afterwards, because he is now a son-in-law to Hera and raised to the status of divinity, though his ghost is seen by Odysseus in the Underworld (*Od.* 11. 601-4):

Τὸν δὲ μέτ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακλείην,
εἴδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην
παῖδα Διὸς μεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου.

There is, after all, no sign of the wrath and punishment of Zeus Xeinios. Is it not the case, then, that those who would feel indignation at Heracles' behaviour, if any, are only the audience? And the poet knows it. Since the hero is never going to be punished, he has to make his own moral comment (σχέτλιος 21. 28) to satisfy his audience who are apparently more morality-conscious than the Olympian gods.

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the word itself is not necessarily a word of reproach. For an investigation into its origin, see F. E. Horowitz, 'Greek *skhétlios*, Sanskrit *kṣatriyaḥ*, and the Indo-European image of the warrior' in *Studia Linguistica* 29 (1975), 99-109. He suggests on *Il.* 22. 38-45 (p. 103) that '*skhétlios* in this passage means "warrior", in the fullest sense of the word: one who overcomes all resistance, who is restrained by no will but his own, and who is best exemplified by Achilles in the *Iliad*, just as he is by Indra in the *Rigveda*.' See also E. A. Havelock, *The Greek Concept of Justice* (Cambrige, Mass. 1978), p. 183: '... *schetlios* and *atasthalos*, to which it is difficult to attach any consistent meaning more precise than "excessive" or "extravagant", "wanton" or "reckless", or, as we say, "shocking", a term which lacks reference to any objective standard. They denote persons or actions which exceed the bounds of what is allowable.' Tentatively, I translate (when I do) σχέτλιος as 'appalling', 'impossible', etc.

[7] Cf. J. Griffin, 'Homeric words and speakers' in *JHS* 106 (1986), 36-57, 40: '...the word σχέτλιος is in both epics (it occurs 30 times) used 29 times in speeches, as an emotional remonstrance directed by one character to another, and only once in narrative, at *Od.* xxi 28.'

As we have seen from the examples above, the 'moral' record of the 'gods of guests and beggars' is not very impressive. Zeus Xeinios is certainly recognised among men as the protector of guests. The belief usually works as a guarantee of hospitality for visitors to foreign lands, and pious men are grateful to Zeus for his protection. In the narrative, however, we do not see the gods themselves standing up for such blameless hosts as the Phaeacians against Poseidon's personal grudge, nor punishing murderers of their guests, like the Cyclops and Heracles. The only possible example of divine punishment of offenders against ξεινίη are the fall of Troy, though not directly depicted in Homer, as a result of the abduction of Helen by Paris, and Odysseus' successful revenge against the suitors with obvious divine aid (especially from Athena). We will discuss the implications of these instances in detail later (Chapters 2 and 3).

Zeus Hiketesios

Zeus is Hiketesios as well as Xeinios and his functions as one or the other are often overlapping. Odysseus claims that he and his companions are 'ἱκέται' to the Cyclops (*Od.* 9. 269) when he requests ξεινήϊον and says, 'Ζεὺς δ' ἐπιτιμήτωρ ἱκετάων τε ξείνων τε' (270). When Odysseus wakes up on Ithaca and mistakenly thinks that he has been deserted on a foreign land by the Phaeacians, it is to Zeus Hiketesios that he prays for their punishment (*Od.* 13. 213). They have not, of course, deceived him and Zeus is not said to have either heard or ignored the prayer.

Penelope reproaches Antinous at *Od.* 16. 421-32 for two offences against Zeus Hiketesios: he does not care for ἱκέται and he is plotting the murder of the son of Odysseus who once helped Antinous' father as a suppliant. Penelope implies that for a suppliant to be ungrateful to his benefactor is as much against divine law (423 'οὐδ' ὁσίη') as the rejection of suppliants by the supplicated. Her argument does not move the suitors. Neither does Zeus himself show any reaction to the suitors' treatment of 'ἱκέται' except, as in the case of Zeus Xeinios, the fact that they do get killed in the end may be interpreted as their punishment. Whether it can be taken as a divine punishment or not will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Zeus is not the only god in whose name men can supplicate, and other gods may be chosen in accordance with the occasion. For example, Telemachus appeals to the Ithacans to fear the wrath of the gods at the suitors' misdeeds, and to check them from inflicting a

nuisance on his house, by calling upon Zeus and Themis, the goddess of the assembly (*Od.* 2. 66-9; cf. *Il.* 20. 4):

θεῶν δ' ὑποδείσατε μῆνιν,
μή τι μεταστρέψωσιν ἀγασσάμενοι κακὰ ἔργα.
λίσσομαι ἠμὲν Ζηνὸς 'Ολυμπίου ἠδὲ Θέμιστος,
ἥ τ' ἀνδρῶν ἀγορὰς ἠμὲν λύει ἠδὲ καθίζει.

The appeal fails to move the suitors, though it earns pity from the others.

When, as a member of the embassy, Phoenix tries to persuade Achilles to give up his wrath and return to the battle, he appeals to the goddesses called 'Λιταί' whom we do not hear of anywhere else (*Il.* 9. 502-12):

καὶ γάρ τε Λιταί εἰσι Διὸς κοῦραι μεγάλοιο,
χωλαί τε ῥυσαί τε παραβλῶπές τ' ὀφθαλμώ,
αἵ ῥά τε καὶ μετόπισθ' Ἄτης ἀλέγουσι κιοῦσαι.
ἡ δ' Ἄτη σθεναρή τε καὶ ἀρτίπος, οὕνεκα πάσας
πολλὸν ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν
βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· αἱ δ' ἐξακέονται ὀπίσσω.
ὃς μέν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς ἄσσον ἰούσας,
τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καί τ' ἔκλυον εὐχομένοιο·
ὃς δέ κ' ἀνήνηται καί τε στερεῶς ἀποείπῃ,
λίσσονται δ' ἄρα ταί γε Δία Κρονίωνα κιοῦσαι
τῷ Ἄτην ἅμ' ἕπεσθαι, ἵνα βλαφθεὶς ἀποτείσῃ.

Λιταί are certainly novel goddesses, but their identification as 'Zeus' daughters' reveals the nature of this passage. This is only an allegorical or mythological retelling of the good old story of Zeus Hiketesios as the guardian of suppliants.[8] However, whether or not Zeus sends Ἄτη to men as retaliation for the rejection of Λιταί is quite another matter. We will come back to this question as we discuss the function of ἄτη in Chapter 4. Here we can only say that we have no obvious example of Zeus in his own person dispatching Ἄτη to punish those who slighted suppliants.

Although, generally speaking, the gods seem rather slow in hearing the call of suppliants for protection, and therefore can sometimes disappoint them, there is one remarkable example of an immediate

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[8] Scholion bT on 502 gives as one of the possible reasons why the Litai are said to be Zeus' daughters: '. . . διὰ τὸ 'Ζεὺς ἐπιτιμήτωρ ἱκετάων' (ι 270)'. Cf. ed. H. Erbse, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* II (Berlin 1971). This is, in fact, the only example of supplication in the *Iliad* appealing to the authority of Zeus.

divine action in response to human appeal to 'ἱκέτης' status. After drifting in the sea for two days and nights, Odysseus lands on Scheria through the mouth of a river. As he swims into it, he prays to the river-god to accept him as his suppliant (*Od.* 5. 447-50):

αἰδοῖος μέν τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν
ἀνδρῶν ὅς τις ἵκηται ἀλώμενος, ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν
σόν τε ῥόον σά τε γούναθ' ἱκάνω πολλὰ μογήσας.
ἀλλ' ἐλέαιρε, ἄναξ· ἱκέτης δέ τοι εὔχομαι εἶναι.

Then the river checks its stream at once to let him in, without being worried about a possible complaint from Poseidon, or being prompted by Athena who, as we know from the passages before and after this (5. 427, 437, 491, etc.), is apparently accompanying him in secret. Odysseus appeals to the god's sympathy as well as to his status as suppliant. This seems to be a standard tactic of a suppliant, as we see Priam also supplicating to Achilles (*Il.* 24. 503):

ἀλλ' αἰδεῖο θεούς, Ἀχιλεῦ, αὐτόν τ' ἐλέησον.

So, we have at least one clear example of a god caring for suppliants. We do not know for certain, however, that Zeus Hiketesios always stands by suppliants and avenges them on their behalf. It may be as a result of this uncertainty that suppliants appeal to the emotion of those to whom they supplicate, as well as to the authority of Hiketesios.[9]

Zeus Horkios

Another major function of Zeus is that of Horkios, though the title itself is never mentioned in Homer.[10] The Achaeans and the Trojans make a truce before the duel of Menelaus and Paris, sacrificing one sheep each for the Earth, the Sun, and Zeus (*Il.* 3. 103-4), and they pray to Zeus and other gods (*Il.* 3. 107 'Διὸς ὅρκια'; 298 'Zeus and other gods'; 318 'the gods'; 320 'Ζεῦ πάτερ'; for the interchangeability of 'Zeus' and 'the gods' see above). When

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[9] Cf. J. Roisman, 'Some social conventions and deviations in Homeric society', in *Acta Classica* 25 (1982), 35-41; He observes (p. 36): '. . . not every supplication in the epics ended successfully . . . . Nausikaa advised Odysseus to come to Arete as a suppliant. She would help him, he was told, if she liked him (*Od.* 6. 313-5).' 'The success of the supplication, then, was ultimately dependent upon the will of the supplicated.'

[10] But cf. Διὸς ὅρκια *Il.* 3. 107.

Menelaus has been shot by Pandarus and the truce is thereby broken, Agamemnon says that Zeus himself, if not the Achaeans, will destroy Troy for their deception (*Il.* 4. 164-8) and declares that the victory of the Achaeans is now certain (*Il.* 4. 234-9):[11]

> Ἀργεῖοι, μή πώ τι μεθίετε θούριδος ἀλκῆς·
> οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ψευδέσσι πατὴρ Ζεὺς ἔσσετ' ἀρωγός,
> ἀλλ' οἵ περ πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὅρκια δηλήσαντο,
> τῶν ἤτοι αὐτῶν τέρενα χρόα γῦπες ἔδονται,
> ἡμεῖς αὖτ' ἀλόχους τε φίλας καὶ νήπια τέκνα
> ἄξομεν ἐν νήεσσιν, ἐπὴν πτολίεθρον ἕλωμεν.

Since we know the result of the war, it is possible to argue that the Trojans are punished for their breach of the truce, though if Zeus is also Xeinios the city of Troy must have been already condemned by the breach of ξεινίη by Paris. It is certainly possible to argue also that, since the abduction of Helen is in such a remote past, and therefore lacks dramatic immediacy, this episode of the broken truce has been introduced to put the Trojans in the wrong within the scope of the *Iliad.*

On the other hand, if we look at the details of the incident, we are faced with a serious question on the function of Zeus Horkios. After the two armies have prayed to Zeus to make their truce, the poet reports that *Zeus* did not accomplish it (*Il.* 3. 302):

> Ὣς ἔφαν, οὐδ' ἄρα πώ σφιν ἐπεκραίαινε Κρονίων,

and so says Hector at *Il.* 7. 69. Moreover, it is Zeus himself who sends Athena to cause the truce to be broken (*Il.* 4. 68-72). If this is the case, it is impossible to argue with any seriousness that Zeus is the guardian of oaths. Neither does the poet get himself into the absurdity of describing Zeus as being indignant at the breakers of the truce. What we see here is not the portrait of Zeus Horkios as the defender of justice. All we see is the pitiable irony of human beings swearing by Zeus, naively believing that he will protect the honest and punish liars, without knowing that they are being led into their ruin through the tricks of the very same god.

This is the only example of broken oaths in the *Iliad.* The truce for the burial of the dead made at 7. 411-2 is kept in peace. The audience is expected to believe Agamemnon's oath (that he has not laid

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[11] Cf. *Il.* 4. 270-1.

a hand on Briseis) to Zeus, the Earth, the Sun, and the Erinyes (19. 258-65). The oaths to Zeus at 7. 76-86 before the combat between Ajax and Hector, and at 10. 329-31 of Hector concerning the reward to Dolon, both become void because their conditions are never met.

In the *Odyssey*, the most common formula of an oath made to Zeus is to him as Xeinios rather than Horkios (14. 158-9 = 17. 155-6 = 20. 230-1; cf. 19. 303-4):

ἴστω νῦν Ζεὺς πρῶτα θεῶν ξενίη τε τράπεζα
ἱστίη τ' Ὀδυσῆος ἀμύμονος, ἣν ἀφικάνω,

in each case said by a guest of the household of Odysseus. We can assume that guests tend to make an oath to Zeus Xeinios under whose protection they are, rather than the god in any other capacities.

In two other cases of oaths in the *Odyssey*, Zeus is not explicitly called upon. When Telemachus bids Eurycleia to remain silent about his departure from Ithaca, she makes an oath to 'θεοί' (2. 377). When the companions of Odysseus make an oath not to harm the cattle of Helios before landing on their island (and this is going to be the only oath broken in this epic), it is not even said that they have sworn by any divinity (12. 304):

αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥ' ὄμοσάν τε τελεύτησάν τε τὸν ὅρκον,

though we can probably assume that it has been made either to Zeus or the gods in general.

After this oath is broken, i.e. when the companions have slaughtered the cattle and started cooking their meat, there occurs an ominous sign (12. 394-6):

τοῖσιν δ' αὐτίκ' ἔπειτα θεοὶ τέραα προὔφαινον·
ἕρπον μὲν ῥινοί, κρέα δ' ἀμφ' ὀβελοῖσι μεμύκει,
ὀπταλέα τε καὶ ὠμά· βοῶν δ' ὣς γίγνετο φωνή.

This can be taken as a reaction of the gods against the breach of the oath. However, Helios, who is a god of oaths himself, does not seem to be annoyed about the broken oath itself. He appeals to Zeus and other gods for the punishment of Odysseus' companions, not as the breakers of an oath, but as the destroyers of his property (12. 377-83). Zeus promises Helios to smash up their ship (12. 387-8) and he fulfils it (12. 403-19). Later Odysseus says that he was hated by Zeus and Helios (19. 275-6), obviously because of his companions' disastrous feasts, and not because of the breach of their oath

as such, for which Odysseus himself is not responsible. Helios' personal grudge must be the one and sufficient reason for the death of the companions and the wreck of their ship.

In conclusion, we must say that Zeus is not acting as Horkios in Homer at all. It is only men who believe in Zeus and other gods as the guardians of oaths. The gods not only often fail to acknowledge a breach of an oath, but sometimes even provoke it deliberately.[12]

Protection of the dead

Another important function attributed to the gods in general is to protect the dead and secure their right of burial. Homeric man takes the dead seriously, probably much more than we do, because of his awe of the gods as their guardians.[13] Hence, a funeral is a good enough reason for a brief truce (*Il.* 7. 408-13, 24. 656-8). The unburied dead can appear as ghosts to demand their burial as Patroclus' ghost does in Achilles' dream (*Il.* 23. 71). Even if we do not believe in the reality of the ghost in the dream, this episode shows how Achilles conceives the situation of the dead yet unburied. When Odysseus and his companions meet Elpenor's ghost in the Underworld, he also demands his funeral by appealing to the authority of the gods (*Od.* 11. 72-3):

μή μ' ἄκλαυτον ἄθαπτον ἰὼν ὄπιθεν καταλείπειν,
νοσφισθείς, μή τοί τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι.

The gods do seem to be concerned with the right of the dead.

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[12] At the end of the list of μάρτυροι to the oath made by Agamemnon at *Il.* 3. 276-91, we find a pair of chthonic deities who are supposed to punish perjury in the Underworld (278-9): '. . . καὶ οἳ ὑπένερθε καμόντας / ἀνθρώπους τίνυσθον, ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ.' In another oath of the same hero at *Il.* 19. 258-65, the same function is attributed to the Erinyes (259-60): '. . . Ἐρινύες, αἵ θ' ὑπὸ γαῖαν / ἀνθρώπους τίνυνται, ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ.' Punishment after death is testified in *Od.* 11. 576ff., but there is no evidence for punishment of perjury. In a world where the skills of theft and perjury are believed to be divine gifts (*Od.* 19. 395-7), it is difficult to imagine such a fate of liars after death. Can Hermes be so malicious as to lead his protégés to the place of their punishment after their death in his capacity of Psychopompus? In the *Hymn*, he does perjure, but carefully chooses a less significant object (προθύραια) than the Styx as his 'μέγας ὅρκος' (383-4). For the view that the gods do not tolerate perjury, Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 32; M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*^{2} (London 1977), p. 109.

[13] He is, however, almost entirely free from any fear of the dead themselves. Cf. R. S. J. Garland, 'Geras Thanonton: An investigation into the claims of the Homeric dead', *BICS* 29 (1982), 70-1.

Hector, mortally wounded by Achilles, pleads with the victor to return his body to his family for his burial, only to be told that his body will be fed to dogs and birds. To this pitiless reply, Hector warns Achilles (*Il.* 22. 358-60):

φράζεο νῦν, μή τοί τι θεῶν μήνιμα γένωμαι
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε κέν σε Πάρις καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
ἐσθλὸν ἐόντ' ὀλέσωσιν ἐνὶ Σκαιῇσι πύλῃσιν.

Achilles, knowing his fate well himself, is unmoved (365-6) and not affected by the last two lines. However, the first line quoted above soon comes true. When Achilles maltreats Hector's body day after day by dragging it behind his chariot, the gods (except Hera, Athena, and Poseidon) are said to pity Hector and to consider an actual interference (*Il.* 24. 23-4):

τὸν δ' ἐλεαίρεσκον μάκαρες θεοὶ εἰσορόωντες,
κλέψαι δ' ὀτρύνεσκον ἐΰσκοπον Ἀργειφόντην.

Apollo, the constant patron of Hector, is, of course, furious (24. 33ff.) and says Achilles should fear the gods' wrath (24. 53-4):

μὴ ἀγαθῷ περ ἐόντι νεμεσσηθέωμέν οἱ ἡμεῖς·
κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων.

By this Zeus, if not Hera, is moved, and he summons Thetis to Olympus and bids her carry his message to Achilles that the gods, especially Zeus himself, are angry at him (24. 113-5; cf. 134-6):

σκύζεσθαί οἱ εἰπὲ θεούς, ἐμὲ δ' ἔξοχα πάντων
ἀθανάτων κεχολῶσθαι, ὅτι φρεσὶ μαινομένῃσιν
Ἕκτορ' ἔχει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν οὐδ' ἀπέλυσεν.

Meanwhile, Hector's body is protected from decay by Apollo (24. 18-21, 411-23). Priam, on the way to Achilles' hut to ransom his son's body, is delighted to hear it, and he knows the reason for the miracle—the abundant offerings Hector used to make to the gods. Talking to the bearer of the news, he says (24. 425-7):

ὦ τέκος, ἦ ῥ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐναίσιμα δῶρα διδοῦναι
ἀθανάτοις, ἐπεὶ οὔ ποτ' ἐμὸς πάϊς, εἴ ποτ' ἔην γε,
λήθετ' ἐνὶ μεγάροισι θεῶν, οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσι.

And he is right. It is exactly for this reason that Zeus decides to intervene in this affair against Hera's argument that Hector's τιμή is not as great as Achilles' (24. 66-70):

οὐ μὲν γὰρ τιμή γε μί' ἔσσεται· ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἕκτωρ
φίλτατος ἔσκε θεοῖσι βροτῶν οἳ ἐν Ἰλίῳ εἰσίν·
ὣς γὰρ ἔμοιγ', ἐπεὶ οὔ τι φίλων ἡμάρτανε δώρων.
οὐ γάρ μοί ποτε βωμὸς ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς ἐΐσης,
λοιβῆς τε κνίσης τε· τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς.[14]

This, however, is a limiting factor of the gods' moral function. It seems to imply that they do not protect *all* the dead, but only the ones from whom they have received a lot of gifts. The complication here is that the gifts themselves are not always the guarantee of divine favour, because the gods can ignore, or refuse to receive, the gifts if they happen to hate the one who offers them (cf. *Il.* 6. 311, *Il.* 8. 550-2). All we can say for sure is that the gods do care for the dead whom they like. The best example is the special treatment of the body of Sarpedon. It is treated by Apollo and carried off to Lycia by Sleep and Death by the order of the hero's father Zeus (*Il.* 16. 666-83).

In one striking example, the paradeigma of Niobe recounted by Achilles to Priam, the gods are said to have buried the bodies of the Niobids by themselves after the bodies had been lying unburied for nine days (*Il.* 24. 612). It was, however, because of Zeus, who had changed the people into stones, that the bodies remained unburied (610-1) and, no doubt, this was an intended delay to increase the mother's woe as punishment. Therefore, the burial by the gods here should simply mean the termination of their anger—as that of Achilles' with which it is compared[15]—rather than their favour. This example only illustrates the fact that the gods can deprive the dead of the right of burial or restore it, as they please.

It may be because of this uncertainty in the gods' protection of the dead as well as of suppliants that Priam appeals to both the gods' wrath and human feeling when he pleads with Achilles to release Hector's body, as we have already seen (*Il.* 24. 503-4):

ἀλλ' αἰδεῖο θεούς, Ἀχιλεῦ, αὐτόν τ' ἐλέησον,
μνησάμενος σοῦ πατρός·

and it proves to be a successful move. Achilles was more moved by

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[14] Cf. 22. 170-2.

[15] For this point of comparison, cf. J. T. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (New York and London 1987), p. 102 (Chapter IV: The myth of Niobe in Ω).

Priam's sorrow as a father than by the divine instruction.[16] Achilles offers hospitality to the king of Troy purely out of his sympathy, not prompted by Zeus' message through Thetis.

Here again, the gods seem rather unreliable. But, as in the case of Eumaeus as a host, the awe of the gods works best side by side with human sympathy which has basically nothing to do with the gods.[17]

Zeus, δίκη and θέμις

Zeus is concerned with human justice more directly, in a sense, as the patron of kings whose obligation it is to uphold δίκη and θέμις. Men in Homer in general seem to believe that the gods are the guardians of justice, as we can see from the view of Eumaeus (*Od.* 14. 83-4):

> οὐ μὲν σχέτλια ἔργα θεοὶ μάκαρες φιλέουσιν,
> ἀλλὰ δίκην τίουσι καὶ αἴσιμα ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων.

By saying 'σχέτλια ἔργα', he is referring to the conduct of the suitors in Odysseus' house, and if indeed we could see the Olympian gods disgusted at the suitors' behaviour, and punishing them, we would have the strongest evidence for their concern with human justice. We will investigate this matter in Chapter 3 as we have already promised in our examination of the function of Zeus as Xeinios.

Another passage suggesting Zeus' concern with δίκη is in Nestor's words. He attributes the cause of the disaster which the Achaeans met on their way home to the gods' wrath (*Od.* 3. 130-5):

> αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ Πριάμοιο πόλιν διεπέρσαμεν αἰπήν,
> βῆμεν δ' ἐν νήεσσι, θεὸς δ' ἐκέδασσεν 'Αχαιούς,
> καὶ τότε δὴ Ζεὺς λυγρὸν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μήδετο νόστον
> 'Αργείοις, ἐπεὶ οὔ τι νοήμονες *οὐδὲ δίκαιοι*
> πάντες ἔσαν· τῶ σφεων πολέες κακὸν οἶτον ἐπέσπον
> μήνιος ἐξ ὀλοῆς γλαυκώπιδος ὀβριμοπάτρης.

He thinks that Zeus made the Achaeans suffer because 'not all of them were behaving according to δίκη (οὐ δίκαιοι)', alluding to the rape of Cassandra by Ajax the son of Oileus—hence Athena's

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[16] Cf. *Il.* 24. 507, 511, 518-21; See also C. M. Macleod, ***Homer: Iliad: Book** XXIV* (Cambridge 1982) on 518-51: 'Achilles' first words are an expression of the wonder described at 480-4 and also a warmly felt response to Priam's speech.'

[17] Cf. Garland, *BICS* 29 (1982), 71.

wrath.[18] In this case, however, Athena's initiative seems to override the function of Zeus as the god of justice. At any rate, Zeus' intervention in the matter is only Nestor's guess, and apparently he himself does not find this 'punishment' fair, because shortly afterwards, he uses a reproachful term for Zeus' management of the fate of the Achaeans (*Od.* 3. 160-1):[19]

Ζεὺς δ' οὔ πω μήδετο νόστον,
σχέτλιος, ὅς ῥ' ἔριν ὦρσε κακὴν ἔπι δεύτερον αὖτις.

When suggesting the negotiation with Achilles through an embassy, Nestor starts his speech by saying that Zeus entrusted Agamemnon with the sceptre and 'θέμιστες' (*Il.* 9. 96-9):

'Ατρεΐδη κύδιστε, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν 'Αγάμεμνον,
ἐν σοὶ μὲν λήξω, σέο δ' ἄρξομαι, οὕνεκα πολλῶν
λαῶν ἐσσι ἄναξ καί τοι Ζεὺς ἐγγυάλιξε
σκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνα σφίσι βουλεύῃσθα.

Achilles also, when talking about the sceptre, says that Zeus entrusts kings with θέμιστες (*Il.* 1. 237-9):

νῦν αὐτέ μιν υἷες 'Αχαιῶν
ἐν παλάμῃς φορέουσι δικασπόλοι, οἵ τε θέμιστας
πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται.

Such is the origin of kingship as seen by human characters. However, a king's prestige seems to rest on his honour and power rather than his behaviour. For example, in *Iliad* Book 1, Nestor tries to persuade Achilles, now terribly angry at Agamemnon, not to quarrel with the king, appealing to the Zeus-given authority of kings (1. 278-9):

οὔ ποθ' ὁμοίης ἔμμορε τιμῆς
σκηπτοῦχος βασιλεύς, ᾧ τε Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν.

Agamemnon's prestige is exceptionally great because his sceptre is literally handed down to him from Zeus through his ancestors (*Il.* 2. 101-7). And this is unaffected by his wrong deed.

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[18] Scholia HEV and Eustathius think that other Achaeans are found guilty of not checking Ajax from the deed, while Scholion Q thinks that they are simply considered collectively responsible for the crime of Ajax alone; cf. ed. C. W. Dindorf, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam* (Oxford 1855) and Eustathius, *Commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam* (Leipzig 1825), ad loc.

[19] For σχέτλιος, see n. 6 above.

When Odysseus checks the Achaeans from rushing towards their ships to go home, he says that kings' τιμή derives from Zeus and threatens them with the kings' fierce anger exercised through their authority:

θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων,
τιμὴ δ' ἐκ Διός ἐστι, φιλεῖ δέ ἑ μητίετα Ζεύς. (*Il.* 2. 196-7)

οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω,
εἷς βασιλεύς, ᾧ δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω
σκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνα σφίσι βουλεύῃσι. (*Il.* 2. 204-6)

But does Zeus actually take action against the breach of θέμις or against unjust kings?

There is a much discussed passage in a simile in which Zeus appears to show his concern with θέμιστες and δίκη (*Il.* 16. 384-8):

ὡς δ' ὑπὸ λαίλαπι πᾶσα κελαινὴ βέβριθε χθὼν
ἤματ' ὀπωρινῷ, ὅτε λαβρότατον χέει ὕδωρ
Ζεύς, ὅτε δή ῥ' ἄνδρεσσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνῃ,
οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας,
ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι, θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.

This has often been discussed as the only example of Zeus' indignation at human injustice expressed in the narrative. Because the lines 387-8 seem very similar to *Opera* 218-21, interpolation or Hesiodean influence has been suspected.[20]

However, there is nothing un-Homeric about the picture of Zeus given there, if we compare it with another one showing him as a weather god raging over the misconduct of men. When the Achaeans

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[20] Interpolation is suspected by P. von der Mühll, *Kritisches Hypomnema zur Ilias* (Basel 1952), p. 247; H. Munding, 'Die Bewertung der Rechtsidee in der Ilias', *Philologus* 105 (1961), 161ff., 106 (1962) 60ff.; F. Krafft, *Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod* (Göttingen 1963), p. 77, n. 1; W. Leaf in his comment on 387-8. Hesiodean influence is suggested by Wilamowitz, *Hesiodos: Erga* (Berlin 1928), p. 66; Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 52, n. 16; M. M. Willcock, *The Iliad of Homer* XIII-XXIV (Hampshire and London 1984), on 387, 'The thought is closer to Hesiod than to Homer.' Eustathius only says, on 388, 'Hesiod also has much to say about this sort of injustice. . .' Among those who consider it genuine but 'new' or 'unique': K. Latte, 'Schuld und Sünde in der griechischen Religion', *ARW* 20 (1920/1), 259 = *Kleine Schriften*, 6 (with n. 8); P. Chantraine, 'Le divin et les dieux chez Homère' in *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens* Tome I (1952), 75-6; W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greeks and their gods* (London 1950), p. 125. Against them, H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, p. 6 says, '. . . the doctrines expressed in the simile of the flood and in the speech of Phoenix are in fact perfectly consistent with the theology of the *Iliad* as a whole.' For my own view, see Chapter 5.

have built their fortification without offering hecatombs to the gods, he is said to thunder all night long (*Il.* 7. 476-81):

παννύχιοι μὲν ἔπειτα κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοὶ
δαίνυντο, Τρῶες δὲ κατὰ πτόλιν ἠδ' ἐπίκουροι·
παννύχιος δέ σφιν κακὰ μήδετο μητίετα Ζεὺς
σμερδαλέα κτυπέων· τοὺς δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ᾗρει·
οἶνον δ' ἐκ δεπάων χαμάδις χέον, οὐδέ τις ἔτλη
πρὶν πιέειν, πρὶν λεῖψαι ὑπερμενέϊ Κρονίωνι.

This is Zeus' reaction towards men who have forgotten the formalities due to the gods.[21] And observing offerings and libations due to the gods is exactly what Homeric men will consider the most important θέμις. Therefore, we can count this passage as the second example of Zeus' concern with θέμις. As for the first example here, however, we do not know what sort of δίκη and θέμιστες are in question. As we will see later these two terms can signify even quite 'immoral' customs as well. We shall come back to the passage and its interpretation in Chapter 5.

Murder and adultery

Lastly, let us briefly see the gods' reaction towards murder and adultery. In biblical morality, 'Thou shalt not kill' is one of the principal articles of God-given law. In Homer, on the contrary, murder itself does not normally attract anything more serious than fines or banishment, still less divine punishment.[22] The only exception is the episode of Meleager. We are told that his mother cursed him, calling upon Hades and Persephone, for murdering her brother, and that the Erinyes heard her prayer (*Il.* 9. 566-72; the punishment itself is not described). Similarly, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery' does not seem to be a god-given moral code in Homer.[23] We all know that Zeus himself is a regular adulterer. In this case again, we have one exception involving the Erinyes: Phoenix's father cursed

[21] Others consider the storm to be the god's warning for the coming day's battle, either for both the Achaeans and Trojans (Leaf 1900, on 7. 478, Eustathius on 7. 476-81) or for the Achaeans alone (Willcock, *The Iliad of Homer* I-XII, 1978, on 478).

[22] Cf. J. Roisman, *Acta Classica* 25 (1982), 38-40.

[23] Neither is 'Thou shalt not steal' divine law, since Hermes himself is the god of thieves. Autolycus, endowed by Hermes with the mastery of thieving and swearing (*Od.* 19. 395-7), knows, however, that stealing and lying invites the grudge of men, if not divine anger (*Od.* 19. 407-8).

his son for having relations with his concubine, calling upon the Erinyes and the gods; Hades and Persephone are the executors this time (*Il.* 9. 456-7). We can conclude from these cases that the gods normally do not punish murderers and adulterers, unless it involves one's senior family members and the latter appeal to the gods for retaliation.

There is one possible example of the gods' disapproval of atrocious weapons. In the story told by Mentes-Athena, it is said that Odysseus asked Ilus for the poison to smear on his arrows, but the latter did not give it to him, 'because he feared (νεμεσίζετο) the gods' (*Od.* 1. 260-3). It testifies to the belief that the gods can be angered by a cruel method of killing even on the battlefield. However, we are told in the very next line that Mentes' father gave it to him instead and evidently did not invite divine anger after all. We again fail to trace the sign of divine concern here.

So far, our impression is that the gods' moral functions do not meet much of human expectation. The only definite instance of divine concern with morality (respect for suppliants) is the prompt reaction of an anonymous river-god to Odysseus' prayer. As for the morality of men, especially when hospitality and supplication are concerned, a purely human sense of sympathy plays an important role along with the fear of divine sanction. Pious Homeric men seem to believe in the gods' morality, sometimes much more than the latter deserve, as we have seen in the case of Odysseus' escape from the Cyclops' cave and the breach of the truce prompted by Zeus.[24]

However, we are left with the following possible cases of the gods' moral concern to be examined in detail:

1. the fall of Troy
   divine punishment of the offenders against ξεινίη?
2. the death of the suitors
   divine punishment of the offenders against ξεινίη and δίκη?
3. Phoenix' allegory
   Is Ἄτη the punishment of those who reject suppliants?
4. the rain-storm of Zeus
   his indignation at 'crooked judgements' by men?

We will discuss these questions in the following chapters.

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[24] Cf. T. J. Saunders, *Plato's Penal Code* (Oxford 1991), pp. 38-9: '. . . obviously the belief is based on wishful thinking rather than hard evidence (p. 38)'.

CHAPTER TWO

THE FALL OF TROY

Paris and Helen

There is no question about the direct cause of the Trojan war. The abduction of Helen by Paris is repeatedly alluded to as the cause by a number of characters (*Il.* 2. 161-2, 356[1], 3. 100, 136-8, 156-7, 351-2, 6. 328, 355-6, 19. 324-5, 22. 114-6, 24. 763-4, *Od.* 4. 145-6, 11. 438, 17. 118-9, 22. 227-9) and once by the poet (*Il.* 24. 28).

Naturally, the pair are much resented by both the Achaeans and the Trojans, especially by the latter whose city threatens to be destroyed by the war. The hatred of both parties is expressed most strongly when Paris has disappeared in the middle of the combat with Menelaus and nobody can find him (*Il.* 3. 453-4):

οὐ μὲν γὰρ φιλότητί γ' ἐκεύθανον, εἴ τις ἴδοιτο·
ἶσον γάρ σφιν πᾶσιν ἀπήχθετο κηρὶ μελαίνῃ.

Even his brother Hector wishes that Paris had never been born (*Il.* 3. 40) or that he dies immediately (*Il.* 6. 281-2).[2] Although we know that his brotherly love would not let him hate Paris completely, these wishes do contain some profound bitterness. Unlike Hector, whose strong sense of responsibility for the Trojans will lead him to his suicidal encounter with Achilles, Paris does not take his responsibility seriously (cf. *Il.* 6. 523-5). He tries to hide away from Menelaus (*Il.* 3. 30-2) and just after having escaped from the single combat with Menelaus by a divine hand, he fancies nothing but making love with Helen (*Il.* 3. 441-6). He stubbornly refuses to return Helen when there still seems to be some hope of saving Troy by doing so (*Il.* 7. 362). Helen knows his character well by now and bitterly complains about it (*Il.* 6. 350-1):

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[1] I take "Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε' as 'struggles and groans of the Achaeans *because of* Helen', with Aristarchus and others. Cf. ed. H. Erbse, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, ad loc.; ed. W. Leaf, *The Iliad*[2], ad loc.; G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, ad loc.

[2] 3. 40 ἄγονος = unborn. Cf. Leaf, ad loc.

ἀνδρὸς ἔπειτ' ὤφελλον ἀμείνονος εἶναι ἄκοιτις,
ὃς ᾔδη νέμεσίν τε καὶ αἴσχεα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων.

Paris does not seem to have any sense of guilt at all about the disaster he has brought to his city and, although the audience knows his end, there is no prospect or recollection of divine punishment of the person of Paris in the epics of Homer.[3]

Helen herself is far more regretful than Paris about the consequences of their marriage. By the time in which the *Iliad* is set, i.e. the last year of the war, she has started longing to go back to Sparta (*Il.* 3. 139-40, *Od.* 4. 259-61). She is fully aware of her responsibility for the catastrophic war and the thought, as well as the hostility of the Trojans (*Il.* 24. 768-75), seems to torment her (*Il.* 3. 176 τὸ καὶ κλαίουσα τέτηκα). Whenever she talks about the war, the epithet she gives herself is the 'bitch' (*Il.* 6. 344, 356, *Od.* 4. 145) and, unlike Paris, it is she herself who often wishes she had died before all this happened (*Il.* 3. 173-4, 6. 345-8, 24. 764). Even the web she is weaving depicts the battle between the Achaeans and the Trojans (*Il.* 3. 125-8). No doubt she cannot get it out of her head at any time.[4]

It may be because of this deep regret that she gets more sympathetic treatment than Paris at least from Priam (*Il.* 3. 164-5) and Hector (*Il.* 24. 767-72). And later, after all, she will be welcomed in Menelaus' house again as a happy wife. She is not punished in any obvious way, but suffers only from her own regret.

The Olympian scenario

It is, however, not only this 'naughty pair' who are blamed for causing the war. The gods' hands are lurking behind the scene already when a carpenter builds ships for Paris to visit Sparta (*Il.* 5. 62-4):

ὃς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τεκτήνατο νῆας ἐΐσας
ἀρχεκάκους, αἳ πᾶσι κακὸν Τρώεσσι γένοντο
οἷ τ' αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶ οὔ τι *θεῶν ἐκ θέσφατα* ᾔδη.

The gods' ultimate responsibility for causing the war is felt by both parties involved. It is stated by Priam (*Il.* 3. 164-5), Helen (*Il.* 6.

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3 Except the comment of Helen at *Il.* 6. 353.

4 Cf. C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition*, pp. 117-8: 'Helen's great web is woven with pictures of the war for her sake, and becomes in an instant the symbol of her self-conscious greatness and guilt, paralleling her speeches to Hector, Priam, and Aphrodite.'

349), Achilles (*Il.* 24. 547-8), Telemachus (*Od.* 1. 348 'Ζεὺς αἴτιος', 17. 119), Alcinous (*Od.* 8. 579-80), and Sirens (*Od.* 12. 189-90). Looking back to the incident ten years after the war, Helen says that she left her home and family because of the 'ἄτη' sent by Aphrodite (*Od.* 4. 261). Penelope also sees a god's hand and 'ἄτη' at work in the shameless flight of Helen (*Od.* 23. 222-4).

On the other hand, when we turn our eyes to Olympian scenes, we see the complexity of contending divine interests. Hera and Athena are the principal contrivers of the fall of Troy (*Il.* 4. 20-1, 8. 457-8, 448-9, 18. 364-7). They have even sworn never to save the Trojans under any circumstances (*Il.* 20. 313-7). Troy falls with the trick of the wooden horse inspired by Athena (*Il.* 15. 70-1, *Od.* 8. 493, cf. 13. 386-8) and the Achaeans win the final battle with her aid (*Od.* 8. 519-20). When the two armies have made the truce, it is Hera who angrily opposes the idea of saving Troy by letting the truce be accomplished (*Il.* 4. 25-9). We know the reason for the hatred of the two goddesses, that is, the judgement of Paris alluded to at *Il.* 24. 29-30.

On the other hand, Zeus, who is supposed to be ultimately responsible for the destiny of Troy, is in fact reluctant to destroy the city as he says in his reply to Hera's protest against the truce criticising her (*Il.* 4. 31-8):

δαιμονίη, τί νύ σε Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες
τόσσα κακὰ ῥέζουσιν, ὅ τ' ἀσπερχὲς μενεαίνεις
Ἰλίου ἐξαλαπάξαι ἐϋκτίμενον πτολίεθρον;
εἰ δὲ σύ γ' εἰσελθοῦσα πύλας καὶ τείχεα μακρὰ
ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον Πριάμοιό τε παῖδας
ἄλλους τε Τρῶας, τότε κεν χόλον ἐξακέσαιο.
ἕρξον ὅπως ἐθέλεις· μὴ τοῦτό γε νεῖκος ὀπίσσω
σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ μέγ' ἔρισμα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι γένηται.

And he goes on to say that since he has yielded to Hera's request this time, she should give way in her turn when he wishes to destroy her favourite city (40-3). Troy is Zeus' favourite, because it is a generous giver of offerings to him (44-9):

αἳ γὰρ ὑπ' ἠελίῳ τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἀστερόεντι
ναιετάουσι πόληες ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
τάων μοι περὶ κῆρι τιέσκετο Ἴλιος ἱρὴ
καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐϋμμελίω Πριάμοιο.
οὐ γάρ μοί ποτε βωμὸς ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς ἐΐσης,
λοιβῆς τε κνίσης τε· τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς.

Therefore, the Olympian scenario of the Trojan war we see here can be summarised as follows: Paris, the prince of Troy, hurt the personal pride of Hera and Athena. As the two goddesses demanded retaliation, Zeus reluctantly arranged to destroy the city of Troy.

The plan of Zeus

But that is not all that Homer tells us about Zeus' motivation. Here we must examine the much discussed phrase 'Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή' in the opening sentence of the *Iliad* (1. 1-7):

Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά, Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος
οὐλομένην, ἣ μυρί' Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε' ἔθηκε,
πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν
ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν
οἰωνοῖσί τε πᾶσι, *Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή*,
ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε
Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.

'What is this plan of Zeus?', asks G. S. Kirk as he summarises the problem and gives his answer, 'Probably, as Aristarchus seems to have argued (Arn/A supplemented by D), that implied by Zeus's promise to Thetis at 1. 524-30 to avenge the slight on her son Akhilleus by favouring the Trojans. Aristarchus (Arn/A) also criticized the 'fictions' of recent critics, οἱ νεώτεροι, chiefly perhaps the idea that Zeus's plan in the *Iliad* was identical with that signified by the same phrase in the post-Homeric *Cypria*, frag. 1. 7, namely to lighten the over-burdened earth by means of heavy casualties at Troy.'[5]

Within the scope of the *Iliad*, Aristarchus may seem right. The same word 'βουλή' is repeated at the beginning of Book 2 where Zeus decides on the plan to fulfil his promise to Thetis (1. 537, 540, 2. 4, and in the plural 'βουλαί' at 15. 53-70, though his plans here extend to the fall of Troy itself. Cf. also 8. 370). However, the 'βουλή' of Zeus as the cause of the war is not itself entirely post-Homeric, if we take the Odyssean example of 'Zeus' plans' into our consideration. In Phaeacia, Demodocus the bard sings the episode of the quarrel between Odysseus and Achilles which pleased Agamemnon, because it had been prophesied as a good omen (*Od.* 8. 73-82). The passage closes as follows (79-82):

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[5] Cf. Kirk's note on 1. 5; U.v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die Ilias und Homer* (Berlin 1916), p. 245.

ὡς γάρ οἱ χρείων μυθήσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
Πυθοῖ ἐν ἠγαθέῃ, ὅθ' ὑπέρβη λάϊνον οὐδὸν
χρησόμενος· τότε γάρ ῥα κυλίνδετο πήματος ἀρχὴ
Τρωσί τε καὶ Δαναοῖσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλάς.

According to this account, 'Zeus' plans'—whatever they are—had already been laid down at the preparatory stage of the expedition. Since they are plural 'plans' it is more difficult to reduce them into one particular plan such as his promise to Thetis. They may include a number of casualties, the destruction of Troy, and even the hardship suffered by the Achaeans on their way and at home. Precisely because this passage is *not* in the *Iliad*, the narrative can put the war in a broader perspective possible only in retrospect to human eyes. All is done—and as they look back, men can only say that everything, after all, was Zeus' plan.[6] The breach of oaths, the abduction of Helen, the judgement of Paris . . . each of these events is a candidate for 'the cause' of the fall of Troy, but the whole plan of Zeus never fits within the human sense of morality. If all of these were prompted by some gods, all within the plan of Zeus, there is no point in arguing that the fall of Troy is the punishment of the Trojans for such and such a deed. Zeus' function is much more complicated, and his plan much more long-termed, than just to prompt or punish a wrongdoing or two.

Troy in its 'historical' context

This view is further confirmed by putting Troy in its 'historical' context. The current war is not the first Trojan war. The city was once attacked and sacked by Heracles because its former king Laomedon rudely refused to give his horses to Heracles after the latter had done some service for him (*Il.* 5. 638-42, 648-51, 14. 250-1). The king had treated even the gods, Poseidon and Apollo, in the same insolent manner; Poseidon (and Apollo at *Il.* 7. 452) built the city wall of Troy of which the god is still proud, despite his hatred towards the Trojans (*Il.* 7. 452-3, 21. 446-7), and Apollo herded the king's cattle

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[6] Cf. J. Irmscher, *Götterzorn bei Homer*, p. 47, n. 3: 'Ich möchte trotz Wilamowitz, *Die Ilias und Homer*, 1916, 245, daran glauben, daß der Hörer der Ilias etwas von der Sage um einen großen Zeusplan zur Dezimierung des Menschengeschlechtes gewußt hat, den Proklos am Ende seines Kyprienexzerptes angibt (fr. 1 Bethe: Homer, II, 1922, 154).' In the same perspective, Euripides employs both interpretations of 'Διὸς βουλεύματα' in *Helen* 35-6, namely, to lighten the overburdened earth and to make Achilles famous (38-41).

(21. 448-9), only to be unrewarded and driven away by the king's threat (21. 450-7). The sack of Troy by Heracles, however, must be considered his personal vengeance rather than the consequence of the general anger of the gods because, despite this cheating by Laomedon, Apollo has remained favourable towards the Trojans, a fact mysterious to Poseidon (21. 441-3) as well as to the audience. Moreover, Troy has been reinhabited since then and is flourishing again. The last blow to the city, even if it was a divine punishment, was not meant to terminate the life of the city entirely. The same is true with the current crisis.[7] As we can overhear from the Olympian conversation over Aeneas, who must be rescued from the hands of Achilles, the coming fall of Troy is not the end of it either (*Il.* 20. 300-8):

ἀλλ' ἄγεθ' ἡμεῖς πέρ μιν ὑπὲκ θανάτου ἀγάγωμεν,
μή πως καὶ Κρονίδης κεχολώσεται, αἴ κεν Ἀχιλλεὺς
τόνδε κατακτείνῃ· μόριμον δέ οἵ ἐστ' ἀλέασθαι,
ὄφρα μὴ ἄσπερμος γενεὴ καὶ ἄφαντος ὄληται
Δαρδάνου, ὃν Κρονίδης περὶ πάντων φίλατο παίδων,
οἳ ἕθεν ἐξεγένοντο γυναικῶν τε θνητάων.
ἤδη γὰρ Πριάμου γενεὴν ἤχθηρε Κρονίων·
νῦν δὲ δὴ Αἰνείαο βίη Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει
καὶ παίδων παῖδες, τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται.

We are not told why Zeus hates 'Priam's lineage'—perhaps because of the insolent Laomedon, or because of Paris, or it may only reflect Hera's vote against Priam's family (this word is addressed to Hera, after all). In any case, Zeus' far-reaching plan is laid out already for the re-establishment of the future Troy. Such is the complexity of the 'plan' of Zeus. Within this grand scheme, it is obvious that the fall of Troy is nothing as simple as a punishment for a crime, but an event in the course of history designed far beyond human expectations by Zeus as the distributor of fate.[8]

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[7] We can catch a glimpse of the last day of Troy, on fire from top to bottom (*Il.* 21. 374-6, 22. 410-1). But we are also told what will happen after the war. The gods will completely destroy the fortification built by the Achaeans, a gloomy reminder of the war, to restore the peaceful landscape of Troad (*Il.* 7. 458-63, 12. 17-33) and the glory of the Trojan wall built by Poseidon and Apollo (*Il.* 7. 452-3).

[8] For the relationship between Zeus (and other gods) and fate, see Chapters 6 and 7.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DEATH OF THE SUITORS

Crimes of the suitors

Since there can be no 'punishment' without crimes, let us first recount what sort of crimes the suitors have committed in the house of Odysseus. Most of the charges are listed in Odysseus' angry declaration of his revenge against the suitors (*Od.* 22. 35-41):

ὦ κύνες, οὔ μ' ἔτ' ἐφάσκεθ' ὑπότροπον οἴκαδ' ἱκέσθαι
δήμου ἄπο Τρώων, ὅτι μοι κατεκείρετε οἶκον,
δμῳῇσιν δὲ γυναιξὶ παρευνάζεσθε βιαίως,
αὐτοῦ τε ζώοντος ὑπεμνάασθε γυναῖκα,
οὔτε θεοὺς δείσαντες, οἳ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν,
οὔτε τιν' ἀνθρώπων νέμεσιν κατόπισθεν ἔσεσθαι·
νῦν ὑμῖν καὶ πᾶσιν ὀλέθρου πείρατ' ἐφῆπται.

The order of the charges seems to follow the magnitude of actual damage done to Odysseus and his house. The consumption of his property, obviously the most serious material damage, is listed first. It is specially documented by the poet at 14. 13-20, namely, only 360 males against 600 females in Eumaeus' stock of hogs. Eumaeus gives a complete list of livestock of Odysseus (100-4) and the pace of consumption (93-4, 105-8).

This accusation, however, by no means calls for the death penalty on its own. The suitors can make amends for the loss, and they do offer to do so at the last moment (22. 55-9). Odysseus' reply to the offer shows that it is no longer a matter of accountancy (22. 61-4). The reason for the deadly vengeance must be sought elsewhere.

The second charge concerns their relations with Odysseus' slave-women (37). Its psychological implications are easy to see. It is an obvious insult to the queen who should be the only woman the suitors are in love with and, in any case, it is shameless and outrageous conduct (cf. 19. 92 μέγα ἔργον; 22. 424 ἀναιδείη).

Beside that, however, there is a more serious social implication in the conduct. As is clear from many examples in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the master of the household—and he only—has the right to have intercourse with his slave-women, because they are potential

mothers of his heir or even potential wives (e.g. Briseis at *Il.* 19. 297-9; the mother of Megapenthes, the heir to Menelaus at *Od.* 4. 11-2). Therefore, the suitors' affairs with the slave-women of Odysseus are an intrusion into his patriarchal right and a threat to his lineage (hence those women must be disposed of afterwards). A suitor would be allowed to sleep with slave-women only after he has won the hand of the queen.

This charge on its own, however, is not quite enough to justify the murder of *all* the suitors. After all, the slaves are just another sort of livestock. As we see from the compensation offered by Agamemnon to Achilles for his heartache for Briseis which includes seven slave-women (*Il.* 9. 128, 638), 'damage' done to slave-women can be compensated by giving a larger number of women back under normal circumstances.[1] Even if it is not acceptable, the charge applies only to a relatively small number of the suitors. Even such 'reasonable' suitors as Amphinomus (18. 125) and Leodes (21. 146-7, 22. 313-9) are not spared. This charge, therefore, cannot be the decisive reason for the death of all the suitors.

Their proposal to Penelope comes next (38). It is not listed first, no doubt, because it has not yielded any actual result as yet, and also because there is basically nothing criminal about courting Penelope *provided that her husband is dead.*[2] Penelope's remarriage was recommended even by Odysseus himself before he left for Troy (18. 269-70), by her parents (19. 158-9), and by Telemachus (19. 533-4, 20. 341-2), and she is considering it seriously herself (16. 73-7, 19. 524-9). From the suitors' point of view, the fault is entirely on Penelope's side. If she had chosen her new husband promptly, there would have been no waste of property over the years, nor tearful nights. It was only her love that prolonged the suffering of the house of Odysseus. Things went wrong for the suitors only because Odysseus was *alive*—a fact not known for certain by anybody. In fact, their proposal to Penelope was the only acceptable excuse for lingering in the house of Odysseus (21. 70-2). Therefore this cannot be the principal reason for their death either.

The general statement in the following two lines (39-40) that the suitors did not fear the gods or the anger of the people, probably refers to their rude and sometimes violent treatment of the visitors

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1 Note the scornful comment of Ajax, 'Just for one girl' (9. 637-8).

2 Contrast 'αὐτοῦ ζώοντος' (38).

to the house of Odysseus and their plot to murder Telemachus. For example, after killing the suitors, Odysseus says (22. 413-6):

τούσδε δὲ μοῖρ' ἐδάμασσε θεῶν καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα·
οὔ τινα γὰρ τίεσκον ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ὅτις σφέας εἰσαφίκοιτο·
τῷ καὶ ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐπέσπον.

He thinks that their treatment of ξεῖνοι is the cause of their ruin brought to them by the μοῖρα of the gods.

Likewise, Penelope, without yet believing that it is her long-awaited husband who has killed the suitors, says (23. 63-6):

ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτων κτεῖνε μνηστῆρας ἀγαυούς,
ὕβριν ἀγασσάμενος θυμαλγέα καὶ κακὰ ἔργα.
οὔ τινα γὰρ τίεσκον ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ὅτις σφέας εἰσαφίκοιτο.

Therefore, in the eyes of Odysseus and Penelope, at least, the suitors were punished by the gods for their breach of the code of ξεινίη, though in human terms, we would (and without doubt the suitors would) never expect to be *killed* merely for 'bad manners'.

Why does Odysseus kill the suitors?

On the other hand, whether the suitors' behaviour has incurred divine anger or not, the immediate necessity which makes the deadly encounter between Odysseus and the suitors inevitable is quite another matter. That is the suitors' real motivation for lingering in the house of Odysseus, namely, to gain the kingship of Ithaca or at least to have a share of the enormous wealth of Odysseus' estate (2. 335-6, 16. 384-5), even through violence, if necessary. For not only do they plot to kill Telemachus, but they go so far as to say that even if Odysseus himself returns, they will manage to kill him (2. 246-51). Eurymachus, in his attempt to make the dead Antinous their scapegoat, ironically reveals their real intention most clearly (22. 48-53):

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἤδη κεῖται ὃς αἴτιος ἔπλετο πάντων,
'Αντίνοος· οὗτος γὰρ ἐπίηλεν τάδε ἔργα,
οὔ τι γάμου τόσσον κεχρημένος οὐδὲ χατίζων,
ἀλλ' ἄλλα φρονέων, τά οἱ οὐκ ἐτέλεσσε Κρονίων,
ὄφρ' 'Ιθάκης κατὰ δῆμον ἐϋκτιμένης βασιλεύοι
αὐτός, ἀτὰρ σὸν παῖδα κατακτείνειε λοχήσας.[3]

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[3] Cf. A. H. F. Thornton, 'Why do the suitors feast in the house of Odysseus?'

Therefore, even though what they have already done does not seem enough to justify their capital punishment, Odysseus has no choice but to kill them or he will be killed. Hence his reply to Eurymachus' plea (22. 61-7):

Εὐρύμαχ', οὐδ' εἴ μοι πατρώϊα πάντ' ἀποδοῖτε,
ὅσσα τε νῦν ὔμμ' ἐστὶ καὶ εἴ ποθεν ἄλλ' ἐπιθεῖτε,
οὐδέ κεν ὣς ἔτι χεῖρας ἐμὰς λήξαιμι φόνοιο
πρὶν πᾶσαν μνηστῆρας ὑπερβασίην ἀποτῖσαι.
νῦν ὑμῖν παράκειται ἐναντίον ἠὲ μάχεσθαι
ἢ φεύγειν, ὅς κεν θάνατον καὶ κῆρας ἀλύξῃ·
ἀλλά τιν' οὐ φεύξεσθαι ὀΐομαι αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον.

Although it is an inevitable self-defence for Odysseus to kill them, there is unfortunately no legal transaction to cancel out the murder committed by Odysseus by the 'intention' of the suitors to kill him. In other words, despite what they have done, their families are still under an obligation to avenge their death.[4] He is fully aware of the danger of killing so many men from powerful families (20. 42-3, 23. 118-22). Other Ithacans cannot stop the suitors' angry kinsmen (24. 462-6), because it is a purely private matter between the suitors' families and Odysseus', just like the nuisance inflicted on his house by the suitors. He kills the suitors for his personal defence and revenge, and likewise their families seek revenge for their personal losses. The anger of the gods is not involved in this chain reaction of vengeance. In this affair, the gods—more specifically Athena—are needed by Odysseus only to win the battle against many and to break the chain of bloody feud in the end. Or can we still say that the gods punished the suitors using Odysseus as their executioner?

Certainly, Odysseus and Penelope would say so (22. 413-6, 23. 63-7). Laertes will also see the hand of the gods behind his son's triumph (24. 351-2). As we see in the account by Amphinomus' ghost of the fate of the suitors, they also think that some god with malicious intent towards them (κακὸς δαίμων 24. 149) brought Odysseus back home and assisted him in killing them (24. 182).[5]

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in *AUMLA* 20 (1963), 341-5 = *People and Themes in Homer's Odyssey* (London 1970), pp. 63-7.

[4] Cf. G. Glotz, *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce* (Paris 1904), pp. 48ff.; M. I. Finley, *The world of Odysseus*, p. 77.

[5] For κακὸς δαίμων, cf. O. Tsagarakis, *Nature and Background of Major Concepts of Divine Power in Homer* (Amsterdam 1977), pp. 111-2; For the meaning of κακός, see Chapter 10.

Zeus' attitude towards human sufferings

We also know the intention of the gods themselves. In the Olympian scene at the beginning of the *Odyssey*, Zeus talks about the recent Aegisthus affair. Despite the warning from the gods with good intentions, he seduced Clytemnestra, killed Agamemnon, and now Orestes has duly retaliated against him (1. 35-43). The parallel between this incident and the case of Odysseus' household is intentional. As the story develops, we come across more references to the former in comparison with the latter (1. 298-302, 3. 193-200, 303-16, comparing Telemachus with Orestes; 24. 192-202, contrasting Penelope with Clytemnestra). After Zeus concludes his statement with the reference to the fate of Aegisthus, Athena takes up the story saying (1. 46-7):

> καὶ λίην κεῖνός γε ἐοικότι κεῖται ὀλέθρῳ·
> ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι,

and the audience will soon realise that 'anybody who does such things' points to the suitors in the *Odyssey*.[6] They are trying to marry Penelope, to kill Odysseus and Telemachus, and to rob them of their property and kingship, ignoring all human and divine warnings. If so, this proclamation of Athena echoes her own plan which will unfold in the course of the story, as Zeus says to her (5. 23-4 = 24. 479-80):

> οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον μὲν ἐβούλευσας νόον αὐτή,
> ὡς ἤ τοι κείνους 'Οδυσεὺς ἀποτίσεται ἐλθών;

Odysseus' homecoming and vengeance against the suitors is entirely in the charge of Athena. Although the other Olympian gods except Poseidon are said to pity Odysseus for being detained far away from home so long (1. 19-20), they do not seem to care for what he has to suffer at home. Even Zeus takes a detached attitude towards human affairs, if we judge by his first speech (1. 32-43):

> Ὢ πόποι, οἷον δή νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται.
> ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
> σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν,
> ὡς καὶ νῦν Αἴγισθος ὑπὲρ μόρον 'Ατρεΐδαο
> γῆμ' ἄλοχον μνηστήν, τὸν δ' ἔκτανε νοστήσαντα,

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[6] Cf. Heubeck-West-Hainsworth, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*: Volume I, on 47.

εἰδὼς αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον· ἐπεὶ πρό οἱ εἴπομεν ἡμεῖς,
Ἑρμείαν πέμψαντες, ἐΰσκοπον ἀργειφόντην,
μήτ' αὐτὸν κτείνειν μήτε μνάασθαι ἄκοιτιν·
ἐκ γὰρ Ὀρέσταο τίσις ἔσσεται Ἀτρεΐδαο,
ὁππότ' ἂν ἡβήσῃ καὶ ἧς ἱμείρεται αἴης.
ὣς ἔφαθ' Ἑρμείας, ἀλλ' οὐ φρένας Αἰγίσθοιο
πεῖθ' ἀγαθὰ φρονέων· νῦν δ' ἁθρόα πάντ' ἀπέτισε.

First he washes his hands of human sufferings. He may be responsible for distributing 'μόρος' or 'μοῖρα', namely a lot, to men, i.e. their birth, status, and all that is given to and expected from men of such a stature, but not for what they do beyond their lot.[7] Aegisthus may be of noble birth, but he is not entitled to seduce the wife of the king, nor to kill him, a much greater man than Aegisthus himself. Zeus sent Hermes to warn him not to go beyond his 'μόρος', but he did not listen. He has now paid for what he has done at the hand of Orestes.

The fact to be noted here is that the gods' participation in this matter is only limited to warning Aegisthus. Zeus does not say that Aegisthus has committed a crime, nor that *he* punished him. All he says is that Aegisthus became out of control, but was finally subdued by Orestes. It is a striking denial of Zeus' interest in punishing men directly or even sending his 'agent' to do so. He may be considered to lay down the course of events as the distributor of fate,[8] but it is always men themselves who get into trouble or who take their own revenge.

A good example is the fate of the companions of Odysseus, which is also in a sort of parallel to that of the suitors. They are said to have perished due to their own 'ἀτασθαλίαι', just as the suitors (22. 317, 416, 23. 67, 24. 458), in the poet's condemning comment at the beginning of the epic. Odysseus tried hard to save them, but in vain (1. 5-9):

ἀρνύμενος ἥν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἑταίρων.
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὣς ἑτάρους ἐρρύσατο, ἱέμενός περ·
αὐτῶν γὰρ σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο,
νήπιοι, οἳ κατὰ βοῦς Ὑπερίονος Ἠελίοιο
ἤσθιον· αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσιν ἀφείλετο νόστιμον ἦμαρ.

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7 Cf. Heubeck-West-Hainsworth on 1. 32-3; For further discussion on μοῖρα and μόρος see Chapter 7.

8 For example, it is by 'μοῖρα θεῶν' that Clytemnestra yields to Aegisthus' seduction (*Od.* 3. 269), from Nestor's point of view.

Their fate, however, was already sealed as early as their departure from Ithaca for Troy, as Halitherses prophesied (2. 171-6):

καὶ γὰρ κείνῳ φημὶ τελευτηθῆναι ἅπαντα
ὡς οἱ ἐμυθεόμην, ὅτε Ἴλιον εἰσανέβαινον
Ἀργεῖοι, μετὰ δέ σφιν ἔβη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς.
φῆν κακὰ πολλὰ παθόντ', ὀλέσαντ' ἄπο πάντας ἑταίρους,
ἄγνωστον πάντεσσιν ἐεικοστῷ ἐνιαυτῷ
οἴκαδ' ἐλεύσεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δὴ νῦν πάντα τελεῖται.

They are destined to die one way or another before coming home again. When, where, and how, however, depend on their behaviour and, despite predestined fate, they are entirely responsible for inviting death by eating the cattle of Helios, and ignoring the warnings (11. 112-3, 12. 139-40, 271-6, 298-301, 320-3). Zeus must have set their destiny from which they have no escape. Nevertheless, it is their own 'ἀτασθαλίαι' (echoing in Zeus' complaint at 1. 34), not Zeus, which is to be blamed. When they insisted on landing on the island of Thrinacie, then, was it not this cruel trap of fate that Odysseus sensed? (12. 295):

καὶ τότε δὴ γίγνωσκον ὃ δὴ κακὰ μήδετο δαίμων.

Neither is Odysseus himself by any means free from the hand of fate. Again, as Halitherses prophesied (2. 175-6, see above), he is destined to return home in the twentieth year after leaving Ithaca. Troy is fated to fall in the tenth year of the war (*Il.* 2. 328-9) and a further ten years of wanderings await Odysseus. It is fixed from the beginning. However, it is Odysseus, and he alone, who is responsible for the delay of his homecoming caused by his action against the Cyclops and by his failure to restrain his companions from killing the cattle of Helios which leads to the loss of his ship. And Zeus might say, 'Don't blame me. I write scenarios, but it is *you* who choose to play your role as you do!'[9] That is his attitude. In fact, he shows exactly the same attitude towards his daughter Athena, when he says (24. 481):

ἔρξον ὅπως ἐθέλεις· ἐρέω δέ τοι ὡς ἐπέοικεν.

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[9] For the problem of μοῖρα and 'free will' of men, see A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 22-3, and Chapter 7 for my own view.

Athena and Odysseus

On the other hand, Athena seems extremely keen on plunging into the middle of human affairs for the sake of Odysseus (cf. her delightful confession of her itch for fighting beside him and his son at 16. 170-1). Unlike other deities who come into the story to assist Odysseus only in one episode or two (e.g. Calypso in Book 5, Circe in Books 10-12, Hermes at 10. 277-306, Leucothea at 5. 333-53), she actually plans the victory of Odysseus and his son and leads them to it almost step by step.

First of all, she moves Zeus to let Calypso release Odysseus (1. 48-62), reminding him of the abundant sacrifices he received from Odysseus which Zeus himself certainly appreciates (1. 65-7) and of the hero's career as a righteous king (5. 8-12).

From then on, she works non-stop to assist Odysseus and his family. She changes her form into Mentes and then into Mentor to encourage Telemachus to confront the suitors in the public meeting and then to visit Pylos and Sparta. She even prepares the ship and crew for him in the form of the young man himself, and then, in the disguise of Mentor, escorts him to Pylos (Books 1-3). Both as Mentes and Mentor, she reveals her divine identity by miraculous departures (1. 319-20, 3. 371-2) to reassure Telemachus of the success of his enterprise. She also sends a dream to console Penelope who is lamenting Telemachus after his secret departure (4. 805-29).

Meanwhile, Odysseus departs from Ogygia on his hand-made raft, but it gets wrecked in the storm stirred up by Poseidon on its way to Scheria (Book 5). Athena comes to rescue him just in time (5. 382-7, 427, 437) and after his safe landing on Scheria, puts him to sleep (5. 491-3). Then she appears in Nausicaa's dream and arranges her meeting with Odysseus which leads to his meeting with the Phaeacians (Books 6-7). She even guides him in person disguised as a Phaeacian girl, though apparently he recognises her true identity (13. 322-3).[10] She transforms herself twice more in Scheria, once into the herald of Alcinous to advertise Odysseus (8. 7-15) and once into a cheering spectator of Odysseus in the games (8. 193-8). Thereby she makes sure that Odysseus is liked by the Phaeacians and goes home loaded with their gifts (13. 120-1, 302).

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[10] Aristarchus rejects this passage as incoherent with the scene in Book 6, but the omission of this line would spoil the thrilling match of cunning between the goddess and the mortal as portrayed by J. S. Clay in *The Wrath of Athena*, pp. 201-2.

As soon as Odysseus has arrived at Ithaca, she appears to him, first in the form of a shepherd and then in her 'conventional' form (Book 13). She tells him what the situation is at his home, gives him all the instructions, and transforms him so that nobody will recognise him, as destined (2. 175).

Then she goes to Sparta straightaway (13. 339-40), and instructs Telemachus to go home (15. 9-42). She speeds up his journey by sea by sending a fair wind (15. 292-4).

She appears to Odysseus again (16. 155) to restore his true appearance temporarily so that he can reveal his identity to his son. Then and afterwards she continuously gives him instructions, encouragement, and even more conspicuous support (17. 360-3, 19. 33-4, 20. 47-8, 22. 205-6, 226-35, 255-6, 272-3, 297-8, 24. 443-9) until the battle with the suitors ends.

Meanwhile she entirely controls Penelope's psychology (18. 158-62, 19. 478-9, 21. 1-4), her sleep (18. 187-97, 19. 603-4, 21. 357-8, 22. 429), and probably her dreams (19. 535-53, 20. 87-90), both for her own sake and for facilitating Odysseus' job. Penelope does not need the goddess's help, however, to recognise her husband.

After the happy reunion of the husband and wife, Athena does such a special service to them as to delay the dawn so that they can both talk to one another and sleep to their heart's content (23. 241-6, 344-8). On the following day, she recovers Laertes' dignity (24. 367-9) and encourages the three generations of heroes to confront the families of the suitors (24. 502-3, 516-9). It is she, too, who brings peace to them in the end (24. 529-32, 542-4, 546-8).

This synopsis of the 'aristeia of Athena' shows how faithful and powerful an ally Athena is to Odysseus, as she herself claims to be:

οὐδὲ σύ γ' ἔγνως
Παλλάδ' Ἀθηναίην, κούρην Διός, ἥ τέ τοι αἰεὶ
ἐν πάντεσσι πόνοισι παρίσταμαι ἠδὲ φυλάσσω,
καὶ δέ σε Φαιήκεσσι φίλον πάντεσσιν ἔθηκα. (13. 299-302)

σχέτλιε, καὶ μέν τίς τε χερείονι πείθεθ' ἑταίρῳ,
ὅς περ θνητός τ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τόσα μήδεα οἶδεν·
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ θεός εἰμι, διαμπερὲς ἥ σε φυλάσσω
ἐν πάντεσσι πόνοις. (20. 45-8)

Indeed, we now know what Nestor talks about when he says to Telemachus (3. 218-22),

εἰ γάρ σ' ὣς ἐθέλοι φιλέειν γλαυκῶπις 'Αθήνη
ὡς τότ' 'Οδυσσῆος περικήδετο κυδαλίμοιο
δήμῳ ἔνι Τρώων, ὅθι πάσχομεν ἄλγε' 'Αχαιοί—
οὐ γάρ πω ἴδον ὧδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας
ὡς κείνῳ ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο Παλλὰς 'Αθήνη—.

Odysseus is Athena's very special protégé.[11] She loves him immensely, probably not so much because he is a pious and generous giver of offerings to the gods as because she admires his cunning and cleverness, which the goddess and the hero have in common (13. 287-99), and his self-control (13. 330-2):[12]

αἰεί τοι τοιοῦτον ἐνὶ στήθεσσι νόημα·
τῷ σε καὶ οὐ δύναμαι προλιπεῖν δύστηνον ἐόντα,
οὕνεκ' ἐπητής ἐσσι καὶ ἀγχίνοος καὶ ἐχέφρων.

Can we not, then, read the *Odyssey* as a story of friendship between the goddess and the hero? Odysseus is destined to face a host of troubles, but Athena just cannot leave him on his own, out of her love. She is, certainly, the best example of the gods in the disguise of foreigners visiting men to inspect their 'ὕβρις' and 'εὐνομίη' (17. 485-7), for she visits the house of Odysseus in the form of Mentes and does show her indignation at the overbearing suitors (1. 252). She is, however, not so concerned about justice in general as about *justice to Odysseus*. She speaks for him and his human supporters before Zeus; he has been a good worshipper of the gods (1. 60-2, speaking for Eurycleia at 19. 363-8) and a righteous king (5. 8-12, speaking for Mentor 2. 230-4) and therefore deserves a much better lot than what he has now. She also cares for Telemachus' good reputation (κλέος ἐσθλόν) for which she sends him to Pylos and Sparta (1. 95, 13. 422-3). Telemachus' journey has basically nothing to do with the 'punishment' of the suitors and is, in fact, not included in the 'scenario' of Zeus as recited by Teiresias (11. 100-37). It can therefore be nothing but the goddess's personal favour to Telemachus.

It is true that Odysseus thinks that he is acting as the agent of the gods of justice by carrying out his personal vengeance. On the other hand, from Athena's point of view, *she* is acting as his agent entirely

[11] Cf. Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, pp. 42-3. She is even his mother-figure according to Locrian Ajax (*Il.* 23. 783).
[12] Cf. Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, p. 42.

out of her friendship and is not in any sense *using* him to achieve her purposes. If either of them can ever be considered serving the other, it must be Athena who serves her human friend, not vice versa.

However, since the fate of Odysseus—or the scenario of Zeus as we call it—is already laid out, Athena cannot do anything for Odysseus until 'the year that the gods spun for Odysseus to go home' (1. 16-7). And, after all, a goddess and a man cannot be equal friends. Athena, capable though she is, does not always act for the immediate benefit of Odysseus, because she knows the whole 'scenario'. If we may further explore this theatrical metaphor, she is the stage director and Odysseus an actor who has to improvise most of his actions. While he only has to do his best in playing his part, she must also direct other characters, especially his antagonists, as convincingly as the hero so that his profile will be even further elevated.

For example, she suggests that Odysseus should beg food from the suitors to see 'οἵ τινές εἰσιν ἐναίσιμοι οἵ τ' ἀθέμιστοι' (17. 363), only to let him suffer further humiliation, for she has no intention of saving any of the suitors (17. 364), even such 'ἐναίσιμοι' ones as Amphinomus (18. 155-6).[13]

Moreover, she deliberately stirs up the suitors to taunt Odysseus so as to increase his suffering (18. 346-8 = 20. 284-6):

Μνηστῆρας δ' οὐ πάμπαν ἀγήνορας εἴα 'Αθήνη
λώβης ἴσχεσθαι θυμαλγέος, ὄφρ' ἔτι μᾶλλον
δύη ἄχος κραδίην Λαερτιάδεω 'Οδυσῆος.

In fact, most of the suitors' violence to 'ξεῖνοι' for which they are made fatally guilty, according to Odysseus and Penelope, was directed at Odysseus himself, and prompted by his appearance which was made so miserable and helpless by Athena. Therefore, the transformation of Odysseus was the beginning of Athena's trick to exploit the haughtiness of the suitors to lure them into more serious offences against ξεινίη, and thereby to give Odysseus a personal and moral justification for the most severe retaliation.

She is no doubt just being cruel to be kind to Odysseus, but we cannot help suspecting that she sometimes finds some pleasure in her control over the course of events. In the battle between Odysseus' party and the suitors, her theatrical cruelty reaches its peak. After

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[13] For Odysseus' appreciation of his virtue, cf. 18. 125, 394-6.

encouraging Odysseus and Telemachus in the form of Mentor, she disappears immediately to prolong their struggle (22. 236-8):

Ἦ ῥα, καὶ οὔ πω πάγχυ δίδου ἑτεραλκέα νίκην,
ἀλλ' ἔτ' ἄρα σθένεός τε καὶ ἀλκῆς πειρήτιζεν
ἠμὲν Ὀδυσσῆος ἠδ' υἱοῦ κυδαλίμοιο.

Then the suitors throw their spears all at once at Odysseus' party. In their first attempt, Athena waves all their spears aside (22. 255-6):

Ὣς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκόντισαν ὡς ἐκέλευεν,
ἱέμενοι· τὰ δὲ *πάντα* ἐτώσια θῆκεν Ἀθήνη.

In their second attempt, however, she makes a few successful, but not mortally so, to give an impression to the characters and the audience that there is still some real danger for our hero—a technique familiar to us through adventurous television series (22. 272-80):

Αὖτις δὲ μνηστῆρες ἀκόντισαν ὀξέα δοῦρα
ἱέμενοι· τὰ δὲ *πολλὰ* ἐτώσια θῆκεν Ἀθήνη.
τῶν ἄλλος μὲν σταθμὸν ἐϋσταθέος μεγάροιο
βεβλήκει, ἄλλος δὲ θύρην πυκινῶς ἀραρυῖαν·
ἄλλου δ' ἐν τοίχῳ μελίη πέσε χαλκοβάρεια.
Ἀμφιμέδων δ' ἄρα Τηλέμαχον βάλε χεῖρ' ἐπὶ καρπῷ
λίγδην, ἄκρον δὲ ῥινὸν δηλήσατο χαλκός.
Κτήσιππος δ' Εὔμαιον ὑπὲρ σάκος ἔγχεϊ μακρῷ
ὦμον ἐπέγραψεν· τὸ δ' ὑπέρπτατο, πῖπτε δ' ἔραζε.

As a matter of fact, these dramatic effects are needed and intended by the poet. However, by attributing control over the whole event to Athena, the poet puts her in an ultimate divine detachment from her human friend—however dearly she might love him. She has already given him all the directions and encouragement he needs, and now she must give him some danger which he must face on his own so that his glory is his, not hers.

It is the view of Odysseus that the suitors were punished by the gods for their wantonness. But he does not know that not only his victory, but also his enemies and the justification for destroying them, were provided by Athena. She was not as interested in the 'punishment' of the suitors (who had not quite done enough to deserve the death penalty yet, at least in the beginning of the epic) as in giving Odysseus and his son great glory. Odysseus is too special, and so is Athena's love for him, to ensure that this divine aid is available to all righteous men in the world, or that 'anybody who does such things' as the suitors will be punished in the same manner.

CHAPTER FOUR

PHOENIX'S ALLEGORY[1]

Supplications in the Iliad

In the Litai allegory of Phoenix, Zeus is described as avenger of the Litai, of suppliants, and benefactor of those who respect them (*Il.* 9. 508-12):

ὃς μέν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς ἆσσον ἰούσας,
τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καί τ' ἔκλυον εὐχομένοιο·
ὃς δέ κ' ἀνήνηται καί τε στερεῶς ἀποείπῃ,
λίσσονται δ' ἄρα ταί γε Δία Κρονίωνα κιοῦσαι
τῷ Ἄτην ἅμ' ἕπεσθαι, ἵνα βλαφθεὶς ἀποτείσῃ.

It has been argued, however, that Zeus is not considered the protector of suppliants anywhere else in the *Iliad*. 'For the heroes of the *Iliad*', Victoria Pedrick maintains, 'supplication operates strictly on a human level, commanding respect only so far as custom and human sanctions compel.'[2] If so, Phoenix's allegory presents yet another difficulty for the unity of the epic.[3] Pedrick even excludes the Litai allegory from her examination of supplications on the ground that 'The retribution envisioned is otherwise alien to both epics, and suits Phoenix's arguments rather than any theology.'[4]

Her observation seems generally sound, and it is tempting to follow her path. However, first we need to examine the Litai allegory in the light of the Homeric doctrine of supplication observed elsewhere. If it is alien to the rest of the corpus, in what way?[5]

Zeus is called Hiketesios (*Od.* 13. 213) and clearly regarded by

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[1] A version of this chapter was published as 'Phoenix's speech—Is Achilles punished?' in the *Classical Quarterly* 41 (1991), 1-15. The author would like to thank the *Classical Quarterly* for their useful comments on the manuscript and kind permission to incorporate this chapter into this book.

[2] 'Supplication in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*' in *TAPA* 112 (1982), 129.

[3] Cf. D. L. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1959), pp. 297-315, esp. p. 303; for an argument against the separatist view, J. A. Scott, 'Phoenix in the Iliad' in *AJP* 33 (1912), 68-77.

[4] V. Pedrick, *TAPA* 112 (1982), 132, n. 29.

[5] For a full list of supplication passages in Homer, see J. Gould, 'Hiketeia' in *JHS* 93 (1973), 80, n. 39.

mortals as the patron of suppliants (*Od.* 7. 165, 181, 9. 270, etc.) in the *Odyssey*. In this epic, the majority of suppliants are foreigners asking for protection and hospitality, and their supplication is usually successful (except Odysseus' to the Cyclops and to Aeolus on his second arrival). When Odysseus arrives in Alcinous' palace as a suppliant, the king even says that a guest/suppliant is like one's brother (8. 546-7).

However, another category of suppliants, namely those in battle, are not always successful. Odysseus, pretending to be a Cretan, claims that he successfully supplicated an Egyptian king in battle after the defeat of himself and his crew, and that the king pitied him, took him home and protected him (14. 278-84).[6] Odysseus himself, on the other hand, ruthlessly kills Leodes when the latter supplicates for his life claiming that his conduct in the house of Odysseus has been reasonable (22. 310-9). Shortly after this, Odysseus does spare Phemius and Medon who have also supplicated him and Telemachus respectively, but that is because he acknowledges their innocence. His criterion here is quite clear: 'An enemy must be killed.' He is determined to kill all the suitors, whatever their excuse may be, even if they resort to the claim of suppliants. Of course, in his eye, they are the offenders against Zeus Xeinios/Hiketesios themselves, but at this point, his rage seems to be beyond such reasoning. Telemachus even fears Odysseus may have killed the innocent Medon in his rage (22. 359-60).

If that is the case in the *Odyssey* where suppliants in other contexts are generally kindly treated, it is no surprise to find in the *Iliad*, where the business is war, that the majority of supplications are unsuccessful. Most of the suppliants in this epic are the Trojans or their allies asking an Achaean warrior for mercy, and they are all killed. Dolon is killed by Diomedes even as he tries to take a suppliant posture (10. 454-7); Adrestus (6. 63-5), who has nearly supplicated Menelaus successfully, and the sons of Antimachus (11. 143-7), are killed by Agamemnon; Tros (20. 463-72) and Lycaon (21. 116-9) by

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[6] Pedrick thinks that 'Zeus is imagined as protecting the suppliant even in battle' (*TAPA* 112 (1982), 133) in this passage. However, if we look at the passage closely, Zeus is not involved in the supplication itself. The king spared the suppliant out of his pity (14. 279 μ' ἐλέησεν) and took him to his palace on his chariot (280 ἐς δίφρον δέ μ' ἕσας ἄγεν οἶκαδε). By then, therefore, the suppliant had acquired ξεῖνος status. That is why the king did not yield to the demand for the man's life in awe of Zeus *Xeinios* (14. 283-4), rather than *Hiketesios*.

Achilles, who did once spare Lycaon and others (21. 77, 100-2). The observation of Pedrick that 'No warrior in the *Iliad* is ever stopped from rejecting an enemy's plea for his life by fear of Zeus' is quite accurate.[7] However, this does not automatically mean that the notion of divine protection of suppliants does not exist in the *Iliad* as a whole, as she infers from the fact that Hiketesios is never mentioned in supplications.[8]

First of all, we must not forget that war is not a lawsuit. In battle, killing is the business, not appeals and hearings. The absence of appeals to Zeus seems rather due to the double standard of human morality universally observed even to this day: one in peace, another in war. If you kill a man in peacetime, you will be a criminal. If you kill hundreds on the battlefield, you will be a hero. Sad to say, killing enemies in battle is seen as basically a *good* thing, the very heart of the heroic virtue. How can you incur divine anger when you are doing something good, winning glory? If a warrior kills more enemies, it means more honour. More honour means a bigger prize. A suppliant in battle therefore stands a chance of success only by offering his opponent a splendid ransom which will outweigh the prize the latter will get by killing him. This scheme sometimes works, but obviously, when the supplicated warrior happens to be bloodthirsty or seeking revenge rather than profit, it doesn't. See the poet's dry comment on Tros trying to supplicate Achilles (20. 466-8):

νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ ᾔδη, ὃ οὐ πείσεσθαι ἔμελλεν·
οὐ γάρ τι γλυκύθυμος ἀνὴρ ἦν οὐδ' ἀγανόφρων,
ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἐμμεμαώς·

This sort of situation is typical of the *Iliad.* It confirms the well-known human reality that there is no use looking for the ethics of sanity where the war-god governs.[9] In the world where moral

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[7] Pedrick, *TAPA* 112 (1982), 133.

[8] Pedrick, *TAPA* 112 (1982), 135.

[9] Cf. *Od.* 11. 537 'ἐπιμὶξ δέ τε μαίνεται Ἄρης'; cf. A. Heubeck, S. West and J. B. Hainsworth, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey Volume I: Books I-VIII* (Oxford 1988), on 5. 447: 'αἰδοῖος: the claim of the suppliant, *except in the heat of battle*, was absolute against other men, and sanctioned by Ζεὺς ἱκετήσιος (xiii 213) . . . .' (my Italics). Even in the successful example of war-time supplication in the *Odyssey*, i.e. a fictitious episode of Odysseus being saved by the king of Egypt, we see the 'ethics of war'. While the pious king protects the helpless enemy in awe of Zeus Xeinios because the foreigner is already accepted in his house as ξεῖνος (14. 280), other angry Egyptians still demand his life (14. 281-2).

values are reversed, pleading alone is not enough to make a valid ἱκέτης.[10]

This explains why Lycaon is the only suppliant in battle who claims to be 'like a ἱκέτης'.[11] He claims that he shared a meal with Achilles sitting next to him when he was his captive (21. 74-7):

> γουνοῦμαί σ', Ἀχιλεῦ· σὺ δέ μ' αἴδεο καί μ' ἐλέησον·
> ἀντί τοί εἰμ' ἱκέταο, διοτρεφές, αἰδοίοιο·
> πὰρ γὰρ σοὶ πρώτῳ πασάμην Δημήτερος ἀκτήν,
> ἤματι τῷ ὅτε μ' εἷλες ἐϋκτιμένῃ ἐν ἀλωῇ.

'I am like your ἱκέτης, *because* . . . ,' he explains. The fact that Lycaon claims to be 'as good as' a ἱκετης to Achilles alone means that he is not actually one, and the fact that the claim needs an explanation shows that it is far from being obvious. This clearly shows that holding one's opponent's knees on the battlefield alone does not make a ἱκέτης. Therefore Lycaon in his desperation tries to introduce the ethics of peace forcibly into his relationship with Achilles. This episode is good evidence for the existence of some respect for ἱκέται in the *Iliad* as in the *Odyssey*. A ἱκέτης is αἰδοῖος (to be respected) and also apparently under some divine protection, more specifically, the deities of food and hospitality. Even διοτρεφές immediately following ἱκέταο might be the sign of underlying association of Zeus with ἱκέτης.

Lycaon's supplication fails largely because of Achilles' determination to avenge his friend's death, but it must fail also because Lycaon cannot claim to be a genuine ἱκέτης. His claim depends on the shaky logic, 'A captive is like a guest.'[12] On the other hand, a genuine guest-friend relationship can successfully introduce the morality of peace into the battlefield, as we know through the Glaucus-Diomedes episode (6. 212-33). Therefore, we must assume that Zeus' capacity as Hiketesios has a valid force among humans

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[10] Note how different Hector the family man (e.g. *Il.* 24. 767-72) is from Hector the warrior (e.g. *Il.* 24. 739).

[11] ἀντί = as good as; cf. W. Leaf, *Homer: The Iliad*², ad loc.

[12] Leaf on 21. 75, referring to the parallel custom of the Arabs, maintains that 'The mere breaking of bread under another man's roof entitles to the position of a suppliant, even though the intention to protect be absent.' Cf. Scholion bT, ad loc. But Achilles is fully aware of the fact that Lycaon was once his captive as we know from his monologue, and that is precisely what drives him to try to 'kill him again'. The bread they shared was simply no hindrance at all to Achilles. Similarly, Odysseus does not hesitate to kill the suitors who have eaten under his roof.

also in the *Iliad*, so far as the functions of Xeinios and Hiketesios overlap.

Achilles, naturally, does not incur divine anger by killing his pseudo-ἱκέτης Lycaon, except the wrath of the pro-Trojan river-god Xanthus (21. 146-7). However, even the god himself cannot help admitting that Achilles is acting ruthlessly (αἴσυλα ῥέζεις 21. 214) *because the gods themselves always stand by him* (215). This being the case, we must conclude that the gods in general, including Zeus, do not act as the protectors of suppliants on the battlefield.

Under more peaceful circumstances, however, Zeus does seem to expect men to respect suppliants. As he predicts Achilles' treatment of Priam, he says (24. 156-8 = 185-7):

οὔτ' αὐτὸς κτενέει ἀπό τ' ἄλλους πάντας ἐρύξει·
οὔτε γάρ ἐστ' ἄφρων οὔτ' ἄσκοπος οὔτ' ἀλιτήμων,
ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἐνδυκέως ἱκέτεω πεφιδήσεται ἀνδρός.

The implication of this passage is straightforward: those who kill ἱκέται are mindless, thoughtless, and wrongful, and ἱκέται should be treated kindly. What must be noted here is the way Zeus expresses his expectation. His tone is not that of the declaration of the guardian-god of suppliants saying, 'He must fear me, Hiketesios.' Instead, it is a relaxed expression of his trust in Achilles' humanity: 'he is a thoughtful enough man to treat a suppliant kindly', as if it were solely a matter of human morality over which Zeus has no direct authority.[13] Therefore, we cannot consider it to be unmistakable evidence of Zeus as avenger of suppliants, while it does show that in the *Iliad*, too, the respect for suppliants is a well-established moral obligation among human beings, endorsed, even if not imposed, by divine authority.

Achilles does not fall short of Zeus' expectation. He treats Priam kindly as an unhappy father like his own, despite his ever unquenchable wrath at Hector as the killer of his friend Patroclus which nearly surfaces at one point (24. 559-70). To Priam's hasty request to see his son's body and refusal to accept Achilles' hospitality, Achilles answers by saying that he is returning the body (though reluctantly) because of the gods' instruction and that he is aware of the divine escort which has brought Priam to his hut unnoticed by others

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[13] But in fact, Achilles' release of Hector's body is his κῦδος bestowed by Zeus. Cf. *Il.* 24. 110.

(24. 563-7). Therefore do not upset me any more, he says (569-70):

μή σε, γέρον, οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἐνὶ κλισίῃσιν ἐάσω
καὶ ἱκέτην περ ἐόντα, Διὸς δ' ἀλίτωμαι ἐφετμάς.

'δέ' after 'Διός' separates two concerns: 1) lest he kill a suppliant and 2) lest he offend against the instruction of Zeus. These two find their echoes in the god's prediction. Achilles tries not to offend (ἀλίτωμαι) against Zeus' instruction just as the god expects Achilles not to be ἀλιτήμων, and Achilles is restraining himself from harming an ἱκέτης just as Zeus expects (ἱκέτεω πεφιδήσεται ἀνδρός). Since the word ἱκέτης is specifically introduced in both passages, we must assume that Priam deserves protection as ἱκέτης *per se* to some extent. The gods' message to Achilles is therefore to make sure that he will not fall back into the 'morality of war' which can emerge at any moment within his heart swollen with anger.

This example, again, does not make clear the status of Zeus, whether he actually acts as the god of suppliants or not, but it at least leaves open the possibility of some divine concern for suppliants. Thus it also leaves a channel open between Phoenix's Litai allegory (where Zeus is clearly the avenger of suppliants) and the rest of the *Iliad* (where, it has been claimed, he is not).[14]

Phoenix's speech

Let us now go back to the speech of Phoenix. What sort of supplication is he talking about? After he has recounted his 'history', he urges Achilles to restrain his great spirit because even the gods are appeased by gifts (9. 499-501):

καὶ μὲν τοὺς θυέεσσι καὶ εὐχωλῇς ἀγανῇσι
λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.

Clearly this is a new category of supplication. It is neither a request for protection and hospitality by a ξεῖνος-ἱκέτης, nor a plea for one's

[14] There is one example of divine wrath against a man who has rejected a suppliant, i.e. Agamemnon rejecting Chryses who has asked the king to release his daughter (*Il.* 1. 11 ff.). However, although Chryses is described with a term of supplication (15 λίσσετο), he pleads in his capacity of a priest of Apollo rather than a suppliant (21), and the Achaeans are punished for Agamemnon's insult to Chryses' priesthood by Apollo on his priest's request (1. 35-52). Therefore, the issue here is solely Apollo's τιμή, not the right of a suppliant.

life in battle, nor an attempt to ransom one's child (dead or alive). It is a supplication for pardon by those who have done something wrong.

This exactly matches the present situation—probably so designed.[15] Agamemnon slighted Achilles, but now he has sent Achilles' closest friends as an embassy to offer him splendid gifts and ask him to return to the battle. There is only one exact parallel to this situation in the *Iliad*—the paradeigma of Meleager, also recounted by Phoenix (529-99). It is almost the exact parallel not only to the present supplication, but to the main structure of the 'Song of Achilles' as a whole. Meleager is the supreme warrior by whose aid the Aetolians have held the Curetes back. But he withdraws from the battle, angered by his mother's curse. Then the Curetes start pressing hard the city of Aetolia. He receives three supplications to return to battle, one from the elders and priests of the city offering gifts, another from his family, and another from his friends, but he refuses them all. Finally, when the enemy have started climbing the walls and setting fire to the city, he yields to the tearful plea of his wife and returns to battle. Although he saves the city, it is too late. He receives no reward.

Like Meleager, Achilles withdraws from the battle leaving the Achaeans in severe military difficulties. He also receives a set of three supplications. He is supplicated first by Odysseus, as the official envoy from Agamemnon offering gifts—corresponding to the Aetolian elders and priests—, then by Phoenix as Achilles' 'nurse'—corresponding to Meleager's family—, and finally by Ajax as a friend who tries to persuade Achilles with the logic of friendship.[16] Achilles, like Meleager, does not listen. He will change his mind, like Meleager, only when the enemies have started climbing the wall and setting fire to the Achaean ships, and with the tearful plea of Patroclus. However, the parallel ends there. It is Patroclus, not Achilles, who returns to battle to drive back the hard pressing enemy. Achilles does get gifts in the end (as promised by Athena at *Il.* 1. 213-4)—though they are meaningless to him after the death of Patroclus.

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[15] Cf. M. M. Willcock, 'Mythological Paradeigma in the *Iliad*' in *CQ* 14 (1964), 141-54, esp. 149-53.

[16] For the corresponding roles of the members of two sets of supplications, cf. H. Ebel, *After Dionysus* (Cranbury, N. J. 1972), p. 99.

Probably the most striking point of comparison between the two is that both groups of supplications completely miss the point. The promise of gifts from Agamemnon means absolutely nothing to Achilles—a fact not recognised by any of the members of the Embassy. The point of Achilles' long angry speech of refusal is compressed into the following two lines (386-7):

οὐδέ κεν ὣς ἔτι θυμὸν ἐμὸν πείσει' Ἀγαμέμνων,
πρίν γ' ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμοὶ δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην

Remember, this is said *after* the offer of splendid gifts from Agamemnon. The offer obviously has not made any difference to the situation at all. Achilles does not feel he has received a due apology or the restoration of his honour. That is the full stop. All the following persuasion based on the same offer, though it has some emotional impact on Achilles, must fail.[17] Instead, he gets even more infuriated. Is his reaction unreasonable?

It is obvious to the audience/reader that, though having agreed to send the Embassy to Achilles, Agamemnon has hardly changed his attitude towards Achilles, as we see in the closing lines of his speech (*Il.* 9. 158-61):

δμηθήτω—Ἀΐδης τοι ἀμείλιχος ἠδ' ἀδάμαστος·
τοὔνεκα καί τε βροτοῖσι θεῶν ἔχθιστος ἁπάντων—
καί μοι ὑποστήτω, ὅσσον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι
ἠδ' ὅσσον γενεῇ προγενέστερος εὔχομαι εἶναι.

There are no 'sweet words' (ἔπεσσι μειλιχίοισιν 9. 113) as recommended by Nestor. Instead, we hear a typical boast of his higher rank and his implicit displeasure with Achilles' haughtiness.[18] 'If he remains stubborn after this, he will be as hateful as Hades to me.'—knowing Achilles so well, he certainly suspects that it is a possible outcome. We readers might think that there is no way for Achilles to know what Agamemnon's actual feeling is like, and judge Achilles' reaction to the Embassy accordingly, thinking that he should not be so obdurate.[19] However, in fact, Achilles acts as if he knew exactly what Agamemnon said when despatching his

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[17] For the emotional impact of the speeches of the Embassy on Achilles, see T. A. Tarkow, 'Achilles' Response to the Embassy' in *CB* 58 (1982), 30-1.

[18] Cf. S. E. Bassett, 'The Ἀμαρτία of Achilles' in *TAPA* 65 (1934), 59-62; D. E. Eichholz, 'The propitiation of Achilles' in *AJP* 74 (1953), 144.

[19] Cf. A. Thornton, *Homer's Iliad: its composition and the motif of supplication* (Göttingen 1984), p. 132.

envoys. When rejecting the offer of compensation, Achilles replies (9. 312-3):

> ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν
> ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ.

It strikes the reader as a bitter irony. For Achilles, too, Agamemnon is 'as hateful as Hades', because 'he has one thing in mind and says another', which is exactly what Agamemnon is doing now through the Embassy. Despite his sending an embassy to lure Achilles back to the battle, there is no word of apology, no change of attitude on Agamemnon's part. Instead, he still thinks Achilles' pride as hateful as Hades, insisting that he is superior to Achilles. Although Odysseus does not report this last part of Agamemnon's speech, Achilles probably knows Agamemnon well enough to sense it from the list of gifts full of royal pride.[20] The reader is directed by the poet to see the statements of the two heroes in an unmistakable symmetry which leads us to judge Achilles' rejection completely justifiable.

Meleager's anger is also never quenched. His mother cursed him, praying for his death, because he killed her brother. How did he come to kill his uncle? It cannot be anywhere but in the battle between the Aetolians and the Curetes.[21] He has been fighting for the Aetolians when his mother, one of those closest to him, curses him, wishes his death, honouring her brother (despite the fact that he was on the enemy's side) more than her son and thereby causing Meleager's distrust in his family, injuring his honour, shattering all the meaning of his heroic life, and even his life itself. That is his condition when the Aetolians come to supplicate him, promising gifts, but thinking only about their own safety, without resolving the cause of his anger. It is no coincidence that the poet put the supplications of his family in the order as given: his father, sisters, and mother. His mother comes last because she is the one who is angry at him, and only when she is desperate to survive does she come and plead with her son, whose own life she has already destroyed. The lines

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[20] Cf. C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass 1958), pp. 192-3; J. M. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago 1975), pp. 15-6. Note also Agamemnon's proud words, '*βασιλεύτερός* εἰμι' (9. 160) echoed by Achilles' rejection of his daughter's hand, 'ὁ δ' Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλον ἑλέσθω, ὅς τις οἷ τ' ἐπέοικε καὶ ὃς *βασιλεύτερός* ἐστιν.' (9. 391-2).

[21] As in Bacchylides, 5. 127-9.

lead naturally into his even more infuriated refusal, after his mother's all too selfish plea (9. 584-5):

πολλὰ δὲ τόν γε κασίγνηται καὶ πότνια μήτηρ
ἐλλίσσονθ'· ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον ἀναίνετο.

Similarly, the three sent to Achilles, who are among those closest to him, fail to see the situation from his point of view. They only think about the lives of the Achaeans and their own. 'Your injured honour is nothing compared with the lives of those who slighted you.'[22]— That is the only message Achilles hears from the triple supplication which he could not accept. Nobody in his society could accept such a deal. What Achilles wants is (1) Agamemnon's humiliation and sincere apology and (2) the full recovery of his own position as the foremost warrior in the Achaean camp. He has an opportunity for (2) now, but (2) should not come before (1), if he is to avoid further humiliation.[23]

Putting together the two stories of Phoenix, the Litai allegory and the paradeigma of Meleager, his message seems to warn Achilles that he will be punished by ἄτη if he does not accept their supplication. Should we then say, as many do, that Achilles is in fact punished by ἄτη resulting in the loss of his beloved friend, because he has rejected the supplication of the Embassy?

One point must be noted. Just as Meleager is not said to be affected by ἄτη, but loses his reward through his *anger* (χόλος 9. 565), Achilles is said to be affected only by his anger (18. 108-11 etc.), not by ἄτη. Can we still say, nevertheless, that he has been punished

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22 On the contrary, of course, he has specially asked Zeus to restore his honour *through* the death of many Achaeans. In his eye, the Achaeans who did not check Agamemnon from dishonouring him, share the king's responsibility. Cf. *Il.* 16. 18, 'ὑπερβασίης ἕνεκα σφῆς'.

23 He has another occasion to recover (2), when Patroclus urges him to save the Achaeans in book 16, but he does not agree to go himself, and sends Patroclus instead, which results in the latter's death. But is Achilles punished for this 'error', as A. Thornton maintains (*Homer's Iliad*, pp. 135-6)? On the contrary, I think that Achilles should be commended for his concern for the Achaeans, which makes him send Patroclus into battle. Although Achilles has not received a true apology, (1), which he expects to come soon (*Il.* 11. 609-10), he sends his friend and other Myrmidons to save the Achaeans before it is too late. This good will has never been appreciated by anybody in the story, least of all by Agamemnon, and, probably as a consequence, is not very often pointed out by critics. However, who can deny that it is the result of his concession, rather than his moral error, that he did save the Achaeans?

through his ἄτη? If so, in what way? Before we can answer these questions, we must next investigate the nature of ἄτη in Homer.

ἄτη in Homer[24]

Although we have two outstanding examples of personified Ἄτη (the allegory of Phoenix, *Il.* 9. 504 ff., and the story of Agamemnon, *Il.* 19. 91 ff.), the other instances of ἄτη do not invest the image of the goddess Ἄτη with any personality. In *Il.* 16. 805, ἄτη is nothing but a physical effect on Patroclus caused by Apollo, though it is said to 'seize' him. It would be very awkward if we had to imagine the god, after hitting Patroclus, hastily calling the goddess Ἄτη to come to 'seize' him.

ἄτη may be talked about as if it could be personalised. There are such expressions as 'Alexander's ἄτη' (*Il.* 6. 356, 24. 28), 'his ἄτη' (Agamemnon's, *Il.* 1. 412, 16. 274; Eurytion's caused by wine, *Od.* 21. 302), and 'my ἄται' (Agamemnon's, *Il.* 9. 115). If each person can have his own ἄτη, or even ἄται, ἄτη cannot be considered a fully personified deity, but a sort of psychological phenomenon. Odysseus says he was lulled 'into ἄτη' (εἰς ἄτην) at *Od.* 12. 372. Such an expression also points to ἄτη as a condition of a man, rather than an external force creating the condition.

The noun ἄτη and its cognate verb ἀάω are used most often to describe a state of mind of someone who makes a certain mistake. A person under the influence of ἄτη can commit murder (*Il.* 24. 480-1), and can undertake an unsuccessful adventure (*Od.* 15. 233) or a fruitless war (*Il.* 2. 111, 8. 237, 9. 18). Patroclus is in the state of ἄτη (ἀάσθη) when he goes too far into the Trojan forces, against Achilles' advice, eventually to be killed by Hector (*Il.* 16. 685). Paris led Helen to Troy through his ἄτη (*Il.* 6. 356, 24. 28) and she followed him through ἄτη sent by Aphrodite (*Od.* 4. 261; cf. 23. 223), causing a disastrous war between the Trojans and the Achaeans.[25]

It is because of ἄτη that Agamemnon makes his most serious mistake: he seizes Achilles' war-prize, Briseis, so causing him withdraw from the battle (*Il.* 1. 412, 9. 115, 16. 274, 19. 88) and resulting in

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[24] In this section, I have attempted to sketch out a rough outline of ἄτη which covers all examples of ἄτη and its derivatives. For more precise subdivisions of usage, see *LfrgE*, ἀάτη.

[25] For possible further implications of the 'ἄτη of Paris', see *LfgrE*, ἀάτη B I 1 a).

a great loss of Achaean lives (*Il.* 19. 134-6). It is with this ἄτη of his that Agamemnon compares Ἄτη who once misled even Zeus into being deceived by Hera's trick (*Il.* 19. 95-133). In his story, Ἄτη is fully personified, said to be the eldest daughter of Zeus (19. 91), but apparently out of her father's control. Therefore, after realizing his mistake, which will result in the lifelong ordeals of his beloved son Heracles, he seizes her by her hair and hurls her out of Mt. Olympus (19. 126-9). This picture of the Zeus-Ate relationship is evidently very different from that in Phoenix's speech.

ἄτη is also observed in some sort of carelessness or forgetfulness. Oeneus forgets to make an offering to Artemis (*Il.* 9. 537) thereby inviting her punishment, and Agastrophus does not keep his chariot at hand at a crucial moment (*Il.* 11. 340), both being in the state of ἄτη (ἀάσατο).

How and why ἄτη comes to men is an interesting and difficult question. Zeus, though once hit by Ἄτη himself, is said by men to be the author of ἄτη at *Il.* 2. 111, 8. 237, 9. 18, and 19. 270, and, as we have seen, Phoenix says that Zeus sends Ἄτη to punish men who spurn Λιταί, a moral argument about the origin of ἄτη not paralleled anywhere else in Homer.

At *Il.* 19. 270-4, accepting Agamemnon's explanation that it was Zeus, Moira and Erinys who sent Ἄτη to him (19. 87-8), Achilles says that Zeus sent ἄται to Agamemnon because the god wanted to kill many Achaeans. Modern readers might ask themselves, 'But was it not Achilles himself who wished the death of many Achaeans?' (cf. *Il.* 1. 409-10). In Achilles' mind, however, the whole cycle of events—Agamemnon's ἄτη, Achilles' wrath, and its disastrous consequences, including the death of Patroclus—was planned by Zeus, who sent ἄτη to Agamemnon to start his plan working. This view is apparently shared by the poet, who says 'Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή' (*Il.* 1. 5) immediately after sketching the disaster of the Achaeans caused by the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles. Certainly it so happens that Agamemnon is hit by ἄτη (to slight Achilles) just after having rejected Chryses' supplication—a formula presented by Phoenix. However, as we have seen above (note 14), he does not offend against the Litai, but against Apollo, and is duly punished for it by the god through the plague, and in the end successfully appeases the god after making up for his offence. The effect of his ἄτη, on the other hand, lasts much longer than the Chryses incident. We can find no moral explanation why Zeus

should send such ἄτη to Agamemnon and cause the subsequent events.

At *Od.* 15. 233-4, Erinys alone is said by the poet to be responsible for Melampus' ἄτη. This ἄτη also resists moral analysis, for his adventure is successful in the end within the plan of Zeus (*Od.* 11. 297). We must assume that it was sent simply to start the god's plan working.

Similarly, we cannot see the reason, moral or otherwise, why Aphrodite sent ἄτη to Helen (as Helen claims) to make her run off with Paris to Troy (*Od.* 4. 261-2). Surely not to destroy her favourite people? All we can say for certain is that the goddess stirred Helen's love for Paris, which Helen later recognises as ἄτη.

The ἄτη which Patroclus experiences at *Il.* 16. 805-6 is a physical and mental 'stupor'—as Leaf calls it[26]—and quite explicitly described by the poet as the effect of Apollo's stroke. The god's immediate purpose in causing it must be to make Patroclus an easy prey for Hector. However, it is not a punishment.[27] It is simply his destiny, part of the plan of Zeus, that he is killed by Hector (*Il.* 15. 64-5, 16. 849).

If the gods do send ἄτη to us for no obvious moral reason, not as punishment for crime, but just as they please, what can we do? We certainly find some sense in Agamemnon's lamenting excuse at *Il.* 19. 90-4:

ἀλλὰ τί κεν ῥέξαιμι; θεὸς διὰ πάντα τελευτᾷ.
πρέσβα Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἄτη, ἣ πάντας ἀᾶται,
οὐλομένη· τῇ μέν θ' ἁπαλοὶ πόδες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' οὔδει
πίλναται, ἀλλ' ἄρα ἥ γε κατ' ἀνδρῶν κράατα βαίνει
βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· κατὰ δ' οὖν ἕτερόν γε πέδησε.

The situation looks most pathetic for Odysseus at *Od.* 12. 372. Being stranded on the island of Thrinacie with no food left, he goes out of the sight of his companions to pray to the gods for any clue how to get out of their desperate situation (12. 336-8):

χεῖρας νιψάμενος, ὅθ' ἐπὶ σκέπας ἦν ἀνέμοιο,
ἠρώμην πάντεσσι θεοῖς οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν·
οἱ δ' ἄρα μοι γλυκὺν ὕπνον ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἔχευαν.

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[26] Leaf, ad loc.
[27] Cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, pp. 5-6.

In response to Odysseus' prayer, the gods (according to him) send γλυκὺς ὕπνος (he calls it νηλεὴς ὕπνος later at 12. 373) which leads him to disaster. He goes back to where his companions are and knows that they have slaughtered the cattle of Helios. He cries out (12. 371-3):

Ζεῦ πάτερ ἠδ' ἄλλοι μάκαρες θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες,
ἦ με μάλ' εἰς ἄτην κοιμήσατε νηλέϊ ὕπνῳ,
οἱ δ' ἕταροι μέγα ἔργον ἐμητίσαντο μένοντες.

The gods sent him sleep which was sweet when it came, but later Odysseus, having discovered the disaster it has caused, calls it ἄτη. It can hardly be his mistake, but rather a misfortune which has fallen on him. What he sees here is the 'blessed gods' as arbitrary dispensers of ἄτη.[28]

We do not know, however, how far we can take this image of 'happy, cruel gods' seriously, for, in a similar situation elsewhere, Odysseus blames only his companions and himself. On the way to (in fact, very close to) Ithaca from Aeolia, his companions open the bag of winds through their misconception that it contains some gifts from Aeolus, while Odysseus is asleep. Then their ship is blown back by the released winds to the island of Aeolus, this time to be sent away coldly. Odysseus explains his situation to Aeolus in this way (*Od.* 10. 68-9):

ἄασάν μ' ἕταροί τε κακοὶ πρὸς τοῖσί τε ὕπνος
σχέτλιος.

Here 'ἄασάν με', means more or less 'brought me to ruin (ἄτη)' and he says it is due to his sleep and ἕταροι κακοί—which should be translated as 'useless companions' rather than 'wicked companions'.[29] It is clear from his recollection, looking back to this event in his narration, that he considers himself also responsible, apparently because of his untimely sleep (10. 27 αὐτῶν γὰρ ἀπωλόμεθ' ἀφραδίῃσιν). But he does not blame the gods at all this time.

We become more suspicious about the gods' responsibility for ἄτη when Elpenor says (*Od.* 11. 61):

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[28] Cf. J. M. Bremer's observation in *Hamartia*, pp. 111-2: 'The Homeric conception of *ate* relates the error to an arbitrary and malicious interference of the gods with human action, causing infatuation in man and resulting in disaster.'

[29] For the meaning of κακοί, see Chapter 10.

ἀσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος.

Even though 'αἶσα κακή of some god' is ultimately responsible for his accidental death, it is obvious that he drank too much wine and fell from the roof because of that. His ἄτη can hardly be the responsibility of anybody but himself. Antinous the suitor also points out the effect of wine which brings forth ἄτη, referring to the episode of a drunken Centaur (*Od.* 21. 293-302; 296 ἄασ', 297 ἄασεν, 301 ἀασθείς, 302 ἄτην).

Another testimony of ἄτη of completely human origin is at *Il.* 10. 391. Having been caught by Odysseus and Diomedes, Dolon blames Hector:

πολλῇσίν μ' ἄτῃσι παρὲκ νόον ἤγαγεν Ἕκτωρ.

By saying 'πολλῇσιν ἄτῃσι' Dolon means nothing more than an inviting promise of reward and glory for his adventure.[30] We have already seen other examples of ἄτη as motivation towards unsuccessful adventures at *Il.* 2. 111, 8. 237, 9. 18 and *Od.* 15. 233.

ἄτη of Locrian Ajax at *Od.* 4. 503 ff. (503, 509 ἀάσθη) is definitely not sent by the gods. He boasts that 'ἀέκητι θεῶν φυγέειν μέγα

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30 Cf. Leaf on 10. 391: 'ἄτῃσι is so far peculiar here that it is used of 'blinding', deception, of a purely human origin; ἄτας ἔφη τὰς ἐπὶ κακῶι ὑποσχέσεις, Schol. BT. In every other instance it conveys the idea of some divine or mysterious blindness.' Dodds (*The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 19, n. 20) does not accept that this passage is an exception, maintaining that ἄται means 'a symptom of Hector's own condition of (divinely inspired) ἄτη and not that 'Hector's unwise advice produced ἄτη in Dolon,' on the ground that ἄται as 'acts productive of infatuation' is 'a unique psychology' and 'a unique use of ἄται'. His interpretation has two major problems. First, ἄτη always involves disastrous consequences for the person who acts under its influence, whereas the present situation is Dolon's disaster and not Hector's. Therefore, even if Hector's suggestion was a strategic error, Hector cannot be considered the victim of ἄτη. If it is to be interpreted as Dodds proposes, namely, that Hector was hit by ἄτη but not affected by it himself, we are indeed dealing with a unique use of ἄτη. Also in this context, it is difficult to visualise 'many' ἄται on Hector's side. Secondly, although Dodds has successfully eliminated two possible meanings of ἄται here, namely, one as 'temporary blinding of mind (produced in Dolon)' and one as '*acts* productive of infatuation', he has failed to take account of another aspect of ἄται, i.e. as 'deluders', agents causing mental malfunction. If we interpret πολλαὶ ἄται here as Hector's *many* words of dazzling promises (which caused Dolon to lose his head), all the difficulty is dissolved. It seems, therefore, by far the best to take the ἄται as 'producers of infatuation'. Cf. Ameis-Hentze, *Homers Ilias*, ad loc.: 'πολλῇσιν ἄτῃσι durch viele Betörungen, betörende Versprechungen'. I find Dodds' analysis of ἄτη in Homer generally sound and accurate except that he does not make it explicit that ἄτη is defined by its conseqences, not by its origin.

λαῖτμα θαλάσσης' (504). Hearing this, Poseidon, who has had no bad intention towards him until then, brings him the final destruction.

From these examples we can now conclude that all ἄτη is a temporary state of mind (including sleep) which brings a person into unfortunate situations, regardless of whether it comes from gods or men. The only common factor in the examples seems to be that they all result in misfortunes.

In other words, even if one makes a mistake in conduct or judgement, but does not meet any obvious misfortune, it is never regarded as ἄτη. Agamemnon's moaning that Zeus sent ἄτη to him to lead him to Troy for nothing (*Il.* 2. 111, 8. 237, 9. 18) is a good example. It is, in fact, *not* ἄτη that made him come to Troy because he will win the war eventually, but for the time being everything seems a failure to him—hence, he thinks, his decision must have been ἄτη.

On the contrary, although he is regretful about his quarrel with Achilles shortly afterwards and says it is a hardship sent by Zeus (*Il.* 2. 375-8), he does not call his state of mind at the time of the quarrel ἄτη until he sees its disastrous consequences (9. 115, ἄτας 116 ἀασάμην, 19. 88 etc.).

ἄτη can be sent from some deity (not only Zeus), be caused by men, or come by itself out of nowhere, often for no obvious reasons. It can be just a phenomenon or a personified goddess. This peculiar nature of ἄτη seems somewhat easier to grasp if we compare it with a similar case of shaky personality, that of ὄνειρος.

Zeus sends a false dream to Agamemnon (*Il.* 2. 6 ff.), again to start his plan working. He summons and addresses the Dream as a fully personified being (οὖλε Ὄνειρε 2. 8). Editors will naturally choose to spell Ὄνειρος with an initial capital here (2. 6, 8, 16, 22, 56). However, when Nestor refers to the very same dream as 'the dream', they choose not to do so (2. 80), because it is conceived as an everyday experience common to all human beings. In no other instance of dreams in Homer is there any further indication that Ὄνειρος has any personality.

Like ἄτη, ὄνειρος claims 'multiple authorship'. Penelope's dream at *Od.* 4. 804 ff. is an εἴδωλον sent by Athena. Another one at *Od.* 19. 535 ff. of an unknown origin is a different sort of dream from the one above, or the one that Zeus sends to Agamemnon. Unlike the previous examples, it is not a 'dream-figure' standing at the bed-

side to deliver a message, but a dream-scene in which Penelope herself is involved. In other words, this ὄνειρος is her *experience* and not a divine or human figure. We see another example of a dream as an experience in the simile at *Il.* 22. 199-200. At *Od.* 20. 87, she says that some god sends her ὀνείρατα κακά. One of the 'woeful dreams' she has just had is the vision of her husband sleeping beside her. This figure itself (which she calls ὄναρ at 20. 90) could be Ὄνειρος the god sent by Athena or by some other god, but such a singular imagery would not be consistent with the plural ὀνείρατα. Evidently Penelope is thinking of plural dreams, perceived as new each time, sent by some god to disturb her mind, rather than a single dream-god visiting her again and again. Her story about the double gate of dreams (19. 562 ff.) also confirms the plurality of dreams. We all have many dreams; some are true and others false, some are sent by some gods, and others come from no known source.[31]

If we think of the similarity between the two phenomena ἄτη and ὄνειρος, the analogy we can draw from the usage of ὄνειρος is significant for understanding that of ἄτη. Zeus or other gods can send ἄτη or ὄνειρος to men in order to achieve their own purposes. Both are something we experience frequently, and in both of them our rational mind does not function as normal. We know what exactly has happened only after having recovered from the experience. Then we often think that we have acted or thought in a different way compared to what we would normally do.

Because of the mysterious nature they have in common, both are often, but not always, believed to be god-sent by the Homeric characters, and described as such by the poet. However, because their names are obviously descriptive of the respective phenomenon, they fail to acquire full personality, and because of their ubiquity, Homeric man or the poet does not seem to find it necessary or possible to pinpoint how and why every single ἄτη or ὄνειρος visits a person.

We can now conclude the following: (1) that Zeus does seem to care for suppliants to some extent; (2) that ἄτη does not necessarily come from the gods; and (3) that the gods, including Zeus, sometimes do send ἄτη to men to achieve their own ends. This makes the Litai-Ate 'theory' of Phoenix possible, if not entirely convincing.

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[31] On dreams in Homer, see Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, pp. 104-7.

When he says that Ἄτη always goes ahead of Λιταί, he is referring to the common and arbitrary nature of her visits: 'she goes everywhere and harms men' (*Il.* 9. 506-7), without suggesting any punitive motivations. Then, his hypothesis seems to go, since Zeus is the god of suppliants and capable of mobilising ἆται, he may well one day punish those who spurn suppliants using ἆται. However, while it seems possible, it is not proved by any evidence in Homer. This being the case, it will be safer for us to read it as an expression of human expectation of divine justice and protection, a persuasive 'theory' of Phoenix, than a well-established theology. We may, on the other hand, separate ourselves from those who claim that the concept expressed there is completely alien to the rest of the epic. Unless it was acceptable to the audience at least as a possible theory, it would not have found its place in its context.

Is Achilles punished through ἄτη?

Finally, we must discuss one of the most popular interpretations of the Litai-Ate allegory of Phoenix, that it symbolises what happens to Achilles in the following course of events. Many scholars have argued that Achilles is punished by Zeus through ἄτη (of either Achilles or Patroclus) which causes the death of Patroclus, just as anyone who spurns the Litai in the allegory of Phoenix will be punished by Ate sent by Zeus.[32]

We have now come back to the question of whether Achilles is actually hit by ἄτη. There is no statement by any of the characters, or by the poet, that Achilles is ever affected by ἄτη. Why? We can only assume that it is because he is not. What is often forgotten by those who maintain the contrary is that not all misfortunes or mistakes are the result of ἄτη.

For example, Hera has deceived Zeus not only by ἄτη, but also by other means. In the Ἄτη story recounted by Agamemnon, Zeus declares Eurystheus king instead of Heracles (*Il.* 19. 95 ff.) as a

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[32] E.g. H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*[2] (tr., New York 1951), p. 63; C. M. Bowra, *Tradition and Design in the Iliad* (Oxford 1930), p. 17: 'The theme is how Achilles' temper leads him both to disaster and to moral degradation.'; H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, p. 27: '. . . both Agamemnon and Achilles receive rough justice for their injustice to each other and the rest of the Achaeans perpetrated during their quarrel.'; J. A. Arieti, 'Homer's *LITAE* and *ATE*,' *CJ* 84 (1988), 4: '. . . when Achilles refuses the *Litae* in Book 9, he is in the grip of *Ate* . . . .'

result of being deceived by Hera, and the agent of the deception is ῎Ατη. But in another similar situation, the agent is sleep. Having had Zeus put to sleep by Sleep, Hera stirs a storm to blow Heracles' ship far off course (*Il.* 14. 249-56). After he has woken up and seen what has happened, Zeus hurls around the gods in a rage and, just as he throws ῎Ατη to the ground in the other episode, he might have thrown Sleep into the sea (14. 258). True, untimely sleep is sometimes associated with ἄτη, as we have seen (*Od.* 10. 68, 12. 372), but neither this episode nor the ἀπάτη episode following it (which is also engineered by Hera with the help of Sleep 14. 161 ff.) claims that Zeus is affected by ἄτη. What, then, is the difference between the two Heracles stories? The only significant difference that we can see is that the unfortunate consequences of the ῎Ατη episode are irreversible, while those of the Sleep episodes are reparable. Therefore, ἄτη seems to be what leads to major disaster with irreversible, or, at least, very grave, consequences.

This appears to enhance the view that Achilles' loss of Patroclus is the result of his ἄτη. It is indeed the most irreversible disaster. But if so, why is its cause not called his ἄτη? We must now go back to another aspect of the definition of ἄτη. It is a state of mind, malfunction of mind, which prompts misjudgement or misconduct. What misjudgement can we find in Achilles through the course of losing Patroclus? When sending out his friend to the battle? Before he sends his friend out, he specially emphasises the heart of his advice (*Il.* 16. 83):

πείθεο δ' ὥς τοι ἐγὼ μύθου τέλος ἐν φρεσὶ θείω,

That is (87):

ἐκ νηῶν ἐλάσας ἰέναι πάλιν.

Even if Zeus gives you glory, he says, you should not continue fighting. Do not get carried away by victory, do not go to the city, lest some god, especially Apollo, intervene (87-94). I fail to see any misjudgement in his instruction. He knows exactly what will happen, what will cause what, if Patroclus does not follow his instruction. His advice is completely logical and blameless. And when he sees the first bad sign of the reversed charge on the battlefield, he recalls the prediction of Thetis that one of the bravest Myrmidons will be killed before Achilles himself. From this divine knowledge, he deduces what has happened (18. 12-4):

ἦ μάλα δὴ τέθνηκε Μενοιτίου ἄλκιμος υἱός,
σχέτλιος· ἦ τ' ἐκέλευον ἀπωσάμενον δήϊον πῦρ
ἂψ ἐπὶ νῆας ἴμεν, μηδ' Ἕκτορι ἶφι μάχεσθαι.

The absolute clarity and accuracy of his reasoning are even tragic. Despite the perfect clarity of his mind and his sound perception of the situation at the time when he sends Patroclus out, he loses his friend. Why? Because he could not predict that Patroclus would be affected by ἄτη of an unknown origin (16. 685), be carried away, and ignore Achilles' advice. Achilles also knows, in theory, that it is Patroclus who is to blame (σχέτλιος—he is impossible!). However, he blames himself, out of love, out of sorrow, and out of his responsibility to protect his friend.[33] 'I should have been there defending him!', he blames himself. Indeed, now, for the first time, his mind is blinded by love, refusing to see the fact that there was little danger for Patroclus and therefore that Achilles was not needed provided Patroclus did not go too far. It is Patroclus' ἄτη which destroyed him.

Is Patroclus' ἄτη, then, the punishment of Achilles for his refusal of the Embassy's plea? It is certainly another popular interpretation.[34] But which event to follow this has not been ordained in advance? Achilles is destined to live a very short life.[35] It is fated that his death shortly follows that of Hector. Hector is to die by the time of the fall of Troy at the latest (because Aeneas will be the only royal survivor) which is imminent in any case, since Troy is destined to fall in the tenth year of the war. And Achilles is to see the death of the 'best of the Myrmidons' under the Trojan wall. Everything is pre-ordained, including the death of Patroclus before Achilles'. Whatever Achilles does, his loss of Patroclus is inevitable.

On the other hand, despite his self-accusation, Achilles knows what was responsible for his absence at the crucial moment for his

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33 Cf. S. E. Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer*, p. 201: 'Like all noble natures, he forgets the shortcomings of others, and thinks only of what he believes to be his own.'

34 E.g. Thornton, *Homer's Iliad*, pp. 135-6: 'According to the plea of the goddesses of supplication to Zeus (I 512), Blind Madness 'follows' Achilles, and it does so by attacking his 'substitute', his beloved friend Patroclus... The death of Patroclus is the punishment (I 512) which Zeus inflicts upon Achilles for rejecting the supplications of the Embassy and of Patroclus....'

35 There was once an alternative of long and less glorious life (*Il.* 9. 414-6), but the choice apparently is already made. Thetis says to Zeus, 'Please give honour to my son who is *destined to be short-lived.*' at *Il.* 1. 505-6.

friend: Agamemnon's ἄτη which caused Achilles' anger. Achilles wishes that anger would disappear from the world completely, in his wailing regret. However, he never says, 'I am sorry that I became angry.' His logic is 'I am sorry that he angered me' (18. 111). He expresses his regret for Agamemnon's ἄτη again later (19. 270-3). It is by no means Achilles' ἄτη—even after the 'disaster' he does not perceive any. Thus his disaster does not fulfil another condition of ἄτη. He does not look back and see he acted in a wrong way. No. His anger at Agamemnon was, at least in his own perception, an inevitable and automatic consequence of Agamemnon's ἄτη. Even blinded by tears, Achilles does not make any concession on this point. He simply sees no more point in making a fuss about his still-injured honour. Although he does not want any compensation himself (19. 147 ff.), he does receive it in the end, because it was obvious to everyone that Agamemnon was to blame (19. 172-83).[36] He is not angry at the king any more, simply because it does not matter now.

Instead, Achilles blames himself for his ignorance of something that it was impossible to know—the fate of his friend, predicted by Thetis in an obscure way, fixed a long time ago, and thus inescapable. What then can be more tragic than Achilles' situation? He must blame himself forever for not being capable of something impossible. It is not ἄτη, a temporary malfunction of mind, but the eternal blindness of humanity that let Achilles down. If Zeus has accomplished it all, he has done it through his ever inscrutable plan, and in accordance with fate, not as punishment through ἄτη.[37]

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[36] Cf. Poseidon's comment on Agamemnon at *Il.* 13. 111: 'ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ καὶ πάμπαν ἐτήτυμον αἴτιός ἐστιν.'

[37] See the poet's report on Zeus' reaction to Achilles' prayer at 16. 249-50 emphasising his ignorance. And also his comment that Zeus' νόος is stronger than men's (16. 688). The dying Patroclus himself says that μοῖρα and Apollo are ultimately responsible for his death (16. 849). Besides, those who argue that Patroclus' death, and the sorrow of it, have been intended by Zeus as the punishment of Achilles will have difficulty in explaining the god's 'pity' for him. Zeus pities Achilles (*Il.* 19. 340) when he laments Patroclus, and sends Athena to feed him (19. 341-8). Why does the god try to lighten Achilles' suffering, if it is his punishment? The relationship between fate and Zeus will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RAINSTORM OF ZEUS—ΔΙΚΗ AND ΘΕΜΙΣ

At *Il.* 16. 386-8, Zeus is said to be angry at those who decided on σκολίαι θέμιστες and 'expelled' δίκη. The usage of the words θέμιστες and δίκη here is peculiar, because this is the only passage in Homer in which 'θέμιστες' can be crooked or straight and δίκη is 'expelled' as if personified. Since these remind us of the recurrent phrase 'crooked δίκη/δίκαι' in Hesiod (*Works* 219, 250 σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν, 221 σκολιῇς δίκῃς, 264 σκολιέων δικέων; cf. *Works* 36 ἰθείῃσι δίκῃς, 225-6 δίκας ἰθείας, *Theogony* 86 ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν, *fr.* 286. 2. δίκη ἰθεῖα) and the expelled Δίκη at *Works* 220-4, Hesiodean influence has been suspected.[1] If the passage is indeed influenced by or even interpolated from Hesiod, the image of Zeus depicted here cannot be taken as a genuine Homeric view of the god. In order to tackle this problem, we must examine the usage of δίκη and θέμις both in Homer and in Hesiod.

δίκη in Homer

Whatever the etymology or original meaning of δίκη might be, it is obvious from Homer's usage of the word and its cognates that it does not mean in Homer what we call 'justice' in English.[2]

The most striking example is at *Od.* 4. 690-2 where unreasonable (ἐξαίσιος) words and deeds and favouritism of kings are said to be 'δίκη of god-like kings' (δίκη θείων βασιλήων). This δίκη can only mean 'typical behaviour' quite apart from moral evaluation. Like-

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[1] Cf. Chapter 1, n. 20.

[2] For the etymology of δίκη, *see LfgrE* (as related to 'δείκνυμι' and with the basic meaning 'Weisung' or 'Weiserin') and literature cited there, among which I find L. R. Palmer's 'The Indo-European Origins of Greek Justice' in *TPhS* (1950), 149-168, most systematic and convincing. Palmer analyses δίκη as from *deik = "mark, point, show" and deduces that its original meaning was '(to show) the boundary mark'. In conclusion (p. 168), he says that δίκη, αἶσα, μοῖρα, νέμεσις, and δαίμων are all expressions of the world view of IE origin, that the order of the world 'was the result of an elemental act of apportionment whereby each component of the universe, gods, men, and natural objects had its alloted portion, the boundaries of which might not be transgressed without grave results.'

wise, when Athena miraculously lights up the passage through which Odysseus and Telemachus take weapons away from the hall, Odysseus says that this is the δίκη of the gods (*Od.* 19. 43), their typical behaviour. The focus is on the fashion of the act, not the moral motivation.

To a much-tried wanderer away from home for many years, the recounting of his experience brings fresh woe—that is also δίκη, a typical thing to happen (*Od.* 19. 168). For servants ever afraid of their arrogant young masters, it is δίκη to give 'a small but welcome gift' (*Od.* 14. 58-9) to their guests. These examples of δίκη are not things which *must* happen in a moral sense, but things which *tend* to happen to a specific category of people or gods.

δίκη can, however, be something inevitable at times. The dead become ghost-like ψυχαί—that is the δίκη, most typical behaviour, of mortals (*Od.* 11. 218-22). This δίκη is almost synonymous with μοῖρα or αἶσα, i.e. one's lot. It is part of natural law, not moral law.

Zeus is certainly depicted as a distributor of δίκη as well as that of μοῖρα/αἶσα, but δίκη in the general sense of decision rather than justice. At *Il.* 1. 542, he is criticised by Hera for making a decision (δικαζέμεν) secretly with Thetis. At *Il.* 8. 431, too, she is sarcastic about Zeus' δίκη—decision—on the fate of the Trojans and the Achaeans (δικαζέτω). On these occasions he is not acting as a moral judge.

δίκη as typical behaviour, or a lot particular to a certain category of people, however, does take on a moral overtone. Comfortable retirement is the δίκη, what is suitable for a noble man in his old age (*Od.* 24. 255). If he is not in a good condition, it is negligence of somebody responsible for looking after him (ἀεργίη of his master is a possible—though rejected—reason for Laertes' poor clothing).

Penelope rebukes her suitors for their manner of proposal (*Od.* 18. 275-9):

μνηστήρων οὐχ ἥδε *δίκη* τὸ πάροιθε τέτυκτο,
οἵ τ' ἀγαθήν τε γυναῖκα καὶ ἀφνειοῖο θύγατρα
μνηστεύειν ἐθέλωσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐρίσωσιν·
αὐτοὶ τοί γ' ἀπάγουσι βόας καὶ ἴφια μῆλα,
κούρης δαῖτα φίλοισι, καὶ ἀγλαὰ δῶρα διδοῦσιν.

Clearly her point is based on the good traditional way of courtship, the manner required from people in her suitors' position. This δίκη means good behaviour. Since their behaviour is not in accordance

with the moral δίκη of suitors or guests (*Od.* 14. 90-1 οὐκ ... δικαίως), they are not δίκαιοι (*Od.* 2. 282).

When Nestor says that Athena was angry at the Achaeans because not all of them were δίκαιοι (*Od.* 3. 133), he is alluding to the impious deed done by Locrian Ajax, i.e. the rape of Cassandra in the sanctuary of the virgin goddess.[3] When Odysseus thinks he was deceived by the Phaeacians, he says they were not δίκαιοι (*Od.* 13. 209). Disappointing visitors—even beggars—is not δίκαιον (*Od.* 20. 294, 21. 312). Agamemnon, who has wronged Achilles, is advised to be 'δικαιότερος' hereafter (*Il.* 19. 181) and to entertain Achilles so that Achilles will have what he is entitled to (δίκη), in this case, his full status restored in the Achaean camp (*Il.* 19. 180).[4] δίκη or δίκαιος in these examples clearly deals with a sense of justice, what is right or wrong.

On the other hand, while the statement 'he is not δίκαιος' in general is a strong moral reproach equivalent to 'he is unjust', its counterpart 'he is δίκαιος' does not seem so much a matter of being just in sharp contrast to unjust, as that of knowing social conventions well and consequently behaving politely, wisely and agreeably. Nestor, for example, is a typical 'δίκαιος' man. Telemachus describes him as follows (*Od.* 3. 244-5):

> Νέστορ', ἐπεὶ περὶ οἶδε δίκας ἠδὲ φρόνιν ἄλλων·
> τρὶς γὰρ δή μίν φασιν ἀνάξασθαι γένε' ἀνδρῶν.

Nestor knows δίκαι and φρόνις better than any other people because he has lived longer than others. Obviously 'δίκαι' here is something one gains through experience which we can naturally assume to be the knowledge and manners to deal with the world, in other words, knowledge of what tends to happen and what must be done in given situations. It is a collection of much broader knowledge than merely the ability to tell right from wrong.

His son Peisistratus, young though he is, is also δίκαιος in the same way as his father. He pleases Athena-Mentor with his polite

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[3] Cf. Chapter 1, n. 18.

[4] Concerning 179-80, G. Nagy points out the correlation of the word δίκη with the concept of making fair allotments (δαίομαι) and with δαίς (related to δαίομαι itself and often mentioned as 'an equal δαίς'). Cf. *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore and London 1979), pp. 128-9. His point, in short, would be that δίκη implies that each person has his fair share of honour (τιμή). See also Palmer, *TPhS* (1950), 160-1, 166.

manner when offering her a goblet of wine before her younger companion (*Od.* 3. 52-3):

χαῖρε δ' Ἀθηναίῃ πεπνυμένῳ ἀνδρὶ δικαίῳ,
οὕνεκά οἱ προτέρῃ δῶκε χρύσειον ἄλειον.

'δίκη' implied in δίκαιος here is in effect little more than good manners: he knows what a guest is entitled to.

When Beggar-Odysseus has been badly taunted and teased by the suitors, Telemachus reproaches them and calls it a day (*Od.* 18. 406-9):

δαιμόνιοι, μαίνεσθε καὶ οὐκέτι κεύθετε θυμῷ
βρωτὺν οὐδὲ ποτῆτα· θεῶν νύ τις ὔμμ' ὀροθύνει·
ἀλλ' εὖ δαισάμενοι κατακείετε οἴκαδ' ἰόντες,
ὁππότε θυμὸς ἄνωγε· διώκω δ' οὔ τιν' ἐγώ γε.

While other suitors are enraged by his statement, Amphinomus persuades the others not to answer with violent words to the words said 'in accordance with the social convention' (18. 414 ῥηθέντι δικαίῳ), no doubt both in content (visitors must be protected; the possible effect of wine and divine stimulus) and in manner (his subtle way of making his point especially in the last half line). The same use of δίκαιος recurs in an identical situation in 20. 322 (18. 414-7 = 20. 322-5).

Such a combination of awareness of social rules, and the good manners to practise or express them, seems to be the essence of being δίκαιος. The coupling of δίκη/δίκαιος with πεπνυμένος (*Od.* 3. 52), φρόνις (*Od.* 3. 244), and νοήμων (*Od.* 2. 282, 13. 209) also suggests that δίκη is as much a matter of modesty as of knowledge. If that is the case, it is no surprise that the δικαιότατος tribe of men happen to be called the Ἄβιοι, the Non-violent or Non-forcible. The wise tutor of heroes Chiron is δικαιότατος of the Centaurs (*Il.* 11. 832), not at all like Eurytion who has the manner of beasts (*Od.* 21. 295-8).

A traveller just arrived in a foreign land wonders whether residents there are δίκαιοι or not (*Od.* 6. 120-1 = 9. 175-6 = 13. 201-2):

ἤ ῥ' οἵ γ' ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι,
ἦε φιλόξεινοι, καί σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής;

(*Od.* 8. 575-6):

ἠμὲν ὅσοι χαλεποί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι,
οἵ τε φιλόξεινοι καί σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής.

The sign of 'δίκαιοι' people is their hospitality and awe of the gods. Those who are not δίκαιοι are χαλεποί, ὑβρισταί, and ἄγριοι. It is clear from this contrast that the 'δίκαιοι' are thoughtful, polite people with the knowledge of social conventions such as the custom of ξεινίη. On the contrary, the 'non-δίκαιοι' are harsh, arrogant and not 'civilised', i.e. ignorant of social rules such as that of ξεινίη. It is in this very same way that the Cyclopes are ἄγριοι and ignorant of δίκαι or θέμιστες (*Od.* 9. 215). They are 'wild' in the way wild animals are. They are ignorant of agriculture, and rely entirely on rich natural resources endowed by the gods (9. 107-11).[5] They have no social institution such as ἀγοραί or θέμιστες, but each one keeps order in his house (9. 112-5). Since they know nothing about social institutions or rules compelling them to fear the gods, to respect ξεῖνοι, or to be considerate to others, they are said to be ignorant of δίκαι—but if they are not 'δίκαιοι', neither are they 'unjust'. They are literally δίκη-less, lacking the social structure based on the human sense of δίκη.[6] If there is no law, there is no crime. That may explain why Polyphemus is not punished by the gods despite his treatment of the visitors to his cave. We may even call it his 'δίκη', his typical behaviour, faithful to his nature.

However, men cannot accept the idea that the gods can approve such a non-human 'δίκη'. Odysseus condemns the Cyclops' brutality saying that the gods have punished him (*Od.* 9. 477-9). Eumaeus, referring to the suitors who are ὑπερφίαλοι (*Od.* 4. 790, 13. 373, 14. 27, 15. 315, 16. 271, 18. 167, 20. 12, 291, 23. 356, etc.) like the Cyclopes (9. 106), expresses his faith in the moral gods (*Od.* 14. 83-4):

οὐ μὲν σχέτλια ἔργα θεοὶ μάκαρες φιλέουσιν,
ἀλλὰ δίκην τίουσι καὶ αἴσιμα ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων.

According to him, the δίκη which the gods approve is of the same nature as αἴσιμα ἔργα, moderate behaviour, namely the δίκη as the command of social conventions and good manners.

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[5] That is all that 'πεποιθότες ἀθανάτοισιν' (9. 107) means. Cf. the views of S. Eitrem, 'Kyklopen' in *RE* 11 (1922) 2333, F. Peachy, *The Story of the Homeric Cyclops* (Diss. Harvard 1948), p. 139 and W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer*^{2} I, on 9. 107 quoted by J. Glenn, 'Homer's "God-trusting" Cyclopes', *CW* 65 (1972), 219 and Heubeck-Hoekstra's note on 9. 106-15.

[6] For the contrast between Odysseus' morality and that of the Cyclops see M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*^{2}, p. 101.

When δίκη is brought into the ἀγορή, however, the dichotomy is not social-natural, but straight-crooked, dichotomy within the social δίκη. It is no longer a matter of fairly flexible 'moderate' and 'wise' behaviour, but a decision between right and wrong, just and unjust in a sharp contrast, often involving bitter contention. We have a typical example of such scenes on the shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18. 497-508):[7]

λαοὶ δ' εἰν ἀγορῇ ἔσαν ἀθρόοι· ἔνθα δὲ νεῖκος
ὠρώρει, δύο δ' ἄνδρες ἐνείκεον εἵνεκα ποινῆς
ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου· ὁ μὲν εὔχετο πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι
δήμῳ πιφαύσκων, ὁ δ' ἀναίνετο μηδὲν ἑλέσθαι·
ἄμφω δ' ἱέσθην ἐπὶ ἴστορι πεῖραρ ἑλέσθαι.
λαοὶ δ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἐπήπυον, ἀμφὶς ἀρωγοί·
κήρυκες δ' ἄρα λαὸν ἐρήτυον· οἱ δὲ γέροντες
ἥατ' ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι λίθοις ἱερῷ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ,
σκῆπτρα δὲ κηρύκων ἐν χέρσ' ἔχον ἠεροφώνων·
τοῖσιν ἔπειτ' ἤϊσσον, ἀμοιβηδὶς δὲ δίκαζον.
κεῖτο δ' ἄρ' ἐν μέσσοισι δύω χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,
τῷ δόμεν ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι.

That there is more than one degree of fairness in this system is clear from the expression 'δίκην ἰθύντατα' (508); δίκη that is delivered very fairly, reasonably fairly, slightly unfairly, grossly unfairly, and so on. There is even a prize for the 'most straight' judgement to encourage the elders to be as fair as possible, and possibly even to counteract bribery. It is a strikingly realistic account of the institution of justice with no idealistic hero-king present. It is a description of a non-heroic society possibly 'contemporary' with the poet.[8]

The heroic society, of course, is not free from the conflict between just and unjust. When Antilochus has claimed his right (δίκῃ *Il.* 23. 542) to the second prize of the chariot race which Achilles intends

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[7] I follow R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle* Vol. 1 (Chicago 1930), pp. 32-5 in interpreting these two lines. However, I do not follow their interpretation of 507-8 that the two talents of gold will go to the winner of the suit (pp. 36-9), because I am not comfortable in taking the superlative ἰθύντατα as used for a choice between two persons. As far as I know, there is no instance in Homer of the superlative used in comparing two items. Cf. M. W. Edwards, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, Volume V: Books 17-20 (Cambridge 1991) on 18. 507-8. I would like to thank Mr. A. Kassman for challenging my interpretation of this passage, which has led to the refinement of my argument.

[8] By 'contemporary' society, of course, I do not mean any historical time, but an imaginary world modelled on the reality familiar to the poet and his audience. Cf. J. Griffin, 'Homeric words and speakers' in *JHS* 106 (1986), 36-57, 37-8; I. J. F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers* (Amsterdam 1987), pp. 44-5.

to give to Eumelus, Menelaus claims *his* right because he has finished third only due to Antilochus' cheat. He can no longer tolerate the situation since Antilochus himself does not tolerate the unfair degrading of prizes. Menelaus reveals the cheating of Antilochus and first calls for judgement by the Achaeans (573-4):

ἀλλ' ἄγετ', Ἀργείων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες,
ἐς μέσον ἀμφοτέροισι δικάσσατε, μηδ' ἐπ' ἀρωγῇ.

Then he changes his mind and decides to be a judge himself (579-85) knowing that the matter is crystal clear:[9]

εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἐγὼν αὐτὸς δικάσω, καί μ' οὔ τινά φημι
ἄλλον ἐπιπλήξειν Δαναῶν· ἰθεῖα γὰρ ἔσται.
Ἀντίλοχ', εἰ δ' ἄγε δεῦρο, διοτρεφές, ἣ θέμις ἐστί,
στὰς ἵππων προπάροιθε καὶ ἅρματος, αὐτὰρ ἱμάσθλην
χερσὶν ἔχε ῥαδινήν, ᾗ περ τὸ πρόσθεν ἔλαυνες,
ἵππων ἁψάμενος γαιήοχον ἐννοσίγαιον
ὄμνυθι μὴ μὲν ἑκὼν τὸ ἐμὸν δόλῳ ἅρμα πεδῆσαι.

It is indeed a straight (ἰθεῖα 580) judgement. Without bullying with his authority, he puts Antilochus in a dilemma, confession of his misconduct or a false oath which is a serious offence against the god, and would in any case decisively remove him from the favour of Menelaus. There is no real choice. Antilochus apologises, offers compensation and returns the prize to Menelaus (587-97).

This dissolves Menelaus' anger and he regains his typical generosity. He forgives the young man saying that his youthful recklessness temporarily overcame his wisdom (604), expresses his appreciation of his and his family's contribution to the expedition (607-8) and gives the prize back to him (609-11):

τῷ τοι λισσομένῳ ἐπιπείσομαι, ἠδὲ καὶ ἵππον
δώσω ἐμήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἵνα γνώωσι καὶ οἵδε
ὡς ἐμὸς οὔ ποτε θυμὸς ὑπερφίαλος καὶ ἀπηνής.

This is his final judgement. It is not strictly a 'straight' judgement in the sense of 'an eye for an eye'. He does not take compensation, nor the prize he is entitled to, but forgives Antilochus for nothing in return. Only a short lecture is enough: 'You were not yourself at that time. Don't do it again.' It is not a punitive sentence, but cor-

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[9] For this interpretation of δικάσω (579), see J. H. Kells, 'Euripides, *Electra* 1093-5, and some uses of δικάζειν,' in *CQ* 10 (1960), 133-4.

rective enough due to the enhancement of the good relationship between the two. After all, Menelaus is more concerned about what others will think of him (575-8). His relationship with the other Achaeans is as important as that with Antilochus. So he chooses to show his generosity 'so that they may know my heart is not arrogant (ὑπερφίαλος) or harsh' (610-1).[10] He must not look as if his heart is 'ὑπερφίαλος', an adjective for non-δίκαιος people like the Cyclopes and the suitors who do not know δίκη. By doing so, Menelaus restores complete harmony in the community. This is the typical δίκη of Homeric heroes. Its aim is not to pursue exacting punishment for crime, but most of all to seek the good for both the parties involved as well as the whole society.[11] The sharp contrast between just and unjust does appear in a bitter dispute, but is kept short-lived. Menelaus' considerate way of handling this matter is the sort of δίκη approved and praised in the Homeric society. Extenuation is by no means a modern invention.

If we look further around, we see many such examples of δίκη, judgement, in the funeral game, a rare occasion on which we see the 'morality in peacetime' at work in the *Iliad*.

Achilles' initial decision to give the second prize of the chariot race to Eumelus, who lost by an accident, is a good example (23. 536-8):

λοῖσθος ἀνὴρ ὤριστος ἐλαύνει μώνυχας ἵππους·
ἀλλ' ἄγε δή οἱ δῶμεν ἀέθλιον, ὡς ἐπιεικές,
δεύτερ'· ἀτὰρ τὰ πρῶτα φερέσθω Τυδέος υἱός.

It is not a 'straight' judgement at all. It is far from our idea of 'fair play'. We find it unfair as Antilochus does. A loser is a loser. Nevertheless, all the others applaud Achilles' decision (539). Why? Because it establishes the best social unity. It can certainly be argued from this passage that a man is valued for what he *is* rather than what

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[10] I. M. Hohendahl-Zoetelief, in *Manners in the Homeric Epic* (Leiden 1980), p. 53 and pp. 143-4, thinks that this explanation may appear to be Menelaus' 'diplomatic, perhaps even a logical, mistake,' for he looks as if lacking modesty. However, from the poet's point of view, this comment is necessary to show that Menelaus' ultimate concern is to consolidate his relationship with the whole community, not only with Antilochus.

[11] It is interesting to compare with this observation the account of K. J. Dover on the concern of a later Greek jury in *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974), p. 158: '. . . the question which a lawsuit or an indictment posed to a Greek jury was . . . 'What action in respect of this situation is likely to have the best consequences for the strength of the community?'

he *does* in the Homeric society, and therefore despite his failure in this particular performance Eumelus gets the prize for his unchanged value. It may be so. But if so, there is little point in the competition to begin with. The motivation for Achilles' decision is simple. He *pities* the best charioteer humiliated and disappointed by the accident (ᾤκτειρε 534). The sentiment seems to be shared by others, too, judging by their reaction to his suggestion. Eumelus does not get the prize exactly for being what he is—otherwise he should have received the first prize instead of the second, but for the sake of good social relationship among heroes, each with some share of honour. In their society, Achilles' slightly 'bent' δίκη is far more welcome than Antilochus' 'straight' δίκη based on a sharp dichotomy between success and failure. Even Antilochus is not opposed to giving some *other* prize to Eumelus, and knows that Achilles will be praised for doing so (548-52).

The same δίκη is in function when the unclaimed prize goes to Nestor. Achilles gives it to the old man not because he is a great athlete, but precisely because he is *not* (621-3); Nestor deserves honour for other reasons, namely his ἀρετή especially in counsel, his status as ἀγαθός, and his age. He himself knows the reason for the award and that he is entitled to it (647-50):

τοῦτο δ' ἐγὼ πρόφρων δέχομαι, χαίρει δέ μοι ἦτορ,
ὥς μευ ἀεὶ μέμνησαι ἐνηέος, οὐδέ σε λήθω
τιμῆς ἧς τέ μ' ἔοικε τετιμῆσθαι μετ' Ἀχαιοῖς.
σοὶ δὲ θεοὶ τῶνδ' ἀντὶ χάριν μενοεικέα δοῖεν.[12]

Achilles' courtesy even deserves the blessings of the gods. The observation of the social structure and respect to elders is the heart of the δίκη of Homeric heroes.

The extreme case of such consideration for social harmony is the last and aborted competition of spear-throwing. The only volunteers are Agamemnon and Meliones. Then Achilles gives the first prize to Agamemnon with no competition, saying that everybody knows

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[12] Hohendahl-Zoetelief, *Manners in the Homeric Epic*, p. 116, thinks that this is only Nestor's interpretation and Achilles gives the prize in fact as a consolation rather than an honour. When we consider, however, that this episode immediately follows Menelaus' final speech to Antilochus in which he especially mentions the work of Nestor and his sons as the reason to let Antilochus go with the second prize, there is no doubt about Achilles' (and the audience's) awareness of the honour due to the old man, whatever the face value of Achilles' words might be.

that he is the best (891 ἄριστος)[13] in this game. Is it, then, a good example of a man valued for what he is? It may be so. But if Agamemnon's superiority is beyond doubt and his victory 100% sure, the performance would not affect the distribution of the prizes. However, if they do play, it may affect the social harmony. If by any chance Agamemnon loses, his pride will be hurt and, temperamental as he is, he may spoil the occasion. On the other hand, even if Agamemnon wins, Meliones may not please Agamemnon if he challenges the king with high spirit. Knowing what the great king's temper is like, Achilles' decision is a precaution on behalf of Meliones and the rest of the company . We may not call it a 'straight' judgement, but if it does not lead to the good of the society with everyone happy with his deserved honour, what is the point of making it straight?[14]

There is little doubt that this same principle is also applied in kings' judicial δίκαι. The fallen Sarpedon is remembered as a king who has protected (εἶρυτο) Lycia with his 'δίκαι' and 'σθένος' (*Il.* 16. 542). σθένος must be his defence force to keep his people physically safe, and δίκαι must be his administration to maintain good order and social unity within his kingdom which is indeed the best defence for any countries.

Minos is the king and judge among the dead (*Od.* 11. 569-70). But his judgements are not the 'Last Judgement' as in Christian eschatology. He is acting exactly like a living king, settling disputes to restore social harmony among the dead. We can tell this because δίκαι are not imposed on the dead by the judge, but 'sought' by them (11. 570 οἱ δέ μιν ἀμφὶ δίκας εἴροντο ἄνακτα). The judge is there above all to serve the good of his people. When hanging above Charybdis, Odysseus may have had a 'flash back' of his old days when he was such a 'civil servant' (*Od.* 12. 439-41):

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[13] Note that this is an adjective he insistently reserves for himself in the bitter quarrel with Agamemnon in Book 1 (244, 412), because the question which of the two is *the* best of the Achaeans was the real issue over which their quarrel flared up. Cf. J. Griffin, *Homer on life and death* (Oxford 1980), p. 53.

[14] We know how unfortunate an inconsiderate 'straight' judgement can be through the judgement in the contest between Odysseus and Ajax (*Od.* 11. 545-7). The δίκη of Athena and some Trojans ruined the life of a supreme hero. The winner Odysseus himself regrets it most bitterly and wishes he had never won (548). What hurts most is that the judgement destroyed not only Ajax' life, but his friendship with Odysseus for ever.

ἦμος δ' ἐπὶ δόρπον ἀνὴρ ἀγορῆθεν ἀνέστη
κρίνων νείκεα πολλὰ δικαζομένων αἰζηῶν,
τῆμος δὴ τά γε δοῦρα Χαρύβδιος ἐξεφαάνθη.

The sight of his life-saving timber must have been no less welcome than dinner after a long working day.

Athena gives us testimony of what sort of king Odysseus used to be in Ithaca (*Od.* 5. 8-12):

μή τις ἔτι πρόφρων ἀγανὸς καὶ ἤπιος ἔστω
σκηπτοῦχος βασιλεύς, μηδὲ φρεσὶν αἴσιμα εἰδώς,
ἀλλ' αἰεὶ χαλεπός τ' εἴη καὶ αἴσυλα ῥέζοι·
ὡς οὔ τις μέμνηται Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο
λαῶν οἷσιν ἄνασσε, πατὴρ δ' ὣς ἤπιος ἦεν.

He was a model of a good king. He was kind (ἀγανός), as mild (ἤπιος) as a father to his people, and moderate/reasonable-minded (φρεσὶν αἴσιμα εἰδώς). This is the way a king should be. Straight but strict judgements cannot be at home in such a king's law-court. Notably, δίκη never means 'penalty' or 'punishment' in Homer.[15]

The Beggar-Odysseus describes what a good king's reign is like in a simile to praise Penelope (*Od.* 19. 109-14). The εὐδικίη (111) or εὐηγεσίη (114) of a king allows him to rule over many mighty people. Nature itself responds to his virtue with abundant fruit of the land and sea. This may be taken as the gods' reward to the righteous king, just as the rainstorm is the punishment of those who chose crooked ordinances' at *Il.* 16. 384-8. However, we have no direct evidence of such reward in the narrative. Moreover, we know that the Cyclopes, who do not know any δίκη or θέμις, enjoy the same nature-given abundance (*Od.* 9. 109-11). Such prosperity cannot be taken as evidence for the gods' constant support for righteous men.

Odysseus' virtue as a king is certainly acknowledged by Athena, but, as we have already seen, she has so many other reasons to protect Odysseus that we cannot conclude from his case that Zeus or other gods reward good kings for their good δίκη or punish them for their bad one. Zeus loves Sarpedon as his son, not as a good king,

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[15] When H. Lloyd-Jones says (*The Justice of Zeus*, p. 27), '. . . just as the Trojans will finally receive rough justice in return for their aggression against Menelaus, both Agamemnon and Achilles receive rough justice for their injustice to each other and the rest of the Achaeans perpetrated during their quarrel,' he obviously does not define the term 'justice' or 'rough justice' according to the Homeric use of the word δίκη, as he implicitly admits in his new edition (1983, p. 166), but according to his own notion of justice, i.e. strict punishment for crime.

but in any case he cannot save his son from his destined death. Being a good king does not help Sarpedon at all.

However, it is not so bad to be a βασιλεύς (*Od.* 1. 392-3). Honour and wealth always seem to be the reward of kings, good or bad. Even the young Telemachus, who has not yet started his career as a βασιλεύς, is already respected as δικασπόλος and entertained by his people (*Od.* 11. 185-6).

The only 'reward' from the gods to a righteous king we know of is that of Minos, that is, the eternal office of judge among the dead! This seems to be the best that a king can expect from the gods for being a good judge. One might wonder if it is attractive enough to deter earthly kings from bad but profitable behaviour.

To sum up, δίκη is a way an individual or a society usually is (hence often 'should be'). It is generally a human matter rather than a divine concern, and not necessarily a compelling model of behaviour. It is a job of kings to decide what the 'way' should be about disputed matters. δίκη can be modified by the authority of a king to achieve the aim of harmony in society. Although he may sometimes be subject to favouritism (*Od.* 4. 690-2), a Homeric king in general seems to serve his people well with his reasonable judgements, δίκαι. The δίκη in the court of elders which we see only in 'digressions' or similes, on the other hand, seems more liable to injustice, for the βασιλῆες need some immediate reward to be encouraged to be fair.

θέμις in Homer

When used to describe 'typical' behaviour, θέμις is almost synonymous with δίκη, except that in general the former is less subject to amendments.[16] One may say that Penelope's sorrow for her missing husband, which is labelled θέμις (*Od.* 14. 130), is just another human sorrow like a wanderer's renewed sorrow in remembering his hardships, which is called δίκη (*Od.* 19. 168). However, the latter is something one could do without, and had better be overcome. On the other hand, when a woman is in Penelope's position, it is not only natural for her to shed tears for her husband, but this is expected

[16] Cf. *LfrgE*, θέμις; There is no clearly 'immoral' usage of θέμις in Homeric epics, but there is one example in the *Hymn to Apollo* (540-1): ἠέ τι τηΰσιον ἔπος ἔσσεται ἠέ τι ἔργον, / ὕβρις θ', ἣ θέμις ἐστὶ καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

from her by society. The speaker who describes Penelope's lament as 'θέμις' has at the back of his mind the social norm 'a wife *should* lament her lost husband.' If she does not, it is not only unusual, but blameworthy. We can confirm it by the parallel case of the funeral custom of antiquity which is undoubtedly an example of θέμις itself. Wailing and lamenting for the dead is not just allowed or natural, but compulsory, especially for females.[17]

Similarly, when Agamemnon's ghost says that it is θέμις that Telemachus will welcome his father with his embrace (*Od.* 11. 451), there is an underlying social norm, 'a son should love his father.' If he does not, it is not only unusual, but morally unacceptable.[18]

One may find an 'immoral' example of θέμις in Agamemnon's oath that he has never laid his hand on Briseis (*Il.* 9. 132-4; cf. 274-6, 19. 175-7):

ἐπὶ δὲ μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμοῦμαι
μή ποτε τῆς εὐνῆς ἐπιβήμεναι ἠδὲ μιγῆναι,
ἣ θέμις ἀνθρώπων πέλει, ἀνδρῶν ἠδὲ γυναικῶν.

In this particular context—talking about Agamemnon sharing a bed with Briseis, whom he has robbed from Achilles—the θέμις does look immoral. However, if taken out as an independent maxim, it can be read as a solemn statement of natural law. Reproduction and preservation of the species is the utmost necessity of all living creatures including human beings. Being natural law, it is certainly not moral, but amoral. It is beyond good or bad. And its inevitability is even more evident than affection between husband and wife or father and son. Thetis' advice to Achilles, when he is in suicidal despair, is to eat and to sleep with a woman (which is good, she says)

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[17] See the poet's cynical comment on the slave-women of Achilles pretending to be lamenting for Patroclus (*Il.* 19. 301-2).

[18] This and the preceding example of θέμις concerning members of families may remind some readers of the suggestion that θέμις is the law within a family and δίκη the law between different families. Cf. E. Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes* (Paris 1969), p. 102; G. Glotz, *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel grec* (Paris 1904), esp. pp. 21-2. These are probably part of the evidence for such a suggestion, but, as far as Homer and Hesiod are concerned, it is obvious that the hypothesis simply does not work except in these examples. θέμις, above all, is a public affair closely connected with ἀγορή (cf. *Il.* 20. 4, *Od.* 2. 68-9). For further criticism of the view of Glotz and Benveniste, see G. C. Vlachos, *Les Sociétés politiques homériques* (Paris 1974), p. 335: '. . . Thémis, installée dans l' *agora* et rendue publique, symbolise désormais une justice parfaitement objective et rattachée à l'institution commune de la Cité.'

(*Il.* 24. 129-31). Sexual intercourse, either with one's wife or concubine, is nothing immoral in itself in the Homeric world.

There are some other examples of θέμιστες as non-moral customs or habits. Achilles says it is θέμις for the Achaean chiefs to come to visit Achilles' hut for holding counsels (*Il.* 24. 652). This θέμις could be just a habit, though it may well be a formal agreement, a sort of social rule.

It was not θέμις for Achilles' god-made helmet to fall on the ground until Patroclus borrowed it (*Il.* 16. 796). This θέμις may be taken as the will of the gods, for the helmet is a divine product, but the 'will of the gods', as in this case, is not always 'moral' in human terms. Amphinomus volunteers to kill Telemachus if 'it is the θέμιστες of Zeus' (*Od.* 16. 409). Although it turns out not to be the case, it is supposed to be possible that the gods might produce such θέμιστες as their ordinances. This usage of θέμιστες seems to carry a meaning close to 'oracle'.

It is said that it is not θέμις for human beings to confront Poseidon in the battle (*Il.* 14. 384-7):

> ἦρχε δ' ἄρα σφι Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων,
> δεινὸν ἄορ τανύηκες ἔχων ἐν χειρὶ παχείῃ,
> εἴκελον ἀστεροπῇ· τῷ δ' οὐ θέμις ἐστὶ μιγῆναι
> ἐν δαΐ λευγαλέῃ, ἀλλὰ δέος ἰσχάνει ἄνδρας.

There is a grammatical difficulty in interpreting τῷ in line 386, i.e. whether we should read it as 'with him (Poseidon)' or 'with it (ἄορ)', along with the peculiar usage of 'μιγῆναι', but it is clear enough that the horrific sight of the god is what matters here.[19] R. Hirzel's interpretation of this οὐ θέμις as 'not advisable' seems to fit better than 'not allowed'.[20] In either case, those who ultimately advise or allow would be the gods.

Some θέμιστες are, of course, definitely moral codes. One of them is ξεινίη, the code of host-guest friendship. Hospitality is the θέμις for guests (*Il.* 11. 779 ξείνια ... ἅ τε ξείνοις θέμις ἐστίν; *Od.* 9. 267-8 ξεινήϊον ... ἥ τε ξείνων θέμις ἐστίν). If you neglect visitors, it is 'οὐ θέμις' (*Od.* 14. 56-7). It is equally θέμις to reciprocate hospitality (*Od.* 24. 285-6). The goddess Themis herself is a model of a good host(ess), quick in welcoming (*Il.* 15. 87-9). It is θέμις for Nestor to

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19 Leaf and Ameis-Hentze, ad loc.

20 R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig 1907), p. 48.

give as much information as he has about Odysseus to his guest Telemachus who has come to his house for it (*Od.* 3. 187). The ultimate authority who guarantees this θέμις to guests is Zeus. Therefore if a man happens to be hated by the gods, it is no longer θέμις to entertain him or assist his journey (*Od.* 10. 73-4). The suitors of Penelope are accused of being ἀθέμιστοι (lacking θέμις) mainly because of their violation of the θέμις of ξεινίη—damaging their host's property and harassing the visitors to the house (*Od.* 17. 363, 20. 287).

Religious customs form another major category of θέμις. Libation before prayer to the gods is θέμις (*Od.* 3. 45). It is θέμις to make an oath to Poseidon when a man gives testimony on a matter of horses (*Il.* 23. 581-5). For Achilles, it is not θέμις to wash himself before completing funeral rites for Patroclus (*Il.* 23. 44).

And, most importantly to our inquiry, θέμις is law and legislation through public assemblies. Hence Themis is the goddess of the assembly. She summons the assembly of the gods on behalf of Zeus (*Il.* 20. 4). In the assembly of the Ithacans, Telemachus appeals to the citizens to check the suitors from wasting his property, in the names of Zeus and Themis as the gods of assembly (*Od.* 2. 68-9), who are also the gods of ξεινίη.

Zeus is believed to grant 'σκῆπτρον' and 'θέμιστες' to βασιλῆες (*Il.* 2. 205-6, 9. 98-9) and they in turn are supposed to protect θέμιστες in the capacity of δικασπόλοι (*Il.* 1. 238-9). However, that θέμις is not a monopoly of a monarch is clear from the frequent coupling of ἀγορή and θέμις (*Il.* 11. 807, *Od.* 9. 112, 215). θέμις, whether it is a moral code or a custom of a community, is something legislated or preserved in assemblies of nobles (βασιλῆες) or even common people. Freedom of speech itself is guaranteed as θέμις in a public assembly (*Il.* 2. 73, 9. 33). Even a beggar's claim that it is θέμις for him to speak out in a private conversation may be a reflection of this system (*Od.* 16. 91). True, Thersites is punished for his rudely frank rebuke of Agamemnon (*Il.* 2. 265-6), but such a speech seems to be his routine practice (*Il.* 2. 213-6), and the very fact that such a man can still speak out boldly is a sign of considerable tolerance. Even his physical punishment by Odysseus, and the threat of more, does not suggest any more than temporary disgrace (2. 261-4). Thersites is hated most of all for disturbing constructive discussions, thereby abusing the very θέμις which allows him to speak out.

King Minos is a single judge in the Underworld giving θέμις to the dead (θεμιστεύοντα *Od.* 11. 569), but he is there to listen to what *they* say first and then to give δίκαι (570) while others surround him, listening to his judgements. θέμις is always a public matter.

As part of his compensation to Achilles, Agamemnon promises seven cities as his daughter's dowry. He describes how the residents there would honour Achilles (*Il.* 9. 154-6, almost = 296-8):

ἐν δ' ἄνδρες ναίουσι πολύρρηνες πολυβοῦται,
οἵ κέ ἑ δωτίνῃσι θεὸν ὣς τιμήσουσι
καί οἱ ὑπὸ σκήπτρῳ λιπαρὰς τελέουσι θέμιστας.

Since they are completed 'under his sceptre', it is obvious that these θέμιστες have something to do with law and custom under the king's protection. It seems most natural to take the last line as referring to the residents' faithful practice of religious rites, orderly assembly, respect for the king, and good manners in general—just about everything moral θέμις implies[21].

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[21] The line 156 = 298 has been interpreted variously. Scholion bT 'λιπαρὰς δὲ τὰς θέμιστας καλῶν τοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει; Scholion A ὑπ' αὐτοῦ βασιλευόμενοι εἰρηνικῶς βιώσονται, or ὅσα δεῖ βασιλέα—λαμπροὺς φόρους τελέσουσιν; Leaf, ad loc., follows Scholion bT (taking θέμιστες as 'his ordinances'): 'will fulfil his pleasant ordinances'; M. L. West's suggestion (*Hesiod: Theogony*, Oxford 1966, on 901) for the meaning of λιπαράς, 'perhaps "such as attend prosperous εὐνομία"', seems to follow the first suggestion of Scholion A cited above; T. B. L. Webster, *From Mycenae to Homer*² (London 1964), p. 106 (cf. p. 121), referring to the Linear B tablet As 821 as read in the first edition of *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*, follows Scholion A's alternative interpretation 'λαμπροὺς φόρους τελέσουσιν': 'beneath his sceptre pay their shining dues. *Themis* is only used here in this sense but is found with the same meaning on Knossos tablets; 'shining' suggests that olive oil was one of the dues as at Knossos. The passage has preserved a very clear Mycenaean memory.' Webster's discussion is interesting in its own right, but unfortunately, the reading 'ti-mi-to' is now retracted by Chadwick in the second edition. Cf. *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*² (Cambridge 1973), p. 168 and p. 420. Besides, as Leaf (ad loc.) says, it is difficult to reconcile this interpretation with the Homeric use of θέμιστες; M. S. Ruipérez, 'Historia de θέμις en Homero' in *Emerita* 28 (1960), 99-123, offers another interesting interpretation that 'λιπαραὶ θέμιστες puede interpretarse como sinónimo de ξεστοὶ λίθοι, aludiendo λιπαρός al pulimento de las piedras, bien operando con el sentido primario de λιπαρός, como λίθοι untados con aceite (p. 119).' In my opinion, θέμιστας here are not Achilles' ordinances (for the sentence talks about *his sceptre*, not *his θέμιστες*; cf. Ameis-Hentze on 156) as Leaf (ad loc.) and Hirzel (*Themis, Dike und Verwandtes*, p. 415) take it, but rather, as in other cases, god-given customs. The king is there with his sceptre to protect already existing, if not written, law and customs. It also makes a better sense if the line means that the residents have 'good customs', which will make Agamemnon's offer of the cities more attractive, than that Agamemnon expects Achilles to be a good law-giver. And if θέμιστες is all that moral θέμις implies,

As we have already seen, the Cyclopes have no public life; They have no public ἀγοραί or θέμιστες (*Od.* 9. 112, 215), and the only θέμις they have is that within their own families (9. 114). Since their 'θέμις' is nothing like the social rules of men, in Odysseus' eye, they are ἀθέμιστοι (9. 106, 189, 428). However, again, they are not outlaws since they have no law to step out of; they are literally law-less.

Where law, θέμις, exists, however, the community expects its members to observe it. Even in the Olympian world, Hera complains that Ares is 'οὐ κατὰ κόσμον' (*Il.* 5. 759; like Thersites at 2. 214) and that he does not know any 'θέμιστα' (5. 761), referring to his violent manner in killing the Achaeans. Then Zeus suggests sending Athena to punish him (5. 765-6). But the gods are never serious in quarrelling with one another over human business.

Nestor says that a man who likes strife within a community is 'ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος' (*Il.* 9. 63), namely, outside membership of a clan, outside the reach of social rules, and even outside one's own family.[22] It is the most isolated state for a human being we can think of, since even the Cyclopes are not 'ἀνέστιοι'. Thus θέμις is considered a fundamental basis of social life. It is believed that an ἀθέμιστος attitude will eventually lead a man to misery, letting him lose all gifts from the gods. The Beggar-Odysseus tells Amphinomus that his present 'misery' is the result of his violation of θέμις in the past (*Od.* 18. 138-42):

καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ ποτ' ἔμελλον ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὄλβιος εἶναι,
πολλὰ δ' ἀτάσθαλ' ἔρεξα βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ εἴκων,
πατρί τ' ἐμῷ πίσυνος καὶ ἐμοῖσι κασιγνήτοισι.
τῷ μή τίς ποτε πάμπαν ἀνὴρ ἀθεμίστιος εἴη,
ἀλλ' ὅ γε σιγῇ δῶρα θεῶν ἔχοι, ὅττι διδοῖεν.

This is of course a lie, but it reflects part of Odysseus' own experience, because he who once won great glory in Troy has been reduced to the status of a wanderer for ten years due to his companions' ἀτασθαλίαι (1. 7) in harming the cattle of Helios and his own ἀτασθαλίαι in lingering in the cave of the Cyclops (10. 437) leading to the most disastrous consequences, especially the giant's curse on

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λιπαρός may well suggest splendid offerings the residents make for the gods as well as comfort they find in their orderly life. My tentative translation of the line would be, therefore, 'under his sceptre they will practice their pleasant customs.'

22 Contrast Peleus' advice to Achilles at *Il.* 9. 255-8, that if he keeps a friendly disposition and avoids quarrels, he will be honoured by the Achaeans (τίωσι).

him. In this context, he is not necessarily talking about divine punishment for any crime, because his ἀτασθαλίαι which changed his fortune were rather a mistake due to his daring spirit than a moral offence. He does not therefore consider himself to have been punished by the gods for a crime, but is talking about the changeability of human fortunes at the mercy of the gods.

δίκη and θέμις in Homer

Putting together the above observations, we may be able to sketch δίκη and θέμις in Homer as follows: θέμιστες are laws or customs which have existed in human society for a long time and often believed to be god-given. It is the king's duty to protect them with his administration of δίκη. δίκη is an application of θέμις.[23] For example, it is a compelling rule, θέμις (what should be done), to entertain a guest, and the fulfilment of that requirement, i.e. hospitality, is δίκη (what is usually done). The performance may not always match the ideal requirement, as in the case of a poor host like Eumaeus, but the requirement itself is unchanged. Similarly, what θέμις defines as right is supposed to be unchanged (like love among family members, religious customs, or sometimes even direct orders from the gods), but different individuals can have different interpretations of θέμις. That is the time when the king should intervene and decide which is right in the light of θέμις, and his decision is called δίκη.[24]

δίκη as judgement aims above all to dissolve conflicts within a community, and its value is measured not in terms of exacting punishment but by its result that should ensure the most desirable social relationship in the future. Consequently, δίκη is fairly flexible and can be given in more than two shades of fairness. Sharp dichotomy between 'just' and 'unjust' in jurisdiction does not seem common.

Those who ignore θέμιστες are called ἀθέμιστοι, and those who do

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[23] Cf. Bonner and Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*, p. 10: 'δίκη strictly represents the application by the human agent of the θέμις, which comes from the gods.' Their interpretation of θέμιστες, taking it 'pronouncements of the king' (p. 9), however, differs from mine.

[24] Cf. G. Ronnet, 'Θέμις et δίκη chez Homère et chez Hésiode' (résumé) in *REG* 87 (1974), XXIII: (the difference between θέμις and δίκη is) 'celle d'une réalité statique, l'ordre établi, et d'une virtualité dynamique, l'absolu moral, qui se concrétise au gré des détenteurs d'autorité.'

not perform δίκη are criticised for not being 'δίκαιοι'. But those who *are* δίκαιοι are so not by being just as against unjust, but by possessing the command of proper δίκαι, social manners as well as rules. There is no indication, apart from a dubious example of Athena's support for Odysseus, of the gods' concern for men's administration of θέμις and δίκη. It certainly seems that the rainstorm of Zeus is a unique example in Homer of divine anger expressed against the violation of θέμις in jurisdiction.

δίκη and θέμις in Hesiod

In Hesiod, δίκη and θέμις are more closely connected with Zeus than in Homer. Symbolically he marries Θέμις and becomes the father of Δίκη in the *Theogony* (901-2).[25] In general, however, the δίκη in this epic is basically the same as Homer's, namely that of heroic kings.

The Muses give their divine gift to the Zeus-nourished kings at their birth (81-90):

> ὅντινα τιμήσουσι Διὸς κοῦραι μεγάλοιο
> γεινόμενόν τ' ἐσίδωσι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων,
> τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ *γλυκερὴν χείουσιν ἐέρσην*,
> τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος *ῥεῖ μείλιχα*· οἱ δέ τε λαοὶ
> πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὁρῶσι διακρίνοντα *θέμιστας*
> *ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν*· ὃ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύων
> αἶψά κε καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσεν.
> τοὔνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, οὕνεκα λαοῖς
> βλαπτομένοις ἀγορῆφι μετάτροπα ἔργα τελεῦσι
> ῥηιδίως, *μαλακοῖσι* παραιφάμενοι *ἐπέεσσιν*.[26]

This picture clearly points to a heroic king born with prestige. Persuasion with soft words above all is a clear sign of heroic δίκη which reminds us of Nestor (cf. *Il.* 1. 249).

The king has another divine patroness. Hecate also is sitting beside him when he gives judgements. But she helps common men, too, at the assembly (434, 430):[27]

> ἔν τε δίκῃ βασιλεῦσι παρ' αἰδοίοισι καθίζει, 434
> ἔν τ' ἀγορῇ λαοῖσι μεταπρέπει ὅν κ' ἐθέλῃσιν. 430

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[25] On λιπαρὴν Θέμιν (901), cf. West, *Hesiod: Theogony*, ad loc., and our discussion above on *Il.* 9. 156 = 298.

[26] On the similarity of 84-7 and *Od.* 8. 170-3, see West on 84ff.

[27] For this order of lines, cf. West, ad loc.

Nereus is the model of a good king, a born 'elder'. He is truthful, gentle, and never forgets θέμιστες, knowing right and mild counsels (233-6):

Νηρέα δ' ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα γείνατο Πόντος,
πρεσβύτατον παίδων· αὐτὰρ καλέουσι γέροντα,
οὕνεκα νημερτής τε καὶ ἤπιος, οὐδὲ *θεμίστων*
λήθεται, ἀλλὰ *δίκαια* καὶ ἤπια δήνεα οἶδεν.

The association of seniority and δίκη is also observed in Nestor's figure in Homer.

We see Zeus himself establishing θέμις as the king of the gods. While recruiting the force against his father's regime, he distributes honours to cooperating gods in the way 'as is θέμις.' (395-6):

τὸν δ' ἔφαθ' ὅστις ἄτιμος ὑπὸ Κρόνου ἠδ' ἀγέραστος,
τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν, *ἣ θέμις ἐστίν.*

This is an anachronistic usage of θέμις, because while when a man says, 'it is θέμις,' it means that it has been a long-established custom, here Zeus is distributing new offices to the gods just now. The poet says 'ἣ θέμις ἐστίν' from his own point of view.[28]

In the *Shield of Heracles*, too, θέμις comes from Zeus. On one occasion his θέμις is an order to Amphitryon to conquer the Taphians and the Teleboans to avenge his brothers-in-law (17-9) which is a unique example of violent punishment directly prompted by the gods in the Homeric-Hesiodic tradition (*Shield* 20-2):

τὼς γάρ οἱ διέκειτο, θεοὶ δ' ἐπὶ μάρτυροι ἦσαν·
τῶν ὅ γ' ὀπίζετο μῆνιν, ἐπείγετο δ' ὅττι τάχιστα
ἐκτελέσαι μέγα ἔργον, ὅ οἱ *Διόθεν θέμις ἦεν.*

θέμις also takes the meaning of 'destined' comparable to αἶσα (*Il.* 16. 707, *Od.* 5. 113, 23. 315), μοῖρα (*Od.* 4. 475, 5. 41, 114, 345, 9. 532), μόριμον (*Il.* 20. 302), or μόρσιμον (*Il.* 5. 674, 19. 417) in Homer, when Athena tells Ares that it is not fated for him to kill Heracles (*Shield* 447-8):

οὐ γάρ τοι θέμις ἐστὶν ἀπὸ κλυτὰ τεύχεα δῦσαι
Ἡρακλέα κτείναντα, Διὸς θρασυκάρδιον υἱόν·

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28 Unlike in Homer. Cf. Griffin, *JHS* 106 (1986), 38: 'The poet never commits himself to expressing, from his own mouth, the idea that something is correct, in line with timeless usage.'

Hospitality is a δίκη (lot, right) of guests as in Homer (*Shield* 83-5):

ἵκετο δ' ἐς Κρείοντα καὶ Ἡνιόχην τανύπεπλον,
οἵ ῥά μιν ἠσπάζοντο καὶ ἄρματα πάντα παρεῖχον,
ἣ δίκη ἔσθ' ἱκέτῃσι, τίον δ' ἄρα κηρόθι μᾶλλον.

Apart from more intensified relationship between the gods, especially Zeus, and δίκη and θέμις, the definition of δίκη and θέμις does not seem very different from that in Homer.

But it is in the *Works*, especially, that δίκη/Δίκη and θέμις are inseparable from Zeus and take on strong moral colourings. In this poem, wherever they are mentioned, they are above all Zeus' business. The *Works* begins with the theme of Zeus as the watch-god of human morality (5-10):

ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει,
ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει,
ῥεῖα δέ τ' *ἰθύνει σκολιὸν* καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.
κλῦθι ἰδὼν ἀίων τε, *δίκῃ δ' ἴθυνε θέμιστας*
τύνη.

We already find a reminder of 'σκολιὰς θέμιστας' in this passage. A 'crooked' person is straightened by Zeus, and we must 'straighten' θέμιστας with δίκη. Here, the roles of θέμις and δίκη are somehow reversed from what we see in Homer. Here, the former is something man can fiddle with and present for divine inspection while the latter is the basis of justice applied to 'straighten' our particular conduct. The moral role played by Zeus is unmistakably clear, which is also very different from the general Homeric atmosphere.

After his lecture on good and bad Ἔρις, the poet invites his brother to settle their dispute (35-9):

ἀλλ' αὖθι διακρινώμεθα νεῖκος
ἰθείῃσι δίκῃς, αἵ τ' ἐκ Διός εἰσιν ἄρισται.
ἤδη μὲν γὰρ κλῆρον ἐδασσάμεθ', ἄλλα τε πολλὰ
ἁρπάζων ἐφόρεις μέγα κυδαίνων *βασιλῆας*
δωροφάγους, οἳ τήνδε *δίκην* ἐθέλουσι δίκασσαι.

Here, δίκαι, instead of θέμιστες as in Homer, come from Zeus, though apparently only 'straight' ones.[29] Then an amazing revela-

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[29] M. L. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford 1978), ad loc.

tion: the poet's brother seems to have bribed the βασιλῆες, for they are accused of being 'δωροφάγοι' for deciding on 'such a δίκη'.[30] Here we see very human βασιλῆες instead of an idealistic hero-king. There is a clear contrast between the fair and god-given δίκη and the crooked man-made one.

There is, however, a remnant of the age of righteous men. The race of gold became δαίμονες after their euthanasiac death, and watch over δίκαι in this world (121-6):

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψε,
τοὶ μὲν δαίμονές εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλὰς
ἐσθλοί, ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων,
οἵ ῥα φυλάσσουσίν τε *δίκας* καὶ *σχέτλια ἔργα*
ἠέρα ἑσσάμενοι πάντη φοιτῶντες ἐπ' αἶαν,
πλουτοδόται· καὶ τοῦτο γέρας *βασιλήιον* ἔσχον.

The contrast between δίκας and σχέτλια ἔργα reminds us of Eumaeus' words (*Od.* 14. 83-4). The idea that divine beings are watching us is also common in both.[31] The responsibility of these δαίμονες as guardians of justice and general welfare is called the 'kingly' honour. They are the kings as we know in Homer who administer δίκαι wisely with their flexible application for the common good.

This race is followed by the race of silver who do not observe θέμις. Zeus is angered by them and clears them away (134-9):

ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο
ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν, οὐδ' ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν
ἤθελον οὐδ' ἔρδειν μακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωμοῖς,
ἣ *θέμις* ἀνθρώποις κατὰ ἤθεα. τοὺς μὲν ἔπειτα
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ἔκρυψε χολούμενος, οὕνεκα τιμὰς
οὐκ ἔδιδον μακάρεσσι θεοῖς οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν.

They did wrong to one another (134-5), but, according to the poet (138-9), this is not the reason for the divine anger. Zeus punished them because they did not pay honour to the gods, an important 'θέμις' of mortals. As in Homer (*Il.* 7. 478-9), the gods do take action against men who neglect this particular θέμις, connected with their τιμή.

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[30] West, ad loc. against the interpretation of 'δωροφάγοι' as an honorary epithet of all kings.

[31] However, lines 124-5 are rejected by critics as interpolated from 254-5. Cf. West, ad loc.: 'these spirits are δαίμονες, ἐσθλοί, πλουτοδόται, not a secret police.'

After the self-destructive race of bronze, Zeus made the race of heroes. They are 'δικαιότερον καὶ ἄρειον' (158) than their immediate predecessors. There is no illustration of their 'righteousness'. Those who have survived the Theban and the Trojan wars enjoy their eternal happiness on the Islands of the Blessed (170-3), but we are not specifically told that this was the reward for being δίκαιοι. They may well have been given such a reward because they are half-divine (160 ἡμίθεοι) and related to the gods as Menelaus was (cf. *Od.* 4. 563-9).

Zeus made the fifth generation of men, race of iron. This race, contemporary with the poet and the audience/readers is also bound to be destroyed by Zeus some day (180-1). The poet recites a parade of vices prevailing in this world. There is no longer θέμις or δίκη as in good old days. There is no longer harmony between father and children, between guest and host, among friends, and among brothers—the poet's own bitter experience (182-4).

In this world men do not respect their aged parents, but rebuke them with harsh words (185-6). The poet condemns such men with strong words: 'σχέτλιοι, οὐδὲ θεῶν ὄπιν εἰδότες' (187). This reminds us of Homer's comment on Heracles who murdered his guest (*Od.* 21. 28):[32]

σχέτλιος, οὐδὲ θεῶν ὄπιν αἰδέσατ' οὐδὲ τράπεζαν,

and the rainstorm passage (*Il.* 16. 388 θεῶν ὄπιν). In Homer, even such a grave offender against god-given θέμις is not punished, despite the poet's condemnation. In Hesiod, the poet claims that harassing one's aged parents alone is enough to invite ὄπις from the gods.

In the age of iron, men do not reciprocate the care their parents have given them once the latter are aged. The poet calls them 'χειροδίκαι' (189), because their δίκη is in their hands (192 δίκη δ' ἐν χερσί), i.e. might is right. They plunder each other's city (189), they do not appreciate any man who is εὔορκος, δίκαιος, and ἀγαθός, and they praise 'κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν ἀνέρα'

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[32] F. Krafft's remarks (*Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod*, p. 80, n. 1) on grammatical and phraseological difficulties in Hesiod's line (187) make us heavily inclined to believe that it is modelled on Homer's line (21. 28), not the other way round.

(191-2).[33] The oath which served well among Homeric heroes as a means of 'straight judgement' does not work in such a society (193-4):

> βλάψει δ' ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα
> μύθοισι *σκολιοῖς* ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ' ὅρκον ὀμεῖται.

The 'crooked words' also echo the Homeric passage with σκολιὰς θέμιστας (*Il.* 16. 387).

The reversed list of these evils, on the other hand, would tell us what good δίκη and θέμις consist of: harmony in the family and among friends, respect for elderly parents, peace, true oaths, righteousness. The support for these values are Αἰδώς (restraint from inside individuals) and Νέμεσις (pressure from the outside world), who will eventually abandon human beings (197-200).[34] Their exit also reminds us of the expulsion of δίκη at *Il.* 16. 388.

The following two lectures, one addressed to Perses (213-47) and another addressed to βασιλῆες (248-73), are the heart of Hesiod's δίκη-doctrine. In both of them, δίκη and its derivatives are persistently repeated and cluster together. The phrase 'crooked judgements' (σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν etc.) appears five times and the adverb σκολιῶς twice (once with δίκας ἐνέποντες 262). The phrase 'straight judgements' also appears once (δίκας ἰθείας 225-6). It looks as if the poet was obsessed by the idea of crooked or straight judgements. According to him, whether δίκαι are straight or crooked is a matter of great concern for Zeus. The belief that Zeus or Dike will punish those who give crooked judgements and reward those who give straight ones is expressed again and again.

Dike brings mischief to men who have expelled her (219-24):

> αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει Ὅρκος ἅμα *σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν*·
> τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἑλκομένης ᾗ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσι
> δωροφάγοι, *σκολιῇς* δὲ *δίκῃς* κρίνωσι θέμιστας·
> ἣ δ' ἕπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἤθεα λαῶν,
> ἠέρα ἑσσαμένη, κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα
> οἵ τέ *μιν ἐξελάσωσι* καὶ οὐκ ἰθεῖαν ἔνειμαν.

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[33] Cf. West on 191: 'ἀγαθοῦ: here in a moral rather than a class sense, since κακῶν contrasts with it, as ὕβριν ἀνέρα with δικαίου.'; 'ὕβριν: apparently qualifying ἀνέρα, as if it were ὑβριστήν. He is Hybris incarnate.'

[34] Cf. West on 200: 'Αἰδὼς καὶ Νέμεσις: Both are forces that inhibit wickedness, one working from inside, the other, public disapproval, from without.' For Homeric αἰδώς and νέμεσις see Chapter 9.

Here is the poet's bitter 'δωροφάγοι' again (221). The rest of the line is another strong reminder of 'σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας' (*Il.* 16. 387). Lines 220 and 224 echo 'ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι' (*Il.* 16. 388).

On the other hand, if people give δίκας ἰθείας (225-6) to both strangers and countrymen, they will be rewarded richly by Zeus (227-37). Their city and people prosper, Zeus maintains peace for them, neither famine nor ἄτη follows those who are ἰθυδίκαι, but they happily till their land. Nature also responds to their virtue, producing wealth in abundance—the earth yields for them plenty of fruit in fields and mountains, their sheep are laden with wool, their women bear children as virtuous as their parents, and they do not need seafaring or trade because their land produces everything they need. This is the ideal world for peasants like the poet himself, with a different system of values from that of the heroic age. For heroic kings, war was an essential part of their life where they could demonstrate their worth, ἀρετή, and win τιμή—being 'ἀγαθός' meant above all being a good warrior, competent in plundering other people's cities (cf. the heroic epithet πτολίπορθος). But Homer does have a parallel of a righteous king's reign endowed with nature's blessings in a simile (*Od.* 19. 109-14) and does present the dark side of heroic values through the voice of Eumaeus, who says that even warriors whom Zeus allows to plunder a foreign land will fear divine anger deep inside (*Od.* 14. 85-8).

In the following lecture to the judges (βασιλῆες), the poet warns them of divine punishment (δίκη 249) for giving 'crooked judgements.' (249-55):

> ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐόντες
> ἀθάνατοι φράζονται ὅσοι *σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν*
> ἀλλήλους τρίβουσι *θεῶν ὄπιν* οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.
> τρὶς γὰρ μύριοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ
> ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων,
> οἵ ῥα φυλάσσουσίν τε *δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα*
> ἠέρα ἑσσάμενοι, πάντῃ φοιτῶντες ἐπ' αἶαν.

Here are, again, the same complex of 'crooked judgements' and 'the ὄπις of the gods' as in *Il.* 16. 387-8 and another of δίκη and σχέτλια ἔργα as in Eumaeus' belief (*Od.* 14. 83-4). The general idea of a 'divine patrol' of this passage reminds us of the doctrine of the gods disguised as guests roaming about on the earth to watch over the ὕβρις and εὐνομίη of men (*Od.* 17. 485-7).

The goddess Dike herself, described at 222-4 as in charge of

punishment, is a reporter of human vices to Zeus at 256-64:

ἡ δέ τε παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη, Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα,
κυδρή τ' αἰδοίη τε θεοῖς οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν,
καί ῥ' ὁπότ' ἄν τίς μιν βλάπτῃ *σκολιῶς* ὀνοτάζων,
αὐτίκα πὰρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθεζομένη Κρονίωνι
γηρύετ' ἀνθρώπων *ἀδίκων νόον*, ὄφρ' ἀποτείσῃ
δῆμος ἀτασθαλίας βασιλέων οἳ λυγρὰ νοεῦντες
ἄλλῃ παρκλίνωσι *δίκας σκολιῶς* ἐνέποντες.
ταῦτα φυλασσόμενοι, βασιλῆς, *ἰθύνετε* μύθους,
δωροφάγοι, *σκολιέων* δὲ *δικέων* ἐπὶ πάγχυ λάθεσθε.

The poet's bitter resentment against the bribed judges is expressed again in 'δωροφάγοι' in line 264, as in 39 and 221. The picture of Dike here reminds us of that of the Litai at *Il.* 9. 508-12 and no doubt that is one of the reasons for the suspected 'lateness' of the speech of Phoenix.[35] We have concluded in Chapter 4 that Phoenix's Litai-allegory was a *possible* theory, not established doctrine. Does Hesiod present his theory of divine punishment as a proven fact?

Another lecture to Perses starts with Zeus' reward for those who are just (274-85). The poet says that it was Zeus who gave δίκη to men which is ἀρίστη (279-80). This δίκη, however, is not simply knowledge of customs and good manners as that of Homeric heroes. The poet continues (280-5):

εἰ γάρ τίς κ' ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαι' ἀγορεῦσαι
γιγνώσκων, τῷ μέν τ' ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς·
ὃς δέ κε μαρτυρίῃσιν ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσας
ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ Δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀασθῇ,
τοῦ δέ τ' ἀμαυροτέρη γενεὴ μετόπισθε λέλειπται·
ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.

It is obvious that he is still thinking about unjust judgements and false testimonies. For the poet of the *Works*, δίκη is above all a

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[35] D. Aubriot, 'Les *Litai* d' Homère et la *Dikè* d' Hésiode' in *REG* 97 (1984), 1-25, however, illustrates the fundamental difference between the Litai of Homer and Dike of Hesiod, as well as their similarities. While the Litai rejects rigidity (p. 22), Hesiod's Dike demands 'straight' sentences in a sharp contrast with 'crooked' ones (pp. 14-5). Cf. p. 15: 'Donc l'image, d' un texte à l' autre, est porteuse de sens opposés: Homère blâme la rigidité tandis qu' Hésiode loue la rectitude; l'un invite à suivre un principe intangible, l' autre prône la souplesse de concessions opportunes présentées comme des compromis positifs et non comme des compromissions.' This observation drawn from the comparison of the Litai and Dike, interestingly, seems to echo my own observation above of two different moral climates, one dominant in Homer and another dominant in the *Works*.

matter of just or unjust, good or bad. He is convinced that Zeus must punish the unjust and reward the just. Here is a very clear-cut image of Zeus as the supreme authority of human morality. The god appears again at 333 as the avenger of suppliants, guests, orphans, and aged fathers, and he is also supposed to punish men who have affairs with their brother's wife (327-35). An amazing range of moral functions are attributed to the god, with no *paradeigmata* given. The tone is very similar to that of the moral speeches of Phoenix, Eumaeus, and the Beggar-Odysseus which are expressions of human faith or hope in the moral actions of the gods in defence of the weak and wronged. Does Hesiod have any firmer ground than those characters in Homer on which to claim that the gods do protect us?

The trouble in accepting Hesiod's words as the announcement of theological truth is that he does not speak with the detached authority of Homer which gives us an impression that the poet is omniscient in the world he creates. Instead Hesiod speaks as a character in the narrative himself. What he tells us is only what he believes. Despite his opening invocation of the Muses, he estranges himself from the goddesses by his address and request to Zeus (8-10) with an emphatic ἐγώ at line 10:

ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέρσῃ ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην.

He claims that what he is going to tell his brother is truth, but at one point, he makes it absolutely clear that he is not speaking as a mouthpiece of the Muses, but telling what he 'believes' to be true, again with an emphatic ἐγώ (270-3):

νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ μήτ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιος
εἴην μήτ' ἐμὸς υἱός, ἐπεὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον
ἔμμεναι, εἰ μείζω γε δίκην ἀδικώτερος ἕξει·
ἀλλὰ τά γ' οὔπω *ἔολπα* τελεῖν Δία μητιόεντα.

There is little doubt about the strength of the poet's faith in the moral support of Zeus, but he does not pretend to be an omniscient divine poet to declare it as truth. He is just another common human being like ourselves who can only 'believe' or 'hope' that the gods will never let justice wither away in this world. It is not a prophecy, but a creed.

Homer and Hesiod

This seems to explain why the content and the tone of the *Works* echo so often those of Homeric characters—specifically humble ones. Hesiod of the *Works* has taken up only the most human level of narrative from Homer. Neither the invocation to the Muses nor heroic detachment from the narrative seems at home with him. The poem is filled with his personal addresses (which are kept to a minimum in Homer) and personal feelings, in short, his 'ἐγώ'.

Homer seldom talks in that way. Most of the time his narrative is under the Muses' control as he claims. He does make us aware of his presence occasionally when he talks to the Muses, to some of his characters in the narrative, and to us, the audience, and when he makes comments, moral or otherwise, on his characters, but seldom showing his own strong feelings.[36] Since he has both human and divine eyes to look at the events in the world, he does not and should not say, 'I *believe* that the gods will do this and that.' Instead, he has an authority to announce anything as truth learned from the Muses: 'The gods *will* do this and that.'

Therefore, he expresses human hopes and beliefs in the morality of the gods only in the mouth of his characters. And from what they say, we can peep into the most human side of the poet, usually hidden behind his role as a divine singer. He knows the agony and helplessness of the weak and humble as much as Hesiod of the *Works* does. He knows the feeling which makes Eumaeus believe that the gods value 'δίκη' and 'αἴσιμα ἔργα' (*Od.* 14. 84), makes Philoetius hope that one day some god will bring his master back home and avenge all the wrongdoings of the suitors (*Od.* 21. 200-1), makes a beggar (the much-tried Odysseus) confess that the gods humiliated him for the wantonness of his young days (*Od.* 18. 138-42), makes Phoenix worried about Achilles' heroic pride which overrides all human compassion (*Il.* 9. 510-4), and makes old Laertes cry aloud

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36 On Homer's restrained style even in making his own comments, see Griffin, *JHS* 106 (1986), 38-40. On the poet's detached attitude observed even in his direct addresses to his characters, see N. Yamagata, 'The Apostrophe in Homer as Part of the Oral Technique' in *BICS* 36 (1989), 91-103, especially Conclusion. However, modern scholarship has revealed that the voice of the poet as the narrator can be detected more extensively in his work than previously thought. Cf. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers*, pp. 18-9 and pp. 136-46; Edwards, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, Volume V: Books 17-20, pp. 2-7.

in triumph (*Od.* 24. 351): 'O heavenly gods, you are indeed there protecting us!'[37]

If the passages with Phoenix and Laertes are declared 'later additions' or 'interpolations' and should be removed because of their moral sentiment, we must also remove the Beggar-Odysseus and Eumaeus who give similar moral lectures to almost everyone they meet. We may suspect, then, that most of the so-called 'Hesiodean' elements in Homer are in fact the reflection of the morality of common people in Homer's day, or possibly his own moral opinions.[38] He cannot express them as Hesiod does because of the narrative scheme he is working on. He must behave as a divine mouthpiece and should never say, '*I* believe in Father Zeus, omnipotent and omniscient . . .' etc. in his own person. He is also bound by traditional themes, phrases and other conventions to give heroic grandeur to his narrative, but, as has been observed by many, he seems to feel freer in introducing objects and people of his own time into similes and descriptions. Then why not contemporary religious beliefs? And why not in the speeches of characters?[39] We hear doctrines of divine concern for human morality from the mouth of Eumaeus, Odysseus and even a suitor. Also it is not unusual for the poet to describe angry gods punishing men (*Il.* 21. 522-4; *Il.* 5. 746-7 = *Il.* 8. 390-1 = *Od.* 1. 100-1) or Zeus sending storms (*Il.* 5. 87-92 damaging to crops; 12. 278-86; 16. 364-5) in digressions, and especially in similes, though without giving the reasons. If that is the case, it is nothing strange if we find a public assembly of the 'age of

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37 For this line as the expression of 'the new spirit of the *Odyssey*', see Russo-Fernández-Galiano-Heubeck, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey* III Books XVII-XXIV (Oxford 1992), on 24. 351-5, W. Burkert, 'Das Lied von Ares und Aphrodite: zum Verhältnis von Odyssee und Ilias' in *RM* 103 (1960), 141, and R. Friedrich, *Stilwandel im homerischen Epos* (Heidelberg 1975), p. 135.

38 Cf. Dodds, *The Greeks and the irrational*, p. 32: 'And once we are told that Zeus is angry with men who judge crooked judgements. But that I take to be a reflex of later conditions which, by an inadvertence common in Homer, has been allowed to slip into a simile.'; G. M. Calhoun, 'The divine entourage in Homer', *AJP* 61 (1940), 272: 'the speeches of characters . . . create at least an illusion of contemporaneity.'

39 Cf. A. Platt, 'Homer's similes' in *JP* 24 (1896), 28-38; M. W. Edwards, *Homer: Poet of the Iliad* (Baltimore and London 1987), p. 103; as indirect evidence for the poet's relative 'freedom' in similes, digressions etc., cf. G. P. Shipp, *Studies in the Language of Homer*[2] (Cambridge 1972), especially Introductory pp. 3-4, where he summarises his argument that 'late' or otherwise 'abnormal' linguistic features are abundantly found in similes, digressions, descriptions, poet's comments, and especailly in the Odyssey, in the lessons on morality.

iron' (as we see also on the shield of Achilles), the human expectation of divine punishment of those who do not practise straight δίκη (which we see in the speeches of Eumaeus, Odysseus, et al.), and the storm sent by Zeus, all together in a simile. It is true that Homer is generally very reserved when it comes to the matter of morality, although very occasionally some moral comments do slip out of his mouth, like the one on Heracles (*Od.* 21. 28). It may be possible to reject one or two such passages as non-Homeric, but not all the moral remarks of Eumaeus, Odysseus, and other characters, nor all 'anachronistic' similes. It is certainly more practical to assume that the poet does present the contemporary moral climate at times along with contemporary landscapes and institutions through the windows of similes, speeches, and *ekphrases*.

Let us now look at the rainstorm simile itself in the light of the observations above (*Il.* 16. 384-8):

ὡς δ' ὑπὸ λαίλαπι πᾶσα κελαινὴ βέβριθε χθὼν
ἤματ' ὀπωρινῷ, ὅτε λαβρότατον χέει ὕδωρ
Ζεύς, ὅτε δή ῥ' ἄνδρεσσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνῃ,
οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας,
ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι, θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.

Up to the word 'Zeus', it is just another description of storms caused by the god which are not uncommon in similes. The rest of line 386 indicates that there are plural men responsible for θέμιστες instead of a single hero-king. They have deliberately, 'forcibly', decided on 'crooked' θέμιστες.[40] In Homer θέμιστες are god-given customs supposed to be protected by the judges. We see Zeus actually send a storm to the Achaeans who have ignored a θέμις directly connected with τιμή of the gods (*Il.* 7. 478-9). Are the θέμιστες here also connected with their τιμή? Then it will be altogether natural for Zeus to be angry and take action. But 'βίῃ' suggests conflict among men rather than offence against the gods. So it seems more likely that someone's claim or right (δίκη) has been dismissed by the pressure of the judges who have perverted the long-standing customs. By so doing, they have created a bad precedent which is destined to be part

[40] The verb κρίνω is not strange for the object θέμιστες, if we think of the nature of θέμιστες, rules and customs which have existed for a long time and are always ready for consultation. The judge must 'choose' relevant codes and precedents on each occasion from the unwritten corpus of local rules. Cf. Webster, *From Mycenae to Homer*², p. 26.

of θέμιστες hereafter, thereby distorting the whole system of θέμιστες. And if, as Eumaeus says, the gods hate σχέτλια ἔργα and honour δίκη and αἴσιμα ἔργα (*Od.* 14. 82-3), and therefore one can expect ὄπις (82) of the gods for not performing δίκη, 'ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι, θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες' is only a condensed version of the same doctrine that the gods get angry at those who abandon the way they should behave.[41]

Whatever the passage exactly means, the world we see through this 'window' is the same one as Hesiod's world in the age of iron. This is the world of sharp distinction between good and bad, just and unjust, fair and unfair judgements. Men in charge of jurisdiction are no longer idealistic heroic kings. People who happen to suffer under their injustice have no means to protect or console themselves, except murmuring their belief that the gods are watching them and will one day punish the unjust. Since they have no direct contact with the gods, the best they can do to prove their belief is to associate nature's violence with divine anger. The mainstream of Homeric epics present, on the other hand, the world of hero-kings under divine protection who rule their people reasonably fairly with their heroic common sense. This distinction, largely due to the difference in motifs and narrative styles, is also found in Hesiod himself, if he composed both the *Works* and the *Theogony*.[42] While in the former, we see mainly the poet's personal (and desperate) hope in divine justice, in the latter, we find the world of ideal kings described in heroic detachment.

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[41] Many have been disturbed by the peculiar expression 'expelling δίκη' which contains a seed of personification, but this sort of half-completed personification is not uncommon elsewhere in Homer, e.g. *Il.* 9. 513, 16. 805, 24. 49, 480. Some scholars may like to attribute all such lines to a 'late' stage of composition, but that itself would not be sufficient to cast doubt on their authenticity, as it is the case with *Il.* 16. 388. For the 'expulsion' of δίκη, see also E. A. Havelock, *The Greek Concept of Justice*, p. 137. All this said, I still feel that I am left with a difficulty in explaining away all the problems involved in 387-8, but what I hope I have shown is that the moral sentiment expressed in the lines is not necessarily alien to Homer, and therefore cannot be taken as sufficient reason on its own to label them as 'Hesiodic'. It is possible to make sense of them within the Homeric context. There is even an argument that it is Hesiod who borrowed the verses from Homer. Cf. L. Bertelli, 'Note critiche ad Hom., Π 384-93 e ad Hes., Erga 221, 224, 264', *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* 101 (1966-67), pp. 371-93, especially pp. 384-9.

[42] For the question of authorship of the *Works* and the *Theogony*, see G. P. Edwards, *The language of Hesiod in its traditional context* (Oxford 1971), p. 195: 'Although the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* are for the most part widely separated in their subject-matter, we have found nothing in their language to suggest that they must be of independent authorship.'

This seems to conclude our quest. If the rainstorm simile is Hesiodic, it is so only in the way the *Theogony* is Homeric. The epic poets seem to have two levels of moral climate ever ready to alternate, one of the age of heroes and another of the age of iron. Whenever Homer describes his (and our) own age of iron, he switches to the world where all the vices we know exist, where there is no heroic king who protects his people like a father, and where the weak and wronged have no hope of getting justice done except through Zeus and the gods. However, in Homer—unlike Hesiod—, this world is confined to small slots of similes, descriptions, digressions and moral speeches, and is not allowed to burst into the mainstream of the narrative. In the main part of the narrative we expect to see the legendary grandeur of the heroes' age, when men are much freer and greater, capable of protecting their rights with their own arms, and there the gods enjoy a carefree life, not much disturbed by the suffering of the generations of men which flourish and fall like leaves of trees.*

* This chapter was indirectly inspired by a series of events that took place in China in June 1989 when I was drafting it. The occasion forced me to question my own view of justice in society, and to think more seriously than ever about justice, law and social order. Without this new perspective, this chapter would not have taken its present form.

CHAPTER SIX

DIVINE ANGER AND MORALITY

We saw a possible example of Zeus' moral indignation at human injustice in the last chapter. Although it is located in a simile where the poet tends to describe social conditions different from those in main parts of his epics, it still obliges us to examine in full what causes divine indignation in Homer, before we can say whether the gods have any sense of moral indignation or no such sense at all.[1]

Divine τιμή

There is no doubt that the gods are angered when their τιμή is damaged or challenged, especially by mortals. Most notably they get angry at, and take action against, men who forget to make them due offerings (*Il.* 9. 533ff. Artemis at Oeneus, *Od.* 4. 351ff. the gods at Menelaus). This is so well known that it is the first cause to be suspected whenever men sense divine anger at work (*Il.* 1. 65, 5. 177-8). The gods also take revenge when their property is damaged (*Od.* 12. 348, 376 Helios at the companions of Odysseus), when their sanctuary is defiled (*Od.* 3. 135ff., 4. 502, Athena at Locrian Ajax), when their priests are insulted (*Il.* 1. 9ff. Apollo at Agamemnon), when mortals compare themselves with the gods in some skill or in well-being (*Il.* 2. 595-600 the Muses at Thamyris, 24. 605ff. Apollo and Artemis at Niobe, *Od.* 8. 224-8 Apollo at Eurytus), and when they are threatened with direct violence (*Il.* 2. 781-2 Zeus at Typhoeus, 6. 130-40 the gods at Lycurgus, 21. 456-7 Poseidon and Apollo at Laomedon, cf. Apollo's warnings to Diomedes at *Il.* 5. 440-2 and to Patroclus at *Il.* 16. 707-11, anger of Poseidon at Troy at *Il.* 24. 25-7). They can be angered also by disobedience of men or lesser gods (*Il.* 3. 413 Aphrodite angry at Helen; cf. potential

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[1] In the following, the terms κότος, νέμεσις, ὄπις, μῆνις, χόλος and their derivatives are discussed as one category. For finer definitions of various words denoting 'anger', see P. Considine, 'The Etymology of ΜΗΝΙΣ' in *Studies in Honour of T. B. L. Webster* Vol. 1 (eds. J. H. Betts, J. T. Hooker and J. R. Green, Bristol 1986), pp. 53-64.

cases: *Il.* 15. 121-2 Zeus at Ares and other gods; *Od.* 5. 146-7 Zeus at Calypso; *Od.* 13. 148 Zeus at Poseidon).

Their sense of honour is very human in logic and excessively divine in the scale of retaliation. Hera and Athena are angry at Paris for his judgement at their beauty contest, and as retaliation, they are determined to destroy the whole city of Troy (*Il.* 4. 24ff.; cf. *Il.* 24. 25-7). Poseidon is angry at the Phaeacians (*Od.* 13. 173) only because they have helped a man whom the god happens to hate. Their punishment is the termination of their seafaring tradition.[2] What they have done is completely in accordance with human moral codes and with what men believe to be a god-given θέμις, i.e. ξεινίη. Yet the patron of ξεινίη, Zeus himself, authorises Poseidon to punish them saying (*Od.* 13. 143-4):

> ἀνδρῶν δ' εἴ πέρ τίς σε βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ εἴκων
> οὔ τι τίει, σοὶ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐξοπίσω τίσις αἰεί.

As far as we know, the Phaeacians are peaceful, non-violent people (cf. *Od.* 8. 246-9). Therefore, the βίη and κρατός mentioned here must be their 'competence' especially their sea-faring skills, not physical violence against Poseidon. But that is enough to hurt the god's sensitive pride. Alcinous realises this when the god's punishment has just begun (13. 172-4; cf. 8. 565-6):

> ὢ πόποι, ἦ μάλα δή με παλαίφατα θέσφαθ' ἱκάνει
> πατρὸς ἐμοῦ, ὃς φάσκε Ποσειδάων' ἀγάσεσθαι
> ἡμῖν, οὕνεκα πομποὶ ἀπήμονές εἰμεν ἁπάντων.[3]

Such unreasonable jealousy of the gods is felt also by Penelope. She says that the gods' jealousy prevented Odysseus and her from enjoying the flower of their life together (*Od.* 23. 210-2). The gods somehow resent continuous human happiness and successes.

The gods are indeed jealous beings. They often become jealous at

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[2] For various interpretations of their actual punishment, see S. E. Bassett, 'The fate of the Phaeacians', *CP* 28 (1933), 305-7; ed. W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer*[2] (Hampshire and London 1965), on 13. 156-8.

[3] There is some clumsiness of the plot in this episode. The gods are talking about 'not honouring Poseidon' as their reason for punishing the Phaeacians, while the prophecy talks about Poseidon's 'jealousy' of the unfailing escorts of travellers by the Phaeacians. This clumsiness may be explained, as J. Irmscher, *Götterzorn bei Homer*, p. 60, says, as due to the poet's attempt to combine two independent stories, 'die Lokalsage vom versteinerten Schiffe (163) mit dem Poseidonzorn gegen Odysseus in Verbindung zu bringen.'

one another as well. Zeus may get angry if his wife goes somewhere far without his permission (*Il.* 14. 310-1). Hera, in her turn, used to be furious at Heracles (*Il.* 18. 119), Zeus' son by a mortal woman. And Zeus, in his turn again, is furious at her for harassing his son (*Il.* 14. 256, 266). Hephaestus is angry at his unfaithful wife and her lover (*Od.* 8. 276, 304). Such reactions as these are fairly understandable since mortals feel exactly the same way.

But their jealousy goes even beyond the bondage of marriage. Calypso complains that male gods are always jealous and cruel when goddesses have liaisons with mortal men (*Od.* 5. 119, 122, 129), while the other way round is far more common and tolerated (except by the wife of the god concerned). Jealousy, in any case, is not a specially divine manifestation of the claim for their τιμή, however justifiable it might be. Mortals seem far more tolerant of their spouse's infidelity judging by the case of Helen welcomed back to Menelaus' palace after the war caused by her elopement.

Divine nepotism and favouritism

Another major cause of divine anger is also a very 'human' one. The gods become angry at the opponents of their favourite mortals, who are often also their offspring.

The *Odyssey*—at least half of it—is all about the wrath of Poseidon at Odysseus who blinded the god's son Polyphemus (*Od.* 1. 20-1, 68-9, 78, 5. 284, 339-40, 423, 6. 330-1, 11. 102-3, 13. 342-3; cf. Aeolus' guess at 10. 74-5, Eumaeus' guess at 14. 366). Odysseus blinded Polyphemus, who had brutally killed six of his companions, in self-defence, but no such circumstances are taken into Poseidon's consideration. Neither do the other gods try, on this ground, to dissuade the angry god from his ruthless revenge on Odysseus. The god's anger is even extended to the Phaeacians who entertain Odysseus and send him home. It is a purely emotional, irrational example of divine anger, utterly human in motivation, and hideously divine in effect—ten years' delay in Odysseus' journey home.[4]

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[4] Some may argue that Odysseus is guilty of taunting Polyphemus by saying that even Poseidon would not be able to cure his eye (9. 520). However, the god, invoked as the father of the giant, has the obligation of revenge for his son, regardless of the circumstances, just as the families of the suitors assume their responsibility for revenge on Odysseus, knowing well that the suitors have been in the wrong. Besides, Poseidon seems as indifferent to Odysseus' taunts as to Polyphemus'

In the *Iliad*, Poseidon is angry when Zeus causes defeat of the Achaeans whom he supports (13. 16, 15. 227), not to mention when his grandson is killed (13. 206-7).

Athena in human disguise shows indignation at the suitors of Penelope in the *Odyssey* (1. 252, 22. 224-5), because they are enemies of her protégé. No other god is described as angry at the behaviour of the suitors. As a war-goddess, her raging spirit against men whom she wants to destroy is almost proverbial (*Il.* 5. 747 = 8. 391 = *Od.* 1. 101; Ares and Athena *Il.* 17. 398-9). In the *Iliad*, she is angry at the Trojans (e.g. 5. 191) and anybody who works against the Achaeans, even Zeus who bans divine interference in the war (8. 460). She is angry at Apollo when he interferes with the chariot-racing of Diomedes, one of her protégés (23. 391).

Apollo, in his turn, is angry at the Achaeans, especially Diomedes (5. 444, 23. 383 where he is racing against Trojan horses nurtured by Apollo; cf. 2. 766), and at Athena (10. 517) for helping them, because they are enemies of the Trojans whom he supports. He is also angered by a cowardly retreat of the Trojan allies (4. 507).

Hera seems to foster more vehement wrath in her heart against her enemies than any other god. When Hector exults in a favourable tide of the battle, her angry shiver shakes the whole of Mt. Olympus (*Il.* 8. 198-9). Since she is angry at his killing of Achaean warriors, and since she favours Achilles, she is the one angered by Apollo's accusation against Achilles of his maltreatment of Hector's body (*Il.* 24. 55). Like Athena, she is angry at Zeus who appears to be favourable to the truce between two armies (*Il.* 4. 24) and who orders the gods not to help them in fighting (*Il.* 8. 461, 15. 103-4), and, unlike Athena (4. 23, 8. 460), she cannot help speaking out against Zeus' policy in her anger. To gods other than Zeus, her anger often proves to be dangerous. When she gets angry at Xanthus who has nearly drowned Achilles, she sets Hephaestus upon him until his stream boils up (*Il.* 21. 328-84). When she is

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brutality against Odysseus' companions. I do not think Odysseus' triumphant words have increased the justification for the god to punish him. Cf. G. Bona, *Studi sull' Odissea* (Torino 1966), pp. 45-6; F. Focke, *Die Odyssee* (Stuttgart and Berlin 1943), p. 168: 'Die Schuld des Odysseus aber besteht einzig und allein darin, daß er einen Sohn des Poseidon blendete. Einzig deshalb zürnt ihm der Meergott.'; A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey* Volume II (Oxford 1989), on 9. 500-5: 'Odysseus does provoke the curse laid on him; but it is carelessness, not ὕβρις or a breach of a law which requires punishment.'

angry at Ares, she sets Athena upon him (*Il.* 5. 762-3, 21. 412-3). In the 'Theomachia', only she and Athena are involved in actual fighting, and successful. Athena beats Ares and Aphrodite under Hera's instruction (21. 403-34). Hera beats Artemis (21. 479ff.).

Xanthus is the only god who is angry at Achilles' merciless killing of Trojan youths (*Il.* 21. 136, 146, 212, 306), but is checked by Hephaestus as we have seen. Ares who rages on the battlefield as a war-god (17. 399) shows more 'human' anger at the death of his son (15. 138) which even (allegedly) endangers his life, but he is checked by Athena from taking any revenge on behalf of his son.

These examples of 'divine' anger as we have seen above are all too human when we look at them in the gods' perspective, in terms of their personal grudge, personal losses, etc. However, if we look at the cases in their broader context, we notice a strange order behind them.

μοῖρα and divine anger

First, the gods expect their share of τιμή, due honour, from human beings. And their τιμή is part of universal order, μοῖρα. Poseidon has the same share of τιμή (*Il.* 15. 189) as Zeus (186 ὁμότιμον) which means that he has the same μοῖρα as his brother (195; 209 ἰσόμορον καὶ ὁμῇ πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ). It is θέμις for men to pay due honour to the gods and it is the gods' μοῖρα to receive it. If men neglect this duty, it is not only against θέμις in human terms, but also against μοῖρα in divine and cosmic terms.

The gods are especially ruthless in punishing men who challenge them because it is not the lot (μοῖρα) of mortals to compete with immortal gods (*Il.* 6. 128-41, 22. 8-13).[5] And all of those who receive eternal punishments in the Underworld are such challengers to the gods (*Od.* 11, 576-600). The gods' apparently 'personal' anger caused by offence against their τιμή, in fact, corresponds to a higher order, a universal law of the world, i.e. μοῖρα. It is by μοῖρα that the gods are immortal and men mortal, and the abyss between them must not be bridged. Men are allowed to enjoy divine privileges only after they are deified, like Heracles (*Od.* 11. 602-4) and Leucothea

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[5] Cf. *Il.* 5. 406-15, though despite Dione's condemnation, Diomedes survives the war and goes home safely according to *Od.* 3. 180-2. Zeus, at least, is not angry at Diomedes as much as he is at Ares judging by his reaction towards Ares' complaint (5. 888-91). See also *Il.* 5. 440-2.

(*Od.* 5. 335). As far as they are mortal, they are never allowed to be equal to the gods in any respect. Perhaps, this, to some extent, explains the general divine jealousy towards divine-human liaisons.

Even so, Poseidon's wrath at the Phaeacians still looks excessive. To our eyes, their competence in seafaring does not seem to affect the god's honour very much. However, it is also a case of μοῖρα if we take a close look at it. It has been prophesied long before the event that one day they will lose Poseidon's favour in one way or another (*Od.* 8. 565-6, 13. 172-4). It is, after all, their μοῖρα, an inevitable fate. Odysseus' visit may not even be the real reason for their punishment, even if it is a direct cause. In this sense, the god's anger perfectly keeps pace with μοῖρα. Moreover, he is very careful in trying to keep himself within the plan of Zeus, who appears to be the administrator of μοῖρα; Poseidon is quite prepared to give up his wrath at the Phaeacians if it was not authorised by Zeus (*Od.* 13. 148). Zeus allows Poseidon to take his revenge because it *is* the time set by μοῖρα to terminate Phaeacian seamanship.

Poseidon's wrath at Odysseus seems equally unreasonable at first sight, but here again, we see μοῖρα at work, behind the scene. Already at the time when he leaves for Troy, it has been prophesied that he will not come back to Ithaca until the twentieth year after his departure (*Od.* 2. 175-6). It does not matter if the cause is blinding the Cyclops, incurring the wrath of Poseidon, or any other, provided he does not go home until then. Poseidon, Helios and Zeus work together to fulfil this μοῖρα of Odysseus. Poseidon's anger at Odysseus and Helios' anger at his crew are both described as if they were human emotions, but completely in accordance with the course of μοῖρα.

On the other hand, it is equally μοῖρα for Odysseus to go home eventually (*Od.* 5. 41-2, 113-5) and to take revenge upon the suitors (11. 118-20). Therefore, Athena's rather excessive love and care for Odysseus, her indignation at the suitors, and her malicious plots against them all perfectly keep pace with μοῖρα. At the very end of the story, she says that Zeus would be angered by further bloodshed in Ithaca after delivering his order for making peace (24. 544). Zeus could be angered not because he is a pacifist, but because peacemaking at this very moment is his plan, and it is μοῖρα.

And it is, after all, μοῖρα that the Trojan war is caused, fought, and ended in the way it is through the plan of Zeus, and the gods' involvement in the war on either side, the Trojan or the Achaean,

is an integral part of the scenario. Although driven by their purely 'human' senses of honour, anger, and affection, the gods perform their roles prescribed by μοῖρα, e.g. Apollo handing Patroclus to Hector, Athena handing Hector to Achilles etc.[6] Men might describe their misfortunes as the result of divine anger (*Il.* 6. 205, 18. 292, 21. 83, *Od.* 11. 560) or divine jealousy (*Od.* 23. 210-2) which may be right, but their anger, however unreasonable and unfair it might look to human eyes, is always a manifestation of fate. The gods may be driven by their divine instinct to get angry, but at least sometimes act out of their knowledge of the course of μοῖρα. Apollo is angry at Patroclus for trying to scale the Trojan wall (*Il.* 16. 711) because it is not αἶσα (707) for him to take the city. Heracles died due to μοῖρα and Hera's wrath (*Il.* 18. 119). The gods work for μοῖρα sometimes even against their personal feelings. A good example is Poseidon's rescue of Aeneas, because it is fated (μόριμον *Il.* 20. 302) that he will survive the war and rebuild Troy.[7] If he was killed, Zeus would be angry (20. 301). On the other hand, if Zeus saved Sarpedon or Hector out of his personal feeling, other gods would be angry (16. 443, 22. 181), though it seems that he has the power to save them against μοῖρα. We will see the relation between Zeus and μοῖρα in detail in the next chapter.

In short, divine anger is μοῖρα-oriented, not morally-motivated. This explains why human expectation of moral performance of the gods is often frustrated. Since it is the gods' plan to destroy the suitors of Penelope in the end, the human guess that the gods must be angry at the suitors' wantonness (*Od.* 2. 66, 20. 169, 215, 23. 63-4) appears to be verified. On the other hand, since it is fated that Heracles will become a god and enjoy divine privileges, the divine ὄπις towards his murder of his guest (*Od.* 21. 28), despite the poet's comment, does not affect him. Zeus sends storms and damages crops whenever it is μοῖρα for him to do so, regardless of the virtue or vice of men. Therefore it is up to human beings to interpret a storm as a sheer misfortune (*Il.* 5. 91) which Zeus is said to send to

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[6] Cf. W. F. Otto, *The Homeric Gods* (tr. by M. Hadas, New York 1954), pp. 278 and 280.

[7] Of course, from the poet's point of view, these 'fates' are what the tradition says, the legendary 'facts' that he cannot change. Cf. E. Hedén, *Homerische Götterstudien* (Uppsala 1912), p. 177; P. E. Eberhard, *Das Schicksal als poetische Idee bei Homer* (*Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums* XIII-1, 1923); G. M. Calhoun, 'The Divine Entourage in Homer' in *AJP* 61 (1940), 260.

men so often (*Il.* 24. 525-33) or divine punishment (*Il.* 16. 384-92).

Among themselves, however, the gods seem to have a morality of the kind common among men. First of all, the gods normally do not like quarrels among themselves. It is said that the gods were once vexed at the violence of Zeus to Hera (*Il.* 15. 21). When Ares, wounded by Diomedes and Athena, complains to Zeus, the father expresses his displeasure with Ares' warlike character and scolds him as 'ἀλλοπρόσαλλος' (*Il.* 5. 890-1). But Zeus is not really seriously angry. After all, you are my son, he says, and has his son's wound treated (5. 895-9). The conclusion of this episode is ever the same divine happiness (906):

πὰρ δὲ Διὶ Κρονίωνι καθέζετο κύδεϊ γαίων.

Zeus and Hera are most frequently at odds with each other, but, rather typical of an old stable couple in ennui, Zeus confesses that he is now so used to his wife's disobedience that he no longer feels anger (*Il.* 8. 407-8). They seem to have grown out of dish-fighting.

Hephaestus is angry at his wife and her lover Ares (*Od.* 8. 304) and calls other gods to come and see the trapped pair. The goddesses do not come, but male gods do. One of them makes a light-hearted moral comment (329):

οὐκ ἀρετᾷ κακὰ ἔργα· κιχάνει τοι βραδὺς ὠκύν,

and says that Ares should pay an adulterer's penalty (332 τὸ καὶ μοιχάγρι' ὀφέλλει). While other gods are making fun of the naughty pair, Poseidon alone is concerned about his nephew's honour, asking Hephaestus to release him, saying that he will guarantee due payment of Ares' penalty (347-8, 355-6). On his request, Hephaestus releases the two. It seems that among the gods, too, adultery is a crime and the offender must pay a penalty. It looks fair enough so far. But are they really serious about it? Hermes even wishes to be in Ares' position, in bed with Aphrodite, even with a tighter trap and a bigger audience (339-42). Poseidon is the only serious person in the scene, not because of moral indignation, but because he pities Ares being in a shameful show. The ending of the story is as usual. The god and the goddess go to their respective place of cult, where the goddess is washed and splendidly dressed by the Charites, to shine in glorious beauty again (*Od.* 8. 362-6)—there is no trace of shame or remorse, but the unchangeable Olympian happiness.

Despite mock-moral statements and mock-legal transactions, there is an overwhelming air of light-heartedness among the gods. No quarrel, no discord is a serious matter among the gods. They respect each other and try to avoid, at least to minimise, fighting against each other especially over human matters (*Il.* 21. 379-80, 462-7, 498-501, *Od.* 6. 329-31, 13. 148, 341-3). Nothing should spoil their heavenly banquet ringing with laughter and music (*Il.* 1. 573ff.). Divine society is basically problem-free and there is no need for moral codes or law apart from the divine instinct for their common happiness. μοῖρα, which often appears as the ruthless reality of life to human beings, is merely the basis of mutual respect and eternal happiness for the gods. They are happy as they are, and they are what they are thanks to the μοῖρα they hold. Therefore, they never trespass beyond μοῖρα themselves, nor allow mortals to do so. They must defend and maintain the present distribution of μοῖρα which is the basis of their privilege and welfare. No wonder they are most furious when men threaten their μοῖρα.

This will lead us to a brief conclusion to our quest for divine morality. The gods do have some sense of morality, but its focus is always on μοῖρα. Unless what μοῖρα bids coincides with the moral virtue of men, the gods do not behave as, or rather do not appear to be, defenders of human morality.

PART TWO

MORALITY OF HOMERIC MAN

CHAPTER SEVEN

FATE, GODS, AND MEN

So far, we have mentioned fate, μοῖρα or αἶσα, occasionally in relation to divine morality, and mostly treated it as identical to Διὸς βουλή. Certainly Zeus looks at times like an administrator and distributor of μοῖραι. We see, however, that the gods, including Zeus, sometimes give up their personal desires in favour of μοῖρα. What exactly is the relation between μοῖρα and Zeus (and the other gods)?

At least four opinions have been proposed and reproposed: (1) fate is identical with the will of the gods or of Zeus; (2) the gods are only the instruments of fate; (3) the gods and fate belong to two separate spheres of religious principles, which the poet failed to coordinate into a coherent system; (4) fate is only the poet's plan or what the legend says, i.e. the plot of the poem.[1] If μοῖρα controls every event, and every step of divine and human conduct, it is impossible to talk seriously about moral responsibility based on the conscious control of behaviour by men or gods. In this chapter, we examine the use of the words μοῖρα, αἶσα and their cognate words, in order to see the relation between fate and the divine and human characters of the epics.

μοῖρα and the cognate words

The primary sense of the μορ- component in μοῖρα, μόρος and other related words (μείρομαι etc.) is a 'divided portion' or 'share' without necessarily any good or bad connotation.[2] The best examples to illustrate its 'neutrality' are:

μοῖραι as 'parts' of night in *Il.* 10. 253:

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[1] Cf. E. Ehnmark, *The Idea of God in Homer*, p. 74; E. Leitzke, *Moira und Gottheit im alten griechischen Epos* (Göttingen 1930), pp. 65-7; S. Eitrem, 'Moira' in *RE* 15-2, (1932), 2453-60.

[2] For the etymology cf. W. Krause, *Glotta* 25 (1936), 146-7; E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*[4] (Heidelberg 1950), μοῖρα, μείρομαὶ H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1960), μοῖρα, μείρομαὶ P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris 1968-80), μείρομαι.

τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται.

μοῖρα as a fraction of one's property in *Od.* 4. 97:

ὧν ὄφελον τριτάτην περ ἔχων ἐν δώμασι μοῖραν
ναίειν.

And μοῖρα as the part of the field in the hands of the Achaeans in *Il.* 16. 68:

χώρης ὀλίγην ἔτι μοῖραν ἔχοντες.

The meaning of 'share' is particularly clear from the usage of μείρομαι (have a share of) in the active and the middle (*Il.* 1. 278, 9. 616, 15. 189, *Od.* 5. 335, 11. 338, all with τιμή and αἰδώς), and of ἔμμορος ('sharing in' *Od.* 8. 480, with τιμή). The meaning of 'division' is transparent in the usage of διαμοιράομαι (*Od.* 14. 434). μοῖρα, most often an undesirable portion like the doom of death, can sometimes be a good portion as in μοιρηγενής ('a child of Fortune' *Il.* 3. 182), ἄμμορος ('without a share in bathing' *Il.* 18. 489, Od. 5. 275; 'without good luck' *Il.* 6. 408, 24. 773), δυσάμμορος ('most luckless' *Il.* 19. 315, 22. 428, 24. 727). But who 'divides' and distributes such 'portions'?

When men talk about a μοῖρα of booty (*Il.* 9. 318, *Od.* 11. 534) or food (especially a portion of meat; *Od.* 3. 40, 66, 8. 470, 14. 448, 15. 140, 17. 258, 335, 19. 428, 20. 260, 280, 281, 293), the distributors are naturally men. Such distribution can be very arbitrary at times (as Achilles' complaint at *Il.* 9. 318-9 or Eumaeus' generous serving of a chine—the portion of the highest honour as at *Il.* 7. 321—to a beggar at *Od.* 14. 437 shows) but generally follows the rule that each person receives his due portion according to his worth and status.[3] Also for the lack of μοῖρα of αἰδώς (οὐδ' αἰδοῦς μοῖραν ἔχουσιν. *Od.* 20. 171), human distribution (i.e. an individual's choice to be shameless etc.) should be considered responsible.

The gods, too, once divided their property among themselves. The three sons of Kronos, Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades, divided the world into three μοῖραι, portions (*Il.* 15. 189-93). Zeus' portion is the Heaven, Poseidon's the Sea, Hades' the Underworld (therefore each of the three is ἰσόμορος 209), and the rest, the Earth, is the common property of all the gods. In this scheme of distribution, as

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[3] Cf. B. C. Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods* (London 1965), p. 225.

is clear from the way Poseidon puts it, the three gods are the distributors of their own μοῖραι. They do not call in the goddess Moira or the like, except that they decided their respective portions by lot.

When μοῖρα and a preposition are coupled, they serve as an adverbial phrase such as within/beyond a proper portion i.e. properly/not properly. When something is done in good order, it is done 'κατὰ μοῖραν' (*Il.* 16. 367 (negative), 19. 256, *Od.* 3. 457, 4. 783, 8. 54, 9. 245, 309, 342; fairly *Od.* 16. 385). When someone speaks properly or in due order, he is said to speak 'κατὰ μοῖραν' (properly; *Il.* 1. 280, 8. 146, 9. 59, 10. 169, 15. 206, 23. 626, 24. 379, *Od.* 2. 251 (negative), 3. 331, 4. 266, 7. 227, 8. 141, 397 (negative), 496, 13. 48, 15. 170, 203, 17. 580, 18. 170, 20. 37, 21. 278, 22. 486; in due order; *Od.* 10. 16, 12. 35, 13. 385) or speak 'ἐν μοίρῃ' (properly *Il.* 19. 186). Antinous has been shot dead by Odysseus 'ἐν μοίρῃ', within his due portion, i.e. deservedly (*Od.* 22. 54). The opposite to 'κατὰ μοῖραν' (properly) is 'παρὰ μοῖραν', i.e. 'beyond portion' (*Od.* 14. 509, negative). 'κατὰ μοῖραν' is used also with other verbs as ἔρεξας (*Od.* 9. 352, negative), ὑποκρίναιτο (*Od.* 15. 170) and ὑποσχόμενος τελέσειεν (*Od.* 15. 203) meaning 'doing something properly or reasonably'.[4] In other words, κατὰ μοῖραν means either 'with every portion in its proper place', i.e. 'orderly' or 'within one's lot', i.e. 'behaving suitably according to one's position or status,'[5] referring to the portions of fortune men hold. Such phrases seem to refer to certain standards of propriety in human society which are obviously under human control, since one can choose whether or not to behave 'within one's lot'. This is one indication of the existence of the moral responsibility expected from each individual in society. Everyone is expected to behave, and to be treated, in accordance with his due 'portion'.[6]

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4 Odysseus reproaches the Cyclops who has eaten some of his companions, for behaving 'οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν' (*Od.* 9. 357), but obviously the giant, being no social animal, does not judge himself according to any social code which would tell him what is his 'due portion' and what is the boundary between proper and improper behaviour.

5 Cf. A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960), p. 21; Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods*, p. 210, points out that in the *Iliad*, in every instance in which a person is said to have spoken 'κατὰ μοῖραν', he shows awareness of the superior position (due to either age or political influence) of another. As he observes, this κατὰ μοῖραν that 'relates to a certain prescribed conduct, or accepted custom' is much more common in the *Odyssey* (pp. 225ff.).

6 L. Pearson, *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece* (Stanford 1962), p. 69.

But when we come to the most frequent use of μοῖρα, that connected with the death of mortal men, it is obviously beyond human control. μοῖρα is often synonymous with death (*Il.* 4. 517, 6. 488, 12. 116, 15. 117, 18. 120, 22. 303, *Od.* 2. 100, 3. 238, 11. 560, 17. 326, 19. 145, 24. 29, 135) and sometimes coupled with death itself (θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα *Il.* 3. 101, 17. 478, 672, 22. 436; θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή *Il.* 5. 83, 16. 334, 853, 20. 477, 21. 110, 24. 132; φόνος καὶ μοῖρα *Od.* 21. 24). The meaning of portion as the life span or death is widely observed in other cognate words of μοῖρα as μόρος (see below), μόρσιμος (*Il.* 5. 674, 15. 613, 19. 417, 22. 13, *Od.* 10. 175), αἰνόμορος (*Od.* 9. 53, 24. 169), and ὠκύμορος (*Il.* 1. 417, 505, 18. 95, 458, *Od.* 1. 266, 4. 346, 17. 137; cf. *Il.* 15. 441, *Od.* 22. 75). There are also such expressions as 'it is μοῖρα to die' (*Il.* 16. 434, 17. 421 23. 80), i.e. it is one's given portion (fate) to die. μείρομαι in the passive is used to convey the same meaning (*Il.* 21. 281, *Od.* 5. 312, 24. 34). There is also, naturally, its opposite, 'it is not μοῖρα to die' (*Il.* 7. 52; cf. *Il.* 20. 302 'destined, μόριμος, to flee'; *Od.* 5. 345 'μοῖρα to be saved') or 'It is not μοῖρα to kill' (μόρσιμος *Il.* 5. 674). But who is the divider of such portions?

Zeus is twice regarded as the author of a specific μοῖρα of death (*Il.* 15. 117 μοῖρα Διός by Ares, *Od.* 11. 560 by Odysseus) and the unfortunate Lycaon says that μοῖρα has handed him to Achilles, as probably being hated by Zeus (*Il.* 21. 83). According to Patroclus, μοῖρα and Apollo are primarily responsible for his death (*Il.* 16. 849). Heracles is killed by 'μοῖρα and Hera's wrath' (*Il.* 18. 119). An unspecified 'θεὸς μέγας' along with μοῖρα is said to be responsible for Achilles' death, who is almost certainly Apollo (*Il.* 19. 410). When Odysseus says that the suitors were killed by 'μοῖρα θεῶν' and their own 'σχέτλια ἔργα' (*Od.* 22. 413), he clearly refers to the gods collectively as dispensers of the 'portions' (fortunes) to men. There are other sorts of μοῖραι as fate such as μοῖρα to go home (Odysseus, *Od.* 5. 41, 114, 9. 532, cf. *Od.* 11. 139 ἐπέκλωσαν θεοὶ αὐτοί; Menelaus *Od.* 4. 475-9 depending on his hecatomb to the gods), to sleep (*Od.* 19. 592 given by the gods)[7], or to marry (μόρσιμος *Od.* 21. 162), most of which are considered god-given. Melampus is

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[7] Cf. ed. W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer*², on 592-3: '"For the immortals have assigned a proper portion to everything, for the benefit of mortals on the grain-giving earth." This enunciates one of the dominant principles of early Greek theology and ethics, the principle of the Just Portion, μοῖρα....'

held as a prisoner by 'θεοῦ μοῖρα' (*Od.* 11. 292), but will be saved later and the whole episode is concluded by the phrase 'Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή' (11. 297). Clearly men believe that at least some of μοῖραι come from the gods, and this is confirmed by the statements of Ares (*Il.* 15. 117) and Xanthus (*Il.* 19. 410).

However, while Nestor thinks that it was μοῖρα θεῶν that changed Clytemnestra's mind to betray her husband (*Od.* 3. 269), Zeus himself expresses a completely opposite view (*Od.* 1. 32ff.) complaining that men wrongly blame the gods as responsible for their misfortunes, whereas men suffer beyond 'μόρος' through their own folly (*Od.* 1. 34):

σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν,

and gives the very same example of Aegisthus having seduced Clytemnestra and murdered Agamemnon beyond 'μόρος' (ὑπὲρ μόρον *Od.* 1. 35). These passages pose two questions: 'Are the gods really responsible for men's fate?' and 'Can men act *beyond* fate?'

Zeus is said by Penelope to know all 'μοῖράν τ' ἀμμορίην τε καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων' (*Od.* 20. 76).[8] As she says, as far as μοῖρα of men is concerned, he seems to *know* everything, if we judge by his conversation with other gods over such characters as Sarpedon, Hector, or Achilles. But 'knowing' fate does not necessarily mean that he is always the author of it.

As we have already seen, μοῖρα in Homer, as more frequently in later tradition, is sometimes personified. In his speech at *Il.* 19. 78ff., Agamemnon claims that Zeus, Moira and Erinys are responsible for his ἄτη. In this context, although some editors put μοῖρα and ἐρινύς in small letters, μοῖρα has to be taken as a personified

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[8] μοῖραν τ' ἀμμορίην τε has been interpreted in two ways, either 'fortunate and unfortunate lots' or 'what is destined and what is not'. Cf. U. Bianchi, ΔΙΟΣ ΑΙΣΑ (Roma 1953), p. 43 (1); Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods*, p. 230. Analogy from an English pair 'fortune and misfortune' may speak for the former, but the problem of this argument is that English 'fortune', though it can mean any fortune, happy or unhappy, primarily means a happy lot, while μοῖρα on its own always evokes the connotation of misfortune. It is difficult to determine, but I am inclined to take μοῖρα as 'what is destined' in a neutral sense, because, in Homer, man is aware of the fact that often both happy and unhappy consequences come from a single μοῖρα, lot. For example, having been born as a prince is probably fortunate for Astyanax until he is dashed to death from the citadel. As Achilles says, there is no unmixed happiness in this world (*Il.* 24. 530). In such a world, the expression for a purely happy lot is difficult to accommodate.

divine power, because it is put beside Zeus and Erinys who is, like Zeus, a legitimate divinity with her cult-history going back to Mycenaean records.[9] Although μοῖρα is not explicitly said to be a goddess or a daughter of Zeus, it is obvious here that this μοῖρα is not just an inanimate portion, but a more active agent.

The image of μοῖρα as the spinner of fate which is common in later tradition also appears in Homer at *Il.* 24. 209-10:

> ... Μοῖρα κραταιὴ
> γιγνομένῳ ἐπένησε λίνῳ ....

This Μοῖρα is comparable to Αἶσα and Κλῶθες in the same function (*Il.* 20. 127-8, *Od.* 7. 197). Interestingly, the gods themselves are also spinners sometimes (*Il.* 24. 525 said by Achilles; *Od.* 1. 17 said by the poet; *Od.* 11. 139 said by Odysseus; *Od.* 20. 196 said by Philoetius; δαίμων as the spinner of fate *Od.* 16. 64 said by

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[9] Cf. Linear B tablets KN Fp 1+31, KN V 52+8285; cf. KN Fh 390; M. Ventris and J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*[2], no. 200 (p. 127, pp. 305-7), no. 208 (p. 411, p. 476); J. Chadwick, *The Mycenaean World*, (Cambridge 1976), p. 98; J. T. Hooker, *Linear B: An Introduction* (Bristol 1980), pp. 152-3. For ἐρινύς as personality, not abstraction, cf. A. Heubeck, 'ἐρινύς in der archaischen Epik', *Glotta* 64 (1986), 162. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the irrational*, p. 7, objects to the view that μοῖρα is personified here: 'I am sure it is quite wrong to write *Moira* with a capital "M" here, as if it signified either a personal goddess who dictates to Zeus or a Cosmic Destiny like the Hellenistic *Heimarmene*. As goddesses, *Moirai* are always plural, both in cult and in early literature, and with one doubtful exception[29] they do not figure at all in the *Iliad*. 29. *Il.* 24. 49.' As he argues, it is probably less misleading to spell μοῖρα here with a small 'μ' to avoid such later associations as he refers to, but it is a minor issue. Even spelt with a small μ, the fact remains that it is personified in this line. As for the number of Moirai, I do not think it is necessary to bother. For example, although the poet addresses θεά (*Il.* 1. 1, *Od.* 1. 10), μοῦσαι (*Il.* 2. 484, 491) and μοῦσα (*Od.* 1. 1) indiscriminately, no one has ever raised a serious question about the number of the Muses. The same applies to ἐρινύς/ἐρινύες. It is quite common to invoke one out of a set of goddesses. For a systematic argument for Moira/Moirai as deities, see Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods*, pp. 194-9; For personification of moira, see also Eitrem, 'Moira', 2458; W. F. Otto, *The Homeric Gods* (tr. by M. Hadas, New York 1954), pp. 268-9. E. Hedén, *Homerische Götterstudien* (Uppsala 1912), pp. 148-9, Otto, and Dietrich think that Moira was originally a goddess of death, and other uses of μοῖραι developed later. However, as we see in this chapter, the idea of one's 'due portion' is widespread not only in relation to death, but in many aspects of life, and expressed not only with the word μοῖρα, but with αἶσα and μόρος which are never fully personified and have no sign of popular cult, and even with δίκη and θέμις, and the notion may go back to IE origin. Cf. Chapter 5 n. 2 and the section 'δίκη in Homer' and Palmer, *TPhS* (1950), 149-68, esp. 168. It is probably pointless to try to argue which has greater antiquity, the idea of μοῖρα as a due portion or Moira the goddess of death.

Eumaeus; cf. *Od.* 3. 208). The plural μοῖραι appears only once at *Il.* 24. 49 in Apollo's speech in which they are said to put an enduring heart into men. But what is the status of μοῖραι? Are they 'portions' (fortunes) given by the gods, or the givers of portions themselves? The word like μοιρηγενής (*Il.* 3. 182) suggests μοῖρα as the giver of fortunes.[10] On the other hand, the spinning of the gods or the portrait of Zeus as the giver of human fortunes (e.g. *Il.* 24. 527-30) suggests that he is in charge of dispensing fate. Zeus is the author of fate certainly in the eyes of human characters, but the case is much more complex in the eye of the poet. As we saw in the last chapter, the gods have various, often contending, personal intentions which strangely keep pace with the course of μοῖρα. The fact seems to point rather to the overall dominance of μοῖρα over the gods than the other way round. It is certainly possible to say, in a paradoxical way, that μοῖρα 'is in the last resort identical with the will of Zeus,'[11] but only in the sense that the gods, including Zeus, always follow the course of μοῖρα and never seriously want to do anything against it.

We also have to examine the expression 'ὑπὲρ μοῖραν' closely when Poseidon says to Aeneas, who is about to stand against Achilles (*Il.* 20. 335-6):

ἀλλ' ἀναχωρῆσαι, ὅτε κεν συμβλήσεαι αὐτῷ,
μὴ καὶ *ὑπὲρ μοῖραν* δόμον Ἄϊδος εἰσαφίκηαι.

The phrase 'ὑπὲρ μοῖραν' means, in general, 'beyond what is allotted', and therefore, in some cases, 'beyond what one is entitled to' as in the case of Aegisthus (*Od.* 1. 35). In this particular example, however, the phrase can be taken in no other way but as 'beyond your fate', because Aeneas' fate is explicitly told to the audience at 20. 302 by Poseidon himself:

μόριμον δέ οἵ ἐστ' ἀλέασθαι.

The god intervenes to prevent the event from occurring in contradiction to destiny.

This example seems to suggest that it is considered possible for

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[10] However, it is not necessary to take the μοῖρα implicit in the word as personified. For example, G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary* I on 182-3 renders it as 'born with (favourable) destiny'.

[11] Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*², p. 5.

men or gods to go beyond fate, though it always remains a potential or rhetorical concern and is never realised. Before we discuss this matter in detail we must go through the usage of μόρος and other related words, where we will face this same question.

μόρος in Homer

The usage of μόρος corresponds to that of μοῖρα especially in its gloomy senses. μόρος is, above all, the fate of death (*Il.* 18. 465, 19. 421, 21. 133, 22. 280, 24. 85, *Od.* 1. 166; with θάνατος: *Od.* 9. 61, 11. 409, 16. 421, 20. 241), or such hard luck as to visit the Underworld while still alive (*Od.* 11. 618), or as in Helen's everlasting bad reputation (*Il.* 6. 357). μόρος as hard luck also appears in its compounds, δύσμορος (Priam *Il.* 22. 60, Laertes *Od.* 16. 139, Odysseus *Od.* 1. 49, 7. 270, 20. 194, 24. 290, 311) and κάμμορος (always for Odysseus *Od.* 2. 351, 5. 160, 339, 11. 216, 20. 33).

All other examples of μόρος are found in the phrases 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' and 'ὑπέρμορα' (or ὑπὲρ μόρα). Two of the examples have already been mentioned (*Od.* 1. 34, 35): Zeus thinks that men suffer 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' because of their own folly, as Aegisthus dared to seduce Clytemnestra 'ὑπὲρ μόρον'. It is also the gods, Zeus and Apollo specifically, who think of 'the fall of Troy ὑπὲρ μόρον' as a possibility (*Il.* 20. 30, 21. 517)[12]. Odysseus could have died 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' before he reached Scheria, had Athena not helped him (*Od.* 5. 436), and the Argives could have gone home 'ὑπέρμορα', had Hera not moved Athena to intervene (*Il.* 2. 155).

It is not always easy to tell what the phrase 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' means. It is clear that μόρος in *Od.* 1. 35, and therefore also in *Od.* 1. 34, does not mean 'fate', because it was not fated for Aegisthus to refrain from seducing Clytemnestra and from murdering Agamemnon. These incidents must happen because the poet is conditioned by the legend which says so. After all, it was μοῖρα θεῶν that Clytemnestra yielded to Aegisthus' seduction (*Od.* 3. 269). Therefore Zeus cannot mean that Aegisthus did what he did 'beyond his fate.' 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' at *Od.* 1. 35 must therefore mean 'beyond one's lot', i.e. beyond what is allowed in one's position.[13] Clytemnestra

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[12] Both ὑπέρμορον in *OCT.*

[13] Cf. M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* I² (München 1955), p. 363; Ehnmark, *The Idea of God in Homer*, p. 76; Hedén, *Homerische Götterstudien*, pp. 174-7.

was not available to him as his 'share'—she was a wife of a much greater man than he was—and it is certainly not a legitimate right of any man to kill the king in conspiracy with his queen. What Zeus expresses here is a clear moral responsibility of a man. 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' at *Od.* 1. 34, on the other hand, seems to mean 'beyond one's portion' (of sufferings) in a sense almost synonymous with 'more than necessary.'

Other examples of 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' point to incidents which might happen before the appointed time. The fall of Troy (*Il.* 20. 30, 21. 517), the return journey of the Argives (*Il.* 2. 155), and death of Odysseus (*Od.* 5. 436) are all to come eventually, even if they are not narrated in the main line of the story. Therefore, even if these incidents did happen before the appointed time, it would not violate the fundamental order of the world, unlike such events as the sun going down to shine in the Underworld, or a man killing a god, which are absolutely inadmissible in the Homeric cosmology.

This is also the case with Poseidon's remarks on Aeneas (*Il.* 20. 302). He is, being a mortal, to die sooner or later, but it was just not so destined for him to be killed by Achilles on that particular day.

We can conclude from the above that if we understand 'μόρος' in 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' or 'μοῖρα' in 'ὑπὲρ μοῖραν' as fate, this fate is not so firmly destined as the basic structure of the Homeric universe and therefore it is potentially possible for somebody to go beyond it.[14] On the other hand, we never hear such statements as 'The kingship of Zeus might have been overturned ὑπὲρ μοῖραν,' or 'The House of Hades could have been exposed to the sunlight ὑπὲρ μόρον.' Whenever it is suggested that somebody might go beyond 'μοῖρα' or 'μόρος' (in the sense of fate), it is just a matter of a timetable—dying, going home, or sacking a city *before the appointed time*.[15] The gods have to intervene only to make sure that the timetable is duly kept. The 'portion' implied in μοῖρα or μόρος here can be considered the length of time that one is given before a certain event takes place. μοῖρα as death also seems to be based on the same idea—μοῖρα is the portion of lifetime which is, in the mythological image, portioned out by the spinner/s (either μοῖρα or the gods).

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14 Cf. W. Schadewaldt, *Iliasstudien*[3] (Darmstadt 1966), p. 153, n. 3.

15 Otto, *The Homeric Gods*, p. 271: '"not until" is the characteristic note of Moira . . . anything that goes beyond fate does not abolish but only accentuates it. The language of the formula is not "contrary to fate", but "beyond fate".'

The idea of μοῖρα connected with an appointed time is also seen in such examples of the usage of μοῖρα at *Od.* 3. 269 (Clytemnestra changes her mind), *Od.* 4. 475 (Menelaus' homecoming) and *Od.* 11. 292 (Melampus' adventure). Compare also 'the year that the gods spun for Odysseus to go home' (*Od.* 1. 16-7).

Many examples of μοῖρα simply mean a 'portion' or a 'share' with 'no metaphysical overtones'.[16] But the usage of μοῖρα and μόρος in such expressions as 'ἐν μοίρῃ', 'κατὰ μοῖραν', 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' suggests μοῖρα/μόρος as a certain moral standard, what one is supposed to meet in one's position or status. This μοῖρα/μόρος is something one *can* go beyond, yet should confine oneself within. Such usage of these terms clearly indicates the existence of freedom of choice and the moral responsibility of human beings. Men do have a choice to behave within or beyond their due portion. That is the reason why Zeus can claim that men suffer for their own ἀτασθαλίαι by going beyond 'μόρος'.[17]

In other examples of μοῖρα, μόρος and other μορ- words, the component μορ- means a portion as fate. We observe at least two types of μοῖρα as fate in Homer: one is a μοῖρα which cannot be changed by any means and another is a μοῖρα which could be driven away from its original course under certain circumstances. Thus it is absolutely impossible (οὔ τοι μόρσιμος) for Achilles to kill Apollo (*Il.* 22. 13), but it is possible for Aeneas to be killed by Achilles 'ὑπὲρ μόρον' (*Il.* 20. 30). Homer talks about the possibility that things can happen beyond μοῖρα/μόρος only when they are destined or natural

[16] Cf. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 20.

[17] Cf. Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods*, p. 218: 'A remarkable proof also of the advance of thought evident in Homer, is that the crime was committed by a mortal man of his own volition, not through some whim and influence of the gods. Man can stay within his own limits, but he may also transgress them, that is if he is prepared to suffer the consequences, to pay for his deeds in full.' Ehnmark, *The Idea of God in Homer*, p. 96, further argues that, since each person has his due portion, μοῖρα, 'The violation of another person's rights is regarded as an offence against the gods, and is punished by them, since it endangers the order established by fate.' But, as is obvious from Zeus' detached comment on Orestes' revenge on Aegisthus, the god has not 'punished' Aegisthus, but rather, it is the world order regulated by μοῖρα—each person has and defends his due portion—that compelled Orestes to stand up against the aggression towards his honour, due portion. The gods have only warned Aegistus of this inevitable rule of the world (cf. Chapter 3). Even if we agree to call the violation of another person's rights 'ὕβρις' as Ehnmark does, there is no sign in Homer that the gods punish men because of their ὕβρις.

to take place sometime. If an incident itself is going to happen anyway, the timetable can be adjusted.[18]

The gods and μοῖρα

Adkins thinks that Zeus seems to be able to overset Fate and save Hector at *Il.* 22. 178ff.[19] I agree that Zeus probably has a choice to save Hector, but only in the sense that he can reset the time for Hector's death, not that he can cancel Hector's absolute μοῖρα that he, being mortal, is to die sometime. In theory, a man could die before his appointed time without timely divine intervention; another could be saved and survive for a while beyond the time originally set for his death, again, with divine intervention. In the sense that divine intervention is sometimes necessary to prevent events from happening beyond μοῖρα, we can say that the latter is dependent on the former. However, the fate that all men will die sometime cannot be changed even by the gods (*Od.* 3. 236-8).[20] So in the reproach of Hera to Zeus (*Il.* 22. 179-81):

ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἐόντα, πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ,
ἂψ ἐθέλεις θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ἐξαναλῦσαι;
ἔρδ'· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι,

the point that the other gods would not approve his action is not so powerful as the argument implied in the first two lines: 'He is destined to die anyway; if you cannot give him an eternal life, what is the point in letting him die a little later than now?'

An appointed time for a certain μοῖρα could be adjusted by the gods since they 'spin' man's timetable of life (as testified by the poet at *Od.* 1. 16-7), but the μοῖρα itself—such as the death of a man—

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18 Cf. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 18, on Polyphemus' prayer to Poseidon (*Od.* 9. 532-5).

19 *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 19. However, Adkins' explanation of Zeus' decision that he does not save Hector 'because it is a shameful thing to do,' has no ground in the context. Hera simply warns him that he might face an unpleasant (possibly violent) opposition from other gods if he acted as he likes or, worse still, that there is a reason to fear that if Zeus sets a bad example by modifying distributions of μοῖραι at will, others may follow it, thereby disturbing the general order of the world. It is a matter of Olympian power politics on the one hand, and that of world order on the other, but not that of shame.

20 Cf. Eitrem, 'Moira', 2454 'Nach Il. XX 127 kommt es den Göttern zu, die Schicksalstunde der Menschen zu bestimmen—das Schicksal selbst aber, der Tod, steht fest.'

cannot be cancelled. The gods have sufficient power to quicken the sunset (*Il.* 18. 239-40), or to delay the sunrise (*Od.* 23. 241-6), but not to keep the sun away forever, because it is an unchangeable μοῖρα for the sun to rise again to shine over the earth (*Od.* 12. 385-6). They can exile hostile gods to the bottom of Tartarus, but cannot kill them because, by an absolute μοῖρα, they are immortal.

The gods have no power or authority to overcome such absolute μοῖραι, nor do they wish to, because it is by this same system of μοῖραι, the present order of the world, that the Olympian gods get their very power and authority.[21]

αἶσα and the cognate words

The basic meaning of the word 'αἶσα', like μοῖρα, is a portion, share, or lot, and is virtually a synonym with μοῖρα, except that αἶσα seems to mean rather a portion 'measured' than 'divided'.[22] This difference of nuance does not show very much in the usage of the words αἶσα and μοῖρα themselves, but it is significantly clear between their derivatives.

Like μοῖρα, αἶσα as a portion does not necessarily have any moral connotation. For example, in his angry rejection of Agamemnon's offer of compensation, Achilles says that he values Agamemnon 'in the measure of straw' (ἐν καρὸς αἴσῃ *Il.* 9. 378).

As a portion, αἶσα is almost indistinguishable from μοῖρα. It can be death (*Il.* 6. 487, 16. 441, 22. 61, 179; θανάτοιο αἶσα *Il.* 24. 428, 750) or life span (*Il.* 1. 416, 24. 224, *Od.* 11. 61), and in a single personified example, Αἶσα spins one's fate of death (*Il.* 20. 127-8). This

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21 Cf. W. Pötscher, 'Moira, Themis und τιμή im homerischen Denken' in *WS* 73 (1960), 27-8.

22 For the basic meaning 'measure', cf. W. Leaf, *The Iliad of Homer*², on 1. 418: 'αἶσα is one of the Homeric words which the Cyprian inscriptions have shewn us yet alive in the primitive sense of *measure*: τῶ Διὸς τῶ ϝοίνω αἶσα ἔτι γ' χόες (Collitz no. 73).' C. M. Bowra ('Homeric Words in Arcadian Inscriptions' in *CQ* 20 (1926), 173), on the other hand, translates the same inscription as 'a *portion* of wine, sacred to Zeus', and considers αἶσα to be used in the sense of 'share'. Cf. *LfrgE*, αἶσα: 'Anteil'. As I have argued elsewhere (N. Yamagata, 'ΑΙΣΙΜΑ ΠΑΡΕΙΠΩΝ' in *La Parola del Passato* XLV (1990), 420-30, 425), however, these two interpretations, αἶσα = portion/share and αἶσα = measure need not be mutually exclusive, because 'the idea of fair division and measurement is inherent in the idea of 'share' or 'portion'. In short, a portion, by definition, is a 'measured portion''. I use this expanded definition, αἶσα = measured portion, as my working hypothesis, because I believe this explains the diversity of the meaning of αἶσα and its cognate words more systematically than the traditional definition, 'portion/share'.

image is probably the result of the association of αἶσα and μοῖρα.

αἶσα can also be a portion of good things, like hope[23] (*Od.* 16. 101, 19. 84), booty (*Il.* 18. 327, *Od.* 5. 40, 13. 138), or territory (*Il.* 15. 209 ἰσόμορος by ὁμῇ αἴσῃ). It can be what a man is going to experience (either good or bad) in the future (*Il.* 5. 209, 16. 707, 22. 477, *Od.* 5. 113, 206, 288, 7. 197, 9. 52, 13. 306, 14. 359, 15. 276, 19. 259, 23. 315), or the destiny of a city (*Od.* 8. 511).

As we have seen, Αἶσα spins a man's fate (*Il.* 20. 127-8), but Κλῶθες are also said to spin αἶσα (*Od.* 7. 197). Zeus is said to be a dispenser of αἶσα at *Il.* 9. 608, 17. 321 (ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν), and *Od.* 9. 52, but his actual involvement in αἶσα is clear only in the two examples in the *Iliad*. At *Od.* 9. 52, κακὴ Διὸς αἶσα means little more than 'bad luck'.

Since αἶσα is a measured portion and often more specifically 'destiny', its derivatives also carry either of these meanings. αἴσιος (*Il.* 24. 376) and παραίσιος (*Il.* 4. 381) are related to αἶσα as fate. αἴσιμος and ἐναίσιμος are either 'being measured out' (hence often 'destined, fateful') or 'within measure'. Interestingly, this seems to explain why one of the κῆρε becomes 'αἴσιμον ἦμαρ' after being measured on Zeus' golden scales (*Il.* 8. 72, 22. 212). αἴσιμον here means 'destined' as well as 'measured'. These passages show that Zeus is involved in the process of measuring out man's fate of death, even though this measuring may only be a formality to confirm what has already been destined long before.[24] One's death (*Il.* 9. 245, 21. 100, 291, *Od.* 16. 280), the course of life (*Od.* 15. 239), or even

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[23] Here I have no intention to get into the philosophical question of whether hope is good or bad for men, posed by the jar of Pandora. For a thorough review of this question, cf. A. M. Komornicka, 'L' elpis hésiodique dans la jarre de Pandore' in *Eos* 78 (1990), 63-77, esp. 68ff.

[24] But it does not make clear what exactly is the role of Zeus in forming μοῖραι of individuals. Cf. Pötscher, *WS* 73 (1960), 22ff., esp. 24: 'Zeus mag das Schicksal ahnen, die letzte Erkenntnis holt er bei den χρύσεια τάλαντα ein.'; Nilsson, *Geschichte*, p. 366: 'Mit Hilfe der Waage konstatiert Zeus wessen Los das schwerste ist, wie der Verteiler der Portionen die Waage ansieht, um einem jeden den rechten Anteil, einen größeren oder kleineren, zuzuteilen.' In my opinion, since Zeus already knows the outcome of the combat of Hector and Achilles, the Kerostasia is to make sure that the *time* is right, that Hector's portion of life has been exhausted (rather like Death holding an hourglass). For, if he dies before his time, that is beyond μοῖρα, a sort of situation that the gods would try their best to prevent. The scales, I should imagine, will stay balanced until the exact time comes. Another example of the Kerostasia at *Il.* 8. 68-72 can be interpreted in the same way. If it is to measure time, that also explains why the poet takes pains to specify the *time* when Zeus produces the scales (8. 68, 22. 208).

the course of hunting in which the life at stake is that of game (*Il.* 15. 274, 21. 495) is αἴσιμος, measured and fated. Omens which reveal fate are ἐναίσιμος (*Il.* 2. 353, *Od.* 2. 159, 182).

αἴσιμος, ἐναίσιμος and their antonym ἐξαίσιος (beyond measure) refer to a variety of measures. There is a measure for offerings to the gods, hence ἐναίσιμα δῶρα ... ἀθανάτοις (*Il.* 24. 425-6), i.e. due offerings to the gods. There is a measure for servants' labour; hence ἐναίσιμα ἐργάζεσθαι (*Od.* 17. 321), i.e. to do assigned work. There is a measure for time; hence ἦλθον ἐναίσιμον (*Il.* 6. 519), i.e. came in time. There is a measure for drinking wine; hence αἴσιμα πίνω (*Od.* 21. 294), i.e. drink within measure.

There seem to be also measures for the human mind. There is a measure for intelligence or sanity; hence a person who is reasonably intelligent is αἴσιμος (fem. *Od.* 23. 14), ἐναίσιμος (*Il.* 6. 521) or his mind is ἐναίσιμος (φρένες ἐναίσιμοι *Od.* 18. 220). Penelope's trick of the web failed because she mismeasured the situation (ἐναίσιμον οὐκ ἐνόησε *Od.* 2. 122). αἴσιμα or αἶσα combined with prepositions, like μοῖρα, often points to a measure by which the propriety of one's word or deed is judged. When a person persuades others with a well-measured or fair argument, i.e. an argument with its portions/components put in due order, it is approved with the expression αἴσιμα παρειπών (*Il.* 6. 62, 7. 121), or αἴσιμα εἶπας (*Od.* 22. 46).[25] To pay back all the penalty to balance the damage—so that each party will have a fair portion of τιμή—is τίσειν αἴσιμα πάντα (*Od.* 8. 348). When one says something rightly or properly, he says it κατ' αἶσαν ('within one's measure' *Il.* 6. 333, 10. 445, 17. 716) and if not, he says it ὑπὲρ αἶσαν ('beyond one's measure' *Il.* 3. 59, 16. 780).[26] It is recommended to be 'within measure', i.e. moderate, in everything (*Od.* 7. 310, 15. 71). Moderate and polite people are said to 'know the things within measure' (αἴσιμα οἶδα *Il.* 15. 207, *Od.* 2. 231 = 5. 9, 14. 433; ἐναίσιμον νοέω *Od.* 7. 299). These expressions imply the existence of a measure for social behaviour. But what

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[25] For this interpretation of αἴσιμα, cf. Yamagata, *PP* XLV, 420-30, esp. 428-30. G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, Volume II: Books 5-8 (Cambridge 1990) seems to suggest (on *Il.* 6. 61-2) that αἴσιμα in 6. 62 means 'justified' as in 7. 121 and at the same time implies 'apportioned or destined', which I do not find very convincing.

[26] But ὑπὲρ αἶσαν can also mean quite literally 'beyond measure', i.e. excessively, unexpectedly (*Il.* 16. 780). Cf. Leaf, ad loc. However, Ameis-Hentze, ad loc., interprets this example as 'beyond fate'.

is the αἶσα of human behaviour in the Homeric world?

As the king of Ithaca, Odysseus never did anything 'beyond measure' (ἐξαίσιον *Od.* 4. 690); being as kind to his people as a father, he is considered 'φρεσὶν αἴσιμα εἰδώς' (*Od.* 2. 231 = 5. 9). When he is asked why he does not eat anything at Circe's table, he replies that anyone 'ἐναίσιμος' would have no appetite until his comrades are rescued (*Od.* 10. 383). Calypso guarantees him her help for his journey home without deception, saying that she has 'ἐναίσιμος νόος' and her heart is not σιδήρεος but ἐλεήμων (*Od.* 5. 190-1).

When Achilles maltreats the dead body of Hector, Apollo criticises him for not having 'ἐναίσιμοι φρένες' (*Il.* 24. 40). Thetis's request to Zeus for honouring her son through the death of many Achaeans is called 'ἐξαίσιος ἀρή' (*Il.* 15. 598), a request beyond measure, by the poet.[27]

These examples point to αἶσα as the measured limit for the human and divine mind, beyond which one cannot go without being cruel. We have no way of knowing whether the gods or the goddess Αἶσα have 'measured out' such αἶσα, but it certainly exists and the gods expect each other and human beings to act within such 'αἶσα', as Apollo's reproach of the other gods and Achilles at *Il.* 24. 33ff. shows. This sort of αἶσα is a source of divine morality more intelligible to men than the harsh μοῖρα or αἶσα that drives angry gods to ruthless persecution of mortals.[28]

Conclusion

Whether harsh or mild, μοῖρα and αἶσα determine the patterns of behaviour of both men and gods. Everyone acts according to his given portion, κατὰ μοῖραν or κατ' αἶσαν—that is the fundamental moral logic we see in the usage of the two words and their derivatives. At the same time, it requires that everyone should be given his own portion, for if not, it disturbs the universal order. Although the

[27] Cf. Leaf, ad loc.: 'ἐξαίσιον, going beyond measure (A 418), i.e. unreasonable. The poet thus speaks explicitly as a Greek partisan.' However, see also I. J. F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers* (Amsterdam 1987), p. 139, for the interpretation that the statement reflects Zeus' point of view.

[28] Having surveyed all examples of αἶσα and its derivatives, I have failed to find any ground for *LfrgE*'s observation (αἶσα, B 2 (a)) that 'an einigen Stellen erscheint die αἶσα . . . als Folge der (personifizierten) ἄτη und ὕβρις.' In my view, the idea seems rather alien to Homeric thinking.

'portion' can be as amoral as one's birth as a mortal or god, or a moral 'common sense'[29] to tell you how to speak and act properly, the gods and men do share the same moral criterion—that is, we all must act within the limit of our share, within measure. This rule sometimes drives the gods to ruthless punishment of mortals who slight the gods' 'portion', honour, even unknowingly. But on other occasions, it tells both men and gods to be compassionate with others. Therefore, ability to behave in a way considerate to other members of one's society, the so-called 'quiet' or 'co-operative' excellences,[30] have the same firm common ground as the μοῖρα as the universal order before to which even the gods give way.

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[29] Cf. Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods*, pp. 227-8: 'The phrase κατὰ μοῖραν, then, with its parallel ἐν μοίρῃ and antonym παρὰ μοῖραν gives proof of the lively appreciation—in direct speech as well as in the narrative—of a propriety that became specialized in certain spheres of social life. It seems to evidence an unwritten standard, according to which personal conduct and social intercourse were directed. The underlying significance of this μοῖρα is not one of fate, but it is intricately connected with that ethical concept μοῖρα in Homer which stands for a particular due portion, either of material goods, or of a keenly felt idea of honour.'

[30] Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 6ff.

CHAPTER EIGHT

HONOUR AND REVENGE

τιμή

The universal law of μοῖρα is that everyone has his own portion, either good or bad. One aspect of this law is that one must endure whatever sufferings fate gives as one's lot. Even the gods are not exempted from this law. Although they are immortal and generally happy, they must endure the loss of their mortal offspring, or occasional injury caused either by other gods or by mortals. Another aspect of the law is that everyone has a claim to one's due portion in his community. And this portion, usually good and desirable, is called τιμή.[1]

Unlike μοῖρα, however, τιμή is not a strictly fixed portion. Since it depends on acknowledgement by others, it could be increased, decreased, or even completely taken away by others. For example, if a man fails to make a due offering to a god, either intentionally or unintentionally, the god's τιμή is injured. If a god's τιμή is injured by a man, he must take action to punish the man in order to restore his τιμή and to warn others to learn a lesson from it. The gods are ever happier if honoured by ever more offerings and prayer. The same is true with men. They always want to receive more τιμή from others, either in a form of material goods or respect, as their status would allow them to expect. Problems arise when someone wants to increase his τιμή without considering the τιμή of others, as Agamemnon robbed Achilles of his war-prize, or Paris carried off the wife and treasure of Menelaus. In such cases, the man whose τιμή is affected must try to restore it either by getting material compensation or by violent vengeance. Or else, his τιμή might be challenged also by others (whether they are foreign enemies or malicious neighbours) who do not hesitate to take advantage of his in-

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[1] I translate τιμή as 'honour' in the following for the sake of convenience only. τιμή is the basis of one's status in a community consisting of material property, political influence and respect from others. Cf. A. W. H. Adkins, ''Honour' and 'Punishment' in the Homeric Poems' in *BICS* 7 (1960), 29.

capability of self-defence. τιμή is a focal point of Homeric morality, through which men and gods define their friends and enemies and thereby determine their behaviour towards others. In this chapter, we will examine how τιμή is exchanged among them under normal circumstances and how they try to regain their τιμή once it is damaged.

Honour as observed in the usage of τιμή and its cognate words[2]

The gods and τιμή

Generally speaking, the gods honour and respect one another. Although they sometimes quarrel or fight, the damaging effect is kept to a minimum. There is a hierarchy within the divine society, and senior gods are more respected by younger ones (*Il.* 21. 468-9, 498-9, *Od.* 6. 329-30, 13. 141-2, 341-2). Zeus is at the top of the hierarchy as the patriarch. However, his two brothers, Poseidon and Hades, hold equal portions of territory to Zeus' and therefore, in this respect, they hold equal τιμή. Poseidon is not pleased when prohibited by Zeus from fighting for the Achaeans, because he thinks he is equal in honour to Zeus (ὁμότιμος *Il.* 15. 186).[3] Zeus must also yield to Thetis' petition to honour her son Achilles in order not to injure her τιμή (*Il.* 1. 515-6). It is also he who disapproves of Hera's attitude towards Apollo when she scolds him fiercely (*Il.* 24. 65). Despite her higher status, she is not allowed to dishonour other gods. However, no trouble in heaven is serious; when Aphrodite dishonours her husband Hephaestus (*Od.* 8. 309) through her affair with Ares, she is put on a shameful show, but not punished in any other way.

The most important τιμή of the gods is their immortality, which is guaranteed by μοῖρα. When originally mortal beings are said to have won a share of the honour of the gods, as in the cases of Ino-Leucothea (*Od.* 5. 335) and the Dioscouroi (*Od.* 11. 302-4), it means that they have acquired immortality above anything else. It is also the case when Hector wishes he had as much honour as Athena or Apollo (*Il.* 8. 540, 13. 827), though the wish itself has only the rhe-

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[2] τιμάω, τίω, ἀτιμάω, ἀτιμάζω, ἀτιμίη, ἀτίμητος, and ἐπιτιμήτωρ.

[3] However, Zeus complains about Poseidon's claim to be his equal (*Il.* 15. 167). There is, of course, a difference in the status between the two and therefore in their τιμή.

torical function of emphasising the certainty of the following clause and is in fact 'the wish without desire.'[4] Some heroic men attain valour (ἀρετή) which almost matches the gods', e.g. Diomedes injuring Ares with Athena's support or Hector raging unafraid of either men or gods, but inevitable old age and weakening await them. Since the gods never age or die, their τιμή, ἀρετή, and βίη are greater than those of men (*Il.* 9. 498).

Divine τιμή, however, depends largely on honour paid by men to them. The gods have no τιμή without human worship. Poseidon is angered by the Phaeacians because of their kind treatment of the god's enemy Odysseus, and says that since they, mortals, do not respect him, he is no longer honourable (τιμήεις) among the gods (*Od.* 13. 129). Therefore he must punish the Phaeacians (*Od.* 13. 144). For the same reason the gods punish severely those men who have failed to make due offerings (which are the γέρας of the gods *Il.* 4. 49) to them (*Il.* 9. 533ff., *Od.* 4. 351ff.). On the other hand, since the gods are so much in need of human worship, abundant offerings are often a bargaining chip for men. Chryses has his prayer heard by Apollo by reminding the god of his generous offerings (*Il.* 1. 39-41).[5] Hector was most loved by the gods because of his constant offerings to them (*Il.* 24. 66-70). Zeus does not abandon Odysseus, though he is hated by Poseidon, for the same reason (*Od.* 1. 66-7).

Since this is the contract between men and gods, a human failure is sometimes looked upon in the same light as the result of failure to pay due honour to the gods. Antilochus says, in claiming his right to the second prize of the chariot race which Achilles has offered to the loser Eumelus, that Eumelus deserves the result because he has not prayed to the gods as he should have done (*Il.* 23. 546-7). On the contrary, Odysseus, who does pray to Athena, wins the foot race in a lucky way (*Il.* 23. 770). Similarly, Teucer, who does not pray to Apollo, fails to shoot the target in the archery competition (*Il.* 23. 863-5), while Meliones succeeds because he prays to the god promising offerings (872-3). The gods get flattered when they are relied upon, as Athena is so pleased when Menelaus prays to her first of

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[4] Cf. F. M. Combellack, 'The wish without desire' in *AJP* 102 (1981), 115-9.

[5] The same logic in other prayers: *Il.* 15. 372-4, *Od.* 4. 764; in a request from one god to another *Il.* 1. 503-4; from one mortal to another *Il.* 22. 83-5, *Od.* 3. 98-101 = 4. 328-30.

all the gods (*Il.* 17. 568-9) that she gives him strength in return (569).

No great enterprise, therefore, should be embarked on without offerings and prayer to the gods. The Achaeans break this rule when they build a great fortification without making any offerings to the gods. Against this insolence, though unintended, Zeus expresses his anger with a thunderstorm (*Il.* 7. 478-9), and because of Poseidon's protest, the wall will be destroyed and forgotten in the near future (*Il.* 7. 459-63, 12. 17-33).

Therefore men honour the gods. The gods, on the other hand, honour only a limited category of men. They honour most, next to themselves, their own offspring and priests, and kings and heroes who are often their descendants. Singers are also supposed to be under the patronage of the gods, especially the Muse (*Od.* 8. 73, 480-1, 22. 345-8). By this assumption men honour them (*Od.* 8. 480, 13. 28) and hold αἰδώς towards them (*Od.* 8. 480).

The priests are honoured among men 'like the gods' (*Il.* 5. 78, 16. 605) because they are, obviously, the representatives of the gods, and failure to honour them will be directly taken by the gods as an offence against their own τιμή. So they do take action to protect the τιμή of their priest as we see in the case of Chryses (*Il.* 1. 43ff., 454).

There is also no doubt that the gods honour their descendants, kings and heroes. The defeat of the Achaeans by Hector is the clearest sign of the τιμή which Zeus grants Achilles as his favour to Thetis (*Il.* 1. 353, 505, 508, 558-9, 2. 3-4, 8. 372, 9. 110, 118, 15. 77, 16. 237). Zeus cannot save his son Sarpedon at the destined moment of death, but he lets it rain with blood in honour of his son (*Il.* 16. 460). He cannot save Troy or Hector either, but he does say that he has honoured Troy (*Il.* 4. 46)—because of the honour the city gives him (48-9) and because of his love for the line of his son Dardanus (*Il.* 20. 304)—and gives honour and glory to Hector while it is still possible (*Il.* 15. 612, 17. 99). Agamemnon is honoured by the Achaeans and the gods because of the sceptre (and the authority) inherited from Pelops to whom Hermes gave it (*Il.* 2. 104). The gods even thunder in the battlefield in his honour (*Il.* 11. 45-6). The gods sometimes appear in person to men whom they honour. Athena often appears in person to help many heroes, especially Odysseus and his son (*Od.* 3. 379), and so do Poseidon and Apollo. A god's attendance increases a hero's valour and glory (e.g. Diomedes in *Iliad* 5) or at least keeps him clear from the doom of death (e.g. Paris in *Iliad* 3 and Aeneas in *Iliad* 5 both saved by Aphrodite).

Just as they honour senior members among themselves (*Od.* 13. 141-2), the gods honour elders among heroes (*Il.* 23. 788). It is so stated by Antilochus in a joking fashion, but it has a good ground to be taken seriously. Athena did intervene to assist Odysseus in the race in which Antilochus finished last, and the heroes of Nestor's generation were greater than contemporary ones (*Il.* 1. 260-1).

The gods are said to honour/value δίκη and αἴσιμα ἔργα by Eumaeus (*Od.* 14. 84). As we analysed in Chapter 5, it is a belief more at home with wishes of non-heroic figures both in Homer and Hesiod than with the 'reality' we see in the Homeric epics. Certainly Athena helps Odysseus to take revenge on the suitors, and the righteous hero does triumph in the end, but not because he is righteous, but because he is honoured by the gods thanks to his heroic strength and cunning character (cf. Chapter 3). Non-heroic figures can hardly expect such τιμή from the gods. The gods' favouritism becomes conspicuous, if we have a look at a case of family tragedy obscured by the grandeur of heroic adventure of Odysseus.

Not all of his companions perished because of their 'ἀτασθαλίαι' (*Od.* 1. 7), certainly not the ones eaten by the Cyclops. It was due to Odysseus' curiosity and greed (ὄφρ' αὐτόν τε ἴδοιμι, καὶ εἴ μοι ξείνια δοίη *Od.* 9. 229) that he and his companions stayed in the cave of the Cyclops and had the most deadly encounter with the giant. Odysseus himself regrets later that he did not listen to the plea of his companions to go back to the ship immediately (9. 228):

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ πιθόμην, ἦ τ' ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν.

This mistake is also bitterly criticised by Eurylochus as his 'ἀτασθαλίαι' (10. 437), the same verdict as on his companions who eat the cattle of Helios and on the suitors of Penelope (*Od.* 21. 146, 22. 317, 416, 23. 67, 24. 458).

Those six who perished in the Cyclops' cave were among the best twelve of the crew whom Odysseus had specially chosen (9. 195-6), apparently the most valorous, courageous and trustworthy of all. We are told that one of the last two victims of the Cyclops was called Antiphus and was the son of Aegyptius who stands up first in the assembly of the Ithacans (2. 15-20). The old man has three other sons, but still cannot forget Antiphus and sheds tears for him in public as he recalls the departure of his son with Odysseus' fleet (23-4). That is bad enough. Moreover, we know that another son of his, Eurynomus, is among the suitors (2. 21-2), who will be killed by

Odysseus in the end. It is entirely Odysseus' fault that the old man loses his eldest son. Another one is killed by the same man in person. Although the second son probably deserves his death, the sorrow of the father is the same, and there is absolutely no consolation or compensation for the death of the first. It is surely for this 'injustice' that the aggressive father of Antinous, Eupeithes, raises his cry, shedding tears among other bereaved (24. 426-9):

ὦ φίλοι, ἦ μέγα ἔργον ἀνὴρ ὅδε μήσατ' Ἀχαιούς·
τοὺς μὲν σὺν νήεσσιν ἄγων πολέας τε καὶ ἐσθλοὺς
ὤλεσε μὲν νῆας γλαφυράς, ἀπὸ δ' ὤλεσε λαούς,
τοὺς δ' ἐλθὼν ἔκτεινε Κεφαλλήνων ὄχ' ἀρίστους.

And he is killed by Laertes. All others are hushed by Athena who proclaims Zeus' amnesty; Odysseus is excused from paying for any of his ἀτασθαλίαι or killing. There will be no compensation or consolation for the bereaved like Aegyptius. This is the δίκη of the gods, the way they do things, the injustice of which the poet did not fail to hint at.

Another humble figure, Phoenix, urges Achilles to honour (*Il.* 9. 513-4) and stand in awe of (αἰδέσεται 508) the goddesses called Litai, on the same ground as men honour other gods, i.e. if you honour them, they will honour you, and if you do not, they will punish you. Achilles apparently is not impressed by his argument. But is Achilles punished for not honouring these goddesses? It is certainly common to interpret Patroclus' death as Achilles' punishment for rejecting the embassy's plea, but as we saw in Chapter 4 (Conclusion), whatever Achilles did, the loss of Patroclus was inevitable. In the example of Phoenix's Litai allegory, too, we see the gap between the 'reality' of divine behaviour and the belief of humble people who think that the gods behave in an intelligibly moral manner.

Men and τιμή

Men honour the gods with prayer and sacrifice. The case is somewhat different, however, when people honour somebody 'like a god', a very common expression for heroes and priests. Achilles, Agamemnon, Aeneas and Thoas are honoured 'like a god' among their people, by the Argives or by the Trojans (Achilles *Il.* 9. 302-3, *Od.* 11. 484 ἶσα θεοῖσιν; Agamemnon *Il.* 10. 33; Aeneas *Il.* 11. 58; Thoas *Il.* 13. 218; cf. Hector *Il.* 22. 434-5), and Odysseus by the Phaeacians (*Od.* 5. 36, 19. 280, 23. 339), not with worship but with

gifts, prizes and other material honours (e.g. food and wine at banquets). Many of the examples of this expression are repeated formulaic expressions (θεὸς (δ') ὣς τίετο δήμῳ *Il.* 5. 78, 10. 33, 11. 58, 13. 218, 16. 605, *Od.* 14. 205) and therefore they may be conventional exaggerations, just conveying the meaning 'he was much honoured.' It is clear in the case of a merely wealthy man with splendid sons, who is said to be honoured like a god (*Od.* 14. 205).[6]

But when priests are said to be honoured among men 'like a god' (*Il.* 5. 78, 16. 605), it may be taken literally to some extent, since they are obviously the representatives of the gods and failure to honour them will be directly taken by the gods as an offence against their honour. And the gods do take action to protect the honour of their priests as we see in the case of Chryses.

Similarly, men honour singers (*Od.* 13. 28) because they are regarded as inspired by the Muses (*Od.* 8. 480-1, 22. 346-8), and described by the poet as such (8. 73). It would be surprising if a poet who sings (*Il.* 2. 484-92):

Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι—
ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε, πάρεστέ τε, ἴστέ τε πάντα,
ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν—
οἵ τινες ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν·
πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήσω,
οὐδ' εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν,
φωνὴ δ' ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη,
εἰ μὴ Ὀλυμπιάδες Μοῦσαι, Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο
θυγατέρες, μνησαίαθ' ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον,

did not believe in the reality of the Muses and that a poet's talent and inspiration came from them. Even if he did not, it was assumed as the reality within the world of poetry.

Kings' honour is also god-given, coming from Zeus (*Il.* 1. 278-9, 2. 197, 17. 251). Agamemnon is confident that the Achaeans and Zeus honour him even if Achilles does not (*Il.* 1. 175)[7], because of his sceptre and authority handed down from Zeus (*Il.* 9. 38) for which he holds the honour of commanding all the Achaean forces (*Od.* 24. 30). Kings' τιμή, of course, comes with their duties. As we

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[6] Cf. *Od.* 7. 10 θεοῦ δ' ὣς δῆμος ἄκουεν; 8. 173 θεὸν ὣς εἰσορόωσιν; also *Il.* 12. 312, *Od.* 3. 246, 4. 160, 6. 309, 7. 71, 15. 520, etc.

[7] But of course, as Nestor rightly remarks, even the gods honour Achilles (*Il.* 9. 110).

have seen, they are judges for their people. In war, they are expected to be supreme warriors. Kings' honour and their military duties are well illustrated in the words of Sarpedon addressed to Glaucus at *Il.* 12. 310-21:

Γλαῦκε, τίη δὴ νῶϊ τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα
ἕδρῃ τε κρέασίν τε ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσιν
ἐν Λυκίῃ, πάντες δὲ θεοὺς ὣς εἰσορόωσι,
καὶ τέμενος νεμόμεσθα μέγα Ξάνθοιο παρ' ὄχθας,
καλὸν φυταλιῆς καὶ ἀρούρης πυροφόροιο;
τῶ νῦν χρὴ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρώτοισιν ἐόντας
ἑστάμεν ἠδὲ μάχης καυστείρης ἀντιβολῆσαι,
ὄφρα τις ὧδ' εἴπῃ Λυκίων πύκα θωρηκτάων·
'οὐ μὰν ἀκλεέες Λυκίην κάτα κοιρανέουσιν
ἡμέτεροι βασιλῆες, ἔδουσί τε πίονα μῆλα
οἶνόν τ' ἔξαιτον μελιηδέα· ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ ἴς
ἐσθλή, ἐπεὶ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρώτοισι μάχονται.'

Their τιμή is supplemented by τέμενος from their people (313 cf. *Il.* 6. 194; δωτίνη *Il.* 9. 155, 297), by a greater share of meat and wine at a banquet (311), and by being looked at like the gods (312). Therefore if one becomes a king, he will be more honoured as well as wealthier (*Od.* 1. 393). Their τιμή always includes material property and rule over a group of people. It can be inherited (*Il.* 20. 180-1) or shared among kinsmen and friends (*Il.* 9. 149-55 = 291-8, 616, *Od.* 4. 174-7). Holders of kingly τιμή, on the other hand, have the obligation to defend the τιμή of their community—including property and people—by their valour and administration of δίκη (εἶρυτο δίκῃσί τε καὶ σθένεϊ ᾧ *Il.* 16. 542).[8] They must always fight at the front on the battlefield and win glory (*Il.* 12. 315-6, 318 οὐ . . . ἀκλεέες; cf. *Il.* 6. 444-6) defending and increasing the interests of their people and themselves against external threats. As δικασπόλοι they protect θέμιστες of Zeus (*Il.* 1. 238-9) and solve domestic problems.

The honour of a king may be threatened if he is not strong enough to perform the duty of defending his people. Achilles in Hades fears that his father might be dishonoured because of his old age and weakness (*Od.* 11. 496-7, 503). Telemachus' right to his father's throne is threatened by the suitors of Penelope because he is not

[8] The phrase clearly indicates that a king must possess both 'cooperative' and 'competitive' excellences in order to 'defend' his kingdom. For the terms 'cooperative' and 'competitive' excellences, cf. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 6-7.

strong enough to take up his father's role as the head of his house and his community.

For a hero/nobleman (ἀγαθός), whether he is a king (βασιλεύς) or not, military valour is an essential source of τιμή. It is his duty to defend his household (οἶκος) consisting of his family, other dependants like slaves and refugees (ἱκέται), and property. What can happen if a household lacks such a protector is depicted in the *Odyssey*. Since Telemachus is powerless before the suitors, his property—the most important part of his τιμή—is consumed at their will until Odysseus comes back to remove them. A hero must help also his kinsmen and friends who are not members of his household when their life and/or τιμή is threatened. Had Telemachus had brothers or other close relations to help him, he would not have suffered from the suitors' wantonness (*Od.* 16. 115-7). The Trojan war is an example of such occasions when kinsmen and friends get together to defend a man's τιμή. Agamemnon leads the whole army on behalf of his younger brother whose τιμή is to be won back from Troy. And apparently many heroes joined the enterprise because of their guest-friendship with the Atreidae as well as because of spoils which will increase their material τιμή, rather than being bound by their oath to protect Helen.[9]

Their duties being chiefly military, heroes are honoured most for their valour and heroic achievements (Diomedes *Il.* 8. 161, Paris *Il.* 6. 521-2; Deikoon *Il.* 5. 536; Sthenelus *Il.* 4. 410). Supreme warriors, therefore, should be more honoured than ordinary soldiers, or it will cause resentment (*Il.* 9. 314-9, 13. 460-1). Of course, their honour is inseparable from their royal or divine descent (Achilles *Il.* 24. 57-9, 66; Diomedes *Il.* 14. 126-7). There are no supreme or

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[9] It seems certainly the case with Achilles. However, it is very difficult to trace the legendary 'fact' about Achilles' connection with Menelaus and Helen. If the cause of the divine beauty contest was an apple thrown into the wedding banquet of Peleus and Thetis, Achilles may not have been even born when Paris abducted Helen, unless the goddesses had waited for years until Zeus appointed Paris the judge, or Paris had waited for years until Aphrodite fulfilled her promise to give him Helen. If Achilles is bound by any oath concerning Helen at all, it would be his father's, since Peleus is more likely to have been among Helen's suitors than his son. ὅρκια which Nestor mentions at *Il.* 2. 339 apparently does not mean specific oaths, 'but the agreement of alliance' and therefore even if any of the members of the alliance goes home, he will not be an 'oath breaker'. Cf. D. Cohen, '"Horkia" and "horkos" in the *Iliad*', *RIDA* 27 (1980), 52-3: 'Being autonomous kings, they can, as Achilles says he will do, leave Troy if they wish, and thus Nestor does not threaten them, or attempt to coerce them.'

even good warriors described among commoners in the epics, and no doubt there were not any in reality either, because commoners could not afford an expensive set of armour nor the leisure to practise military skills. And, as a rule in the Homeric world, nothing is more effective than divine blood in the veins in making a man strong.

The importance of τιμή for heroes is best-illustrated by the very themes of the two epics. Achilles' anger is the result of the damage done by Agamemnon to his honour (*Il.* 1. 171, 244, 355-6, 411-2, 2. 239-40, 9. 110-1, 647-8, 13. 113, 16. 58-9, 274) and that is a good enough reason for sacrificing many lives. The Trojan war itself is an expedition called for to regain the τιμή of Menelaus, i.e. Helen and his stolen treasure supplemented by compensation (*Il.* 1. 159, 3. 286, 459, 5. 552, 17. 92, *Od.* 14. 70, 117). In the *Odyssey*, the suitors are all killed because they damaged the τιμή of Odysseus so badly, by dishonouring Odysseus (16. 274, 20. 167, 21. 99, 427, 22. 370, 23. 28), Penelope (14. 164, 18. 144, 24. 459), Telemachus (14. 164), Odysseus' household (16. 431), and all the visitors to his house (22. 414-5, 23. 65-6).

Distribution of τιμή is not as egalitarian as that of the μοῖρα of death. For example, wretched wanderers (*Il.* 24. 531-3) or immigrants (*Il.* 9. 648, 16. 59) have very little τιμή in the Homeric world. However, within the class of heroes, everyone does have a decent τιμή and should be guaranteed it by other members of the class, as far as they want to remain friends. We have already seen how careful Achilles is in dealing with the various degrees of τιμή of his comrades at the funeral games (Chapter 5).

Even a great king like Agamemnon does not have a right to rob τιμή of his lesser associate like Achilles. Adkins[10] thinks that, as far as Agamemnon is successful in his military duties, he can do whatever he likes, such as taking Briseis from Achilles. Of course, Agamemnon *can* take Achilles' prize because he is 'ἀγαθός' i.e. militarily superior, but only if he is prepared to make Achilles an enemy. To be sure, making an enemy is not by itself a moral error by any means in the Homeric society. Therefore, Agamemnon is not 'wrong', and therefore not censured, provided his intention was to do without Achilles in the expedition—which he does choose as

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[10] *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 51.

his course of action at the height of the quarrel (*Il.* 1. 173-4). But his conduct is not justified if he would like Achilles to be his φίλος, friend or ally. Adkins' assertion that Agamemnon may do this to Achilles apparently derives from confusion of two distinct moralities in Homer, one dealing with friends and another dealing with enemies. As far as Agamemnon considers Achilles to be his ally, he must respect Achilles' τιμή. If the Homeric society is so dangerous (as Adkins often emphasises) that military strength is vital for survival, the act of discarding the most valued ally for a trivial reason ought to be most severely criticised and effectively prevented. After all, Achilles must have refrained from killing Agamemnon partly for the same reason. In the end, Agamemnon is told that he should be δικαιότερος (*Il.* 19. 181) hereafter, that is, to behave in a way more considerate to fair distribution of τιμή within the community.[11] A member of the aristocratic warrior class should have a due portion of τιμή in his group, or he may break off from it and become hostile. Agamemnon is in command of the whole Achaean army, not as an absolute monarch, but as a manager of a business.[12] He must pay wages to his partners in a reasonable proportion to their ranks and work, or they may quit the job. This is the case even with Odysseus' cowherd, who contemplates leaving his master's household which is plagued by the suitors, and finding some other employer (*Od.* 20. 218-23). Moreover, war is a serious business. One risks one's own life, which is irreplaceable once lost. Although living in the world of fiction, Homeric heroes never forget, nor let us forget, that (*Il.* 9. 408-9):

> ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν οὔτε λεϊστὴ
> οὔθ' ἑλετή, ἐπεὶ ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἕρκος ὀδόντων.

So if the director of this dangerous business wants to be successful, he must reward his partners sensibly. And we see Agamemnon's normal mode of management when he encourages his generals in *Iliad* 4 as he tactfully appeals to their sense of honour.

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[11] Cf. Chapter 5, 'δίκη in Homer'; S. E. Bassett, 'The Ἁμαρτία of Achilles', *TAPA* 65 (1934), 61; H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, p. 26: '. . . by depriving him of his prize, Agamemnon has neglected an obligation implicit in his whole relation to the partners in the expedition, that he will respect the *time* of his subordinates.'

[12] Cf. *Il.* 16. 53 where Achilles calls himself an equal (τὸν ὁμοῖον) of Agamemnon.

To Idomeneus (4. 261-4):

εἴ περ γάρ τ' ἄλλοι γε κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοὶ
δαιτρὸν πίνωσιν, σὸν δὲ πλεῖον δέπας αἰεὶ
ἕστηχ', ὥς περ ἐμοί, πιέειν ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνώγοι.
ἀλλ' ὄρσευ πόλεμόνδ', οἷος πάρος εὔχεαι εἶναι.

His message is, 'Since I honour you (σε τίω 257) so much, be a warrior as you claim to be (264).'

To the Aiante (285-291):

Αἴαντ', Ἀργείων ἡγήτορε χαλκοχιτώνων,
σφῶϊ μέν—οὐ γὰρ ἔοικ' ὀτρυνέμεν—οὔ τι κελεύω·
αὐτὼ γὰρ μάλα λαὸν ἀνώγετον ἶφι μάχεσθαι.
αἲ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον,
τοῖος πᾶσιν θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι γένοιτο·
τῶ κε τάχ' ἠμύσειε πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος,
χερσὶν ὑμετέρῃσιν ἁλοῦσά τε περθομένη τε.

The message is quite flattering: 'I am completely satisfied with your work. I wish others were also like you!'

To Nestor (313-6):

ὦ γέρον, εἴθ', ὡς θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν,
ὥς τοι γούναθ' ἕποιτο, βίη δέ τοι ἔμπεδος εἴη·
ἀλλά σε γῆρας τείρει ὁμοΐον· ὡς ὄφελέν τις
ἀνδρῶν ἄλλος ἔχειν, σὺ δὲ κουροτέροισι μετεῖναι.

'You excel all in your fighting spirit. If only you could become young again to replace some useless man!'

To Menestheus and Odysseus (338-48):

ὦ υἱὲ Πετεῶο διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος,
καὶ σύ, κακοῖσι δόλοισι κεκασμένε, κερδαλεόφρον,
τίπτε καταπτώσσοντες ἀφέστατε, μίμνετε δ' ἄλλους;
σφῶϊν μέν τ' ἐπέοικε μετὰ πρώτοισιν ἐόντας
ἑστάμεν ἠδὲ μάχης καυστείρης ἀντιβολῆσαι·
πρώτω γὰρ καὶ δαιτὸς ἀκουάζεσθον ἐμεῖο,
ὁππότε δαῖτα γέρουσιν ἐφοπλίζωμεν Ἀχαιοί.
ἔνθα φίλ' ὀπταλέα κρέα ἔδμεναι ἠδὲ κύπελλα
οἴνου πινέμεναι μελιηδέος, ὄφρ' ἐθέλητον·
νῦν δὲ φίλως χ' ὁρόῳτε καὶ εἰ δέκα πύργοι Ἀχαιῶν
ὑμείων προπάροιθε μαχοίατο νηλέϊ χαλκῷ.

'You are first to be invited to my banquet, so you ought to be first

to fight. What are you doing here?', he reproaches. When Odysseus replies in anger denying his allegation of being lazy, he explains that his reproach was not really meant, and promises to compensate afterwards for his words (362 ὄπιθεν ἀρεσσόμεθ'). He is doubly cautious not to injure his generals' pride and honour.

To Diomedes and Sthenelos, Agamemnon uses the glory of their fathers as a stimulus for their τιμή. He deliberately underrates Diomedes' valour (399-400):

τοῖος ἔην Τυδεὺς Αἰτώλιος· ἀλλὰ τὸν υἱὸν
γείνατο εἷο χέρεια μάχῃ, ἀγορῇ δέ τ' ἀμείνω.

Although the reproach incurs Sthenelos' anger, Diomedes gets Agamemnon's message (413-8; 413 οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ νεμεσῶ 'Αγαμέμνονι). The king is only encouraging them to κῦδος (415) which is his as well as all the Achaeans'.[13]

Such are the normal tactics of Agamemnon. He uses three main arguments to encourage his generals: 1) I always give you a great share of τιμή. Therefore you must do your work. 2) I am happy with your achievement. I wish others, too, were like you. 3) Your father was a great warrior. Why don't you fight as he did? All of these appeal to the heroes' sense of honour in quite positive ways. Even his reproach 3) is done through the praise of the heroes' fathers. This shows exemplary management of his personnel, who follow him voluntarily and because of the fame and other (material) τιμή they hope to get out of the operation. In one case, it took him and Menelaus a whole month to recruit a reluctant hero to join the expedition (*Od.* 24. 118-9). It is clear that even a great king like Agamemnon cannot mobilise a great number of heroes without being sensitive to their sense of honour. 'Cooperative excellences'—as Adkins calls them—are essential in his leadership.

Considering this delicate social relationship among the Achaean heroes, Agamemnon's failure to honour Achilles and acknowledge his contribution is almost unthinkable. It is certainly an exceptional blunder on Agamemnon's part and therefore later classified as ἄτη (*Il.* 19. 88).

In *Iliad* 1, Agamemnon's behaviour is doubly unusual. First of

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[13] However, Diomedes has obviously been offended enough to remember this occasion at *Il.* 9. 34-5.

all, he refuses to respect Chryses' priesthood and to return the priest's daughter. It is, as we have seen, common sense in his society that the gods and their priests should be respected, or the gods will severely retaliate against those who do not. All the Achaeans approve Chryses' request accordingly, except Agamemnon. He is blind to what he is doing when he rejects the priest's plea, and will pay for it dearly by many lives of his army. As the result of the argument between Agamemnon and Achilles, prompted by Calchas' pronouncement that Agamemnon should return Chryses his daughter and give compensation to Apollo, Agamemnon makes another unusual mistake by disgracing Achilles in public by taking his war-prize Briseis. The implication of the event is no less serious than, say, a company director's withdrawal of bonus from the bank account of a senior executive of his company. Achilles' angry reaction is completely justifiable. By far, he has done the largest and most difficult part of work (*Il.* 1. 165-6, 9. 316-7, 322-3) and yet has received fewer prizes than Agamemnon (*Il.* 1. 166-8, 9. 330-3). He has no personal reason to hate Troy (1. 152-7) but has been fighting solely for the sake of the τιμή of Agamemnon and Menelaus (1. 158-9, 9. 337-9). Nevertheless, Agamemnon could not care less about it (1. 160). Agamemnon treats him, he says, not like a warrior of his status, but like an immigrant with no τιμή (9. 648, 16. 59), which is the worst possible humiliation to a half-divine hero.

Since Agamemnon's insult to Achilles is so unusual, the damage done to Achilles' τιμή can in no way be repaired easily. Achilles resorts to an equally unusual measure to protest.[14] The τιμή that Achilles asks of Zeus via Thetis is not simply a material τιμή (which is already promised by Athena at *Il.* 1. 213-4). When he rejects Agamemnon's first offer of compensation saying (*Il.* 9. 607-8):

> οὔ τί με ταύτης
> χρεὼ τιμῆς· φρονέω δὲ τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴσῃ,

he implies that the defeat of the Achaeans by Hector has brought him a greater τιμή than the one Agamemnon offers.

Heroes need heroic honour, and if it is not given, there will be heroic retaliation. But as far as a hero gets due honour from his comrades and friends, he will honour them, too. Achilles honours Patroclus just like himself (*Il.* 18. 81-2 τῖον . . . / ἶσον ἐμῇ κεφαλῇ;

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[14] It is not unusual nowadays if we call it a 'strike' or an 'industrial action'.

20. 426 μοι ἑταῖρον ... τετιμένον; cf. 23. 94 where he calls Patroclus 'ἠθείη κεφαλή'), and after Patroclus, Antilochus (*Od.* 24. 78), Automedon and Alcimus (*Il.* 24. 574-5). Patroclus, in his turn, honours Achilles more than anybody else, and, after him, Automedon (*Il.* 16. 145-6). We know how deep and strong is the affection of Achilles towards Patroclus from his agony after his friend's death. The τιμή he pays Patroclus comes from the very depth of his heart and has nothing to do with the social status of the heroes. Similarly, Ajax and Teucer have honoured Lycophron as much as their parents (*Il.* 15. 439), and when his honoured friend Podes (*Il.* 17. 576) is killed, Hector is covered with 'the dark cloud of woe' (591).

Friends and comrades, however, can be turned into enemies if a conflict involving τιμή occurs among them. We have seen the most conspicuous example in the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles, in which Achilles could have killed Agamemnon had Athena not intervened (*Il.* 1. 188ff.). Achilles warns Phoenix that even he, who brought up Achilles, could become an enemy to Achilles if he continued to stand by and speak for Agamemnon (*Il.* 9. 613-4). Instead, he says, come home with me and 'take half of my τιμή.' (9. 616). We can make out from this a very clear definition of a friend and an enemy. An enemy is a person who does not give you τιμή and/or takes it away from you. A friend is a person who gives you τιμή and/or shares it with you.[15]

It is through the conflict over τιμή (Achilles' divine armour as the prize for the greatest Achaean warrior) that the good friends Odysseus and Ajax are separated for ever (*Od.* 11. 544-6). Menelaus and Paris, too, were once a host and a guest until the latter robbed the former of his τιμή. On the other hand, Diomedes and Glaucus renew their ancestral friendship, by giving fresh τιμή to each other (6. 232-6), even when their armies are fighting against each other. And, theoretically, even Hector and Ajax, having exchanged 'parting gifts' after their interrupted duel, could develop friendship (φιλότης) between them (*Il.* 7. 301-2). It is in this sense that I call τιμή the focal point of Homeric morality through which a man defines his friends and enemies.

To be a host or a guest is a beginning for making friends. Although the sight of strangers at your door may not always please

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[15] Cf. The saying 'κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.'; J.-C. Riedinger, *REG* 89 (1976), 248: 'Les liens d'amitié sont des liens d'honneur réciproque.'

you, it is not θέμις to dishonour them (*Od.* 14. 56-7). One ought to feel ashamed of having a visitor standing outside one's doorstep for a long time, even if he is a complete stranger (*Od.* 1. 119-20). One must honour one's guests earnestly (προφρονέως . . . τῖεν *Il.* 6. 173) and with affection (ἐνδυκέως φιλέειν καὶ τιέμεν *Od.* 15. 543, 17. 56). The guests deserve αἰδώς (αἰδοῖος: ξείνος *Od.* 9. 271, 19. 316; ἱκέτης *Il.* 21. 75, *Od.* 5. 447-8, 7. 165, 181) and τιμή, because they are supposed to be under the protection of Zeus Xeinios/Hiketesios, who is the 'ἐπιτιμήτωρ ἱκετάων τε ξείνων τε' (*Od.* 9. 270).[16] Though there is no direct evidence of the god's concern with suppliants and guests, Homeric man usually performs his duty as a host faithfully. If the host is wealthy, the τιμή of the guest will include quite substantial entertainment such as the slaughter of a bull each day (*Il.* 6. 174). If the host's living is as modest as Eumaeus', his guest will at least get the best part of the meat (*Od.* 14. 437-8). A beggar with no useful skill might be less welcome than noble guests or δημιοεργοί from whom some returns can be expected (*Od.* 17. 382-7), but seems nevertheless guaranteed a minimal support for existence from others with better fortunes, as Eumaeus says to a most wretched beggar (the disguised Odysseus) who has come to his house (*Od.* 14. 56-8):

ξεῖν', οὔ μοι θέμις ἔστ', οὐδ' εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι,
ξεῖνον ἀτιμῆσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες
ξεῖνοί τε πτωχοί τε·

Even the arrogant suitors (except Antinous) pity and feed the Beggar-Odysseus at his first appearance (*Od.* 17. 365-8).

Reception of visitors is a duty. But to have a distinguished visitor is a host's honour (*Od.* 11. 338) and pleasure, and it may develop into a long-lasting guest-friendship, handed down to the descendants of the host and the guest, unless either of them dies without leaving a son to inherit the obligation of entertainment (*Od.* 3. 353-5, 24. 283-6). Parting gifts, ξείνια or ξεινήια, exchanged by friends or given to the guest by the host, are very important to seal their friendship. They increase the wealth and τιμή of their recipients, and thereby the giver is acknowledged as a friend. They also serve as tokens when one claims guest-friendship to somebody. Although Diomedes does not know his grandfather Oeneus, nor

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16 As Adkins rightly argues in *BICS* 7 (1960), 25, ἐπιτιμήτωρ does not mean 'avenger', but the one 'who gives τιμή (to someone)'.

does he even remember his father Tydeus, he owns the golden goblet given to Oeneus by Bellerophontes and knows its history (*Il.* 6. 218-22). And no doubt Glaucus has confirmed Diomedes' claim of guest-friendship by his own knowledge of the history of the crimson belt which was presented by Oeneus to his grandfather Bellerophontes. But the significance of parting gifts is not only material or formal, as we can tell from what Menelaus says to Telemachus at *Od.* 4. 590-92:

αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
δώσω καλὸν ἄλεισον, ἵνα σπένδῃσθα θεοῖσιν
ἀθανάτοις *ἐμέθεν μεμνημένος ἤματα πάντα.*

'So that you will remember me always.' (ἤματα πάντα here seems to mean both 'toujours' and 'tous les jours')—It is a voice of sincere friendship and wish for everlasting love between him and Telemachus and between their families. Menelaus gives Telemachus his most valued (τιμηέστατον 15. 114) treasure, because he values this friendship so much. Telemachus, indeed, will always remember his host in return (*Od.* 15. 372-4).

Genuine affection, without doubt, is inseparable also from τιμή which one pays to one's own family members. As the gods honour their divine kin or human descendants, men honour their family. It is not very often stated explicitly, probably because it is taken for granted, but we can find the evidence of the τιμή paid to one's own family in such expressions as 'A honoured B *like his own son.*'[17]

Men usually honour their parents (*Il.* 15. 439; mother *Od.* 7. 69-70, 18. 161-2), children (especially legitimate sons; *Il.* 9. 142, 13. 176, 15. 551, *Od.* 14. 203, 15. 365), brothers (*Il.* 22. 235), wives (*Od.* 1. 432, 7. 67, 69-70, 18. 161-2) and occasionally their bastard sons (*Od.* 14. 202-3), sons-in-law (*Il.* 13. 176) and nephews (*Il.* 15. 551). Family members also deserve αἰδώς (mothers *Il.* 22. 82, *Od.* 8. 420; fathers-in-law *Il.* 3. 172; mothers-in-law *Il.* 22. 451; wives *Il.* 6. 250, 21. 460, *Od.* 3. 381, 451, 10. 11, 17. 152, 19. 165, 262, 336, 583). We are probably allowed to assume that such τιμή and αἰδώς originate from natural, spontaneous affection towards one's family. Family bonds are always strengthened by sharing an οἶκος, property attached to it, and its good or bad reputation, in other words, by sharing the same τιμή. On the other hand, even

[17] Cf. J.-C. Riedinger, *REG* 89 (1976), 248.

family members can become enemies if one robs τιμή of another. One such case, a conflict between brothers over the kingship of Thebes, is the cause of the first expedition against Thebes alluded to at *Il.* 4. 378ff.

Whether in a family or in a community, elders are generally honoured in the human world as well as in the divine, as we see in the Achaeans' respect towards Nestor (*Il.* 23. 648-9). On the other hand, even a king could be dishonoured if he ages without an heir to protect him (*Od.* 11. 496-7, 503). This decline does not occur in the divine world since the gods never age or die.

There is another category of human τιμή which is not shared by the gods. Men honour, or rather value, wealth which is the basis of their τιμή. Gold (*Il.* 18. 475, *Od.* 8. 393, 11. 327) and treasure (*Od.* 1. 312, 4. 614ff., 15. 114ff.) are highly valued, and a wealthy man is honoured 'like a god' (*Od.* 14. 205-6). On the contrary, men tend to dishonour immigrants who are often with no status or property (*Il.* 9. 648, 16. 59), a wretched wanderer (*Il.* 24. 533), and a person in unseemly clothes (*Od.* 14. 506). This is a sheer reality of the human world. The gods, on the other hand, do not seem to care about wealth, since everything they possess is just so valuable (to a human eye) as the first-class treasure in the human world.

Both gods and men honour their family and kin. Men honour the gods, but the gods do not always honour men. Kings, heroes, priests and probably singers are honoured by both gods and men, but it is not certain that the gods protect guests and hosts as men believe. Like the gods men also honour elders, but only if they remain powerful either on their own or through their sons, because valour, as well as δίκη, is an essential attribute of an ἀγαθός to maintain his τιμή. Likewise, widows and orphans, who have no powerful male in their family to guarantee their τιμή (e.g. by providing necessities out of his property and making them respected among fellow members of the community because of his ἀρετή), can be dishonoured (*Il.* 22. 487ff.). Wealth and poverty, which are never permanent, also affect the τιμή of men. The τιμή of the gods, on the other hand, never changes because they do not know death, old age or poverty.

Revenge, recompense and penalty as observed in the usage of τίσις and its cognate words[18]

It has been debated whether the τιμή family and the τίσις family (including ποινή) are etymologically related.[19] Adkins connects the two groups of words with the idea of τιμή by maintaining that τίνεσθαι is 'to get back τιμή for oneself,' despite his taking the view that τιμή and τίνεσθαι derive from different roots.[20] Although, as we will see later, the case is not so simple as Adkins' generalisation, the two groups of words do have an overlapping area, not because they sound similar, but because τιμή often is the object of the verbs τίνω and ἀποτίνω. For example, Agamemnon in his oath before the duel between Menelaus and Paris declares that, if Menelaus wins, the Trojans should pay τιμή to the Achaeans (*Il.* 3. 285-6 τιμὴν ... ἀποτινέμεν; 288-9 τιμὴν ... τίνειν). The idea close to 'paying τιμή back' is observed in the following passages: Hector, when urging his horses, says that they should pay for the care of Andromache (ἀποτίνετον *Il.* 8. 186); Hephaestus feels obliged to return the service to Thetis who once protected him (*Il.* 18. 407 ζῳάγρια τίνειν); Mentor-Athena says to Odysseus that he will pay for the friendship of Odysseus by assisting him in the battle against the suitors (*Od.* 22. 235 ἀποτίνειν); if Telemachus returns Penelope to her father's house so that she can remarry, he must also return her dowry, property to secure a bride's τιμή, in full (*Od.* 2. 132 ἀποτίνειν); Eumaeus says that he does not reward (i.e. return τιμή to) his guest for his lip service (*Od.* 14. 166 τίσω).

τιμή can be recovered from another source than that which one has given or lost it to. Alcinous and other noble Phaeacians give additional gifts to Odysseus, but instead will later collect compensation from their people (*Od.* 13. 15 τισόμεθ'). Achilles, when persuading Agamemnon to give up Chryseis without immediate compensation, reassures the king that the Achaeans will pay him back three or four times as much once Troy is sacked (*Il.* 1. 128 ἀποτείσομεν). Ares, having been surprised in bed with Aphrodite, must pay her husband

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[18] τίνω, ἀποτίνω, τίνυμαι, ἀποτίνυμαι, τίτος, ἄντιτος, and ποινή.

[19] E. Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, 2. pp. 50-5; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, τίνω; H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, τίνω and τίω.

[20] Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (London 1972), p. 15; ibid., *BICS* 7 (1960), 27.

Hephaestus a penalty (*Od.* 8. 332 μοιχάγρια; 348 τίσειν). Since what matters here is that Hephaestus will get due compensation (αἴσιμα πάντα 348), rather than that Ares will be punished, Poseidon can offer to pay the penalty (*Od.* 8. 356) if Ares does not. In all of these cases, τίνω/ἀποτίνω can readily be interpreted as 'giving/getting τιμή back.'

However, when it comes to revenge, punishment, or penalty between two hostile parties, instead of arbitration within a friendly company, the function of τίνεσθαι changes. For example, if one's brother is killed, what one loses is not simply τιμή, and therefore one will surely view revenge as being different from the retrieval of stolen property or lost honour. What one tends to seek is punishment of the offender through his suffering, rather than recovering one's particular losses.

That punishment is not just recovery of τιμή is illustrated in Agamemnon's oath before the duel of Menelaus and Paris (*Il.* 3. 284-91):

> εἰ δέ κ' Ἀλέξανδρον κτείνῃ ξανθὸς Μενέλαος,
> Τρῶας ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην καὶ κτήματα πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι,
> *τιμὴν* δ' Ἀργείοις ἀποτινέμεν ἥν τιν' ἔοικεν,
> ἥ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται.
> εἰ δ' ἂν ἐμοὶ *τιμὴν* Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες
> τίνειν οὐκ ἐθέλωσιν Ἀλεξάνδροιο πεσόντος,
> αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἔπειτα μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα *ποινῆς*
> αὖθι μένων, ἧός κε τέλος πολέμοιο κιχείω.

First of all, Menelaus must kill Paris in order to avenge himself (*Il.* 3. 28, 351, 366). The idea of Agamemnon's oath is that if the Trojans return Helen and the stolen property to Menelaus, and give such compensation to the Argives as is appropriate as a trophy for victors and makes their expedition worthwhile, his army will be satisfied and there will be no more war. But if the Trojans refuse to accept this condition despite Paris' defeat, and thereby continue to despise the τιμή of the Achaeans, Agamemnon will get 'ποινή' from them by force. In other words, in the latter case, he no longer tries to get τιμή, material compensation, just for its own sake, but seeks the capital punishment of perjurers first. Once the truce is broken by the Trojans, Agamemnon does not heed gains and losses of τιμή any more. He rejects any offer of ransom and insists on death to all Trojan males, including even unborn ones (*Il.* 6. 57-60). He is not a merchant who would think, 'Let us get ransom and increase our

τιμή. Let us save infants as slaves so that we can sell them later.' τιμή is one thing, ποινή is another, sought in different motivations. ποινή can sometimes be material compensation, but human emotion always goes beyond financial calculation.

Ajax's story to persuade Achilles to give up his anger, ironically, reveals that anger cannot always be removed by material ποινή alone, though the emphasis of his argument is that one *should* overcome one's anger nevertheless (*Il.* 9. 632-6):

> καὶ μέν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φονῆος
> ποινὴν ἢ οὗ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο τεθνηῶτος·
> καί ῥ' ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ πόλλ' ἀποτείσας,
> τοῦ δέ τ' *ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ*,
> ποινὴν δεξαμένῳ·

It is clearly acknowledged here that there is something in human anger which cannot be resolved just by increasing one's τιμή.

Therefore, normally, the murder of a family member or a close friend calls for deadly vengeance. τίνυσθαι/τίνεσθαι is above all to get emotional satisfaction through returning suffering which is equal to, or greater than, that one has received from one's enemy (*Il.* 15. 116, 16. 398, 17. 34, 18. 93, 19. 208, 21. 134, 22. 271, *Od.* 9. 317, 24. 434-5, 470; cf. *Il.* 11. 142).

It is certainly true that Orestes won fame (*Od.* 3. 204, κλέος) and got his royal heritage back by avenging his father's death (*Od.* 3. 197-8, 203), and in that sense won his τιμή back. But, as far as Aegisthus is concerned, his τίσις (*Od.* 1. 40) would not have been complete if he only returned the throne to Orestes and went into exile. He must pay for his murder of Agamemnon by his own life (*Od.* 1. 43, 3. 195). In other words, what the murderer 'pays' is not simply the τιμή of the avenger.

This is also the case with Odysseus' deadly vengeance upon the suitors. They have not killed anybody yet (though plotting against Telemachus' life), and do offer Odysseus compensation which will not only repay the damage but actually increase his material τιμή (*Od.* 22. 55-9; 57 τιμή), but for Odysseus even the whole of their property is not enough payment for what they have done to him and his household (*Od.* 22. 61-4). So he refuses the offer of greater property than he originally had. Moreover, the killing of the suitors means risking his own life under the threat of their kinsmen's vengeance, and in principle he could even lose all his τιμή by going into exile. It is not a step a sober accountant would take. Nevertheless,

he must kill them all, because he will be avenged, paid off, only when he gets emotional satisfaction from their most miserable death. Therefore their death, and it only, is what they pay (*Od.* 14. 163, 22. 64, 23. 57, 24. 352) and what Odysseus is paid (*Od.* 1. 268, 3. 216, 5. 24, 11. 118, 13. 193, 386, 15. 177, 16. 255, 17. 540, 20. 121, 23. 31, 24. 326, 480, 482; Telemachus *Od.* 3. 206). Although he is pious enough to check his tongue, his joy after the revenge must be no less than that of Eurycleia who nearly cries out in triumph (*Od.* 22. 407-8). Penelope, too, would have rejoiced at the sight of the bloody avenger Odysseus (*Od.* 23. 47-8).

Vengeance, whether socially justifiable or not, is a dark desire to give physical or psychological pains to a person who has caused one some displeasure. It is a negative feature of humanity that still lingers long after the establishment of modern laws which prohibit personal vengeance. Heroes, with no such modifying convention in their society, are generally ruthless in avenging themselves on their enemies. Achilles, not at all satisfied with just killing Hector, drags his victim's body behind his chariot day after day, until Apollo, who criticises him as being 'as savage-minded as a lion' (*Il.* 24. 41), moves Zeus to stop him. Peirithous avenged himself on the Centaurs (*Il.* 2. 743 ἐτείσατο) and he and his men mutilated the face of one of them called Eurytion (*Od.* 21. 299-301). The unfaithful goat-herd Melanthius is punished (*Od.* 22. 168, ἀποτίσῃ) by torture and mutilation (*Od.* 22. 172-7, 187-93, 475-7). Even the most sensible of the Achaeans, old Nestor, talks in revengeful terms when urging the army to avenge themselves (τείσασθαι) by taking Trojan wives into bed (*Il.* 2. 354-6). Agamemnon, as we have already seen, goes so far as to say that even unborn babies of Troy, in so far as they are male, should not escape death (*Il.* 6. 57-60). Most horrifying, though pitiful, is the passion of Hecuba as the mother who has lost her dearest son. She wishes to bite at Achilles' liver and eat it in revenge for Hector (*Il.* 24. 212-4).[21] In her mind, there is no more queenly honour or dignity,

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[21] Eating one's enemy raw is the ultimate temptation for an avenger, but never actually happens in Homer. Achilles wishes if he could be so wild as to eat Hector raw (*Il.* 22. 346-7) and Hecuba, who herself wishes to eat him raw, calls him 'ὠμηστής' (24. 207). On Hera's wrath at the Trojans, Zeus wonders if she will be satisfied only by eating Priam, his children and other Trojans raw (*Il.* 4. 35-6). Cf. J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death*, p. 20.

but only a single desire of vengeance fostered in her grief and dark despair.

Vengeance is often performed in the name of the gods. Agamemnon says that Zeus will let perjurers pay their penalty either by their own lives or by their wives and children (*Il.* 4. 161-2). Some gods are certainly supposed to punish perjurers in this world, and others in the underworld (*Il.* 3. 276-9, 19. 258-60), but there is no passage to testify to this function of the gods in Homer. The belief only serves as a convenient justification for the renewed attack of the Achaeans against Troy. Odysseus believes that it is the gods who punished the suitors (*Od.* 22. 413; cf. 1. 267-8, 3. 205-6, 20. 169; Telemachus 17. 51 Ζεὺς ἄντιτα ἔργα τελέσσῃ), but as we have seen, the death of the suitors is rather a divine favour to Odysseus than a divine punishment of them (cf. Chapter 3). He also claims that it was Zeus and the other gods who punished Polyphemus at *Od.* 9. 479, but in this case again, the gods apparently played no part in his vengeance (cf. Chapter 1, 'Zeus Xeinios').

On the other hand, clear examples of divine punishment mostly deal with the gods' own τιμή (cf. Chapter 6). For Agamemnon's insult to Chryses' priesthood, Apollo sends plague to the Achaeans (*Il.* 1. 42ff.). Helios demands that Zeus punish the companions of Odysseus for killing his cattle (*Od.* 12. 378 τῖσαι) and threatens to go to, and shine in, the underworld otherwise (*Od.* 12. 382-3). Helios does not accept τιμή which the starving crew of Odysseus promise to pay afterwards (12. 345-7), but wants their immediate destruction. He does not take account of their desperate situation, but seeks revenge for its own sake.

When Odysseus mistakenly thinks that he has been dumped on a foreign land by the Phaeacians, he calls upon Zeus Hiketesios for their punishment saying that the god punishes wrongdoers (*Od.* 13. 213-4; 214 τίνυται ὅς τις ἁμάρτῃ). It would have been interesting to see if Zeus actually took action upon this call of an ἱκέτης, had this situation been true. But even without any evidence for the function of Hiketesios, we know well what sort of ἁμαρτία Zeus actually punishes. Ironically, he allows Poseidon to punish the Phaeacians precisely because they have escorted Odysseus to his home safely. Their assistance to Odysseus is taken by Poseidon as an offence against his τιμή. Therefore the Phaeacians have their punishment (τίσις *Od.* 13. 144). Divine punishment is as malicious and merciless as human vengeance. One logical doctrine is that of Ἄτη as avenger of the

Λιταί (*Il.* 9. 512 ἀποτείσῃ), but as we have seen, ἄτη does not function on such a principle at all (Chapter 4). ἐρινύς/ἐρινύες, however, seem to be effective divine avengers in certain cases which we will examine in the next chapter.

Avengers demand not just getting lost τιμή back, but full emotional satisfaction—often even by risking their own lives or τιμή—, and this is normally accepted in the Homeric morality. Only when one goes too far—like Achilles maltreating Hector's dead body day after day—the gods may intervene. Odysseus, who once paid dearly for his boast after blinding the Cyclops (*Od.* 9. 500ff.), knows it well, and does not boast over the bodies of the suitors. However, the dark passion of vengeance is shared by the gods, too. There is no universal principle to check cruelty in the name of vengeance.

CHAPTER NINE

FORCES THAT RESTRAIN HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

We have seen how we can formulate the Homeric sense of morality in terms of μοῖρα and in terms of τιμή. Each individual has his due portion and is expected by the society to stay within it. If this rule is broken, some sanction is usually applied. If one dishonours, injures, kills, or in any other way wrongs someone else, and if the latter or his kinsmen are capable, revenge is usually expected. This prospect, without doubt, is a very powerful deterrent against violence and other wrongdoings. But fear of vengeance is only one of many forces that restrain human desire to act selfishly against the interest of others. In this chapter, we will examine other such forces that keep human behaviour 'within one's due portion.'

Divine punishment

We have examined the morality of the gods extensively and seen how unreliable they are in punishing wrongdoers (cf. Part I). They often turn a blind eye to outrage done by their protégés and sometimes punish the innocent like the Phaeacians or the Niobids. Although pious men, often battered by misfortunes, believe in fair justice of the gods and fear their punishment, divine sanction in general is not much feared by men of high birth. Achilles cruelly rejects Hector's last plea to return his body to his family, despite his warning against divine μήνιμα (*Il.* 22. 358). Heracles kills his guest and gets away with it (*Od.* 21. 27). The suitors insult their host and his guests unafraid of Zeus Xeinios. It is indeed well said by Odysseus (*Od.* 18. 132-3):

> οὐ μὲν γάρ ποτέ φησι κακὸν πείσεσθαι ὀπίσσω,
> ὄφρ' ἀρετὴν παρέχωσι θεοὶ καὶ γούνατ' ὀρώρῃ.

But there is one divine power revered and feared universally and definitely in action as an avenger, namely, ἐρινύς.

As we have already pointed out, unlike μοῖρα or αἶσα, ἐρινύς is primarily a deity in her own right, not a personified idea, as we can

see her name among Mycenaean deities on Linear B tablets.[1] In Homer, too, they are active deities who are even given handmaids by the Harpies (*Od.* 20. 78).

ἐρινύες are most frequently described as avengers of mothers, fathers, and other elder family members. In four out of six such cases, they are avengers of a mother. Meleager's mother calls on Hades and Persephone to give death to her son who has killed her brother, and it is ἐρινύς who hears her prayer (*Il.* 9. 571-2). ἐρινύς here must be the avenger not only for the mother's grief, but also for the blood of her kinsman, for, by killing his uncle, Meleager has slighted the ties of blood between him and his mother. Oedipus suffers from his mother's ἐρινύες, because he is ultimately responsible for her death by having killed his father/her husband and having married her (*Od.* 11. 280). The power and function of ἐρινύες are proved by such firm examples and they are truly dreaded as such, probably more than the Olympian gods.[2] Telemachus says that he will never send his mother away against her will because he fears that she might call on ἐρινύες, in addition to the possibility that he might get νέμεσις from people (*Od.* 2. 135-7).

ἐρινύες watch over the family ties also among the gods. Athena, after beating Ares, taunts him saying that he has been punished by his mother's ἐρινύες (*Il.* 21. 412), though neither the 'punishment' nor 'ἐρινύες of Hera' can be taken seriously in this context. However, when Iris persuades Poseidon to obey Zeus' order saying that ἐρινύες always follow seniors (*Il.* 15. 204), both of them take the goddesses' authority seriously. Elder members of a family must be treated with respect even among the gods, or they may call on ἐρινύες.

The only example of a father's ἐρινύες appear at *Il.* 9. 454 in Phoenix's story about his father's curse on him. Phoenix is cursed to be childless because he has slept with his father's concubine. It is not only an insult to his father, but could be regarded as violation of the natural order, because it is not natural that a father and a son share the same female as their sexual partner (as Oedipus did). ἐρινύες here are the avengers of a father and also the guardians of the natural order.

The activities of ἐρινύες as avengers are widely acknowledged and

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1 Cf. Chapter 7, n. 9.

2 We get the same impression from Aeschylus' *Oresteia*.

have the most powerful deterrent effect at least against intra-familial crimes. It seems to be because of this authority of the goddesses that the Beggar-Odysseus tries to connect his case with the power of ἐρινύες when cursing the suitors (*Od.* 17. 475):

ἀλλ' εἴ που πτωχῶν γε θεοὶ καὶ ἐρινύες εἰσίν, ...

Although the syntax is hypothetical, we can surely take these 'θεοί' seriously. It is a firmly established belief of Homeric man that Zeus Xeinios is the protector of wanderers and foreign visitors, and even some of the suitors believe that the gods visit men disguised as mortal visitors to monitor how ξεῖνοι are treated (*Od.* 17. 485-7). If there are in fact 'θεοί' for beggars, the ἐρινύες whom Odysseus talks about here must be the agents avenging beggars on behalf of such gods or the gods themselves in the capacity as avengers. As we have noticed, it is ἐρινύς who hears the prayer addressed to Hades and Persephone in one case (*Il.* 9. 569-72), and in another, Hades and Persephone are said to have heard the prayer addressed to ἐρινύες (*Il.* 9. 454-7). These two examples suggest the general tendency of grouping together the gods of the Underworld, but also indicate the possibility for ἐρινύς as an avenging agent on behalf of other deities.[3] This must be the reason why Odysseus could say 'if there are any ἐρινύες for beggars by any chance, ...'

In two passages, ἐρινύς is said to send ἄτη to men. In his speech admitting his mistake in dishonouring Achilles, Agamemnon says that Zeus, Moira and Erinys sent ἄτη to him (*Il.* 19. 87-8).[4] In his view, these three deities acted as a team in giving him misfortunes. ἄτη sent to Agamemnon, however, is not punishment, and not even the repentant Agamemnon views it that way. As we saw in Chapter 4, ἄτη may be allotted by Zeus, Moira, Erinys or virtually by any gods if they wish, and men's moral virtue or weakness has little to do with its distribution. Therefore it is no surprise for us to hear that ἐρινύς sends ἄτη to Melampus (*Od.* 15. 234) who turns out to be a

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[3] For the connection between Persephone and Erinys see M. D. Petruševski 'ΔΗΜΗΤΗΡ-ΕΡΙΝΥΣ-ΠΕΡΣΕΦΟΝΗ' in *ZAnt* 21 (1971), 621-33. For the Erinyes as agents, cf. Scholion bT on *Il.* 9. 571: 'πῶς δὲ Ἀΐδην ἐπικαλεῖται, ἡ δὲ Ἐρινὺς ἔρχεται; δηλονότι ὡς ὑπηρέτις.'

[4] I do not think that the interpretation of this passage as an example of ''Ἐρινύς als Schicksalsgöttinnen' by *LfgrE* is appropriate ('Ἐρινύς B 1b). The very fact that Moira and Erinys are listed as separate beings seems to suggest their distinct identities and functions.

successful adventurer in the end within the plan of Zeus (*Od.* 11. 281-97). Obviously Melampus is not 'punished' with ἄτη. Here, ἐρινύς is not an avenger, but an agent of Zeus helping to accomplish his plan.

ἐρινύες are also the guardians and witnesses of oaths along with Zeus, Gaia, and Helios (*Il.* 19. 259). It is understandable for men to call on a deity from the Underworld along with the earth and the heavenly gods, to make sure that the powers of the whole universe witness a solemn oath, especially when we think of the gods' practice of making μέγιστος ὅρκος by the Styx (*Il.* 2. 755, 14. 271, 15. 37-8). Again, a pair of chthonic deities, who are probably Hades and Persephone, are said to fulfil the same function as ἐρινύες on another occasion, namely to punish perjurers in the Underworld (*Il.* 3. 278-9). We have no direct evidence for the validity of this belief, but there is no doubt that the addition of such chthonic deities to the list of divine witnesses would increase its deterrent force against perjury.

The most striking activity of ἐρινύες in Homer is in the episode of the horse Xanthus of Achilles (*Il.* 19. 407-18). The horse is granted a human voice by Hera and predicts its master's approaching death. After its speech, ἐρινύες stop its voice. This passage is usually cited to exemplify the function of ἐρινύες as the guardians of the order of nature. The examples we have seen so far of ἐρινύες in this function are all concerned with human relations. This is the only example to suggest the control of ἐρινύες over the world outside the human sphere.

But why do they stop Xanthus' voice? If their duty is to keep the horse behaving within the realm of speechless animals, it is too late to stop it talking after it has already spoken.[5] Do they stop its voice to prevent it from being 'un-horsely' for too long or to prevent Achilles from knowing too much about his own destiny?[6] Or do they simply act as agents of Hera? It is difficult to determine. In any case, we must be careful not to extend the office of ἐρινύες too much only because of this example, which is by no means sufficient to prove that they have control over the whole universe.

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[5] Cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 7; If it is unusual for Homeric horses to talk, it is perfectly normal for them to understand human speech. Cf. *Il.* 8. 184ff., 23. 417-8, 446-7.

[6] A. Heubeck, 'ἐρινύς in der archaischen Epik', *Glotta* 64 (1986), 154.

The major reason for us to be cautious in the interpretation of this episode is the parallel between the Achilles-Xanthus episode and the Adrastus-Areion episode. The latter suggests a connection between ἐρινύς and the horse Areion, which is said to have brought Adrastus to safety from Thebes in the *Thebaid* and is said to be a son of Poseidon and Demeter-Erinys.[7] The horse is also regarded as a son of Poseidon and a Harpy or an Erinys in other traditions.[8] If we consider this multiple connection of Demeter-Erinys-Harpy, and recall that Xanthus itself was born from a Harpy, the parallel is too close to be ignored.[9] Therefore it will be sensible for us to bear in mind that 'The identification of Xanthus with Arion, and the latter's intimate association with the Erinyes, could easily have been responsible for their appearance here.'[10]

In our observation, therefore, the ἐρινύς or ἐρινύες are primarily the avengers for bloodshed or other offences within a family, and agents of higher gods who guard oaths and possibly social codes of hospitality. In the latter capacity, they can send ἄτη to men in order to initiate some action, but not to punish somebody. Their actual deterrent force, however, seems effective mostly against intra-familial offences. One of the solemn oaths witnessed by ἐρινύς is broken and the most insolent of the suitors are not scared by a beggar's call on ἐρινύες.

νέμεσις

νέμεσις is justified anger or 'public disapproval'.[11] Roughly speaking, it is caused when one sees someone (sometimes oneself) 'going beyond one's lot', doing something considered inappropriate for one's position in the society, which most often means acting against θέμις and δίκη.[12] The noun νέμεσις is not used for divine

[7] Cf. Pausanias VIII. 25. 4-10.

[8] Scholia on *Il.* 23. 347.

[9] For the detailed discussion of the connection of Demeter-Erinys-Harpy and the two episodes on a hero and his horse, cf. Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods*, esp. p. 125, pp. 136-7, pp. 236-7. See also U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, 'Lesefrüchte', *Hermes* 35 (1900) 565; *RE* Supplementband VIII (1956), 102-3.

[10] Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods*, p. 237.

[11] Cf. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 26, n. 109.

[12] Cf. M. Scott, 'Aidos and Nemesis' in *Acta Classica* 23 (1980), 25: '*Nemesis* is derived from the verb *nemein* which implies to 'divide, distribute or assign'. It is concerned with assigning to people and situations their correct due. It is concerned with maintaining the due order of things'; G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, on 3. 156.

anger, but its cognate verbs can be used to express divine indignation either at men or at other gods.[13] However, νέμεσις is most often human indignation *in contrast with divine anger* as in the statement of Telemachus at *Od.* 2. 130ff. He says if he sends his mother back to her father's home (135-7):

μήτηρ στυγερὰς ἀρήσετ' ἐρινῦς
οἴκου ἀπερχομένη· νέμεσις δέ μοι ἐξ ἀνθρώπων
ἔσσεται.

The divine avengers ἐρινύες are contrasted with public criticism. Divine sanction and νέμεσις are coupled also at *Od.* 22. 39-40 when Odysseus counts up the crimes of the suitors:

οὔτε θεοὺς δείσαντες, οἳ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν,
οὔτε τιν' ἀνθρώπων νέμεσιν κατόπισθεν ἔσεσθαι.

The suitors have met much νέμεσις from the family of Odysseus and the community, but have not heeded it at all, just as they do not care about 'the gods and Erinyes of beggars' invoked by Odysseys (*Od.* 17. 475). In this, they stand in sharp contrast to Telemachus, who refrains from an apparently logical, but selfish, act of sending his mother back to her father's home, fearing ἐρινύες of his mother and νέμεσις of people. Obviously, the suitors are bad examples of men, and Telemachus is a good one. One must avoid public disapproval in order to be regarded as a good person. Even if a man is a strong fighter, if he acts shamelessly, not regarding νέμεσις, he can be discredited. This is the case with Paris. He is an excellent warrior who is destined to kill Achilles, but shows little enthusiasm for fighting in the war that he alone is responsible for (e.g. *Il.* 3. 36-7). Therefore his wife Helen complains that Paris does not know νέμεσις nor αἴσχεα of people (*Il.* 6. 349-51):[14]

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τάδε γ' ὧδε θεοὶ κακὰ τεκμήραντο,
ἀνδρὸς ἔπειτ' ὤφελλον ἀμείνονος εἶναι ἄκοιτις,
ὃς ᾔδη νέμεσίν τε καὶ αἴσχεα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων.

Far from being ashamed as he should be, he even seems to resent (i.e. to feel νέμεσις towards) the Trojans for their indignation at

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[13] Unlike in Hesiod (*Th.* 223, *Op.* 200), there is no sign of deification or personification of νέμεσις in Homer.

[14] As we will see later (Chapter 11), αἶσχος and its cognate words such as αἰσχρός are very strong terms to express νέμεσις directed towards anti-social behaviour.

him, according to Hector (*Il.* 6. 326), though Paris himself denies it (335-6):

οὔ τοι ἐγὼ Τρώων τόσσον χόλῳ οὐδὲ νεμέσσι
ἥμην ἐν θαλάμῳ, ἔθελον δ' ἄχεϊ προτραπέσθαι.

As we know, however, this is a poor excuse just after his lustful hour with Helen, and therefore it cannot be believed. We are inclined to believe Hector's observation of Paris' normal attitude and behaviour.

However, he is an exception. Usually, responsible warriors refrain from cowardice and laziness in battle, regarding social pressure from outside (νέμεσις) and inner sense of shame (αἰδώς) as in the reproach of Poseidon to encourage Achaean heroes (*Il.* 13. 119-22):

ὑμῖν δὲ νεμεσσῶμαι περὶ κῆρι.
ὦ πέπονες, τάχα δή τι κακὸν ποιήσετε μεῖζον
τῇδε μεθημοσύνῃ· ἀλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ θέσθε ἕκαστος
αἰδῶ καὶ *νέμεσιν*· δὴ γὰρ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρωρεν.

In this context, νέμεσις and αἰδώς are almost synonymous. νέμεσις is public disapproval as well as one's awareness of it (as it is here) which in turn is what αἰδώς basically is.

The verbs νεμεσ(σ)άω and νεμεσίζομαι and the adjective νεμεσ(σ)ητός further illustrate when Homeric man feels νέμεσις either at others or at oneself.

One feels νέμεσις when someone's τιμή is damaged or threatened by a man of a lower rank. The Achaeans feel νέμεσις against Thersites (*Il.* 2. 223) who criticises Agamemnon with sharp words of reproach. As a result, he gets punished by Odysseus (246-67). What Thersites says is mostly an echo of Achilles' complaint, which is fair enough in its own right, but their society does not allow a soldier of a low status to criticise kingly heroes so rudely. Similarly, the suitors are most infuriated when a beggar wants to join their contest of the bow (*Od.* 21. 285), fearing that his attempt, if successful, might discredit their valour.[15]

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[15] Scott, *AC* 23 (1980), 26: 'Indirectly, any offence against the classified society is an offence against any member of that society, high or low, because it threatens the security of established arrangements.' These 'established arrangements', in my opinion, are nothing other than θέμις and δίκη, customs and 'the way things normally should be' in general. I am puzzled by Scott's insistence on 'non-moral'

Interestingly, within the divine society, the gods feel νέμεσις when their τιμή is slighted by a superior god, not by mortals or lesser gods. Poseidon feels νέμεσις at Zeus' domineering commands (*Il.* 13. 16, 353, 15. 211, 227) and Hera feels νέμεσις at the dominant rule of Zeus (*Il.* 15. 103). This seems to reflect a slight difference between divine and human laws. In the human world, class difference must be kept clear. In the divine world, each member seems to have an equal right (cf. *Il.* 4. 57-8). Namely, there is only one 'class' in divine society, and trying to suppress another individual's intention is what deserves public disapproval. On the other hand, the class-division between the gods and men must be kept clear. If a god accepts hospitality from mortals undisguised, it can be a matter of νέμεσις (*Il.* 24. 463-4).[16]

νέμεσις is also felt, as we have already seen, at military shortcomings. One feels νέμεσις when a brave hero does not join the battle (*Il.* 13. 119, 293) or when one fails to protect one's fallen comrade's body and armour (*Il.* 16. 544, 17. 93, 254). Since heroes receive τιμή in exchange for outstanding military performances, cowardice naturally is regarded as what we would call a breach of contract.

Another category of behaviour likely to be met with νέμεσις is an offence against the convention of ξεινίη. If one does not fulfil one's duty as a host, one deserves νέμεσις. Telemachus feels νέμεσις towards himself if he does not welcome a visitor at once (*Od.* 1. 119). He complains about the manners of the suitors to a newly arrived guest, but is aware that this guest might feel νέμεσις towards him who should not sound like a mean host (*Od.* 1. 158). The host can also incur νέμεσις if he either keeps his guests longer or sends them

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nature of αἰδώς (p. 24) and νέμεσις (p. 26) and the dominance of '*arete*-standards' as the only effective moral concepts. Her own analysis of these terms actually tells us much more than her restatement of Adkins' theory. For example, she says on p. 26, '. . . like *aidos*, *nemesis* is not a rigid moral concept,' no, because their points of reference θέμις and δίκη are not rigid moral concepts themselves. As she rightly continues (pp. 26-7), 'It is dependent on the emotional sensitivity of the individual and also on his concept of the due order, offences against which will cause *nemesis*. Unlike fixed morality, it will adapt to individuals and to circumstances.' This flexibility is a characteristic of Homeric δίκη as we saw in Chapter 5. But there is a broad consensus in the society. At least every member of Homeric society seems to agree on what is 'οὐ θέμις' or 'οὐ νέμεσις', for example.

[16] However, it is all right with the Phaeacians (*Od.* 7. 201-3) and the other way round, namely, cases in which men accept divine hospitality, as we see Circe and Calypso entertain Odysseus with no fuss.

away against their will (*Od.* 15. 69; cf. *Od.* 18. 409). For this reason, Telemachus cannot get rid of the suitors.

The conduct of the suitors, on the other hand, certainly deserves νέμεσις, because it is an offence against ξεινίη to behave arrogantly and rudely in their host's house and exploit his hospitality (*Od.* 1. 228, 21. 147; cf. *Od.* 2. 64, 138, 4. 158). Other people of the community also ought to feel νέμεσις at the suitors (*Od.* 2. 239). However, it does not seem to work very strongly on the suitors and their families as a restraining force from selfish conduct. On the contrary, for a sensible guest like Odysseus (disguised), it deserves νέμεσις even to moan about one's own misfortune in someone else's home (*Od.* 19. 121). The effect of νέμεσις seems to be connected with the belief in Zeus Xeinios. Some suitors are opposed to Antinous' violence towards a wanderer (Odysseus) because they believe in the gods of hospitality. But others, including Antinous, obviously do not fear the gods at all (*Od.* 22. 39). The pious Odysseus believes that Zeus feels νέμεσις towards κακὰ ἔργα like killing a guest (*Od.* 14. 284), though we have seen that the god did not take any action against the guest-killer Heracles. Man's faith in Zeus Xeinios, and νέμεσις connected with it, seem to be independent of what the god really cares about.

Behaviour contrary to other social conventions also invites νέμεσις. It is θέμις to give the funeral rites to the dead, and if one fails to do so, one deserves νέμεσις. Penelope tells her suitors that she will get νέμεσις from others (νεμεσήσῃ *Od.* 2. 101, 19. 146, 24. 136), if she leaves her husband's household without preparing a proper funeral cloth for her aged father-in-law.

Sexual behaviour is controlled by νέμεσις, but only to some extent. If a man approaches a virgin openly, the public will direct νέμεσις towards both of them (*Od.* 6. 286-8). Therefore Nausicaa has to avoid 'being seen' together with Odysseus. Helen knows that if she sleeps in the middle of the day with her husband who has just escaped from a combat, she will receive νέμεσις from others (νεμεσσητόν *Il.* 3. 410). But, in the end, she yields to the power of Aphrodite (418-20) and joins Paris in bed. The goddess is described here as an amoral force which overrides the restraining force of νέμεσις. Similarly, Zeus cannot control his desire for Hera, who is equipped with Aphrodite's love-charm, despite Hera's protest that making love outdoors in the middle of the day is 'νεμεσσητόν' (*Il.* 14. 336). In either case, however, the actual νέμεσις can be

avoided by keeping the act secret. Accordingly, νέμεσις does not work as a force against secret adultery. Helen fled with Paris in Menelaus' absence, and Aphrodite and Ares make love in Hephaestus' absence. There is no absolute sense of guilt in this world as far as adultery is concerned. Helen has a heavy sense of guilt about her elopement with Paris because of the death and misery caused by it, and not for the act itself.

One's appearance is more important than one's substance in the world in which public criticism is felt as the most powerful sanction. The extreme case is that of clothing. If a king is dressed in rags it is a matter of νέμεσις (*Od.* 22. 489) and he can be dishonoured (*Od.* 23. 115-6).[17]

Unpleasant words and deeds in general cause νέμεσις. One feels νέμεσις, for example, when one hears criticism of one's own brother (*Il.* 10. 115) or an ominous thing about one's future (*Od.* 21. 169), or is woken up in the middle of the night (*Il.* 10. 145). Therefore, cautious speakers often apologise in advance saying, 'Do not feel νέμεσις towards me if I . . . ,' when one has to say or do something unpleasant to others (μὴ νεμέσα *Il.* 10. 145, 16. 22; cf. *Il.* 15. 115, *Od.* 1. 158; *Il.* 9. 33 σὺ δὲ μή τι χολωθῇς). Admission of νέμεσις on one's part, as we say, 'Excuse me,' works as a verbal buffer in difficult communications.

There is an example in which one feels νέμεσις in front of the gods when one provides poison for atrocious weapons (*Od.* 1. 263). As we saw in Chapter 1, this νέμεσις works on some individuals but not on others, just as νέμεσις towards an offence against ξεινίη. Mentes' father does not fear the gods when he gives the poison to Odysseus, nor are the gods described as feeling νέμεσις towards him.

Another indication that νέμεσις controls human behaviour is in the recurrent phrase 'οὐ νέμεσις,' denoting such and such act is not blameworthy. It is mostly applied to borderline cases rather than positively commendable acts. It is not blameworthy that the Trojans and Achaeans have fought the ten-year war for Helen, say the Trojan elders amazed at her divine beauty (*Il.* 3. 156). The miserable war, of course, is not desirable to them, and they are eager to

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[17] Cf. E. Block, 'Clothing makes the man: A pattern in the *Odyssey*' in *TAPA* 115 (1985), 1-11; She quotes B. Fenik (*Studies in the Odyssey*, pp. 61ff., n. 1) in p. 2: 'For Homeric society what a person wore represented in a real, not just a symbolic, sense what he *was*. A king without his proper raiment is not a king . . . .'

return this ruinous beauty to the Achaeans, but at least, they admit, it has a good enough reason.

Similarly, Agamemnon tries to convince his generals that removing their ships off-shore for their safety is not cowardice, if not desirable (*Il.* 14. 80):

οὐ γάρ τις νέμεσις φυγέειν κακόν, οὐδ' ἀνὰ νύκτα.

This plan, however, is met by Odysseus' νέμεσις (82 ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη) and rejected as dangerous (84 οὐλόμενε) and suitable only for an inglorious army (84).

Penelope complains that Phemius' songs of the sufferings of the Danaans give her fresh woes (*Od.* 1. 340-2). Telemachus, however, justifies the bard's choice of themes, saying that it is not blameworthy for singers to sing about topical matters to entertain people (*Od.* 1. 350). The suitors are not happy about Penelope's tricks to postpone her decision to marry one of them, but Agelaos admits that it was not blameworthy for her to do so provided there was still hope that Odysseus might come home, since that would have been better (*Od.* 20. 328-31). In most of these cases, οὐ νέμεσις is applied to something that is not desirable to one party, but is not subject to public disapproval.

Similar situations are observed in the use of negative plus νεμεσσάω / νεμεσίζομαι / νεμεσσητός. The Achaeans' complaint about the prolonged war is not pleasant to Agamemnon, but no object of νέμεσις (*Il.* 2. 296). Achilles' anger at Agamemnon itself is not commendable, but nothing blameworthy until the latter offers compensation (*Il.* 9. 523). Menelaus does not want to leave Patroclus' body to Hector's plunder, but thinks it will not invite νέμεσις if he avoids fighting against someone with divine backing (*Il.* 17. 100-1). Agamemnon should not feel νέμεσις towards himself (thinking that he is humiliating his own kingly status) by making amends for his own error (*Il.* 19. 182). Peisistratus does not object to lamenting the dead (*Od.* 4. 195), except at the dinner table. Nobody enjoys being scolded by his mother, but Telemachus admits that Penelope's reproach is fair enough (*Od.* 18. 227). A visitor (Odysseus disguised) would rather not see his hostess sobbing, but he does not object to it (*Od.* 19. 264). Odysseus' declaration of vengeance is more than unpleasant to the suitors, but Eurymachus admits that his indignation is justifiable (*Od.* 22. 59).

These examples seem to imply that, when an act which is not

desirable to one party is classified as οὐ νέμεσις, the party that finds it undesirable cannot push the matter very far to give their interest priority. In this sense, οὐ νέμεσις is a manifestation of social tolerance and a cooperative attitude which yields to interests of others, however undesirable to oneself, provided the values of the society as a whole allow the act. νέμεσις functions as a neutral reconciler, or at least a buffer between parties with contending interests. One tries to avoid νέμεσις, and tolerates things which are not subject to νέμεσις. Thus, in these two ways, νέμεσις works as a restraining force on behaviour.

αἰδώς

αἰδώς, shame, respect or fear, is another restraining force on behaviour, not coming from others, but felt inside oneself, with implicit or explicit external pressure. When αἰδώς is felt towards the public, such state of mind can be also described as feeling νέμεσις.[18] However, the real difference between νέμεσις and αἰδώς is that, while νέμεσις can be felt by others as well as by oneself towards one's shortcoming, αἰδώς can be felt only by oneself.[19] It is always internal, and public pressure can do nothing about those who are incapable of feeling αἰδώς, like the suitors of Penelope (*Od.* 1. 254, 13. 376, 20. 29, 39, 171, 386, 23. 37).

αἰδώς is felt towards the public in many situations similar to those in which one feels νέμεσις. As we have seen in a previous example, one feels αἰδώς as well as νέμεσις when one runs away from battle

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[18] Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* I (Berlin 1931), pp. 353ff. defines αἰδώς in this aspect only. As W. J. Verdenius, 'ΑΙΔΩΣ bei Homer', *Mnemosyne* 12 (1944), 49-50, rightly argues that αἰδώς is not conscience in a modern sense, but conscience in reference to the public, 'Öffentlichkeit des Gewissens'. However, G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*[4] (London 1934), p. 84, convincingly pictures αἰδώς as a feeling functioning almost in the same way as our 'conscience': 'But suppose no one sees. The act, as you know well, remains νεμεσητόν—a thing to feel nemesis about: only there is no one there to feel it. Yet, if you yourself dislike what you have done and feel aidôs for it, you inevitably are conscious that somebody or something dislikes or disapproves of you. You do not look at the sun and the earth with peace and friendliness. Now, to an early Greek, the earth, water, and air were full of living eyes: of *theoi*, of *daimones*, of *kêres*. . . . . And it is they who have seen you and are wroth with you for the thing which you have done!' Eumaeus certainly will agree with Murray (cf. *Od.* 14. 402-6). For a more precise classification of the semantic range of the word, cf. *LfgrE*, αἰδώς.

[19] At least in the epics of Homer. Cf. *Hymn to Demeter* 214; N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford, 1974), ad loc.

(*Il.* 5. 530-1, 787, 6. 442, 8. 228, 13. 95, 122, 15. 502, 561-3, 657, 661, 16. 422, 17. 95, 336, 22. 105). The same feeling can be described as δέος in one case (*Il.* 15. 657-8), the same fear of public reproach as implied in νέμεσις and αἰδώς.

When one behaves against θέμις and good manners, one expects νέμεσις from outside and should feel αἰδώς inside. Telemachus would not dare to send his mother away from home, fearing her ἐρινύες and the νέμεσις of the public (*Od.* 2. 135-7) and also feeling αἰδώς inside (*Od.* 20. 343).

Telemachus reproaches the Ithacans who look on the suitors' outrage without trying to stop them, saying that they should feel νέμεσις at the suitors (*Od.* 2. 64) and αἰδώς about themselves before neighbouring communities for their allowing the suitors' act (65) and that they should fear divine anger (66), the same triplet which restrains Telemachus from driving his mother away. It does not, however, work as efficiently on the Ithacans, especially not the kinsmen of the suitors.

In the divine world, too, νέμεσις and αἰδώς towards the public come (or go) together. When Ares nearly dashes out into the battlefield to avenge his son's death, he is aware of the obvious consequences, the νέμεσις of other gods (*Il.* 15. 115) as well as Zeus' χόλος and μῆνις (117-8, 122). As expected, Athena reproaches him saying that he has lost his νόος and αἰδώς (129), namely, intellect to perceive the situation rightly, and respect (αἰδώς) towards Zeus' authority and consideration (αἰδώς) towards other gods who would be affected by Ares' action. If he is fully aware of νέμεσις of other gods, he should have felt αἰδώς inside and restrained himself.

Unseemly behaviour or appearance which is subject to νέμεσις, that is, against good manners and social convention, also evokes αἰδώς. One feels αἰδώς when one is seen weeping (*Od.* 8. 86; cf. the lamenting Thetis' hesitation to join other gods' company *Il.* 24. 90-1). Words or deeds that have even the slightest sexual implication are especially prone to cause αἰδώς. αἰδώς is felt when 'αἰδώς' is exposed, hence the name (*Il.* 2. 262, 13. 568, 22. 75)[20], when a naked man is seen by girls (*Od.* 6. 221-2), when one sees a couple in bed (*Od.* 8. 324), when a lady joins her suitors' company all by herself (*Od.* 18. 184) and when a virgin talks about her imminent wedding

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[20] C. E. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ* (Leipzig 1937), pp. 39-40, gives parallels in other languages.

(*Od.* 6. 66). Contact between the two sexes is restricted to a minimum in this society. αἰδώς seems to deter men and women from open sexual behaviour very efficiently.[21]

The majority of the uses of αἰδώς and its cognate words, however, refer to person-to-person relationships, rather than individual-public relationships. When αἰδώς is felt towards a particular person, it translates better as respect than shame, and is often coupled with love (φιλότης) or awe/fear (δέος).

One feels αἰδώς towards someone superior to oneself, either in status, prowess, wealth or seniority. The heralds of Agamemnon with the unwelcome mission of collecting Briseis feel fear (ταρβήσαντε) and αἰδώς towards Achilles (*Il.* 1. 331), because they are conscious of the unfairness of Agamemnon's order (in this sense they feel νέμεσις towards themselves, too), of Achilles' temper, and also of his higher rank. Achilles is respected and feared by his companions, too. Hermes pretending to be one of Achilles' men says that he fears and respects Achilles (*Il.* 24. 435 δείδοικα καὶ αἰδέομαι). Patroclus describes him as 'αἰδοῖος νεμεσητός' (*Il.* 11. 649), a man who arouses αἰδώς and νέμεσις in others—grammatically this will be the most straightforward reading—, in other words, Patroclus says, 'I feel αἰδώς and νέμεσις in front of him'. 'νεμεσητός' is most often interpreted as 'prone to anger' (μεμψίμοιρος—Aristarchus), but that will suggest that Patroclus is always frightened of Achilles' temper which surely is not the case. It is equally unlikely that Patroclus is playing with an oxymoron, 'he is respectable-blameworthy,' which sounds utterly out of context. I would rather propose to take αἰδοῖος and νεμεσητός, being closely combined in asyndeton, as synonymous, for νέμεσις and αἰδώς can equally mean internalised anticipation and avoidance of νέμεσις from others (cf. *Il.* 13. 122). What Patroclus says here, then, will be something like 'I cannot help respecting him and blaming myself when doing anything he might find inappropriate.' He is not talking about Achilles' unreasonable temper, but his voluntary avoidance of situations which might cause justifiable anger (νέμεσις) in Achilles.

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[21] However, as Scott, *AC* 23 (1980), 25, points out, men are regularly bathed by women in Homer. See Scott's perceptive analysis of *Od.* 6. 221-2. No doubt, it is not nakedness per se, but nakedness in certain contexts that is felt to provoke αἰδώς. For example, we do not normally associate the bare legs of athletes running in a competition with sexuality.

Agamemnon must be respected as a king (*Il.* 4. 402 βασιλῆος αἰδοίοιο), and therefore Diomedes respects (αἰδεσθείς) him and does not protest against his harsh words to himself and Sthenelus. It is this courtesy, on the other hand, that makes Agamemnon anxious when Diomedes is about to choose a partner for the night-raid. Agamemnon has to advise Diomedes not to choose a militarily inferior man because of his respect to the person's higher rank (*Il.* 10. 237 αἰδόμενος, 238 αἰδοῖ), fearing that he might choose Menelaus for the sake of courtesy. Indeed, Menelaus is respected very much among the Achaeans, mainly because of his powerful family background. He is respected even by Nestor who, when complaining about him to Agamemnon, admits that he is φίλος and αἰδοῖος to Nestor (*Il.* 10. 114). 'φίλος' as well as 'αἰδοῖος' probably reflects Menelaus' amiable character and the truly friendly relationship between him and the old man (cf. *Od.* 15. 151-3).

A master is always an object of respect and fear for his servants. Eumaeus respects Odysseus so much that even in his absence, he refers to him as his 'master', not 'Odysseus' (*Od.* 14. 145-7). But this respect has an affectionate tone as well. His respect for Odysseus is so deep because the latter 'loved and cared for' him (*Od.* 14. 146 μ' ἐφίλει καὶ κήδετο θυμῷ). The members of Odysseus' family are also αἰδοῖοι to him (*Od.* 15. 373),[22] especially Telemachus, whom he 'respects and fears' (*Od.* 17. 188 αἰδέομαι καὶ δείδια) as his master. However, he loves his young master as much as he loves Odysseus, as we can see in his emotional welcome to Telemachus (*Od.* 16. 23), especially his addresses to Telemachus, 'γλυκερὸν φάος' (23) and 'φίλον τέκος' (25). This happy combination of αἰδώς and φιλότης is what eventually wins him true friendship of Odysseus on equal terms (*Od.* 21. 214-6).

On the other hand, while Penelope should be αἰδοίη βασίλεια (*Od.* 18. 314) to her servants, twelve of her maidservants dishonour her (οὐ τίουσαι *Od.* 22. 425) by having shameless affairs (ἀναιδείη 22. 424) with her suitors. Their lack of αἰδώς towards their mistress costs them their lives in the end.[23] These two cases, Eumaeus' and the maidservants', indicate that the virtue of servants consists of

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[22] I take αἰδοῖοι here to include both Odysseus' family and visiting strangers who are all 'Würdige' of his respect. Cf. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ*, p. 16.

[23] Cf. Chapter 3.

αἰδώς, δέος and ideally also φιλότης for their masters. How lazy servants can become in their master's absence is illustrated by the poor treatment Argos the dog gets from Odysseus' servants (*Od.* 17. 319-21). That happens if their only motivation for hard work is δέος towards their master. Man loses half of his efficiency in work once enslaved (*Od.* 17. 322-3), because of lack of motivation. Eumaeus does not undergo such deterioration because of his αἰδώς and φιλότης towards his master's family.

Elder or senior persons are treated with αἰδώς as well as τιμή within a family or a community, not necessarily because of their actual strength or power, but virtually for the sake of their age itself which, of course, is accompanied by more experience and, generally speaking, by wisdom. For a young man like Telemachus, it is a highly αἰδώς-inspiring experience to meet and talk to such a grand old king as Nestor (αἰδώς *Od.* 3. 24; cf. 3. 14). For Helen, Priam is her 'φίλος ἑκυρός', αἰδοῖος and δεινός (*Il.* 3. 172). For Andromache, Hecuba is her 'αἰδοίη ἑκυρή' (*Il.* 22. 451). Fathers- and mothers-in-law should be ideally treated with φιλότης as well as αἰδώς by their sons- and daughters-in-law, but φιλότης is not always generated between in-laws, as we see from the famous conflict between Hecuba and Helen or between Priam and Aeneas, and know well from our own personal experiences. In default of φιλότης, αἰδώς works as the only keystone to sustain family harmony.

αἰδώς is felt towards a stronger or senior person among the gods as well. Apollo refrains from fighting against his uncle Poseidon because of αἰδώς (αἴδετο *Il.* 21. 468). Similarly, Athena does not openly help Odysseus until he reaches Ithaca because she feels αἰδώς towards Poseidon (αἴδετο *Od.* 6. 329). Hera is the wife of Zeus, the patriarch of the gods and men, and therefore she is respectable, αἰδοίη (*Il.* 21. 479). For Calypso, Hermes is 'αἰδοῖός τε φίλος τε' (*Od.* 5. 88), presumably because of his close tie to Zeus. Judging by the extremely formal reply of Hermes (εἰρωτᾷ μ' ἐλθόντα θεὰ θεόν 97), the two gods certainly respect each other on the ground of their equal divine right. Calypso's 'αἰδοῖος', therefore, must be wholehearted. Her 'φίλος', however, does not sound more than a word of courtesy. Hermes is φίλος—or rather ξεῖνος—to her in so far as he is a welcome visitor entitled to have ξείνια in her residence, but he rudely confesses that he did not want to come this far himself

(*Od.* 5. 99-102) which is unthinkable if they were really 'φίλοι' to each other.[24]

However, the gods do have a sense of αἰδώς with warmly felt φιλότης towards their benefactors. For Hephaestus and his wife, Thetis is αἰδοίη, φίλη, and δεινή (Hephaestus *Il.* 18. 394, 425; Charis 386), for she once saved him from hardship and also, in consequence, there is a ξεινίη-relationship between her and them. Hephaestus' welcome is warm, and he is willing to meet her request, to make Achilles' new armour.

The goddess is a benefactor of Zeus, too (*Il.* 1. 396-406). Therefore, Zeus gives τιμή to Achilles at her request and finds a solution to the divine dispute caused by Achilles' treatment of Hector's body in the way honourable to Achilles (*Il.* 24. 110), because of the god's αἰδώς and φιλότης for Thetis (111). Hera makes up a story of tension between Oceanus and Tethys in order to borrow Aphrodite's love-charm, and says that she will be called αἰδοίη and φίλη by them if she dissolves their marriage crisis (*Il.* 14. 210).

These examples show that the gods do hold a warmly-felt sense of gratitude, and respect and love derived from it, towards their allies, just as Eumaeus respects and loves his master for the latter's love and care for him.

Power, either based on political influence or on wealth, and seniority are obvious sources of αἰδώς, respect and fear, because if one upsets stronger persons, they could be dangerous and δεινός, while if one wins their hearts, they will be φίλος and beneficial. Respect towards one's benefactors is also important in a similar way, for if you do not show due gratitude to your benefactors, nobody will help you in the future. Simple dynamics of wealth and power behind αἰδώς are described repeatedly by Odysseus in his typical, sobering frankness. He happily accepts the Phaeacians' offer of more presents as their gratitude for his longer stay, saying that if he returns home with fuller hands, he will be αἰδοιότερος and φίλτερος there (*Od.* 11. 360). In this philosophy, even φιλότης

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[24] J. Griffin, *Homer on life and death*, pp. 59-60 sees a good intention in Hermes' words. Certainly this statement can serve as an apology for him to have come to deliver an unwelcome message from Zeus to Calypso, and indirectly prepare her to accept Zeus' command in a less imposing way. Yet, his personal grumble about the bleakness of his itinerary has gone too far to be a disguised kindness of a sensitive person. He can only mean that he would have been reluctant even if he were to deliver good news.

depends on wealth. He makes up a story of his presumed identity in Ithaca in which he says that his father was respected by others 'like a god' because of his wealth and sons (*Od.* 14. 205) and that he himself became δεινός and αἰδοῖος (14. 234) when his household became richer.

However, we must not be misled by what is only Odysseus' personal and ad hoc world-view, and draw a cynical conclusion that wealth and power alone cause αἰδώς towards a person in Homeric society. The best evidence to refute it, ironically, is the treatment Odysseus himself receives among the Phaeacians and from Eumaeus, the very same people to whom he preaches with his sobering truth of life. Odysseus becomes φίλος, δεινός and αἰδοῖος among the Phaeacians, thanks to Athena behind the scenes (*Od.* 8. 21-2), but on the human plane, solely due to the charm of his personality. He wins their hearts and almost the hand of the princess, before he reveals his identity (*Od.* 7. 312-5). Alcinous is impressed not by the wealth or the high status which this wandering stranger simply does not have, but the wisdom and refined manners of the man. More remarkably, the recognition of Odysseus' worth comes before the display of his athletic skills in Book 8. Alcinous, whose principle is 'ἀμείνω δ' αἴσιμα πάντα' (*Od.* 7. 310), finds a man with the same philosophy as his in Odysseus (312 τά τε φρονέων ἅ τ' ἐγώ περ). Odysseus is respected as a man who acts 'within one's lot' by another who does the same. This refutes another theory of Odysseus, that it is physical strength (βίη *Od.* 14. 503) that wins a man the φιλότης and αἰδώς of others (505), without which he is dishonoured (ἀτιμάζουσι 506). He, of course, proves to be wrong with Eumaeus, too. Eumaeus is greatly impressed by the stranger's story (concluded with the above philosophy of life) which is a tactful request for a blanket, and reassures him that he will provide him with all necessities (14. 510-1). Eumaeus praises his story by saying (509):

οὐδέ τί πω παρὰ μοῖραν ἔπος νηκερδὲς ἔειπες,

'You have said nothing beyond μοῖρα or useless.' One is applauded when one speaks 'within μοῖρα', appropriately to his status and to the circumstances.

Odysseus may be a happy exception, as envied by his companions (*Od.* 10. 38-9), guided by a divine guardian, but there is a strong moral message in both of these episodes. Man does not win αἰδώς only by his wealth or physical strength, but by good manners and

thoughtful words, in other words, masterly knowledge and application of θέμις and δίκη. Elderly persons are respected, no doubt, mostly for these moral values which they tend to acquire through their experience. Such values will surely win genuine φιλότης as well as αἰδώς to their owner, as in the case of Odysseus. He himself, in fact, believes in and defends such moral values on one occasion (*Od.* 8. 169-73):

ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ εἶδος ἀκιδνότερος πέλει ἀνήρ,
ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφὴν ἔπεσι στέφει, οἱ δέ τ' ἐς αὐτὸν
τερπόμενοι λεύσσουσιν· ὁ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύει,
αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν,
ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνὰ ἄστυ θεὸν ὣς εἰσορόωσιν.

It is, in fact, αἰδώς itself that wins the αἰδώς and τιμή of others as if towards a god (172-3). We can clearly see here that Homeric man is not ignorant of what we would hail as moral virtues, such as modesty, wisdom and thoughtfulness (what Adkins would call 'quiet virtues'), and they are not at all of minor importance. In a time of need such as Odysseus is now in, they are vital for survival.

The cases of αἰδώς towards one's benefactors, past, present or potential, and towards those who deserve respect for their own virtues, are fairly natural phenomena. αἰδώς, however, is felt not only towards those who are obviously respectable. An extreme case is αἰδώς due, as a rule, to any suppliants and guests.

Suppliants as foreign travellers are normally in a weaker social position than their hosts. Even if they are politically powerful or wealthy at home, they are alone and defenceless in a foreign land. If they are killed abroad, their kinsmen would not be able to avenge their death without knowing what has happened to them. The killer can easily get away with it. Therefore αἰδώς towards them is not so instinctive as the examples we have already seen. On the other hand, anyone would like to be protected by his host under a reliable agreement. It is not difficult to imagine the reason for the development of the code of hospitality, that of mutual obligations between ξεῖνος and ξεινοδόκος, out of general necessity. To secure the safety and hospitality to every traveller anywhere in the world, some international law is required. In the world of Homer, as in later Greece, this law is the belief in Zeus Xeinios/Hiketesios. Guests are αἰδοῖοι, because they are under the protection of the god. It is towards this god,

through one's guests, that one feels αἰδώς.[25] Therefore a murderer of his guest, a most serious offender against the code of hospitality, is condemned by the poet this way: 'σχέτλιος (appalling)! He did not feel αἰδώς (αἰδέσατο) for θεῶν ὄπις nor τράπεζα' (*Od.* 21. 28).[26]

In the land of the Phaeacians who believe in this code, Odysseus is guaranteed their αἰδώς, presumably with or without his personal charm. Nausicaa readily helps him as a naked, shipwrecked wanderer, though her first impression of him is 'an ugly man' (*Od.* 6. 242). On his arrival at the royal palace, even before he starts his remarkable story of wanderings, the Phaeacians offer a libation to Zeus 'who attends suppliants who deserve respect (αἰδοῖοι ἱκέται)' and accepts this ἱκέτης as their ξεῖνος (*Od.* 7. 164-5 = 180-1). For Alcinous, a guest-suppliant is like one's own brother who deserves escort home and loving gifts (φίλα δῶρα) which the hosts give out of love (φιλέοντες) (*Od.* 8. 544-7). By this stage, Odysseus has already consolidated his position as a distinguished guest, and that must be the main reason for the emphasis on willing φιλότης added to compulsory αἰδώς. This is said, however, before Odysseus reveals his identity. Therefore Alcinous is not expecting any returns. A mere wanderer can be accepted as a guest of the royal palace and be welcomed with αἰδώς, thanks to the Phaeacians' piety towards Zeus Xeinios, and their αἰδώς is enhanced further by their φιλότης prompted by Odysseus' personality.

The same combination of the awe of Zeus and personal love is observed in another host of Odysseus, Eumaeus. When Eumaeus thinks that his guest is making up a nice story of Odysseus' imminent return to improve his treatment, he tells his guest, the disguised Odysseus (*Od.* 14. 388-9):

οὐ γὰρ τοὔνεκ' ἐγώ σ' αἰδέσσομαι οὐδὲ φιλήσω,
ἀλλὰ Δία ξένιον δείσας αὐτόν τ' ἐλεαίρων.

The first line is a negative sentence, but, in effect, it negates only

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[25] Cf. Scott, *AC* 23 (1980), 19: 'The values placed under the protection of the gods must be felt by the society to be worthy of such protection.' Another factor arousing αἰδώς for strangers is the fear of something mysterious. Cf. Scott ibid.: 'The element of fear of the unknown involved in the feeling about strangers would be represented, too, in legends of gods in disguise asking for hospitality, who, if turned away, would have had the means of taking a harsh revenge.' Verdenius, *Mnemosyne* 12 (1944-45), 52, thinks that this is *the* reason for αἰδώς towards strangers.

[26] For σχέτλιος see Chapter 1, n. 6.

the reason for him to do what he does, namely, 'I do feel αἰδώς and φιλότης towards you, but *not* because you say that.' This he does because 'I fear Zeus Xenios and pity your own self.' Fear of Zeus alone might be enough to cause αἰδώς towards a wanderer, but the φιλότης that Eumaeus feels towards his guest arises from his personal feeling, pity, towards a helpless fellow human being. αἰδώς felt merely as a rule may have the same effect in material terms, but could not be as willing and warm as his αἰδώς mixed with pity and love towards Odysseus.

Penelope's case is a good example to show that αἰδώς towards a guest develops φιλότης only when the host(ess) finds his/her personal commitment in the person. Ever since Odysseus left Ithaca, Penelope has not entertained visitors, though she considers them αἰδοῖοι (*Od.* 19. 316). αἰδώς alone is not enough for her to overcome her distress at performing her duty of hospitality. However, as soon as the unusual beggar (Odysseus) tells her a story of friendship with Odysseus, she changes her attitude. The 'beggar' tells her that he entertained and sent off Odysseus as a dear and respected friend (ξεῖνον . . . φίλον τε . . . αἰδοῖόν τε *Od.* 19. 191, αἰδοίως 243). His αἰδώς and φιλότης towards her husband moves Penelope and she decides that she must treat him with αἰδώς and φιλότης, too (254). Clearly, not all ξεῖνοι are promoted to be φίλοι.

Thus αἰδώς towards suppliants/guests is a shaky thing without the support of φιλότης. Suppliants, however, cannot demand φιλότης which they are not primarily entitled to. Instead, they try to strengthen the αἰδώς felt as a rule by an appeal for pity. For example, when taking refuge from the sea into a river, Odysseus prays to the river-god, claiming that he is the god's ἱκέτης and therefore αἰδοῖος (*Od.* 5. 447-8) and appealing to him, 'ἐλέαιρε' (450). As we will see later in this chapter, ἔλεος is another force which restrains one from doing harm to others and makes one beneficient towards others. Especially when it comes to supplicating an enemy, ἔλεος is a vital element, because, as we have seen, no enemy supplicating for life on the battlefield is considered to be under the protection of Zeus. Lycaon, supplicating Achilles for his life, says that he is a sort of ἱκέτης (if so αἰδοῖος) because he had eaten bread with Achilles before. On this ground, he asks for αἰδώς and ἔλεος from Achilles: μ' αἴδεο καί μ' ἐλέησον (*Il.* 21. 74-5). Although Achilles' tone is slightly familiar ('φίλος' 106), the logic does not work on the enemy determined to kill with no more room for ἔλεος in his heart.

Knowing such an Achilles on the battlefield, Hector gives up his initial idea of supplicating Achilles for his life, concluding that Achilles would not pity nor respect him (*Il.* 22. 123-4 ἐλεήσει, αἰδέσεται). Hecuba tries to dissuade Priam from going to see Achilles to ransom Hector's body by stating the same fear (*Il.* 24. 207-8):

ὠμηστὴς καὶ ἄπιστος ἀνὴρ ὅ γε, οὔ σ' ἐλεήσει,
οὐδέ τί σ' αἰδέσεται.

Note the adjectives that she attributes to Achilles. He is man-eating and faithless.[27] A proper human being would have the feelings of ἔλεος and αἰδώς, but Achilles is only a sub-human creature, as savage as a beast in her eye, and not without good reason. Nevertheless, Priam has a hope that Achilles might have some respect and pity for his old age even as the enemy is dragging Hector's body around behind his chariot (*Il.* 22. 419-20 ... αἰδέσσεται ἠδ' ἐλεήσῃ/γῆρας), for as we have seen, old age itself deserves αἰδώς. Although he has received a decisive encouragement from a divine omen, his actual appeal to Achilles is still on the human plane—an appeal to human feeling as well as to respect for divine protection (*Il.* 24. 503):

ἀλλ' αἰδεῖο θεούς, Ἀχιλεῦ, αὐτόν τ' ἐλέησον.

As a suppliant, Priam is considered, at least by men in general, to be under divine protection. However, since his kingdom is at war with Achilles' army, he is an enemy to Achilles and not entitled to mercy if met in battle—even his old age would not save his life on the night of the capture of Troy. Therefore, Zeus secures Achilles' 'morality in peace' in advance for the old man so that the hero will hold αἰδώς towards his suppliant. At the same time, Priam tries his best to evoke Achilles' human feeling of pity. αἰδώς and ἔλεος, two forces that keep one away from violence and harshness, must function together to change the angered Achilles. What changes the ruthless killer of Lycaon and Hector into the sympathetic host of Priam is the combination of divine interference and Achilles' recognition and identification of the sorrow of two fathers, his and his

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[27] Elsewhere ὠμηστής is applied only to animals which eat dead human bodies: birds of prey (*Il.* 11. 454), dogs (*Il.* 22. 67), and fish (*Il.* 24. 82). Cf. *Il.* 21. 127 for body-eating fish.

victims'. αἰδώς does not work without divine authority, and it often needs the support of ἔλεος, too.

The divine authority behind αἰδώς does not have to be Zeus. Phemius' supplication to Odysseus is successful, because, as a singer, he is under the patronage of the Muses (*Od.* 22. 344) and therefore deserves αἰδώς (*Od.* 8. 480). Chryses' supplication to Agamemnon to ransom his daughter is not successful in the first instance, but αἰδώς and τιμή towards him are restored in the end, because of the undeniable authority of Apollo that he has behind him (*Il.* 1. 23, 377).

By whatever god you claim to be a suppliant, the claim must be genuine in order to work. When protesting against Achilles' blunt rejection of reconciliation with Agamemnon, Ajax desperately appeals to Achilles' duty of hospitality (*Il.* 9. 640):

αἴδεσσαι δὲ μέλαθρον.

In fact, Achilles does hold αἰδώς and also φιλότης towards the members of the embassy in their capacity as his guests and friends. He has welcomed them warmly and provided them with refreshments, as is due to visitors. But their errand is another matter. They cannot demand that Achilles throw away his pride and resolution, even his life, as dinner-time entertainment. All diplomats, ancient or modern, realise that they will often be disappointed in their negotiations in spite of being lavishly entertained by foreign dignitaries.

Another unsuccessful suppliant, Leodes, also fails to relate himself to divine protection. He appeals to Odysseus' sense of αἰδώς and ἔλεος (*Od.* 22. 312). He says that he has been a good guest in the house, trying to stop others from outrage, and also that he has been the libation-offerer among the suitors, whereby trying to claim the protection of Zeus Xeinios and other gods. The fact remains, however, that he has been consuming Odysseus' property every day, abusing the convention of ξεινίη. Moreover, he has been the leader of all those amorous prayers to win Penelope, which, to Odysseus' eye, is another unforgivable abuse of divine authority. Leodes cannot deserve αἰδώς.

Interestingly, Odysseus' 'supplication' to the Cyclops fails in the same way, in a sense. Odysseus and his crew had no desperate need for food or shelter at that time. They had access to fresh water and plenty of goats on the neighbouring island (9. 116ff.). They stayed in the cave only out of Odysseus' curiosity and greed, in the hope

that the resident of this enormous cave might give them some present (*Od.* 9. 229).[28] They were not obviously in a 'pitiable' condition. Moreover, since they have helped themselves to the Cyclops' cheese (*Od.* 9. 231-2), they are, technically, thieves. The 'host' obviously is not happy to see them. Any man, even a reasonable one, would not be pleased to find that strangers had entered his home in his absence, instead of waiting at the threshold to be invited in as guests. Such 'guests' would have to be extremely lucky with their host not to be declared intruders. Odysseus immediately senses that his 'host' is not pleased, but instead of humbly begging with the word 'ἐλέησον', which is necessary even towards a man with much gentler manners, he lectures his host on what he ought to do for them, and tries to impress him with divine authority (*Od.* 9. 269-71):

ἀλλ' αἰδεῖο, φέριστε, θεούς· ἱκέται δέ τοί εἰμεν.
Ζεὺς δ' ἐπιτιμήτωρ ἱκετάων τε ξείνων τε,
ξείνιος, ὃς ξείνοισιν ἅμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ.

This is not very impressive diplomacy. However, even if he had spoken more humbly, and asked for his host's ἔλεος, he would still have failed, because the Cyclops' mind has no ἔλεος at all, nor does he fear or respect the gods. Odysseus' logic collapses, because the Cyclops does not acknowledge the divine authority necessary to evoke αἰδώς.[29]

Suppliants, singers and priests are not very strong in terms of wealth and political power, but have divine authority behind them which causes the sense of αἰδώς in others. In this sense, this category of αἰδώς is also connected with fear of something/somebody

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[28] Of course, the motive for this expedition itself is Odysseus' curiosity (9. 174-6). We should call it an irresponsible curiosity, if he really sensed, as he claims, that they were going to meet 'ἄνδρα ... μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ἀλκήν, ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας (9. 214-5).' Or is this statement just a retrospective analysis of his instinctive caution?

[29] Odysseus Tsagarakis, *Nature and Background of Major Concepts of Divine Power in Homer*, p. 23, interprets *Od.* 9. 270-1 as follows: 'In addition to *ptochoi*, *aidoioi* enjoy divine support; these are needy people at large; they are not to be found in battlefield.' His reading of αἰδοίοισιν as an independent substantive from ξείνοισιν is unusual to say the least, but even if it is possible to read this way, his interpretation of αἰδοῖοι is a tautology, for needy people are αἰδοῖοι *because* of divine protection. In other words, 'αἰδοῖοι' are, by definition, those who enjoy divine support. I totally agree with the last part of his sentence, that αἰδοῖοι are not to be found on the battlefield, if he means that men on the battlefield are not αἰδοῖοι, i.e. not under divine protection, rather than not considered needy.

stronger than oneself. However, there is another category of recipients of αἰδώς who are not obviously under divine protection—women.

Any woman other than slaves can be described as αἰδοίη either as a wife (*Il.* 6. 250, 21. 460, *Od.* 3. 381, 451, 10. 11, 17. 152, 19. 165, 262, 336, 583; cf. Hera as Διὸς αἰδοίη παράκοιτις *Il.* 21. 479), as a mother (*Od.* 8. 420; cf. *Il.* 22. 82), as a virgin (*Il.* 2. 514), or as a house-keeper (*Od.* 1. 139, 4. 55, 7. 175, 10. 371, 15. 138, 17. 94, 259). We can fairly assume that the underlying cause for αἰδώς towards women is basically the same as that towards open sexual contacts. In Homer, as in many other cultures, when a man and a woman who are not supposed to get into sexual contact are left alone, face to face, they tend to feel embarrassed.[30] In Homer, women are clearly observed from men's point of view; hence they are 'to be respected (by men)', i.e. not to be treated with overt sexual interest, either seriously or jokingly.[31] However, the specific meaning of αἰδοίη changes according to a woman's status.

A wife is αἰδοίη as 'somebody else's wife' (*Il.* 6. 250, 21. 460, *Od.* 3. 451), as one's hostess (*Od.* 17. 152, 19. 165, 262, 336, 583), or even as one's own wife (*Od.* 3. 381, 10. 11). αἰδώς towards another man's wife seems to be common sense, but that towards one's own cannot be explained without taking into our account the sacred nature of matrimony. After all, wives have a goddess of marriage as their guardian.[32] Penelope is patiently waiting for her missing husband, 'feeling αἰδώς towards their wedlock and rumour of people (*Od.* 16. 75, 19. 527)'. What ties her to Odysseus is first of all her affection, but secondly, αἰδώς felt towards the sanctity of wedlock and νέμεσις of people. However, divine protection of marriage is not the only factor in αἰδώς towards a wife. As for the public, we can attribute their αἰδώς towards a lady of an οἶκος to the power of her husband. As for her own husband, the most important factor will be his own love for her, which also generates his τιμή towards her, and possibly also her dowry and her family's power.[33]

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30 The best Homeric example will be the possible indignation of Nausicaa if caught by Odysseus by her knees (*Od.* 6. 147).

31 I see no ground for taking αἰδοῖος applied to women as 'züchtig' as many do. E.g. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ*, p. 16.

32 Hera does not show her activities as the marriage-god very often, but she seems to be able to arrange marriages (*Il.* 14. 267-8) and to dissolve marriage crises (*Il.* 14. 208-10) at times. She can also interfere with childbirth (*Il.* 19. 117-9).

33 That dowry makes a divorce difficult is observable in Telemachus' statement

A woman as a mother is respected by her sons and daughters despite the fact that her sons' social status is technically higher than hers, as potential heads of the household. Nevertheless, she is respected because she is older and because she bore them. It is this tie that enables parents to call ἐρινύες on their children should they ever forget the fact. And it is through this tie that Hecuba tries to persuade Hector to avoid fighting with Achilles, exposing her breast and saying (*Il.* 22. 82-3):

Ἕκτορ, τέκνον ἐμόν, τάδε τ' αἴδεο καί μ' ἐλέησον
αὐτήν,....

He must respect her motherhood, symbolised by her breast, and pity her for her feeling. Motherhood with a divine guardian behind it can claim a higher command of αἰδώς, but yet what Hecuba emphasises here is her innermost sorrow and misery for which she asks for pity (ἐλέησον). She implores him most powerfully by evoking αἰδώς and more emotional ἔλεος at the same time in one action.

For virgins, we cannot find divine protectors at all. Athena, though herself a virgin, is clearly a patroness of warriors and not of virgins. Artemis, another virgin-goddess and worshipped as the patroness of all unmarried creatures—including human virgins—in later tradition does not clearly emerge as the protector of virgins in Homer. She is called on by Penelope wishing a chaste death rather than remarriage, but as the goddess of sudden death rather than the goddess of chastity. Virgins in Homer deserve αἰδώς in the sense that they should be protected by the household and the community. If a man approaches a virgin openly, the public will direct νέμεσις against him as well as the girl (*Od.* 6. 286-8). It is mainly due to the social pressure that she must be treated with controlled behaviour, with αἰδώς.

It is almost certain that there is no special guardian deity for the house-keeper. If she is respected by the members of the οἶκος and by the guests, it must be because of her position as the deputy of the hostess. αἰδώς which she enjoys depends entirely on the goodwill of her master and mistress. Also it is unlikely that αἰδώς towards her

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at *Od.* 2. 132-3. An interesting case of a husband's respect for his wife's father is Alcinous' extraordinary respect for his wife who almost shares his kingship because, apparently, he respects her late father who was his elder brother and the first to succeed to the throne had he lived to do so (*Od.* 7. 63-8).

has anything to do with the requirements for controlling sexual desire and so on, because a house-keeper is often too old to be sexually attractive. αἰδώς towards her is probably a tribute to her professionalism.[34]

Female members of a household—not to mention house-keepers—are powerless and helpless on their own as we know from Penelope's hardship due to the suitors with no αἰδώς (*Od.* 1. 254, 13. 376, 20. 29, 39, 171, 386, 23. 37). Mothers can call on ἐρινύες when they are wronged by their children (*Il.* 9. 571-2, 21. 412, *Od.* 2. 135-6, 11. 280), and wives can possibly expect protection from marriage gods at a marriage crisis. In other contexts, however, women in general are defenceless against male aggression. Therefore, the αἰδώς towards them must have some support of human initiative. For wives, it may be their dowry or their paternal influence, as well as love, that guarantees their husbands' αἰδώς towards them. For unmarried daughters and house-keepers, not much more than the affection of their fathers and their masters respectively can be expected as their support. It must be also the case with wives and mothers in daily life. Here, in αἰδώς towards women, we may be allowed to detect a sign of a social code somewhat comparable to 'ladies first.' As in the case of suppliants/guests, we can count this category of αἰδώς as generated by mostly human feeling and only partially augmented by divine sanctions.

Finally, dead bodies also seem to deserve αἰδώς. When accusing Achilles of maltreating Hector's body, Apollo says among the gods (*Il.* 24. 44-5):

ὣς Ἀχιλεὺς ἔλεον μὲν ἀπώλεσεν, οὐδέ οἱ αἰδὼς
γίγνεται, ἥ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἠδ' ὀνίνησι.[35]

This really is the most extreme case of αἰδώς towards the helpless. Nothing, nobody is as helpless as a dead body. Everyone would like his body to be properly treated with funeral honours so that he can enter the House of Hades. When he is actually in need, however, he is absolutely powerless. Thus the universal law that the dead deserves αἰδώς and ἔλεος, even if it is one's enemy (cf. *Il.* 7. 409-10), seems to have developed. Although Hera, Athena and

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[34] Cf. Scott, *AC* 23 (1980), 32, n. 25.

[35] Line 45 is rejected by Aristarchus and most modern scholars because it is identical with Hesiod's *Opera* 318, and sounds irrelevant in this context. See below.

Poseidon are not indignant at Achilles' conduct, other gods have continuously pitied Hector (ἐλεαίρεσκον *Il.* 24. 23). If the case gets even worse, as Apollo suggests, the gods might feel νέμεσις towards Achilles (μὴ . . . νεμεσσηθέωμεν 53).[36]

As we saw in Chapter 1, the gods are not constant in protecting the dead, but among humans the belief that the gods are guardians of the dead is firm enough to control their behaviour (*Od.* 11. 73) under normal circumstances. Achilles ignores Hector's warning, because, as Apollo says, he has lost normal human feeling, αἰδώς and ἔλεος towards the helpless. Just as Hecuba describes him as a savage, sub-human being (ὠμηστής, ἄπιστος *Il.* 24. 207), Apollo says his mind is not 'ἐναίσιμοι' (*Il.* 24. 40) and like that of a wild lion (λέων δ' ὣς ἄγρια οἶδεν 41). Indeed, Achilles in this scene has every sign of being 'beyond', or rather 'below', his assigned lot. He is not living up to the human moral ideal of having 'mind within measure', with αἰδώς towards those under divine protection and ἔλεος towards the helpless.

If possession of αἰδώς is not as highly valued as that of ἀρετή, lack of αἰδώς is a serious moral defect always associated with highly anti-social offences or inhumanity. Agamemnon is accused by Achilles of not having αἰδώς (*Il.* 1. 149, 158, 9. 372) when he made his most serious moral error of insulting Achilles and robbing him of his prize. The suitors of Penelope, who have no sense of αἰδώς whatsoever, come to deserve severe punishment by Odysseus in the end. The twelve slave-women who have had shameless relations (ἀναιδείη *Od.* 22. 424) with the suitors are also punished. Only beggars are allowed to live without αἰδώς (*Od.* 17. 347, 352, 578), though only to some extent (*Od.* 17. 490), for, otherwise they cannot sustain themselves. It is truly a sub-human living condition.

Interestingly, inanimate objects, such as stones and rocks (*Il.* 4. 521, 13. 139, *Od.* 11. 598), and the war-god Κυδοιμός who has no personality (*Il.* 5. 593), are also 'without αἰδώς'. Once man has lost his αἰδώς, he steps out of the sphere and 'measure' of man, and approaches the world of senselessness. In other words, αἰδώς is what makes man a human, instead of a lion or a rock.

Then, a question concerning *Il.* 24. 45 arises: how does αἰδώς harm people as well as benefit them? It is not unlikely that this

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[36] Cf. Chapter 1, 'Protection of the dead'.

line was borrowed from Hesiod (*Works* 318), or was a common proverbial expression.[37] It is, however, interesting to find this 'Hesiodean' line in one of the most moralising passages in Homer. As I stressed in Chapter 5, Homer does present 'Hesiodean' moral sentiment from time to time, especially in this sort of context. We have no decisive evidence against such lines as genuinely Homeric.[38] If this line is to be read in the extant text, we must try to make sense of it in the context of the extant Homeric corpus, rather than by borrowing the context from Hesiod. We have seen mostly positive effects of αἰδώς so far, notably provision of hospitality to the needy and honour to a man of αἰδώς. What can be its negative effect? We have mentioned, in passing, two such examples.

αἰδώς is not a useful thing for a beggar (οὐκ ἀγαθή *Od.* 17. 347, 352; κακὸς αἰδοῖος ἀλήτης 578), because it does not achieve his only aim of life—to survive with whatever sustenance he can get. He must throw away his shame, and step forward to beg. He needs boldness. When boldness is vital for survival—such situations are not only limited to a beggar's life, but also very common in battle, for example—indeed αἰδώς can be harmful.

In another example, in fact observed on two different occasions, Telemachus asks his host to tell him the truth about his father, however painful it might be, without feeling αἰδώς or ἔλεος towards him (*Od.* 3. 96 = 4. 326): μηδέ τί μ' αἰδόμενος μειλίσσεο μηδ' ἐλεαίρων. Even αἰδώς out of pity and affection is sometimes useless or harmful. If Odysseus is dead and Telemachus remains ignorant of this, he should continue to suffer in empty hope for ever. The truth might be painful at this particular moment, but will terminate the prolonged pain of Telemachus and his family. When αἰδώς works as a force against the courage to tell necessary truth, it can also do harm to men. If we do read the line in question (*Il.* 24. 45) in its Homeric context, we must read it as referring to αἰδώς against necessary courage.

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37 Cf. Leaf, ad loc.; C. W. Macleod, *Homer: Iliad: Book XXIV*, ad loc.; M. M. Willcock, *The Iliad of Homer* XIII-XXIV, ad loc.

38 The line obviously makes little sense in the immediate context, but if we are to label all 'irrelevant' proverbial expressions as interpolations, we must also remove 24. 49: τλητὸν γὰρ μοῖραι θυμόν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν. It may be also worth noting that Plutarch quotes this line as from Homer (*De vitioso pudore* 2, 529d) rather than from Hesiod. This might mean that at least in later antiquity the line was better-known as a Homeric line rather than a Hesiodic or an anonymous proverb.

One last thing to be noted about αἰδώς is that it is always felt in inter-human relationships. αἰδώς is never directly felt towards deities.[39] Although it often has its ultimate authority in divine powers, and men fear divine anger at an offence against ξεινίη, it is only pious men who see the gods in the background. The gods themselves are not depicted as actually demanding αἰδώς.[40] The feeling, therefore, never comes to men as an imposed, inevitable fear, but rather arises from awareness of their human existence in front of another human being as helpless as they themselves have been in the past, or might be in the future. Strong and proud men tend to lack αἰδώς most, because they find few people to fear or respect in terms of their power or wealth, have never been physically affected by νέμεσις of the public or ὄπις of the gods, that is, have never been forcibly punished by others, or experienced a drastic downfall of their fortunes (which every Homeric man, if not the poet himself, would attribute to divine anger), and therefore do not find it necessary to secure αἰδώς of others in case of their own need. αἰδώς is an awareness of human fragility and limitation, which is necessary to confine oneself within one's measure, one's lot. If one ignores its voice, or lacks it completely, one will inevitably arouse νέμεσις in others, and may eventually arouse it in the gods also.

σέβας

σέβας is awe or fear, sometimes nearly synonymous with αἰδώς in the *Iliad*, denoting either one's consciousness of νέμεσις or consideration towards the helpless. Iris urges Achilles to protect the body of Patroclus, saying that if he loses it to the Trojans, it is Achilles' disgrace (*Il.* 18. 178-80):

ἀλλ' ἄνα, μηδ' ἔτι κεῖσο· σέβας δέ σε θυμὸν ἱκέσθω
Πάτροκλον Τρῳῇσι κυσὶν μέλπηθρα γενέσθαι·
σοὶ λώβη, αἴ κέν τι νέκυς ᾐσχυμμένος ἔλθῃ.

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[39] Even in an apparent exception at *Il.* 9. 508 where Phoenix argues that one should feel αἰδώς towards the Litai, the person (in this case the Embassy) who entreats one is the person towards whom αἰδώς should be directly felt and the goddesses are only the authority in the background. As in the case of νέμεσις, Homer, unlike Hesiod (*Works* 200), never deifies αἰδώς.

[40] Verdenius, *Mnemosyne* 12 (1944-45), 60, quotes Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* I 356: 'Im Menschen selbst sitzt sie. Kein Gott hat sie gefordert, kein Gott hat sie gegeben.'

If the Trojans get hold of his friend's body and feed it to dogs, it will be his great cause of shame. Therefore Achilles should feel σέβας and take action, shrinking from such disgrace, even if he has no armour. This is σέβας connected with νέμεσις.

At *Il.* 4. 242, Agamemnon uses the verb σέβομαι in the same way as αἰδέομαι when encouraging the Argives:

'Αργεῖοι ἰόμωροι, ἐλεγχέες, οὔ νυ σέβεσθε;

σέβας implied here is the sense of shame (αἰδώς) felt towards the public, the fear of νέμεσις, as the addition of 'ἐλεγχέες' (you objects of public reproach!) makes clear.

There is another category of σέβας corresponding to another aspect of αἰδώς—the force that restrains one from harming a person in a weaker position than oneself and supposed to be under divine protection. When Achilles killed Eëtion, Andromache's father, he duly cremated and buried the king's body, complete with his armour, feeling σέβας (*Il.* 6. 417). This σέβας seems to reflect his respect for Eëtion's status, and possibly the special divine favour the king had enjoyed—as we know from the nymphs' attendance at his funeral (420).

King Proetus, when he hears his wife's false accusation of Bellerophontes that the young man has tried to seduce her, is seized by wrath, but does not dare to kill Bellerophontes because of σέβας (*Il.* 6. 167 σεβάσσατο). This σέβας apparently comes from the human awareness that bloodshed, by any name, is an act of going beyond one's μοῖρα. Since the king does have a clear intention to kill him anyway (168-70), he seems to fear only shedding blood by his own hand.[41] It is more like lack of courage, one category of αἰδώς which may harm oneself. And indeed, this attempted murder by somebody else's hand fails.[42]

In the *Odyssey*, σέβας is most often astonishment or admiration. Nestor and Helen are seized by σέβας as they look at Telemachus looking so much like his father (*Od.* 3. 123, 4. 142). This σέβας is

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[41] It is also possible, though less likely considering religious overtones σέβας sometimes takes, that the σέβας here only means fear of the man himself and his strength.

[42] Is it not this kind of αἰδώς/σέβας felt at direct bloodshed, in spite of the intention to kill, that made the parents of Oedipus expose him, only to let him survive and cause disaster both to them and to himself (cf. *Od.* 11. 271-4)? αἰδώς, indeed, helps some and destroys others.

simply amazement. Odysseus is seized by σέβας, amazement and admiration, when he watches the dance of the Phaeacian youth (*Od.* 8. 384). The σέβας that Telemachus feels towards the palace of Menelaus is probably of the same sort (*Od.* 4. 75), great admiration, but possibly with some reverence as if towards something divine, because he wonders if the palace of Zeus is just like this.

This factor is more clearly observed in the σέβας which Odysseus feels towards Nausicaa in their first meeting. He suspects she might be a goddess or a nymph. Artemis, perhaps? Therefore his σέβας towards her stature (*Od.* 6. 161) has a sense of reverence as well as admiration. He goes on praising her appearance comparing her to a young palm tree which he once saw in Delphi, and augments the description of his feeling of awe which prevents him from touching her knees, with verbs ἄγαμαι, τέθηπα and δείδια (168). This kind of religious 'awe' is never expressed with the word αἰδώς. This is a feeling which restrains man from approaching something divine, whereas αἰδώς is always felt towards human beings.

σέβας can function as a restraining force from cruelty or bold actions, like αἰδώς. The true difference between the two rests in that σέβας alone has the meaning of reverence towards something wonderful, most notably divinities. αἰδώς endows a person with modesty, pity and thoughtfulness, but not religious piety as such.[43] While lack of αἰδώς or σέβας is severely criticised, possession of either is less often praised as the sign of good moral quality.

ἔλεος

The forces we have seen so far are all based, ultimately, on some sort of fear of somebody stronger than oneself, or at least capable of imposing sanctions on oneself, whether they are the gods, the public, or individuals. ἔλεος, on the contrary, has no powerful authority behind it. It is an emotion which spontaneously arises from one's heart, without any compulsion by external forces.[44] It is always directed towards someone in a weaker or less fortunate position than oneself. Therefore even if one does not show pity to such a person, there is no danger of retaliation from any quarter. On the other

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[43] For this point, see J. T. Hooker, 'Homeric Society: A Shame-Culture?' in *G & R* 34 (1987), 121-5, 123.

[44] Cf. *LfrgE*, ἔλεος.

hand, because of such a situation over which one has full control, it is the utmost hallmark of one's moral quality—whether one is capable of restraining selfish desire or passion and staying within 'one's lot.'

ἔλεος tends to be felt towards a person in extreme want, like the wanderer-Odysseus, whose call for ἔλεος (*Od.* 6. 175) Nausicaa readily accepts, and whom Eumaeus entertains because of his awe of Zeus Xenios and because of his pity for the man himself (*Od.* 14. 389). Even most of the arrogant suitors pity the 'beggar' Odysseus and generously give him portions of food at his first appearance (*Od.* 17. 367). Penelope, too, entertains the 'beggar' out of pity (*Od.* 19. 253) until she is told that he once was a host of her husband, which adds αἰδώς and φιλότης to her feeling towards the man. Diners at a banquet may pity an orphan and give him some food, though not necessarily generously (*Il.* 22. 494).[45] Old men also are likely to attract ἔλεος because of their physical weakness (*Il.* 10. 176, 22. 419).

ἔλεος is felt when someone close dies. One feels ἔλεος towards one's fallen friends and comrades (*Il.* 5. 561, 610, 17. 346, 352, 23. 110, *Od.* 11. 55) or dead family members (*Od.* 11. 87). The sorrow of the bereaved also evokes ἔλεος in others. Hector's wife and parents all try to stop him from risking his life, by asking him to pity them for their sorrow and hardship resulting from his death (*Il.* 6. 431, 22. 59, 82). A widow's lament for her husband (*Od.* 8. 530) and Priam's lament for Hector (*Il.* 22. 408) are pitiable. Hector pities his wife as he imagines her sorrow and hardship after his death (*Il.* 6. 484). Priam's desperate plea to Hector not to engage in the suicidal encounter with Achilles is also described as pitiable (*Il.* 22. 37).

Weeping in general evokes ἔλεος. One may pity and spare an enemy supplicating in tears (*Od.* 14. 279-80). Odysseus weeps as pitiably as a widow as he listens to Demodocus' song of Troy (*Od.* 8. 531), remembering his own sufferings. Tears that Odysseus and Telemachus mingle after the son has recognised his father are, no doubt, tears of joy mixed with long-suffered sorrow, but the sight of the two weeping would be pitiable (*Od.* 16. 219). Even the cries of sparrow chicks being attacked by a bird of prey (*Il.* 2. 314) sound pitiable to human sensitivity.

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[45] However, 487-99 are athetised by Ar. Cf. Leaf on 487.

The gods also have a sense of pity. Zeus pities the Trojans, especially Hector (*Il.* 15. 12), or the Lycians, especially his son Sarpedon (*Il.* 16. 431), when they are in danger. He pities the horses of Achilles (*Il.* 17. 441), the Myrmidons, and especially Achilles (*Il.* 19. 340), when they lament Patroclus. He also pities Priam who has lost his son Hector and tries to ransom his body. Out of pity, the god sends him a messenger (*Il.* 24. 174) and an auspicious sign (301) to encourage him, sends an escort (332) to assist him, and makes him 'φίλος' and 'ἐλεεινός' to Achilles (309). The gods, except Hera, Athena and Poseidon, pity the maltreated body of Hector (*Il.* 24. 23), especially Apollo (19) who protects it from decay. Apollo, ever sympathetic towards the Trojans, criticises Athena for not pitying them at all (*Il.* 7. 27). Hera (*Il.* 8. 350) and Poseidon (*Il.* 13. 15, 15. 44), on the other hand, pity the Achaeans in trouble.

Despite the anger of Poseidon, all other gods start pitying Odysseus for his long detention away from home in his final year of wanderings (*Od.* 1. 19). From then on, Odysseus overcomes all difficulties thanks to the ἔλεος of many deities—even Circe, who has tried to ensnare Odysseus and his companions, pities them crying in the joy of rescue and reunion, and offers them entertainment and rehabilitation from their long journey (*Od.* 10. 399); Calypso helps his homecoming with her compassionate heart (*Od.* 5. 191 ἐλεήμων); Leucothea helps him out of pity (*Od.* 5. 336); and, finally, an anonymous river-god, responding to his appeal for αἰδώς and ἔλεος, delivers him into safety (*Od.* 5. 447, 450). At home, Athena pities Penelope's lament for her husband and sends a dream to encourage her (*Od.* 4. 828).

Although the gods always take sides and represent the interests of different groups of men (or gods), the gods as a whole, especially their head Zeus, ultimately cover all sides with their sense of pity. Therefore man has fair hope that there may be some gods who pity him if properly requested. This hope makes man believe that prayer is worthwhile.

The gods, of course, do not pity or help men 'beyond μοῖρα'. Athena does not pity the Trojan women praying for her pity by offering a present (*Il.* 6. 94, 275, 309), because it is μοῖρα for Troy to fall. We know that Poseidon would not pity the Phaeacians for their offerings, because their punishment is fated (*Od.* 13. 182). The Achaeans pray to Zeus to pity them and help them persuade Achilles (*Il.* 9. 172), but he does not, because it is his βουλή to honour

Achilles through their suffering, and probably also to prepare a chain reaction of the deaths of three heroes, Patroclus, Hector and Achilles. Zeus does pity his son Sarpedon, but does not save him against his fate (*Il.* 16. 431ff.).

The gods do know pity and may yield to human request—this is the basis of the Homeric religion. Since man has no power to threaten or force the gods to do anything for him, the best he can do is to pray to them, offering τιμή and appealing through his own helplessness to their sense of pity. Of course, they may not be moved by offerings, and may not help him even if they pity him, if destiny is set otherwise. ἔλεος of the gods may not be enough, but it is essential.

The situation is not very different when one's fortune rests on mortals stronger than oneself, in so far as ἔλεος is essential but not guaranteed. Odysseus fails to make the Cyclops pity him and his companions (*Od.* 9. 349, 23. 313), because the giant's heart is νηλεής (*Od.* 9. 272, 287, 368). Tros (*Il.* 20. 465) and Lycaon (*Il.* 21. 74) also fail to make Achilles pity them, because he is so enraged at Patroclus' death (*Il.* 21. 100-5). Priam and his driver are in constant danger in their enemy's camp. Their life depends on the ἔλεος of a passer-by (Hermes disguised *Il.* 24. 357) and that of Achilles (*Il.* 22. 419, 24. 503-4) who might not have pitied Priam as Hecuba had suspected (*Il.* 24. 207) without divine intervention. Odysseus accepts Phemius' plea for mercy (*Od.* 22. 344), but not that of Leodes (312) for whom, not being under divine protection of any sort, Odysseus' ἔλεος would have been the only hope for survival. But does ἔλεος have no power behind it to force individuals to be merciful—as in the case of αἰδώς? Is ἔλεος totally a private matter which makes no difference to our life whether we hold it towards others or not?

This is not necessarily the case. Although it does not have a divine guarantee, extreme lack of ἔλεος is commonly met by criticism and indignation, in other words, νέμεσις. Achilles is repeatedly criticised for not pitying the Achaeans by refusing to fight for them. Phoenix advises him not to make his heart 'νηλεές' (*Il.* 9. 497). Ajax accuses him of being 'νηλής' (*Il.* 9. 632). Nestor accuses him of not having any pity for the heavy casualties of the Achaeans (*Il.* 11. 665). His companions' criticisms are more severe. Patroclus says that, since Achilles is so pitiless, his parents must be the sea and a rock, instead of a goddess and a hero (*Il.* 16. 33-5). The Myrmidons do not go that far, but they say his mother must have nursed him with gall (χόλος

Il. 16. 203-4). In the eye of the dying Hector, Achilles' heart is 'iron-made' (*Il.* 22. 357). As these examples show, he is viewed as being inhuman, stepping out of his lot as a human being. Although ἔλεος—as αἰδώς—is an emotion and a private matter which the public can do nothing about, it is considered an essential element of humanity. Like human characters, pro-Trojan gods are also angry at Achilles' lack of pity. Scamander is angry at his merciless killing of Trojan youths (*Il.* 21. 146-7). But his attack on Achilles is countered by Hera, ironically because of Achilles' prayer for the gods' pity (*Il.* 21. 273). Apollo complains about Achilles' inhuman, lion-like heart, without ἔλεος or αἰδώς (*Il.* 24. 44), but that is countered by Hera (56-63), again. As the river-god complains, the gods always stand by Achilles whatever he does, and he is immune to divine anger as far as his lack of pity is concerned.

As Achilles does at *Il.* 21, 273, man can accuse the gods of lacking ἔλεος when he thinks that they are not fair on him. Philoetius complains to Zeus for his apparent lack of pity for his master Odysseus (*Od.* 20. 202). In fact, all the gods including Zeus, except Poseidon, pity Odysseus (*Od.* 1. 19), but it seems that Philoetius' appeal would have been a legitimate one, had they indeed not cared for him.

Interestingly, greedy consumption of food and drink in somebody else's home is also classified as 'lack of ἔλεος' as well as lack of αἰδώς. Eumaeus describes the suitors' daily feast and criticises them as (*Od.* 14. 82):

οὐκ ὄπιδα φρονέοντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶν οὐδ' ἐλεητύν.

Since ὄπις is primarily the gods' anger, this can be interpreted as 'not fearing gods nor pitying their host.' Similarly, though out of an ignoble motivation, Antinous reproaches other suitors for giving away ruthlessly what belongs to the host to a beggar (οὐδ' ἐλεητύς *Od.* 17. 451-2). Being considerate in using other people's property is conceived as a sort of ἔλεος in the Homeric language.[46] And this ἔλεος is what the suitors consistently ignore.[47] Their lack of ἔλεος may not be the only reason for Odysseus' vengeance, but one thing

[46] If you think this use of ἔλεος is strange, imagine a visitor to your house who borrows your telephone, calls somebody on the other side of the earth, and talks on and on cheerfully. Is he not incapable of feeling for you?

[47] Contrast the Beggar-Odysseus' consideration towards his host Eumaeus (*Od.* 15. 309).

is clear—those who do not know αἰδώς or ἔλεος do not deserve it themselves. Odysseus does not feel obliged to have αἰδώς nor ἔλεος towards the suitors, the only forces which might have hindered him from killing them.

A man lacking pity, like one lacking αἰδώς, steps into the non-human, inanimate world. The day of death is νηλεὲς ἦμαρ (*Il.* 11. 484, 588, 13. 514, 15. 375, 17. 511, 615, 21. 57, *Od.* 8. 525, 9. 17). The cutting edge of bronze, which sheds blood without feeling anything is νηλεὴς χαλκός (*Il.* 3. 292, 4. 348, 5. 330, 12. 427, 13. 501, 553, 16. 345, 561, 761, 17. 376, 19. 266, *Od.* 4. 743, 8. 507, 10. 532, 11. 45, 14. 418, 18. 86, 21. 300, 22. 475). A tight bond is νηλεὴς δεσμός (*Il.* 10. 443). The horror of the Cyclops is in his νηλεὴς θυμός (*Od.* 9. 272, 287, 368) which is as indifferent to human pains as death or weapons. Also as indifferent to Odysseus' suffering is his 'cruel' sleep (νηλέϊ ὕπνῳ *Od.* 12. 372) which leads him and his companions to a disaster. Human mind should not lack ἔλεος, not because there will be divine punishment (which is not guaranteed anywhere), but because it is part of human nature. If man lacks it, he will be 'beyond his lot'.

However, there are times when one has to suppress one's ἔλεος. When Telemachus has to know the truth, however sad it could be, Nestor and Menelaus should tell it to him without hiding anything out of αἰδώς or ἔλεος (*Od.* 3. 96, 4. 326). When the official mourning period is over, one should bury the body of the deceased with a hardened heart (*Il.* 19. 229 νηλέα θυμόν). The disguised Odysseus pities his wife weeping for him without knowing that he is right in front of her, but he cannot show his emotion until the revenge on the suitors has been completed (*Od.* 19. 210). And most sadly, Hector must suppress his pity for Andromache (*Il.* 6. 484) and his parents. He cannot yield to Andromache's plea to pity her and Astyanax (*Il.* 6. 407, 431) or listen to his parents' pitiful pleas to pity them (*Il.* 22. 59, 82) and to stay in safety, because he is the foremost warrior in charge of defending his country. If he does not fulfil his role, he will be met by νέμεσις of people towards which he feels αἰδώς (*Il.* 6. 442, 22. 105). ἔλεος must be suppressed when working against θέμις, αἰδώς and νέμεσις. It is, on the other hand, the truest voice of our mind. Therefore, when it works *with* θέμις, αἰδώς and νέμεσις, like when one receives a stranger as one's guest, it gives sincerity, warmth and love to one's every step, which is a happy fulfilment of humanity.

One can be just and honourable without ἔλεος, or sometimes one must do without ἔλεος in order to be just and honourable, but when doing so, the human mind is uneasy. Achilles does not offend against divine law, but only defends his right and honour when refusing to fight for the Achaeans. However, by doing so, he is unhappy and uneasy, even before he loses Patroclus.[48] Hector dies a glorious death by the hand of Achilles, but his glory is empty because he could not pity and protect his family (*Il.* 6. 444-65).[49] For the lack of ἔλεος, no divine punishment is necessary, because the human mind, when suppressing ἔλεος, punishes itself by unhappiness. The greatest unhappiness of all, though, is that, if one ignores the voice of ἔλεος inside, one is denied the ἔλεος of others when it is most needed, a fact that the suitors of Penelope do not learn until too late.[50]

Conclusion

The behaviour of Homeric man is controlled by an assortment of forces both external and internal, rational and emotional. Awe of the gods, fear of retaliation and criticism from men seem to work most strongly, but they are often combined with some other forces. When Eumaeus receives a beggar as his guest, he does so in awe of Zeus Xeinios, but also out of pity. When Telemachus refrains from sending his mother away, fear of divine punishment, fear of public opinion and his own respect for his mother join forces. αἰδώς mixed with ἔλεος often generates φιλότης and warm human relationships. When man lacks αἰδώς and ἔλεος, however, even if he is successful in social terms, he is not happy deep inside.

Man's behaviour is seldom controlled by a simple motivation.

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[48] For the signs of Achilles' uneasiness—or that he 'feels bad', see J. A. Arieti, 'Achilles' guilt' in *CJ* 80 (1985), 195.

[49] Cf. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death*, p. 102: 'These terrible events produce glory, but we are not dealing with heroes for whom that is an adequate reward.'

[50] Hesiod, who is obsessed by the justice of the gods and their punishment, never talks about ἔλεος. In his extant corpus, there is only one example of the use of a cognate word of ἔλεος, namely ἐλεον at *Works* 205, used in the sense of 'pitiable' for a nightingale caught by a hawk. His moral world sits entirely on δίκη, θέμις, νέμεσις and αἰδώς and is completely void of ἔλεος. The poet does not preach to his brother with the doctrine of ἔλεος. His Zeus does not know ἔλεος. Is this perhaps a sign of the poet's more 'advanced' sense of justice and morality? See the remark of Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 35, that in later Greek literature 'there was little room for pity in either [gods or men]. That was not so in the *Iliad*.'

Different shades of mixture of fear and love are ever present. The combinations of δέος and αἰδώς, νέμεσις and αἰδώς, αἰδώς and ἔλεος, αἰδώς and φιλότης etc. are very commonly used to express various feelings. Roughly speaking, fear is felt towards hostile (or potentially hostile) men (or gods), and love is felt towards friendly (or potentially friendly) men (but not gods). However, ἔλεος goes beyond the boundary of enemies and of men and gods. It is widely believed that the Greek virtue is to help friends and harm enemies, and we saw its reflection in the last chapter dealing with τιμή. However, as Book 24 of the *Iliad* most eloquently tells us, ἔλεος, pity and sympathy, the force that moves the gods, joins all humans together and can override hostility, is an essential part of humanity in the Homeric world. All 'good' characters in the epics possess this quality, and it is through his ἔλεος towards Priam, his enemy, that Achilles, who has been continuously criticised for lack of ἔλεος in the rest of the epic, wins his greatest κῦδος (*Il.* 24. 110).

ἔλεος wins man eternal glory—perhaps Penelope summarises this moral sentiment in this passage (*Od.* 19. 328-34):

> ἄνθρωποι δὲ μινυνθάδιοι τελέθουσιν.
> ὃς μὲν ἀπηνὴς αὐτὸς ἔῃ καὶ ἀπηνέα εἰδῇ,
> τῷ δὲ καταρῶνται πάντες βροτοὶ ἄλγε' ὀπίσσω
> ζωῷ, ἀτὰρ τεθνεῶτί γ' ἐφεψιόωνται ἅπαντες·
> ὃς δ' ἂν ἀμύμων αὐτὸς ἔῃ καὶ ἀμύμονα εἰδῇ,
> τοῦ μέν τε *κλέος* εὐρὺ διὰ ξεῖνοι φορέουσι
> πάντας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, πολλοί τέ μιν *ἐσθλὸν* ἔειπον.

Unfeeling, harsh (ἀπηνής) men are hated, and ones who have been nice to everyone (ἀμύμων lit. 'not to be blamed by anybody') are praised for ever. This is the definition of κλέος and ἐσθλός in the 'morality of peace'.

CHAPTER TEN

GOOD AND BAD

So far we have described what is good and what is bad in Homeric society indirectly by examining what sort of conduct is praised or criticised. In this chapter, we will examine the words denoting 'good' (ἀγαθός, ἐσθλός, etc.) and 'bad' (κακός etc.) themselves to see what sort of conduct, persons or objects are considered 'good' or 'bad'. Our chief interest will be to see if the image of the 'good' person we have built so far—e.g. one who knows δίκη, behaves within one's μοῖρα, fears divine anger and νέμεσις of people, and has αἰδώς and ἔλεος—will match the image of ἀγαθός/ ἐσθλός.

The etymology of neither ἀγαθός nor ἐσθλός is known, but they are almost exact synonyms by use.[1] The former has ἀμείνων and ἀρείων as its comparative forms, ἄριστος as its superlative form, and ἀρετή as the noun corresponding to it.[2] Since ἐσθλός has no corresponding noun, and its comparative or superlative forms are not used in Homer, we may consider ἀγαθός and ἐσθλός to share comparative and superlative forms and ἀρετή as the corresponding noun. It was once speculated that the root ἀρ- in ἀρετή, ἀρείων and ἄριστος might be related to ἀνήρ, which would make an interesting parallel with *vir-virtus* in Latin where manliness is the original concept of goodness, but this hypothesis is now rejected.[3]

Whatever the etymology might be, the basic meaning of ἀγαθός seems to have much in common with English 'good'. Therefore a man classified as ἀγαθός is expected to be good in some way. However, just as a *gentle*-man may not always be gentle, there is some difference between a man called ἀγαθός and his quality, as we will see in the following.

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[1] For the slight difference between the two, see *LfgrE*, ἀγαθός and ἐσθλός.

[2] For the etymology of the latter three, see *LfgrE*, ἀρείων, E. The etymology of ἀμείνων is not known. Cf. *LfrgE*, ἀμείνων, E.

[3] E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue greque*[4], ἀρέσκω.

ἀρετή

ἀρετή means all sorts of 'goodness', but its most prominent usage is as a warrior's competence in war. It is used for the prowess of the Danaans (*Il.* 11. 90), Achilles (*Il.* 11. 763), Hector (*Il.* 22. 268), Diomedes (*Il.* 8. 535), Meliones (*Il.* 13. 275), Oeneus (*Il.* 14. 118), Periphetes (*Il.* 15. 642), Odysseus (*Od.* 4. 725, 815, 8. 237, 239, 12. 211, 18. 205), Odysseus and Telemachus (*Od.* 24. 515) and the suitors of Penelope (Antinous and Eurymachus *Od.* 4. 629, 21. 187; others 22. 244). Prowess mainly consists of physical strength (βίη), and therefore can be increased by joining that of two persons together (*Il.* 13. 237), but may be augmented also with wise counsel (βουλή) and tact (νόος), as in the case of Odysseus (*Od.* 12. 211) and Periphetes (*Il.* 15. 642-3; πόδες, μάχεσθαι, νόος are three aspects in which he claims his ἀρετή). Old Nestor's ἀρετή, of course, largely depends on his βουλή.[4] The fact that ambush is considered to reveal the best of ἀρετή (*Il.* 13. 277) also seems to indicate that ἀρετή does not consist merely of physical strength but also of courage, patience, and foresight (cf. the night raid of Odysseus and Diomedes in *Iliad* 10 and the courage of Odysseus and Neoptolemus in the Wooden Horse described at *Od.* 4. 271-88 and 11. 523-32).

ἀρετή changes according to a man's physical and mental conditions and, above all, to divine favour (*Il.* 20. 242, *Od.* 18. 133). ἀρετή is not something automatically inherited from a noble father by his son, but is granted to individuals by the gods (*Il.* 1. 290). However, even if one was born with ἀρετή, one cannot retain it satisfactorily when divine favour is on one's enemy's side or, naturally, in one's old age as we know well from Nestor's constant complaint (e.g. *Il.* 23. 627-45).

The same is true with ἀρετή as competence in specific skills. Competence in chariot riding (*Il.* 23. 374, 571) rests on the horses' natural strength and the charioteer's skill (*Il.* 23. 319-25), but even the combination of the best skill and the best horses does not bring victory to Eumelus who is regarded as 'ὤριστος' (23. 536), because he lacks divine favour (23. 391-3). On the contrary, Diomedes survives an accident caused by Apollo and wins the race because of Athena's help (23. 388-400). ἀρετή in running (*Il.* 20. 411) is also

[4] For the importance of competence in counsel as part of prowess, see M. Schofield, 'Euboulia in the *Iliad*' in *CQ* 36 (1986), 6-31.

seen to be affected by divine interference in the foot-race (23. 770-4).

ἀρετή is a source of prosperity. In one of his false stories, Odysseus describes how he, as a bastard son of a rich man, was left with little property after his father's death but managed to marry a wealthy woman because of his ἀρετή (*Od.* 14. 208-13). The content of his (i.e. of the man who Odysseus pretends to be) ἀρετή is worth attention. He was not useless (ἀποφώλιος 212) nor cowardly (φυγοπτόλεμος lit. battle-fleeing 213) which alone suggests his ἀρετή as being prowess in battle. He elaborates the description of his character as follows (216-27):

> ἦ μὲν δὴ θάρσος μοι Ἄρης τ' ἔδοσαν καὶ Ἀθήνη
> καὶ ῥηξηνορίην· ὁπότε κρίνοιμι λόχονδε
> ἄνδρας ἀριστῆας, κακὰ δυσμενέεσσι φυτεύων,
> οὔ ποτέ μοι θάνατον προτιόσσετο θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ,
> ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρώτιστος ἐπάλμενος ἔγχει ἕλεσκον
> ἀνδρῶν δυσμενέων ὅ τέ μοι εἴξειε πόδεσσι.
> *τοῖος ἔα ἐν πολέμῳ· ἔργον δέ μοι οὐ φίλον ἔσκεν*
> οὐδ' οἰκωφελίη, ἥ τε τρέφει ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,
> ἀλλά μοι αἰεὶ νῆες ἐπήρετμοι φίλαι ἦσαν
> καὶ πόλεμοι καὶ ἄκοντες ἐΰξεστοι καὶ ὀϊστοί,
> λυγρά, τά τ' ἄλλοισίν γε καταριγηλὰ πέλονται.
> αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ τὰ φίλ' ἔσκε τά που θεὸς ἐν φρεσὶ θῆκεν.

This is a very clear illustration of what a warrior's ἀρετή is like. He does not engage in any productive or constructive labour. In an economic sense, he is completely useless. He engages only in adventure and piracy, and by the wealth gained in this manner, he becomes δεινός and αἰδοῖος in his homeland (*Od.* 14. 234). This story illustrates another aspect of such ἀρετή. However strong one might be, the gods can change one's fortune (300ff.) and one can fall into misery. This idea is repeated later in Odysseus' warning to Amphinomus with a strong moral message (18. 130-42). No creature is more fragile than man, because (132-5):

> οὐ μὲν γάρ ποτέ φησι κακὸν πείσεσθαι ὀπίσσω,
> ὄφρ' *ἀρετὴν* παρέχωσι θεοὶ καὶ γούνατ' ὀρώρῃ·
> ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ λυγρὰ θεοὶ μάκαρες τελέσωσι,
> καὶ τὰ φέρει ἀεκαζόμενος τετληότι θυμῷ.

Clearly, ἀρετή is conceived as the basis of well-being which the gods can give or take away at their will. Therefore, one must not be wanton (ἀθεμίστιος), but must modestly enjoy good fortune while it is there (141-2).

The ἀρετή of the Phaeacians is not warlike. It consists of the swiftness of feet (which is more of use in dancing than in battle in their case, cf. *Od.* 8. 372-84) and skills in seafaring (*Od.* 8. 244, 247). However, they lose Poseidon's favour in the end because they injured Poseidon's τιμή unknowingly (13. 128-30, 143-4), and that seems to terminate their ἀρετή as the basis of their prosperity (which, before his departure, Odysseus wishes will last for a long time for them at 13. 45). This episode formally follows the pattern of Odysseus' moral lecture, that those who exulted in ἀρετή could be subdued by the gods, but Poseidon's motivation for changing the fortune of the Phaeacians is not related to their moral behaviour viewed in the human context. The only thing we can be sure about is that the gods change man's ἀρετή at will by their own logic, which is inscrutable to mortals.

ἀρετή as goodness-usefulness in any field changes according to one's fortune. In slavery, men have only a half of their natural ἀρετή, i.e. efficiency, because they do not work voluntarily (*Od.* 17. 322-3). Penelope says that her feminine ἀρετή—chiefly beauty—(*Od.* 18. 251, 19. 124) is lost ever since Odysseus left, despite the presence of so many suitors who acknowledge it (*Od.* 2. 206). If it is not enjoyed by her husband for whom it is meant, her beauty is of no use, and therefore her usefulness, ἀρετή, as a woman—to please her husband—is lost. She also means that her beauty has been eroded by too much sorrow. Menelaus' ἀρετή which makes him superior to Antilochus (*Il.* 23. 578) is the superiority by birth granted by the gods. ἀρετή is always subject to the gods' discretion.

The gods, whose τιμή is perpetual, alone have unchangeable ἀρετή and βίη—strength and superiority (*Il.* 9. 498). The horses of Achilles are without equal in ἀρετή (*Il.* 23. 276) which will never weaken because they are immortal. One has to be either divine, or to be under divine protection, to keep one's ἀρετή.

There is, however, another category of human ἀρετή which lasts forever. It is Penelope's ἀρετή, i.e. chastity (*Od.* 24. 193, 197), which will be remembered through songs by generations of men. It is the ἀρετή of Eumaeus (*Od.* 14. 402), providing generous hospitality to his master in disguise, which will win him fame (ἐϋκλείη). Winning fame by abiding by θέμις and δίκη is another path to the eternal ἀρετή.

The eternal glory of ἀρετή, either that of prowess or of cooperative virtues, is the substitute for immortality in the Homeric world.

The agony of Homeric man, however, lies in the fact that one cannot guarantee divine favour (which is essential for keeping one's ἀρετή) only by behaving within one's lot, i.e. performing one's duties and not taking more than one's due share both in war and peace. The gods may or may not appreciate one's good behaviour, like the Phaeacians' hospitality which turns into their ruin in the end, while the gods often overlook outrage committed by their favourite humans. The lack of a cause-and-effect connection between moral goodness and ἀρετή as the result of divine favour creates internal tension of the word ἀρετή and related terms, because one can be anti-social, i.e. bad for the society, and can still be ἀγαθός, i.e. a man of a high status and prowess. This tension seems to reflect, to some extent, the split between moralities in war and peace, which acknowledge different qualities as 'excellence', and also the morality of the gods, which does not always appear to be 'moral' to human eyes. In other words, the gods cannot be the measure for the moral virtue recognised among men.

ἀγαθός

ἀγαθός applied to persons

Those described as 'ἀγαθός' in Homer are mostly wealthy princes and noblemen who are excellent warriors in battle. Achilles (*Il.* 1. 131, 19. 155, 21. 280, 24. 53), Agamemnon (*Il.* 1. 275, cf. 3. 179), Menelaus (*Il.* 4. 181), Diomedes (*Il.* 10. 559), Tydeus (*Il.* 14. 113), Peleus (*Il.* 21. 109), Hector (*Il.* 21. 280), Nestor (*Il.* 23. 608), an opponent of Paris called Euchenor (*Il.* 13. 664), his father called Polyidus (*Il.* 13. 666), an opponent of Menelaus called Podes (*Il.* 17. 576), and King Alcinous' son called Laodamas (*Od.* 8. 130, 143) are all classified as 'ἀγαθός' without qualification. They are not preceded by any particular deeds or characteristics to be commended, except that Euchenor and Podes are 'ἀφνειός' and Agamemnon is 'βασιλεύς' as well as 'ἀγαθός' (*Il.* 3. 179) and that Diomedes is described as ἀγαθός when killing enemies of high rank (ἄναξ *Il.* 10. 559 and ἄριστοι 560). In fact, Achilles is called ἀγαθός most often in speeches criticising him (*Il.* 1. 131, 19. 155, 24. 53). This seems to suggest that the word ἀγαθός in describing heroes has lost its power of commendation, somewhat like 'gentle' in the word 'gentleman', and come to be used as a word to register a person in the ruling class which is wealthy and influential enough to mobilise

hundreds or even thousands of people for military expeditions like the Trojan war. This interpretation of ἀγαθός as the label for a social class is further confirmed by the use of 'ἀγαθή' for a woman. To be ἀγαθή seems to be almost the same as to be 'a wealthy man's daughter' (*Od.* 18. 276). It also corresponds to the statement by Odysseus in the guise of a beggar that 'χέρηες' do all sorts of humble jobs for 'ἀγαθοί' (*Od.* 15. 324).[5] Penelope defends the beggar-Odysseus from the resentment of the suitors caused by his wish to try the bow, by saying, 'πατρὸς δ' ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ γένος εὔχεται ἔμμεναι υἱός' (*Od.* 21. 335). It is particularly clear here that 'ἀγαθός' suggests nothing but noble birth.

However, in principle, ἀγαθός is expected to be ἀγαθός in its literal sense, i.e. a man who possesses ἀρετή, and in most cases ἀγαθοί are indeed men of prowess. It is also true in the Olympian world where Zeus is ἀγαθός (*Il.* 15. 185) among all his brothers and sisters because he is strongest. Heroes' prowess is illustrated in many examples of the usage of ἀγαθός with modifying terms.

Menelaus (*Il.* 2. 408, 586, 3. 96, 4. 220, 6. 37, 10. 36, 60, 13. 581, 593, 17. 237, 246, 560, 651, 656, 665, *Od.* 3. 311, 4. 307, 609, 15. 14, 57, 67, 92, 97, 17. 120), Diomedes (*Il.* 2. 563, 567, 5. 114, 320, 347, 432, 596, 855, 6. 12, 122, 212, 7. 399, 8. 91, 145, 9. 31, 696, 10. 219, 241, 283, 11. 345, 14. 109), Ajax (*Il.* 15. 249, 17. 102), Hector (*Il.* 13. 123, 15. 671), and a son of Priam called Polites (*Il.* 24. 250) are 'βοὴν ἀγαθός'. Teucer is 'ἀγαθὸς ἐν σταδίῃ ὑσμίνῃ' (as well as 'ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν τοξοσύνῃ' *Il.* 13. 313-4) and Polydeuces is 'πὺξ ἀγαθός' (*Il.* 3. 237, *Od.* 11. 300). Hector wishes that his son may one day become 'βίην ἀγαθός' (*Il.* 6. 478) as himself. Patroclus, though not a princely leader, is 'ἀγαθὸς θεράπων' of Achilles (*Il.* 16. 165, 17. 388) by his valour which is by no means inferior to that of other kingly ἀγαθοί.

As we have already seen, an ambush is believed to reveal who is really a man of ἀρετή, i.e. a true 'ἀγαθός' (*Il.* 13. 284). When Poseidon says in the guise of Thoas that Idomeneus and he know how to face 'ἀγαθοί' (*Il.* 13. 238), or when Odysseus says that Eurymachus considers himself a great man because he has never met 'ἀγαθοί' (*Od.* 18. 383), they talk about ἀγαθοί as valorous warriors. Achilles would be happier killed by Hector than drowned in

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5 Cf. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 32.

a river, because if Hector kills him, both the victor and the victim are ἀγαθοί (*Il.* 21. 280), and he will die a glorious death at least.

As we saw above, however, ἀρετή is never a permanent quality. When divine favour is not on one's side, one, either a brave man or a coward, is equally useless (*Il.* 17. 631-2). Therefore, Odysseus prays to Athena to be his 'ἀγαθὴ ἐπίρροθος' (*Il.* 23. 770). This ἀγαθή should mean both 'mighty' herself and 'effective' in making him mighty. In the case of Podaleirius and Machaon who are called 'ἰητῆρ' ἀγαθώ' (*Il.* 2. 732), however, it is more natural to think that they are called so because they are 'good doctors' than because they are 'valorous doctors' or 'noble doctors', even though they might well be so.

All these examples of ἀγαθός imply, eventually, some sort of usefulness, most often in battle. The only exception to be pointed out is a statement of Achilles that any man who is ἀγαθός and ἐχέφρων will love his wife (*Il.* 9. 341). It is probably right to take this ἀγαθός as the label of a noble man, since no man of a humble status is described as ἀγαθός anywhere in Homer, but the emphasis is not on the prowess or status of ἀγαθός, but on his way of life, perhaps rather similar to the gentleness we would expect from a 'gentleman'. As we saw in the last chapter (see the section 'αἰδώς') women deserve respect by convention, namely by θέμις and δίκη, and abiding by this code is naturally part of behaving as ἀγαθός.

ἀγαθός applied to objects and conduct

By and large, objects or conduct are ἀγαθός when they are useful, profitable and/or satisfactory to the party affected by them and, unlike the case of persons, can be safely rendered as 'good' in English: good life (*Od.* 15. 491), good meat (*Od.* 14. 441), good hospitality (*Od.* 24. 286), good feast (*Il.* 23. 810, *Od.* 15. 507), good news (in negative as 'bad news' *Il.* 9. 627), good care (κομιδή *Od.* 24. 249), and so on.[6] Ithaca is good as 'κουροτρόφος' (*Od.* 9. 27) and as 'αἰγίβοτος καὶ βούβοτος' (*Od.* 13. 246). Eumaeus' homeland Syrus is good as 'εὔβοτος εὔμηλος, οἰνοπληθὴς πολύπυρος' (*Od.* 15. 405-6).

It is good to stop fighting at the fall of night (*Il.* 7. 293), to make love (*Il.* 24. 130-1), to make offerings to the gods (because they are

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[6] Cf. *LfgrE*, ἀγαθός.

rewarded and useful *Il.* 24. 425-6), to leave a son to revenge one's own death (*Od.* 3. 196). It is not good, practical or efficient, to have many rulers (*Il.* 2. 204), and αἰδώς is not good for a beggar (*Od.* 17. 347, 352). A friend's persuasion is good, i.e. effective (*Il.* 11. 793, 15. 404).[7] 'Good intention' or 'good outcome' is rendered as ἀγαθόν or ἀγαθά, which mean 'good' in the sense that they are beneficial to the one affected by the outcome of the conduct, as in 'εἰς ἀγαθόν' (*Il.* 9. 102, 11. 789) or 'ἀγαθὰ φρονέων' (*Il.* 23. 305, 24. 173, *Od.* 1. 43). In the expression 'ἀγαθὰ ῥέζεσκον', too, ἀγαθά is good for the one who is affected by this conduct (*Od.* 22. 209).

The gods give men both good and bad fortune, 'ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε' (Zeus at *Od.* 4. 237, the Muses at *Od.* 8. 63; 'May Zeus give ἀγαθόν.' *Od.* 2. 34). Proetus foretells both good and bad fortune for Menelaus (κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε *Od.* 4. 392). In these examples, too, 'ἀγαθόν' or 'κακόν' are good or bad from the viewpoint of the recipients of such fortune. They do not suggest that the originators themselves are morally good or bad.

When we come across such an expression as 'αἵματός εἰς ἀγαθοῖο' (*Od.* 4. 611, said by Menelaus to Telemachus), however, we are brought back to the world of heroes, where being 'ἀγαθός' means belonging to a specific social class with specific responsibility, such as knowing θέμις and δίκη—being polite, for example—and fighting courageously in battle. Then it would be more accurate to imagine Priam as a man with kingly, noble features suitable to an 'ἀγαθός' than merely good-looking at *Il.* 24. 632 (ὄψις ἀγαθή). When Bellerophontes rejects the queen's temptation by 'ἀγαθὰ φρονέοντα', the poet seems to mean not just that he has adjudged its 'good outcome', but also 'in a noble way', thinking in a responsible way suitable to an 'ἀγαθός' (*Il.* 6. 162 where he is also δαΐφρων, an owner of a heroic spirit). This must be the case also with Clytemnestra's 'ἀγαθαὶ φρένες' (*Od.* 3. 266) which she had held until she yielded to Aegisthus' seduction, and with Penelope's 'ἀγαθαὶ φρένες' (*Od.* 24. 194) praised by Agamemnon's ghost. As for 'ἀγαθαὶ φρένες' of Eumaeus (*Od.* 14. 421) and Amphinomus

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[7] In this particular case, it seems to mean that it is satisfactory (effective) in the eye of the one who persuades, rather than in the eye of the one persuaded. However, in the Homeric morality, friends are least likely to give harmful advice, and therefore we can expect that their effective persuasion will normally turn out to be beneficial to the persuaded as well.

(*Od.* 16. 398), however, the emphasis is on their moral quality rather than on their noble birth.

An interesting example is that Zeus' φρένες are criticised as not ἀγαθαί by Athena. She complains that Zeus is hard on the Argives whom she cares for, having forgotten how she once helped his son Heracles (*Il.* 8. 362-9). Her verdict on her father is (*Il.* 8. 360-1):

> ἀλλὰ πατὴρ οὑμὸς φρεσὶ μαίνεται οὐκ ἀγαθῇσι,
> σχέτλιος, αἰὲν ἀλιτρός, ἐμῶν μενέων ἀπερωεύς.

The addition of ἀλιτρός especially suggests moral condemnation. She obviously criticises Zeus' moral defect—being forgetful of his benefactor—with the word 'οὐκ ἀγαθός'. Zeus *is* ἀγαθός among the gods (*Il.* 15. 185) because of his status, but that does not stop him being 'not good' in a specific context. Any noble person should be nice to his benefactor—that is Athena's argument, and on this ground, Zeus certainly does not behave as an ἀγαθός at the moment.

Having seen these examples in which ἀγαθός does take on a moral overtone, we must not fail to observe the distinction between ἀγαθός in reference to a class title and ἀγαθός as a term of commendation in specific situations, either in the sense of being 'nice' to somebody, or in the sense of 'behaving nobly, suitably to one's status as ἀγαθός'.[8]

ἐσθλός

ἐσθλός applied to persons

ἐσθλός, as an exact synonym of ἀγαθός, covers the same range of meanings. It denotes noble, competent, valorous, useful, and/or beneficial.

ἐσθλός—like ἀγαθός—often means a man of wealth and noble birth. Peleus is ἐσθλός as well as βουληφόρος, ἀγορητής and ἱππηλάτα (*Il.* 7. 125-6), which are administrative or military qualities (expected to be) inherent in kingship. One automatically

[8] Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 30ff. seems to me to base his argument for the overwhelming importance of 'competitive excellences' on the assumption that ἀρετή, ἀγαθός etc. are 'the most powerful words of commendation used of a man' *at any time*, and therefore as far as one is recognised as 'ἀγαθός' in one's society, one cannot be discredited or censured in any way for any anti-social behaviour. The examination of the terms in this chapter, I hope, will prove that it is not the case.

assumes that a public meeting is summoned by ἐσθλός, a man of high standing (*Od.* 2. 33). The beautiful princess Nausicaa is naturally courted by many ἐσθλοί of Phaeacia (*Od.* 6. 284). Telemachus and Peisistratus are both ἀνδρῶν ἐσθλῶν παῖδες (*Od.* 4. 236). Telemachus as ἐσθλός gets a very special treatment in the palace of Nestor. He is washed by a princess (*Od.* 3. 464-5), and at the banquet served by ἐσθλοί, men of noble birth (*Od.* 3. 471). Indeed, he is from a noble family. Odysseus is often referred to as his 'πατὴρ ἐσθλός' (*Od.* 1. 115, 2. 46, 71, 3. 98, 379, 4. 328, 16. 214), which probably means valorous as well as noble father.[9] Odysseus' father is also 'πατὴρ ἐσθλός' (*Od.* 23. 360) and his grandfather Autolycus also was ἐσθλός (*Od.* 19. 395). Kinsmen of ἐσθλός are naturally assumed to be ἐσθλοί. Therefore when Odysseus weeps while listening to the song of Troy by Demodocus, Alcinous asks him whether he has lost a relative or brother who is ἐσθλός (*Od.* 8. 582, 585). Hippocoon is King Rhesus' ἀνεψιὸς ἐσθλός (*Il.* 10. 518-9). When a noble man kills his kinsman, it is a great problem, because his victim is also of a high status, probably has a powerful family and retaliation can be expected. An Epeigeus who is 'οὔ τι κάκιστος' (*Il.* 16. 570) himself once killed his 'ἐσθλὸς ἀνεψιός' and had to go into exile (*Il.* 16. 573). Achilles sacrifices twelve noble (ἐσθλοί) Trojans in the honour of Patroclus (*Il.* 23. 175, 181)—what matters here is the victims' status rather than their valour.

ἐσθλός and κακός are often coupled in a generalising statement meaning 'anybody'. Whether κακός or ἐσθλός, every man has a name (*Od.* 8. 553), every man sleeps (*Od.* 20. 86), and no one can escape μοῖρα of death (*Il.* 6. 489). Zeus dispenses happiness either to ἐσθλοί or to κακοί at his will (*Od.* 6. 189). The suitors of Penelope did not respect any man visiting the house of Odysseus, either κακός or ἐσθλός (*Od.* 22. 414-5, 23. 65-6). We do not hear about any category in-between. Apparently, ἐσθλοί are the ruling class and κακοί include all the rest. In this particular case, the word for 'good' or the one for 'bad' only means 'splendid/not splendid in respect of birth', and does not have a tone of commendation or denigration. Here these terms have nothing to do with actual display of ἀρετή of men so classified.

If there is no moral specification for the 'κακός' on a social scale,

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[9] On 'πατὴρ ἐμὸς ἐσθλὸς 'Οδυσσεύς', see O. C. Cramer 'Ulysses the good?' in *TAPA* 104 (1974), 77-80.

apart from not being ἐσθλός, there certainly seems to be some for the ἐσθλός. When Antinous has reproached Eumaeus for bringing a beggar to the house of Odysseus, Eumaeus answers by criticising him for not speaking properly (*Od.* 17. 381):

'Αντίνο', οὐ μὲν καλὰ καὶ ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἀγορεύεις.

'καὶ ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν' seems to imply that a man of noble birth is normally expected to talk more nicely—in the sense of 'nice to the listener's ears'. The underlying idea is that ἐσθλός' manner should be καλός, which will become more prominent in later Greek as in the phrase 'καλὸς κἀγαθός'.

Related to this is the idea that ἐσθλοί have a placable mind. When persuading Poseidon to follow Zeus' instruction, Iris says that φρένες ἐσθλῶν are placable (στρεπταί *Il.* 15. 203), and Poseidon yields to her persuasion, admitting that she has spoken properly (κατὰ μοῖραν 206). Apparently, to have a flexible, placable mind is considered part of the quality of being noble and is acknowledged among the gods. The same argument is tried with Achilles by Phoenix who says that Achilles should show respect to the Litai, for the mind of ἐσθλοί is placated by τιμή (*Il.* 9. 514). It obviously contains a tacit message to Achilles himself—'If you are ἐσθλός, you should soften your feeling by the τιμή that we have brought to you.' The same idea is more clearly expressed by Poseidon in human disguise when encouraging the Achaeans. He suggests negotiation with Achilles (again, apparently), and says that Achilles should and will yield to the plea of the Achaeans, since φρένες ἐσθλῶν are ἀκεσταί (*Il.* 13. 115).[10] ἐσθλός is expected to be a gentle, reasonable man. This use of ἐσθλός corresponds to the image of a 'good man' we have seen, i.e. knowing δίκη and behaving within one's lot.

However, as in the case of ἀγαθός, the most important quality expected from an ἐσθλός is his valour. In time of peace, this quality is developed and displayed in games, as the Phaeacian youths who are probably inexperienced in battle are called ἐσθλοί in the context of their games (*Od.* 8. 110), while the noble spectators are called

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[10] The lack of the reference to the Embassy in Book 9 in this statement, of course, can certainly be taken as evidence for the late addition of Book 9, but Achilles himself expects more sincere apology and placation from Agamemnon even as the ambassadors are negotiating with him (*Il.* 9. 387), and he does accept Agamemnon's explanation (if not an apology as we would call it) and compensation in the end.

ἄριστοι (108). The suitors of Penelope are presumably also inexperienced in actual battle, but are competent (ἐσθλοί) enough to fight against Odysseus (*Od.* 22. 204). When a person is called ἐσθλός in battle, it most certainly means a man of valour. For Odysseus and Telemachus, Zeus and Athena are the mighty allies (ἐσθλώ *Od.* 16. 263). Nestor advises Agamemnon to arrange the army according to their clans so that they can tell who is ἐσθλός and who is κακός (*Il.* 2. 365-6), i.e. who is valorous and who is cowardly. He arranges his army in such a way that ἐσθλοί surround κακοί so that the latter cannot run away but are forced to fight (*Il.* 4. 298-300). When the battle intensifies, the Achaeans exchange their shields so that ἐσθλοί will have ἐσθλά ones—more effective, but heavy—and χείρονες will have χέρεια ones—less effective, but light (*Il.* 14. 382). Prominent heroes are not only ἐσθλοί themselves, but have ἐσθλοί ἑταῖροι (Pandarus' *Il.* 4. 113; Ajax's *Il.* 13. 709-10; Sarpedon's *Il.* 16. 327; Odysseus' *Od.* 5. 110, 133, 7. 251, 23. 331; cf. *Od.* 24. 427). Patroclus reproaches Meliones for fighting with words instead of arms, despite being 'ἐσθλός' (*Il.* 16. 627).

ἐσθλός should be a man of action. ἐσθλός is a warrior who works hard in battle (πολλὰ ἐοργώς) and κακός is an ἀεργός warrior (*Il.* 9. 319-20). ἐσθλός though he is, Achilles is useless if he does not fight for the Achaeans (*Il.* 11. 665). Achilles' sorrow over Patroclus' death is particularly deep because Achilles, ἐσθλός though he is, could not protect his friend (*Il.* 16. 837). He kills many 'ἐσθλοὶ υἱοί' of Priam (*Il.* 22. 44, 24. 204-5, 520-1), including Hector (who is ἐσθλός *Il.* 22. 158, 176), because Achilles is 'μέγ' ἀμείνων' than Hector (*Il.* 22. 158). Hector knows how ἐσθλός Achilles is and that he is much χείρων than his opponent (*Il.* 20. 434). Yet he stands against Achilles because he must strive for κλέος and not to be κακός (*Il.* 6. 443-4), but ἐσθλός. κακός is not a verdict on a fallen hero killed by a stronger one, but that for a coward. And, who knows, since ἀρετή is controlled by the gods (*Il.* 20. 242-3), Achilles might turn out to be a loser (*Il.* 16. 860-1). And after their duel, the dying Hector prophesies that one day, ἐσθλός though he is, Achilles also will be killed by Paris and Apollo (*Il.* 22. 359-60). As we can see from some of above examples, ἐσθλός denoting a man of valour has two antonyms—χείρων and κακός. Hector may be χείρων (with less divine gift of ἀρετή) compared with Achilles, but not κακός (not performing his role as a warrior). Even Achilles would prefer being killed by Hector, another ἀγαθός like himself, to being drowned in

a river (*Il.* 21. 279-80), for, then, he will die an honourable death at least. What we see here is a system which does value good intention and distinguish failure from cowardice.[11]

Therefore it is no wonder that the victims of heroes on the battlefield are often described as ἐσθλός. And no doubt that increases the glory of the victors. Diomedes kills many ἐσθλοί (*Il.* 5. 176) and so does Patroclus (*Il.* 16. 425). Antilochus' victims, Echepolus (*Il.* 4. 458) and Mydon (*Il.* 5. 581) are both 'ἐσθλός'. Antiphus' victim Leucus is Odysseus' 'ἐσθλὸς ἑταῖρος' (*Il.* 4. 491). Glaucus' victim, a Myrmidon called Bathycles, is 'ἐσθλὸς ἀνήρ' (*Il.* 16. 600). Aeneas' victim called Leocritus is 'ἐσθλὸς ἑταῖρος' of Lycomedes (*Il.* 17. 344-5). Menelaus' victim Podes is 'ἐσθλός ἐνὶ προμάχοισι' (*Il.* 17. 590). Achilles' victim called Iphition is ἐσθλός and 'πολέων ἡγήτωρ λαῶν', and a son of a nymph (*Il.* 20. 382-4). Another victim of the hero called Demoleon is 'ἐσθλὸς ἀλεξητῆς μάχης' (*Il.* 20. 396). In one of his old adventure stories, Nestor boasts that he killed Itymones who was ἐσθλός (*Il.* 11. 672-3).

Any ἐσθλός, heroic warrior, has a limit to his ἀρετή. ἐσθλός though he is, Aeneas would be killed by Achilles if he challenged him (*Il.* 20. 312). ἐσθλός though he is, Odysseus could be in danger when surrounded alone by his enemies (*Il.* 11. 471). Even the mighty Ajax cannot advance when blocked by many Trojan ἐσθλοί (*Il.* 5. 624). Danger of death in battle is a natural part of the warrior's life. μοῖρα subdues both ἐσθλός and κακός (*Il.* 9. 319). Therefore an ἐσθλός is not discredited by failure, unless it is due to his cowardice.[12] The fallen Protesilaus who was ἐσθλός is still much missed by his troops because he was ἀρείων than his brother who now is their leader (*Il.* 2. 707-9). The Trojans lament many of their fallen 'ἐσθλοί' (*Il.* 24. 167; cf. *Il.* 6. 452). They are obviously remembered with respect, not contempt, for the valour that they

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[11] In this respect, Adkins' label for Homeric society 'results culture' is misleading. Despite his defeat, Hector dies as 'ἐσθλός', not as 'κακός', and his death is not αἰσχρός. We may also note that despite the most inglorious outcome of the chariot-race, Eumelus remains 'ἀνὴρ ὥριστος' (*Il.* 23. 536). Failure despite good intention does not discredit a man, provided his good intention and ἀρετή are *known* to the public. Cf. *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 35, etc.

[12] Cf. G. S. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer*, p. 374: 'Then with Hector and Achilles and Patroclus and Ajax there was no sense that being beaten was in itself disgraceful, or that the duel was a crucial test of virility. The epic sense of fate prevented this. A man would die when fate or the gods willed it; his part was to do his best, to fight honourably . . . .'

possessed and exercised. There is no sign that their defeat in battle is considered αἰσχρός. On the other hand, despite his being ἐσθλός, Aeneas has not been satisfactorily rewarded by Priam, presumably for personal (the clash of their characters?) or political reasons (Aeneas being from another line of the royal family) (*Il.* 13. 461). Success and failure are not the only factors which give honour and disgrace to ἐσθλοί in the Homeric society.

An interesting example of the use of ἐσθλός is that applied to Odysseus as Telemachus' father. Telemachus dreams of his πατὴρ ἐσθλός coming home and regaining his τιμή (*Od.* 1. 115-7). For him, the loss of his πατὴρ ἐσθλός is a double misfortune (κακὸν ἔμπεσεν . . . δοιά *Od.* 2. 45-6), as sorrow for his father's death is topped with the troubles (κακά *Od.* 2. 71-4) inflicted by the suitors, whom Odysseus would have warded off had he returned home. As we have seen, Odysseus is ἐσθλός as a member of the ruling class, and that meaning should be present also in the recurring phrase 'πατὴρ ἐσθλός'. However, for Telemachus, his father is ἐσθλός most of all as an efficient defender of his house and family. When Telemachus entreats Nestor and Menelaus to tell him his father's whereabouts, Odysseus is again imagined as a competent warrior and counsellor (*Od.* 3. 98-100, 4. 328-30). Therefore, even when he welcomes his father with tears of joy, Odysseus is 'good', not in the sense that he is 'nice' to his son, but that he is 'efficient' in fighting off his enemies. Nestor also mentions Odysseus as Telemachus' πατὴρ ἐσθλός and as a warrior honoured by Athena (*Od.* 3. 379). For Penelope, too, Odysseus is 'πόσις ἐσθλός', not as a 'nice' husband, but a 'valorous' husband. He is her 'πόσις ἐσθλὸς θυμολέων' (*Od.* 4. 724, 814), who excelled among the Danaans in all kinds of ἀρετή (725, 815) whose κλέος reaches all over Greece (726, 816). For Odysseus' family, what is most missed is the military ἀρετή of Odysseus to defend their house, now so helpless and being consumed by intruders.

Man can be ἐσθλός—competent—in skills other than fighting. The Trojan elders are good orators (*Il.* 3. 150-1). Telemachus' ship has a good crew (*Od.* 2. 391 ἐσθλοὶ ἑταῖροι). A competent guide is ἡγεμὼν ἐσθλός (*Od.* 15. 310). Eumaeus is a competent swineherd (*Od.* 15. 557).[13] Odysseus' sheep are guarded by good shepherds,

[13] J. Griffin's translation, 'the virtuous swineherd', in my opinion, overemphasises a nuance not very strong in the word ἐσθλός here. Cf. 'Homeric words and speakers' in *JHS* 106 (1986), 47.

ἀνέρες ἐσθλοί (*Od.* 14. 104). A herd's skill is partially military, for they need competence in defence against theft as well as herding skills. Therefore it is not surprising that they are ἐσθλοί.

In one example we have already seen (*Od.* 19. 334)[14], ἐσθλός is used of a man whose behaviour and mind are blameless (332), particularly concerning his treatment of his guests. Such a man will win κλέος (333) and his guests will all say that he is 'ἐσθλός' (334). Although the most immediate meaning of ἐσθλός here should be 'good', useful in the eye of the affected party (i.e. his guests), it also implies that he duly plays his role as an ἐσθλός expected by his society. ἐσθλός can point to cooperative virtues expected from the ruling class ἀγαθοί/ἐσθλοί, just as in the case of ἀγαθός.

ἐσθλός applied to objects and conduct

Objects, animals and conduct are in general 'good' when they are competent/useful to persons affected by them. ἐσθλός is applied to good fortune (ἐσθλόν in contrast with κακόν *Il.* 1. 106-8, 24. 530, *Od.* 15. 488), splendid banquets (*Il.* 1. 575-6, *Od.* 18. 403-4), good health (μένος ἐσθλόν lit. full bodily strength *Il.* 5. 516), treasure (*Il.* 9. 330, 24. 381, *Od.* 4. 96, 15. 91, 159, 19. 272), useful information (*Il.* 10. 448), effective medicine (φάρμακα ἐσθλά *Il.* 11. 830-1, *Od.* 4. 227-8, 230, as protection from κακά—*Od.* 10. 287, 292), good horses (*Il.* 23. 348), property (*Od.* 2. 312-3), good wagons (*Od.* 9. 241-2), good offerings to the gods or the dead (*Od.* 10. 523, 11. 31, 12. 347), and fair wind (as a 'useful companion' *Od.* 11. 7, 12. 149). Conduct and functions of mind are also judged according to their usefulness. It is good, useful, to pray to Zeus (*Il.* 24. 301; cf. 425 'It is ἀγαθόν to give offerings to the gods.'). It is good, helpful for a messenger to have a sensible mind (*Il.* 15. 207). A plan is good when profitable (*Il.* 9. 76, 12. 212 ἐσθλὰ φραζομένῳ, 18. 313). When one loses one's 'competent mind' (φρένας ἐσθλάς *Il.* 17. 470), one makes a 'useless plan' (νηκερδὴς βουλή 469). Competence in reasoning is expressed in such phrases as νόος ἐσθλός (*Il.* 13. 732-3, *Od.* 7. 73), νόημα ἐσθλόν (*Od.* 7. 292), and φρένες ἐσθλαί (*Od.* 2. 117, 7. 111). ὁμοφροσύνη of a husband and wife is ἐσθλή and is stronger and better (κρεῖσσον καὶ ἄρειον) than anything else (*Od.* 6. 181-5). This 'goodness' is commended in its strength and

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[14] Cf. Conclusion to Chapter 9.

benefit in managing one's household. We may consider it to be a moral virtue, but in Homer its merit is judged solely in terms of its practicality.

When Penelope says that her suitors speak ἐσθλά to Telemachus while plotting κακά against him, ἐσθλά means good, pleasant things and κακά are bad, harmful things. Good and bad, that is, primarily *in the eye of Telemachus*, not as morally judged by the society. Conduct morally condemned by the public would be classified as an object of νέμεσις rather than κακά.

On the other hand, when Telemachus says to the suitors that he can tell ἐσθλά from χέρεια (*Od.* 18. 229, 20. 310), he means what is suitable or unsuitable for ἐσθλός, a man of high status. In this contrast of ἐσθλός and χέρεια, ἐσθλός refers not to profitable effects, but to the noble quality expected from the aristocracy, ἐσθλοί. There are some other such uses of ἐσθλός. The glory suitable for ἐσθλοί is κλέος ἐσθλόν (*Il.* 5. 3, 273, 9. 415 (cf. 413, κλέος ἄφθιτον), 17. 16, 143, 18. 121, 23. 280, *Od.* 1. 95, 3. 78, 380, 13. 422, 18. 126, 24. 94). It is mostly the result of their valour, but Amphinomus' father has κλέος ἐσθλόν for his sensible character and wealth (*Od.* 18. 126) rather than his physical ἀρετή. Nausicaa will gain φάτις ἐσθλή (*Od.* 6. 29-30) when she fulfils all of her virginal duties at home. This is partly the virtue depending on her ἀρετή (= usefulness), and partly the discipline required from noble persons. Alcinous praises Odysseus' φρένες ἐσθλαί (*Od.* 11. 367)—a noble or reasonable mind fitting for ἐσθλοί. However, when the Achaeans say Odysseus has done many ἐσθλά (*Il.* 2. 272), these refer to his military ἀρετή rather than his noble birth. Heroic might is ἶς ἐσθλή (*Il.* 12. 320-1). Patroclus is on one occasion referred to as κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἡνιόχοιο (*Il.* 23. 280), his glory itself. Military ἀρετή suitable for ἐσθλός is rewarded with μοῖρα καὶ γέρας ἐσθλόν (*Od.* 11. 534) or δόσις ἐσθλή (*Il.* 10. 213) and κλέος (212), noble prizes and glory.

ἀμείνων and ἀρείων

ἀμείνων and ἀρείων, both comparative forms of ἀγαθός, are used most often to compare two persons. When it is said that A is ἀμείνων or ἀρείων than B, it means that A is stronger, a greater warrior, than B, rather than that A's birth is nobler than B's. We know this because we sometimes find such expressions as 'A is ἀμείνων/ἀρείων than A's father/brother (Father—Briareos *Il.* 1. 404, Periphetes *Il.* 15. 641, and Hector wishes Astyanax may one day become

ἀμείνων than himself *Il.* 6. 479; Brother—Protesilaus *Il.* 2. 707, Idomeneus *Od.* 19. 184). We also hear that few sons are ἀρείων than their fathers (*Od.* 2. 277).

Achilles is most frequently described as ἀμείνων than somebody else, and that is one of the reasons why we know that he is *the* best of the Achaeans. He is stronger than Agamemnon (μεγ' ἀμείνων *Il.* 2. 239), Menelaus (πολλὸν ἀμείνων *Il.* 7. 114), Hector (*Il.* 22. 158), Patroclus (*Il.* 11. 787, 16. 709, 22. 333), and he says that no other Achaean can rival him in battle though others are ἀμείνονες than he in ἀγορῇ (*Il.* 18. 106).

We also know that Hector is stronger than Menelaus (*Il.* 7. 111), Patroclus much stronger than Lycaon (*Il.* 21. 107), Agamemnon much stronger than Aegisthus (*Od.* 3. 250) and Ajax stronger than Hector (*Il.* 11. 543)[15]. Pandarus is better than anybody else in Lycia as an archer (*Il.* 5. 173). Nestor claims that the heroes of old days were stronger than Achilles or Agamemnon, but used to listen to his advice (*Il.* 1. 260). Dione says that Diomedes will meet a stronger opponent than Aphrodite one day (*Il.* 5. 411). Many warriors stronger than Ascalaphus have been killed (*Il.* 15. 139). Patroclus encourages the Aiante to be even braver than usual (*Il.* 16. 557). Odysseus and his companions are attacked by the Ciconians from inland who are stronger than the ones of the town (*Od.* 9. 48). The Beggar-Odysseus might meet a stronger opponent than Irus (*Od.* 18. 334). Some gods are also stronger than others. Athena boasts that she is stronger than Ares (*Il.* 21. 410-1) after beating him in the preceding scene.

There are a few other examples which need closer examination. Agamemnon, in his encouraging taunt to Diomedes, says that Diomedes is a lesser warrior than his father Tydeus, and ἀμείνων only in ἀγορῇ (*Il.* 4. 400). Protesting against this, Sthenelus claims that the Epigonoi are μέγ' ἀμείνονες than the first Seven against Thebes (*Il.* 4. 405) who were not successful. However, the reason Sthenelus gives for his claim is basically that the Epigonoi followed the gods' instruction in the siege of Thebes. Therefore there is no objective evidence for the relative ἀρετῇ of the Seven and of their sons to tell which are in fact ἀμείνονες. All we know is that the

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[15] Although the authenticity of the line itself is doubtful, the fact is clear from their two encounters at *Il.* 7. 244ff. and 14. 402ff.

Epigonoi were successful because of some divine support which always increases one's net ἀρετή.

At *Il.* 10. 237, Agamemnon urges Diomedes to choose the best (ἄριστος) man as his companion for the night adventure, who should be ἀρείων, better in prowess, not in social status. Agamemnon, we are told, has Menelaus in mind when he says that Diomedes should not choose somebody only because he is βασιλεύτερος (*Il.* 10. 239). Here we see the contrast between ἀρείων (= stronger) and βασιλεύτερος (= nobler). On the other hand, Menelaus is 'πρότερος καὶ ἀρείων' than Antilochus (*Il.* 23. 588; cf. 605) where the context suggests nothing more than that Menelaus is higher in rank than Antilochus. The same ambiguity is most prominent when Ajax tells Idomeneus to shut up in front of his 'betters' (ἀμείνονες *Il.* 23. 479), where it may mean either 'higher in rank' or 'better in skill (in judging at a chariot race)'.

After Hector has scolded Paris for being lazy in his bed-chamber with Helen, while other Trojans are fighting, Helen wishes she had married a man 'ἀμείνων' than Paris, a man who knows νέμεσις and αἴσχεα (*Il.* 6. 350-1). Obviously she is not talking about his birth or prowess, but about his attitude. He should fight bravely in the war for which he is responsible, but he does not. That is not fitting for a man of his status, an ἀγαθός. She wishes he were more ἀγαθός-like in his responsibility as a warrior. Telemachus probably also uses the word ἀρείων in the sense of 'morally superior', as well as in the sense of 'stronger', at *Od.* 20. 133 when saying that Penelope has a tendency to honour a lesser man and to dishonour a better one, for he has in mind the suitors on the one hand and Odysseus on the other. Odysseus, as we know, is superior to the suitors in every respect.

When applied to a man's physical appearance, ἀμείνων/ἀρείων means 'nobler' or 'more beautiful'. Laertes looks better, i.e. more kingly, after having a bath (*Od.* 24. 374). The dead body of Patroclus (*Il.* 19. 33) miraculously gets more presentable as time passes because of divine protection.

ἄρειον is used as an adverb, better, only once in the expression that Penelope will know Odysseus 'better'—more properly—soon (*Od.* 23. 114).

All other examples of ἀμείνων/ἀρείων are translatable as 'better' in the sense of more useful, effective, or competent for the party affected: better horses (*Il.* 10. 556-7), a better seer (*Od.* 2. 180), a better watch (σκοπός *Od.* 22. 156), a stronger fortification (*Il.* 4.

407), a better idea (*Il.* 9. 104, *Od.* 5. 364; μῦθον *Il.* 7. 358, 12. 232; μῆτις *Il.* 9. 423, 14. 107, 15. 509), a wiser thing to do (*Il.* 1. 116, 217, 274, 11. 469, 19. 56, *Od.* 1. 376, 2. 141, 7. 51, 14. 466, 22. 104), and better old age, happier than earlier years (*Od.* 23. 286). Mist is more convenient than night for thieves (*Il.* 3. 10-1). To attack in a great number is more effective (*Il.* 12. 412). To fight and survive is the better νόος and μῆτις than anything else (*Il.* 15. 509), and one's own prowess is the better fortification (*Il.* 15. 736) than anything else.

As in the last two examples above, ἀμείνων/ἀρείων are used in some expressions with a character of maxims or moral teachings. Peleus advises his son by saying that φιλοφροσύνη is better (*Il.* 9. 256) than χόλος (260). Odysseus tells Medon that εὐεργεσίη is far better than κακοεργίη (*Od.* 22. 374). It is better to be moderate in everything, 'αἴσιμα πάντα' (*Od.* 7. 310, 15. 71). Nothing is better and stronger than the unanimous mind of a husband and wife (*Od.* 6. 182). This last group of examples commend 'quiet virtues', but still on the ground of ἀρετή as usefulness and competence.

Finally, when Apollo criticises Achilles' maltreatment of Hector's body as 'οὐ μήν οἱ τό γε κάλλιον οὐδέ τ' ἄμεινον' (*Il.* 24. 52), it seems that it is the word 'κάλλιον' that carries strong moral condemnation—it is not seemly, and the word ἄμεινον seems to refer only to Achilles' interest judging by the god's following comment—it is not profitable for him, because the gods may be offended (53).

ἄριστος

As the superlative of ἀγαθός, the literal translation of ἄριστος will be 'the best'. Once we start translating the occurrences of ἄριστος as 'the best', however, we soon discover that it does not always work.[16]

For example, at least several Achaean heroes are called 'ἄριστος of the Achaeans': Achilles (*Il.* 1. 244, 412, 16. 274, 'Αργείων *Il.* 16. 271-2, 17. 164-5), Agamemnon (*Il.* 1. 91, 2. 82, 580), Diomedes (*Il.* 5. 103, 414; cf. *Il.* 5. 839), Patroclus (ὤριστος 'Αχαιῶν *Il.* 17. 689) and Ajax ('ἄριστος' after Achilles *Il.* 2. 768-9; cf. *Il.* 2. 761; in appearance after Achilles *Od.* 11. 469-70, 24. 17-8).

[16] Cf. *LfrgE*, ἄριστος B, for a concise classification of the semantic range of the word.

When the Achaeans choose by lot the opponent for Hector, who must be "Ἀχαιῶν ὅς τις ἄριστος' (*Il.* 7. 50), they pray that it may turn out to be Ajax, Diomedes or Agamemnon (179-80). Apparently, each of these three is considered by the Achaeans equally 'ἄριστος'. Therefore, we must understand 'ἄριστος' applied on its own to a hero as 'one of the best' rather than *the* best.

But in what sense are the ἄριστοι 'best'? We see the same ambiguity as with ἀμείνων and ἀρείων. Nestor believes in the message of the dream of Agamemnon, because he is ἄριστος (*Il.* 2. 82), i.e. highest in rank among the Achaeans. On the other hand, when the poet answers his own question to the Muse, 'Who is ἄριστος?', by saying that it is Ajax because Achilles is absent (*Il.* 2. 761-9), he means that Ajax is the strongest warrior after Achilles.

As is evident from these examples, ἄριστος, like ἀγαθός, is a word to describe a class of people who are considered noble by birth and expected to be excellent warriors. Most expressions like 'ἄριστος among such and such people' imply that the person so described is (one of) the bravest and noblest, i.e. the leader of the people. For example, Periphas (*Il.* 5. 843) and Thoas (*Il.* 15. 282) among the Aetolians, Acamas among the Thracians (*Il.* 6. 7), Euphorbus among the Trojans (*Il.* 17. 80-1), Schedius among the Phocaeans (*Il.* 17. 306-7), Patroclus among the Myrmidons (*Il.* 18. 10), Asteropaeus among the Paeonians (*Il.* 21. 207), the sons of Merops among their people (*Il.* 11. 328), Hector (*Il.* 21. 279, cf. *Il.* 24. 384) and Alcathoon (*Il.* 13. 433) in Troy, and Sarpedon (*Il.* 16. 521-2), obviously among the Lycians.

If one is of noble birth and has the qualities necessary to be a good warrior—wealth, physical strength, skill in fighting, courageous character, and, perhaps, wise counsel and eloquence—one is ἄριστος not only in war but also in peace. For this reason, Eurymachus is ἄριστος among the suitors (*Od.* 15. 521) and Antinous among 'young men in Ithaca' (*Od.* 22. 29-30; cf. 17. 415-6 where he looks 'ὤριστος' and king-like) even though they may never have fought in battle.

ἄριστος is, of course, used in its literal sense 'the best' from time to time. Calchas (*Il.* 1. 69) and Helenus (*Il.* 6. 76) are the best among seers (οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος) and Polypheides was once the best prophet (μάντις βροτῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος *Od.* 15. 252-3). The craftsman who made Ajax's shield is the best leather-worker (σκυτοτόμων ὄχ' ἄριστος *Il.* 7. 221). Teucer is the best in archery

(*Il.* 13. 313-4). Diomedes is the best warrior among the participants in the chariot race (*Il.* 23. 357) and, according to Nestor, the best counsellor among those of his age (*Il.* 9. 54). Eumelus is the best (ὤριστος) charioteer (*Il.* 23. 536). Hector is the best and bravest son of Priam (*Il.* 24. 242). Athena, impressed by Odysseus' cunning story, says that he is 'βροτῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος ἁπάντων/βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισιν' (*Od.* 13. 297-8)—ἄριστος here is unmistakably superlative as we know it to be true through the whole of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. He is indeed *the* best partner of Diomedes to be chosen for the most dangerous night adventure (*Il.* 10. 236).

In the funeral games for Patroclus, Achilles invites the two best boxers to fight (*Il.* 23. 659) and *the* best boxer is Epeius (*Il.* 23. 669). The best two in close combat (*Il.* 23. 802) are also invited and Ajax and Diomedes stand up; of them the latter is declared the winner only by Achilles' judgement after a close match. Agamemnon is said to be 'ἄριστος' in the strength of arms by Achilles (*Il.* 23. 890-1) and declared the winner without any actual competition. This is a remarkable passage in which Achilles acknowledges Agamemnon as a man of ἀρετή for the first time, and his judgement is to promote a good relationship among the Achaeans, as well as between Agamemnon and himself.[17] In the Phaeacian games, Euryalus is the best in appearance after Laodamas among the participants in the foot-race (*Od.* 8. 116), and Clytonaus is the best in running (*Od.* 8. 123). A rock which Hector throws against the gate of the Achaean fortification is so great that it requires the two best men—i.e. strongest men—of the community to raise it (*Il.* 12. 447). Penelope is urged to choose 'whoever is the best' as her new husband (*Od.* 11. 179, 16. 76, 18. 289, 19. 528; cf. 20. 335). People say that Antinous is ἄριστος in speech and counsel (*Od.* 16. 419-20) to which Penelope does not agree.

ἄριστος can be an effective word of reproach when combined with such words as νεῖκος—'the best in quarrel' (*Il.* 23. 483) or as εἶδος 'the most good-looking (and useless in fighting)' (*Il.* 3. 39, 13. 769 of Paris; *Il.* 17. 142 of Hector).[18]

When Zeus is said to be the 'ἄριστος' of the gods (θεῶν ὤριστος *Il.* 13. 154; *Il.* 14. 213 by Aphrodite; ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι *Il.* 15. 107-8; ἀνδρῶν ἠδὲ θεῶν *Il.* 19. 95-6 by Agamemnon; θεῶν ὕπατος

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[17] Cf. Chapter 5, n. 13.

[18] Cf. χοροιτυπίῃσιν ἄριστοι at *Il.* 24. 261.

καὶ ἄριστος *Il.* 19. 258, 23. 43, *Od.* 19. 303, in the oaths by Agamemnon, Achilles and Odysseus respectively), it means, undoubtedly, that he is both the strongest and the highest in rank. When Zeus says that Poseidon is 'πρεσβύτατος καὶ ἄριστος' (*Od.* 13. 142), therefore, he means that Poseidon is 'the eldest and the highest' after Zeus himself. However, when we hear that Apollo is 'θεῶν ὤριστος' (*Il.* 19. 413), it only means, again, he is *one* of the greatest gods, but not *the* highest. The application of the word is very much the same with both men and gods, used as *one* of the best at one time and as *the* best at another.

The plural ἄριστοι can be translated in various ways: the bravest (sc. men), strongest (sc. men), noblest (sc. men), chiefs etc. The meaning of the word 'ἄριστοι' is the combination of all the above. ἄριστοι, who are referred to as ἀγαθοί as well, are the noblest part of the population supposed to be the best in all the activities entrusted to them, i.e. leadership and prowess in war, wise counsel in meetings, fair judgement among people under their influence. The emphasis, however, differs in the two epics. Generally speaking, ἄριστοι are the most valorous warriors in the *Iliad*, and in the *Odyssey* they are a prosperous aristocracy in peace.

The examples of ἄριστοι translatable as 'brave warriors' (with emphasis on their valour) are: Agamemnon's troops (*Il.* 2. 577); Hector's troops (*Il.* 2. 817, 12. 197 cf. λαὸν ἄριστον *Od.* 11. 500 of the Trojans and their allies); Diomedes and others (*Il.* 5. 780); Aeneas and Hector (*Il.* 6. 78, 17. 513); the strongest of the Lycians (*Il.* 6. 188); the Achaeans (*Il.* 6. 435, 11. 658-9, 825-6, 13. 117, 128; the Argives *Il.* 3. 19, 8. 229, 9. 520; the Danaans *Il.* 5. 541; the leaders—of the Achaeans understood—*Il.* 7. 285, 13. 42); the Trojans (*Il.* 10. 560, 11. 258, 12. 13, 13. 740, 751, 836, 18. 230); Odysseus and Diomedes (the best two of the Achaeans *Il.* 10. 539); the Pylian warriors killed by Heracles (*Il.* 11. 691); Hector and Polydamas (*Il.* 12. 89); Glaucus and Asteropaeus (*Il.* 12. 103); Polypoetes and Leontes (*Il.* 12. 127); the bravest/chiefs of the Trojans and their allies (Polydamas, Aeneas, Agenor, Sarpedon, Glaucus *Il.* 14. 424-5); the bravest/chiefs of the Achaeans (*Il.* 15. 296, 16. 23, 17. 368, 377, 509, *Od.* 1. 211); the strongest of the gods (Hera, Poseidon, Athena *Il.* 20. 122-3); two brave warriors (Aeneas and Achilles *Il.* 20. 158); the bravest sons of Priam (*Il.* 24. 255, 493); the bravest who died at Troy (Ajax, Achilles, Patroclus, Antilochus *Od.* 3. 108); Nestor's sons (πινυτούς τε καὶ ἔγχεσιν ἀρίστους *Od.* 4.

211); the bravest Achaeans in the Wooden Horse (*Od.* 4. 272, 278, 8. 512, 11. 524); the three strongest of Menelaus' companions (*Od.* 4. 409); the strongest men for ambush (mentioned by Aegisthus *Od.* 4. 530; by the suitors 4. 778); Antinous and Eurymachus (*Od.* 4. 629, 21. 187); Telemachus' crew (*Od.* 4. 666); Odysseus and Achilles (the bravest of the Achaeans *Od.* 8. 78); the best twelve companions of Odysseus (*Od.* 9. 195); the bravest (surviving) suitors (*Od.* 22. 244); the bravest/noblest of the Trojans and the Achaeans who died in the battle over Achilles' body (*Od.* 24. 38); the bravest in battle (*Od.* 24. 507).

In the following examples, ἄριστοι is translatable as chiefs or nobles, with emphasis on their social status rather than on their valour: the Achaeans (*Il.* 9. 3, 10. 214, 273, 326); the Trojans (*Il.* 10. 300); the Trojan and Achaean chiefs (*Il.* 3. 274); Glaucus' ancestors (*Il.* 6. 209); the noblest of the sons of Ithaca (the suitors *Od.* 23. 121); the noblest courting Penelope (*Od.* 1. 245, 2. 51, 16. 122, 251, 19. 130); the noblest of all the Cephallenians killed by Odysseus (*Od.* 24. 429), who look like the noblest of a whole city (*Od.* 24. 108); the noblest among the Phaeacians (*Od.* 6. 257, 8. 91, 108); the priests of the highest rank (*Il.* 9. 575); Euryalus beats all the 'ἄριστοι' (*Od.* 8. 127); 'ἄριστοι' in Pylos were afraid of Ereuthalion, but Nestor was not (*Il.* 7. 150); the ambush will tell who is brave and who is cowardly *among ἄριστοι* (*Il.* 13. 276ff.). The last two examples are particularly significant in their implication that 'ἄριστοι' can be cowards sometimes. In this case, ἄριστοι as the marker of a class is separated from its basic meaning, those who are bravest.

The examples of ἄριστοι applied to 'the best' in certain functions other than as warriors are: the best carpenters (*Il.* 6. 314-5); the best at dancing (*Il.* 24. 261 as reproach, *Od.* 8. 250, 383); the best crew (*Od.* 8. 36); the best at sailing (*Od.* 8. 247); the best witnesses (the gods *Il.* 22. 254-5).

When a woman is described as 'ἀρίστη', it usually means that she possesses excellent feminine ἀρεταί, i.e. usefulness as a woman, such as beauty and skill in textile production.[19] Alcestis (*Il.* 2. 715), Laodice (*Il.* 3. 124, 6. 252), her sister Cassandra (*Il.* 13. 365) are all ἀρίστη in form (εἶδος). Most understandably, one would be most

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[19] This meaning is not attested in the use of ἀγαθή for a woman in Homer. Cf. *Od.* 18. 276.

willing to fight to win the hand of the most beautiful daughter (or, one of the most beautiful daughters) of a king (*Il.* 13. 365, 378).

The 'best women' on offer to Achilles (*Il.* 9. 638) are most probably as beautiful as skilled in hand, because that is the ἀρετή of a maidservant. On the other hand, when Athena advises Telemachus to entrust 'the best maidservant' (*Od.* 15. 25) to guarding his property, the meaning of 'the best' is more specific, i.e. best for this purpose, most trustworthy.

The only example of ἀρίστη meaning 'highest in rank' is Hera's claim to be 'θεάων ἀρίστη' (*Il.* 18. 364). She means that she is the highest among the goddesses because she is the wife of Zeus, but not that she is the most beautiful of all, even if she does believe so, as we hear in the episode of the Judgement of Paris.

An object or an animal is described as 'ἄριστος' when it is the best/most useful of the sort: the best horses (*Il.* 2. 763, 10. 306, *Od.* 3. 370); the best cattle (*Od.* 12. 343, 353, 398, 18. 371); the best cow (*Il.* 17. 62; the best sterile cow *Od.* 10. 522, 11. 30); the best ram (*Od.* 9. 432); the best goat (*Od.* 14. 106), the best pig (*Od.* 14. 19, 108, 414, 20. 163, 24. 215); the best ship (*Od.* 1. 280, 2. 294, 16. 348; ships and the crew *Od.* 7. 327-8); the best armour (*Il.* 15. 616); the best shields (*Il.* 14. 371); the best chest (*Od.* 8. 424); the best landing site (*Od.* 5. 442, 7. 281); the best outcome (*Il.* 3. 110, *Od.* 3. 129, 9. 420, 23. 117); the best treatment (*Il.* 6. 56); the best conduct (*Il.* 2. 274); the best idea or counsel (ἄριστα: *Il.* 9. 103, 314, 12. 215, 344, 357, 13. 735, *Od.* 13. 154, 365, 23. 117, 130; ἄριστον *Od.* 5. 360; βουλή: *Il.* 2. 5. 7. 325, 9. 74, 94,-5 10. 17, 14. 161, *Od.* 9. 318, 11. 230, 24. 52; μῆτις: *Il.* 17. 634, 712, *Od.* 23. 124-5); the best omen (*Il.* 12. 243 '. . . is to fight for one's fatherland').

ἄριστος, on the whole, is not very different in meaning from ἀγαθός, except that the former puts more emphasis on particular excellences rather than on the class difference.

ἀριστεύς

ἀριστεύς, a cognate noun of ἄριστος, is virtually synonymous with ἄριστος as a masculine noun. An ἀριστεύς is a nobleman who is the highest in rank and supposed to be the bravest in his community. Achilles (*Il.* 17. 203), Teucer (*Il.* 15. 489), Diomedes and Agamemnon (*Il.* 5. 206), and the best men for ambush (*Od.* 14. 218, 15. 28) are all ἀριστῆες in the sense of 'the bravest men'. In the same sense, Paris is criticised for not being one (*Il.* 3. 44-5). Other heroes are

mentioned as ἀριστεύς as chiefs or noblemen, with emphasis on their social status: Achaean chiefs (*Il.* 1. 227—also 'the bravest', 2. 404, 7. 73, 159, 184, 227, 327, 385, 9. 421, 10. 1, 117, 15. 303, 19. 193, 23. 236, Od. 24. 86; Danaan chiefs: *Il.* 17. 245); Achaean chiefs and kings (*Il.* 9. 334); Odysseus (*Od.* 21. 333, 24. 460); the nobles of the Phaeacians (*Od.* 6. 34); the noblemen of Hellas and Phthia (*Il.* 9. 396); wives and daughters of noblemen (*Od.* 11. 227); the suitors of Penelope (*Od.* 21. 153, 170).

ἀριστεύω

The cognate verb of ἄριστος, ἀριστεύω, has the same ambiguity as ἄριστος. Its literal meaning is 'to behave as ἄριστος' (i.e. to fight bravely) or to be 'the best'. We can see the combination of the meanings 'to fight bravely' and 'to be the best' in the following examples: the encouragement of Glaucus' father (*Il.* 6. 208); Peleus' encouragement to Achilles (*Il.* 11. 784); of Hector (*Il.* 6. 460); of Odysseus (*Il.* 11. 409); of Moulius (*Il.* 11. 746); of Pyraechmes (*Il.* 16. 551); of Apisaon (*Il.* 17. 351).

The examples in which we seem to find only the meaning 'to be the best' are: of the crew of Telemachus (*Od.* 4. 652); Nestor is 'ever the best in counsel' (*Il.* 11. 627). The examples in which we see only the meaning 'to fight bravely' are: of those who faced Hector (*Il.* 7. 90); of Odysseus (*Il.* 11. 409); of Machaon (*Il.* 11. 506); of Teucer about to shoot an arrow (*Il.* 15. 460).

κακός[20]

κακός applied to persons

κακός, when applied to persons, works as an exact antonym of ἀγαθός or ἐσθλός, for it has a double meaning 'lowly, not noble' and 'useless, not valorous', with a few exceptional cases in which it is used to denote moral wickedness—just as ἀγαθός or ἐσθλός is very occasionally used to commend moral goodness.

κακός as 'cowardly' or 'weak', i.e. 'bad' in terms of military competence, is often contrasted with ἀγαθός/ἐσθλός in military contexts, as in Nestor's advice at *Il.* 2. 365-6 and his arrangement of his

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[20] For etymology and a concise classification of the semantic range of the word, cf. *LfrgE*, κακός.

troops at *Il.* 4. 298-9. It is the behaviour of κακοί to escape from battles (*Il.* 8. 94, 11. 408), and it is 'not a cowardly action (κακόν)' to defend one's comrades (*Il.* 18. 128-9). Ambush is a good test for telling κακός from ἀγαθός among 'ἄριστοι' (*Il.* 13. 276ff.). κακός is sometimes coupled with ἄναλκις and is almost synonymous with it (*Il.* 8. 153, *Od.* 3. 375). Heroes hate to be called κακοί (*Il.* 17. 180, *Od.* 21. 131 'κακὸς καὶ ἄκικυς') or to be threatened as if they were κακοί (*Il.* 2. 190, 15. 196 Poseidon). They especially fear criticism for being κακός from a less valiant and/or noble person (*Il.* 22. 106ff., *Od.* 21. 324ff.; cf. *Od.* 6. 275ff.).[21]

Circe can make a man 'κακὸς καὶ ἀνήνωρ' (*Od.* 10. 301, 341), an expression which presupposes the assumption that virtue (virtus) equals manliness. From Polyphemus' point of view, Odysseus is a weakling (ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἄκικυς *Od.* 9. 515) even though Odysseus surpasses him by tricks. This indicates that heroic valour mostly consists of physical strength and that cleverness alone cannot make a hero.

As we have seen in the survey of ἀγαθός and ἀρετή, human valour is not permanent, but liable to divine interference. Mentor-Athena guarantees that Telemachus will never be a coward (κακός *Od.* 2. 270, 278). Here the audience knows her intention to give glory to him. Nestor also knows that Telemachus will never be 'κακὸς καὶ ἄναλκις' because a divinity, whom he rightly identifies as Athena, looks after the young man (*Od.* 3. 375-8). At *Il.* 17. 631-2, with divine favour on their side, the Trojans gain more power than usual and every Trojan spear, thrown by either κακός or ἀγαθός, hits its mark.

Brave heroes in particular feel bitter about lack of discrimination between κακός and ἀγαθός. Achilles complains that he is not fairly rewarded for his hard work, by making a rather roughly rounded statement that both κακός and ἐσθλός get the same reward (*Il.* 9. 319). And, as Hector reminds Andromache, no man, either κακός or ἐσθλός, can escape μοῖρα, the fate of death (*Il.* 6. 488-9).

A person who is 'not κακός', i.e. ἀγαθός/ἐσθλός, ought to be a good athlete in the time of peace, for the physical strength effective in war should be kept at hand all the time. Therefore Odysseus has

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21 In the parallel case with Nausicaa (*Od.* 6. 275), 'κακώτερος than she' can, of course, only mean 'lower in status than she'.

to prove that he is 'οὐ κακός' by joining the Phaeacian games to gain his hosts' respect (*Od.* 8. 214).

κακοί are also contrasted with ἀγαθοί as a noble, wealthy class of people who are supposed also to be excellent warriors. Somehow, the heroic virtue, like wealth, is believed to be inherited, to some extent, in the Homeric world. Therefore Ajax exults over his fallen enemy, saying that he is not 'κακός' nor 'κακῶν ἔξ', i.e. not born from cowardly-lowly ancestors (*Il.* 14. 472). Diomedes relates his genealogy to show himself as a worthy man before producing his counsel, as if one's noble birth itself guaranteed one's ability as a counsellor (*Il.* 14. 126-7). It is stated elsewhere, however, that many sons are less valorous (κακίους) than their fathers (*Od.* 2. 276-7).

Those who are *not* κακοί, i.e. ἀγαθοί, seem also to have a conspicuously noble appearance, as we can judge from what is said about Mentes-Athena by Eurymachus (*Od.* 1. 411); about Telemachus and Peisistratus by Menelaus (*Od.* 4. 64); and about Odysseus, who is also 'φυήν . . . οὐ κακός' at *Od.* 8. 134, by Nausicaa (*Od.* 6. 187). Only occasionally do we find such a figure as Dolon, who is 'εἶδος κακός', but with some heroic virtue as, in his case, excellence in running (*Il.* 10. 316).

Just as 'οὐ κακοί' are 'ἀγαθοί', 'οὐ κάκιστος' means 'ἄριστος', one of the best people. Epeigeus among the Myrmidons (*Il.* 16. 570), Antilochus among the Argives (*Od.* 4. 199-200), and Antinous among the suitors (*Od.* 17. 415-6) are so described.

Those labelled as 'κακοί' are usually not greatly welcomed as visitors by anybody. This can be seen in Melantheus' bitterly contemptuous description of Eumaeus leading a beggar (Odysseus in disguise *Od.* 17. 217), presumably referring to their humble appearance. When the suitors are criticised for not respecting either κακός or ἐσθλός (*Od.* 22. 415, 23. 66), however, it means they do not respect anybody. As we have already seen in reference to ἐσθλός, the phrase 'κακός and ἐσθλός' is used in the sense of 'everybody', including all who are not ἐσθλοί in the κακός category (cf. *Od.* 6. 189, 8. 553).

The expression 'οὐ κακός' is often just a circumlocution of 'ἀγαθός' (= noble) as we have seen. There is, however, one example of 'οὐ κακός' applied to the humble cowherd of Odysseus, who, unlike Eumaeus the swineherd, has no claim to noble descent as far as we know. He is praised for his loyalty to his missing master with the expression 'οὔτε κακῷ οὔτ' ἄφρονι φωτὶ ἔοικας' (*Od.* 20.

227). There seem to be two ways of interpreting κακός in this sentence. One is to take the word as referring to his excellence in the capacity of a servant—'You do not seem a bad (i.e. disloyal) servant (to your master).' Another is to take the word as referring to κακός as 'lowly' in status—'You do not sound like a man of a low status (which in fact you are), but like a nobleman (who is supposed to know all good manners and social codes).' In either case, it is obvious that 'οὐ κακός' is used here to commend a 'quiet' virtue.

When Hera accuses Apollo of associating with the Trojans by calling him 'κακῶν ἕταρε' (*Il.* 24. 63), she seems to mean nothing more than 'You friend of those who are bad *to me*, i.e. my enemies.' Hera obviously resents the Trojans because of Paris' judgement, and the harm that he has done to her favourite heroes (after all, Helen, the pride of the Achaeans, was born in the goddess' sacred city of Argos), and it is because of him that she thinks that the Trojans deserve the fall of their city.

When used attributively, κακός is often readily translatable as 'bad', with such connotations as harmful, useless, incompetent; in other words, bad to the affected party. Thus ἑεδνωταὶ κακοί (*Il.* 13. 382) will be 'bad (grudging) givers of dowry', ἡνίοχοι κακοί (*Il.* 17. 487) 'bad (incompetent) charioteers, κακὰ τέκνα (*Il.* 24. 253) 'bad (useless) children', κακοὶ νομῆες (*Od.* 17. 246) 'bad (neglectful) shepherds'. Similarly, when the companions of Odysseus who have opened the bag of winds and caused disaster are described as 'ἕταροι κακοί' (*Od.* 10. 68), they are bad more in the sense that they did *harm* (κακά) to Odysseus, than in the sense that they did it with bad intention. They are more *useless* than wicked. When Ares is called 'τυκτὸν κακόν' (*Il.* 5. 831), ill-born, this κακόν probably means, again, 'harmful', as is natural to a war-god, rather than intrinsically 'wicked'.

However, when Clytemnestra is alluded to as 'κακὴ γυνή' (*Od.* 11. 384), a 'bad' woman who killed Agamemnon, moral condemnation is obviously present. She is not only 'harmful, bad' to her husband, but did not behave in a way fitting for a noble woman, ἀγαθή.[22] κακός is used also in such reproachful expressions as 'cowardly shames!' (*Il.* 2. 235, 5. 787, 8. 228), 'useless doll!' (*Il.* 8. 164), and 'coward bitches!' (*Il.* 13. 623), all addressed to warriors

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[22] Cf. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 36-7.

who are *not* in fact κακοί. These are also examples of moral condemnation, because, for ἀγαθοί, being useless as warriors means not fulfilling their duty.

κακόν and κακά as neuter nouns

κακόν and κακά as neuter nouns are translated as 'evil', 'troubles', 'sufferings', 'sorrows', 'harm', etc. The weight of the meaning is seldom on the moral 'badness' of the originators of κακόν/κακά—hence the originators are often not named—but on the painful (physically and/or figuratively) and harmful effect on its sufferers.

The difference in meaning between singular κακόν and plural κακά is often negligible, but it is sometimes significant, particularly when we find them both together in a single context. For example, when Achilles accepts Priam as his guest and talks to him consolingly, he says that Priam has suffered 'πολλὰ κακά' at *Il.* 24. 518 and that he expects 'κακὸν ἄλλο' at *Il.* 24. 551. Here, κακά sums up many troubles, including Hector's death, which Priam has suffered already, while κακόν refers to another trouble still to come, i.e. the fall of Troy. See also *Od.* 6. 173-5 and *Od.* 12. 208-9.

On the other hand, while Artemis sends a wild boar to Oeneus' domain as 'κακόν' (*Il.* 9. 533), which sums up the whole incident, the specific troubles caused by it are 'κακὰ πολλά' (540). Bearing such subtle but discernible differences of usage in mind, let us examine the examples of κακόν and κακά separately.

κακόν

As the worst we human beings can suffer is normally considered death, κακόν is very often used in the sense of (actual, imminent, or possible) death. The examples of κακόν used as 'death' are: the fall of Troy (*Il.* 2. 380, 13. 454; cf. alluded to at *Il.* 24. 551); of the Achaeans (death, defeat) (*Il.* 8. 541, 9. 250, 13. 89, 120, 828, 14. 80, 81, 15. 700, *Od.* 3. 152); the fall of Calydon (*Il.* 9. 599 prevented); of Hector (*Il.* 11. 363, 20. 450); of Patroclus (*Il.* 11. 604, 17. 410); of Cleitus (*Il.* 15. 450); of Euphorbus (*Il.* 17. 32); Hippothous (*Il.* 17. 292); of Aeneas (*Il.* 20. 198); of Lycaon (*Il.* 21. 39, 92); of a Priamid (in fact, Hector) (*Il.* 22. 453); of the suitors' families (*Od.* 2. 166, 24. 462); of Aegisthus (*Od.* 3. 306); of Odysseus and his companions by the Cyclops (*Od.* 9. 423); caused by Charybdis (*Od.* 12. 107, 221); caused by eating Helios' cattle (*Od.* 12. 275);

of the suitors (*Od.* 15. 178, 16. 103[23], 17. 159, 18. 154, 20. 351, 367, 23. 67).

An interesting phenomenon is that sometimes the author of κακόν is identified with κακόν (evil = death) itself as in:

κακὸν ἦλυθε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς (*Il.* 21. 39) for Lycaon, and
κακὸν ἦλυθε δῖος Ὀρέστης (*Od.* 3. 306) for Aegisthus.[24]

Its implication is highly significant in the context of Homeric psychology. The killer comes as death—this equation is made possible only when the event of killing is perceived by the victim himself. From the observers' point of view, Aegisthus' 'κακόν' is nothing 'bad' but a glorious heroic achievement by Orestes. He comes as 'κακόν' only in Aegisthus' eye and not in ours. This illustrates the point made earlier in this section—κακόν is something 'bad' only in terms of the effect on the affected party, and does not therefore carry any moral evaluation of its originator.

For Telemachus and Penelope, the κακόν they suffer at home is twofold (*Od.* 2. 45-6). One is that Odysseus is missing (possibly dead) and another is that the suitors of Penelope are wasting Odysseus' (and Telemachus') property (*Od.* 4. 697). The suitors even plot death against Telemachus, and all of these seem almost beyond endurance for Penelope (*Od.* 20. 83ff.). Indeed, the suitors themselves are κακόν, a great trouble, to Telemachus and Penelope (*Od.* 15. 375-6). But for the first half of their κακόν, Odysseus' absence, nobody knows who is responsible for it except the gods (and the omniscient poet and his audience). We know that it was the gods, more specifically Poseidon, who delayed Odysseus' return to Ithaca. However, we also know that Poseidon's intention is to take revenge on *Odysseus* and not directly on his family. Their κακόν is not specially sent to them by any god, but merely the consequence of Odysseus' κακόν, his absence from home. Suppose Penelope acted like Clytemnestra, i.e. married another man—which would not be at all impractical—, Odysseus' κακόν (particularly his death) would not have been her κακόν to such an extent as it is.[25] κακόν

[23] Odysseus in the guise of a beggar says he *would* bring κακόν to the suitors, if he *were* young. In reality, of course, he means it, and he means their death.

[24] Cf. κακόν = the wild boar at *Il.* 9. 533, κακόν = Chimaera at *Il.* 16. 328-9, ἀθάνατον κακόν = Scylla (*Od.* 12. 87).

[25] Cf. Athena's comment on 'feminine nature' at *Od.* 15. 20-3.

of man may be sent by the gods, but it becomes κακόν only when it is acknowledged by him as such. What matters is, again, only the recipient's reaction to it.

Just as much as the suitors are κακόν for Telemachus, he is becoming their κακόν (*Od.* 4. 667) himself, plotting κακόν against them (*Od.* 2. 304) in his turn. And as we have already seen, their death brought by Odysseus and Telemachus is the ultimate 'κακόν' for the suitors (though, like Orestes' revenge upon Aegisthus, κλέος for the two). There is no moral evaluation to compare κακόν of one party with another's. They are both κακόν in equal terms.

In the following examples, κακόν can be interpreted as danger or harm: punishment from Agamemnon on the Achaeans (*Il.* 2. 195); the war for all the Trojans (πᾶσι κακόν *Il.* 5. 63); somebody's 'mischief' (*Il.* 5. 374, 21. 510; done by a beast *Il.* 15. 586); a wild boar sent by Artemis (*Il.* 9. 533); punishment from Zeus on other gods because of Ares' disobedience (*Il.* 15. 134); Ajax's difficulty in battle (*Il.* 16. 111); wasps teased by children (ξυνὸν κακόν *Il.* 16. 262); Chimaera (*Il.* 16. 328-9); not intended by Iris to Priam (*Il.* 24. 172); punishment from Achilles (*Il.* 24. 436); of Priam asleep in Achilles' hut (*Il.* 24. 683); which pirates bring (*Od.* 3. 74, 9. 255); which Odysseus might meet (*Od.* 16. 173); the sanction on the suitors from the Ithacans (*Od.* 16. 381); Odysseus-beggar has not done (*Od.* 17. 567, 18. 15); punishment on Irus (*Od.* 18. 73, 107); Eurymachus threatens to bring to Odysseus (*Od.* 18. 389); punishment of Eurytion the Centaur (*Od.* 21. 304).

κακόν as sorrows and misfortune (less drastic than death and serious threat to life) are seen in the following examples: of Briseis especially over Patroclus' death (*Il.* 19. 290); heirlessness of Peleus (*Il.* 24. 538); misfortune which Odysseus wishes not to visit the Phaeacians (*Od.* 13. 46); misfortune which men do not foresee in their good days (*Od.* 18. 132); good and bad fortune (+ ἐσθλόν *Il.* 24. 530; + ἀγαθόν *Od.* 4. 237 that Zeus gives to man; *Od.* 4. 392 of Menelaus; *Od.* 8. 63 of Demodocus; *Od.* 15. 488 that Zeus gives to Eumaeus).

There are a few other unpleasant things and occasions regarded as κακόν: rude words (*Il.* 4. 362); disgrace (μέγα κακόν) that Odysseus would get if he ran away from the battle (*Il.* 11. 404); troubles caused by Zeus among the gods (*Il.* 15. 109); paying a huge dowry back in order to return one's mother to her father's home (*Od.* 2. 132).

κακά

κακά, like κακόν, is used in the sense of death, though not as often. Naturally enough, it refers to the death of a single person more rarely than κακόν. κακά is used in the sense of (plotted, intended) death in the following examples: of Bellerophontes (*Il.* 6. 157); of Telemachus (plotted by the suitors *Od.* 3. 213, 16. 134, 17. 66, 499, 596, 18. 232, 21. 375); of the suitors (plotted by Odysseus *Od.* 14. 110, 17. 465, 20. 5, 184; plotted by Telemachus *Od.* 17. 27, 491); of Agamemnon (plotted by Clytemnestra *Od.* 24. 199); of Priam (not plotted by Hermes in disguise *Il.* 24. 370); men plot against one another (*Od.* 16. 423); men and lions or wolves and sheep plot against each other (*Il.* 22. 262-4).

κακά is often destruction and many casualties (devised, intended, caused), especially in battle. Such examples are: of both the Achaeans and the Trojans (devised by Zeus *Il.* 7. 70, 478); of the Achaeans (*Il.* 2. 234, 3. 99, 8. 356, 10. 52, 12. 67, 16. 424, 22. 380); of the Trojans and their allies (by Diomedes *Il.* 5. 175, 10. 486; by Patroclus *Il.* 16. 373, 783, 18. 455; by Neoptolemus *Od.* 11. 532); of the Achaeans on their way home (by δαίμων *Od.* 3. 166); of Odysseus and his companions (by δαίμων *Od.* 12. 295); of one's enemy (*Od.* 14. 218, 17. 289); destruction of Achaean ships (*Il.* 15. 503); the sufferings and fall of Troy (*Il.* 2. 304, 4. 21, 28, 8. 458, 18. 367, 22. 61, *Od.* 3. 118).

κακά in the sense of harm (done or intended by known originators) is found in the following lines: to Calchas by Agamemnon (*Il.* 1. 105); by Paris to the Trojans (*Il.* 3. 57); by Paris to Menelaus (*Il.* 3. 351); by anybody to his host (*Il.* 3. 354); to Hera by the Trojans (*Il.* 4. 32); by the wild boar sent by Artemis (*Il.* 9. 540); to Heracles plotted by Hera (*Il.* 14. 253, 15. 27); to the Trojans by Hector (*Il.* 18. 312); to Ares plotted by Hera (*Il.* 21. 413); to Poseidon and Apollo by the Trojans (*Il.* 21. 442); to Telemachus (by Icarius, if he returns his mother) (*Od.* 2. 134); to Odysseus by Poseidon (*Od.* 5. 340); to Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus (*Od.* 8. 273); to the Cyclops by Odysseus (*Od.* 9. 316, 460); to Odysseus by Circe (*Od.* 10. 286, 317); to Odysseus and his companions by Circe (*Od.* 10. 431); to people by the Phoenicians (*Od.* 14. 289); done by one's stomach (*Od.* 17. 287, 474); to Ares by Zeus (*Od.* 18. 27); by the suitors (*Od.* 20. 314, 22. 264, 316); to Peirithous' house by Eurytion (*Od.* 21. 298).

κακά as troubles or misfortunes (with originators not directly

specified) is also found in many passages, especially referring to Odysseus' sufferings: of Odysseus (*Od.* 1. 234, 2. 174, 5. 377, 6. 175, 7. 213, 8. 137, 184, 11. 482, 13. 131, 14. 243 (false), 270, 15. 176, 16. 205, 17. 284, 439, 18. 123, 20. 53, 200, 21. 207, 400, 23. 101, 169, 287—κακῶν ὑπάλυξις); of Odysseus and his companions (*Od.* 11. 104, 111, 12. 138, 209, of Odysseus' companions (*Od.* 10. 189, 374, 12. 271, 340)[26]; that Calchas prophesies (*Il.* 1. 106, 107); of the Achaeans (at Troy *Il.* 14. 89, *Od.* 3. 113; on their way home *Od.* 3. 116); of Helen (and Troy) (*Il.* 6. 349); of Menelaus in the battle (*Il.* 17. 105); toil of wrestling (*Il.* 23. 735); of Priam (*Il.* 24. 518); woes of man in general (*Od.* 1. 33, 4. 221); diseases (ἰητῆρ κακῶν) (*Od.* 17. 384); of Penelope sent by a δαίμων (*Od.* 18. 256, 19. 129); sleep lets people forget both ἐσθλά and κακά (*Od.* 20. 85-6).

There is one example in which κακά means 'pollution'. At *Od.* 22. 481, it is said that sulphur is the 'cure of pollution (κακῶν ἄκος)'. Sulphur is used after the killing of the suitors by Odysseus. It must have had a ritual meaning in the purification of the hall where they were killed, but there is no sign of 'purifying' Odysseus himself as a murderer. Their murder disturbs Odysseus only because of the fear of vengeance. Being an avenger himself, he is not a criminal or polluted in any sense. This κακά means only physical pollution of the place and does not convey any moral conviction on murderers.

κακός applied to objects

κακόν and κακά often being 'death', it is not surprising that κακός is the most common adjective used in connection with death or fate. We find such expressions as θάνατος κακός (*Il.* 3. 173, 16. 47, 21. 66, 22. 300, *Od.* 22. 14, 24. 153), κῆρ κακή (*Il.* 16. 687), κακαὶ κῆρες (*Il.* 12. 113, *Od.* 2. 316, 23. 332), κακὸς οἶτος (*Il.* 3. 417, 8. 34, 354, 465, *Od.* 1. 350, 3. 134, 13. 384), μοῖρα κακή (*Il.* 13. 602), κακὸς μόρος (*Il.* 6. 357, 21. 133, *Od.* 1. 166, 11. 618), κακὴ αἶσα (*Il.* 1. 418, 5. 209, *Od.* 19. 259), δαίμονος αἶσα κακή (*Od.* 11. 61), κακὴ Διὸς αἶσα (*Od.* 9. 52), and κακὸν ἦμαρ (*Il.* 9. 251, 597, 20. 315, 21. 374, *Od.* 10. 269, 288, 15. 524).

Most of these expressions are simply synonymous with death.

[26] *Od.* 10. 374 κατὰ in *OCT.*

These terms which κακός modifies are, of course, themselves often synonymous with death, but the addition of κακός gives them a more powerful impact. It can be almost translated as 'deadly'. And this translation is also appropriate to the examples applied to the objects directly leading to death, such as 'deadly war' (*Il.* 1. 284, 4. 15, 82, 13. 225, 16. 494, *Od.* 22. 152, 24. 475), 'deadly strife' (*Il.* 3. 7, 11. 529, *Od.* 3. 161), κυδοιμὸς κακός (*Il.* 11. 52-3, 538-9), Διὸς μάστιξ κακή (*Il.* 13. 812), κλόνος κακός (*Il.* 16. 729-30), and κακὸς κόναβος (*Od.* 10. 122). Panic leading to defeat is φύζα κακή (*Od.* 14. 269, 17. 438). All these terms refer to struggles in battle. There are several other examples of κακός as deadly. The plague sent by Apollo to the Achaeans is νοῦσος κακή (*Il.* 1. 10) and his arrow which brings the plague is κακὸν βέλος (*Il.* 1. 382). The deadly message which Bellerophontes carries is σῆμα κακόν (*Il.* 6. 178). κακὸς δαίμων who brings Odysseus back to Aeolia (*Od.* 10. 64) is a deadly god for the suitors (*Od.* 24. 149). The monster Scylla is πέλωρ κακόν (*Od.* 12. 87) and ἀθάνατον κακόν (118). The darkness which Theoclymenos sees surrounding the suitors in the hall of Odysseus is κακὴ ἀχλύς (*Od.* 20. 357), a sign of their ensured death.

κακός also emphasises the words referring to sorrow and sufferings, such as κακὰ κήδεα (*Il.* 18. 8, *Od.* 1. 244, 6. 165, 15. 344), πῆμα κακόν (*Od.* 5. 187, 10. 300, 344), κακὸς πόνος (of battle *Il.* 17. 401), ἕλκος κακόν (*Il.* 2. 723), κακαὶ ὀδύναι (*Il.* 5. 766, *Od.* 9. 440), and κακὴ βούβρωστις (*Il.* 24. 532). Nothing is κακώτερον, i.e. nothing gives more sorrow and pain, than Patroclus' death to Achilles (*Il.* 19. 321) the report of which is κακὸν ἔπος, painful news (*Il.* 17. 701), the sea to man (*Od.* 8. 138), or wanderings to man (*Od.* 15. 343). Lamentation is also bad, i.e. sorrowful, and it gets worse (κάκιον) if given no break (*Od.* 18. 174, 19. 120).

Something ominous or leading to misfortune can be also crowned with κακός, such as κακὸν ὄναρ (*Il.* 10. 496), ὀνείρατα κακά (*Od.* 20. 87), φλέγμα κακόν (*Il.* 21. 337), κακὸν σῆμα (*Il.* 22. 30), ὄρνις κακός (*Il.* 24. 219), and δῶρα κακά (*Il.* 24. 528). Things leading to harm in general are often described as κακός. Achilles' wrath is μῆνις οὐλομένη (*Il.* 1. 1-2) and κακὸς χόλος (*Il.* 16. 206). Zeus' deception of Agamemnon by a false dream is κακὴ ἀπάτη leading to the Achaeans' difficulty (*Il.* 2. 114, 9. 21). Stormy winds are κακὴ ἀνέμοιο θυέλλα (*Il.* 6. 346, *Od.* 10. 54) and ἄνεμος κακός (*Od.* 5. 109). Strife leading to sorrow and misfortune is ἔρις κακή (*Od.* 3. 161). Poisonous herbs are κακὰ φάρμακα (*Il.* 22. 94, *Od.* 10.

213). A plan or suggestion leading to harm is κακὴ βουλή (*Od.* 10. 46, 12. 339, 14. 337), κακὰ κέρδεα (*Od.* 23. 217) or κακὸς νόος (*Od.* 13. 229). Folly that invites misfortunes is ἀτασθαλίαι κακαί (*Od.* 12. 300, 24. 458).

Special attention should be paid to the phrase 'κακὰ ἔργα' found in the following lines: *Il.* 15. 97 Zeus does to the Achaeans; *Il.* 21. 19 Achilles' attack on the Trojans; *Il.* 23. 176 Achilles' sacrifice of twelve Trojans for the dead Patroclus; *Od.* 2. 67 the gods may be offended at κακὰ ἔργα by the Ithacans; *Od.* 9. 477 the Cyclops' own deeds fall upon himself; *Od.* 14. 284 killing of a guest; 16. 380 the suitors' plan to kill Telemachus against which the Ithacans may take action; *Od.* 17. 158, 23. 64, 24. 326 of the suitors; *Od.* 17. 226, 18. 362 begging—base habits; *Od.* 20. 16 of Odysseus' maidservants sleeping with the suitors; *Od.* 8. 329 referring to adultery: 'οὐκ ἀρετᾷ κακὰ ἔργα'.

In the three Iliadic examples, κακὰ ἔργα does not mean anything more than 'harmful, destructive deeds', with no moral overtone.[27] In the *Odyssey*, on the other hand, some examples seem to carry a moral accusation, particularly for the suitors. The examples at *Od.* 2. 67, 14. 284, and 23. 64 are set in the context of the belief that the gods will punish evil deeds, here specifically the offence against ξεινίη. At *Od.* 9. 477, Odysseus reproaches the Cyclops saying that the gods have punished him. The example at *Od.* 16. 380 is in Antinous' own words, when he fears possible community sanctions on the suitors for their 'harmful deeds'. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the suitors have any sense of guilt about plotting death against Telemachus. It is more plausible that Antinous describes their plot as 'deeds harmful *to Telemachus*', 'bad, deadly' from the view-point of Telemachus alone, as in the well-attested usage of the word κακός, without moral overtone. However, the suitors are aware that what they are doing may be met by public indignation and may create a dangerous situation (τι κακόν *Od.* 16. 381) for them eventually. It is a sort of awareness of νέμεσις, but

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[27] κακὰ ἔργα in the poet's comment on Achilles' sacrifice of twelve Trojans at *Il.* 23. 176 has often been regarded as the poet's moral condemnation on the hero, e.g. G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*[4](London 1934), p. 141, but I do not see the reason for making it an exception while it makes perfect sense if we read it, like many other examples of κακός, as 'intending harm to them', without any moral condemnation. Intending harm for one's enemy is nothing to be condemned as is clear from another example at *Il.* 21. 19.

Antinous' reaction to it is not to avoid it by restraining himself, but to bury it by doing greater harm. It is far from what we can describe as a sense of guilt or shame. The examples at *Od.* 17. 226 and 18. 362, said of begging, must point to the 'lowly' social status of a beggar, and therefore have nothing to do with moral vice. The example at *Od.* 8. 329, though said as a joke, sounds like a moral teaching, implying 'If you harm others, it does not benefit you in the end.' The same idea recurs in Odysseus' message to Medon that εὐεργεσίη is far more profitable than κακοεργίη (*Od.* 22. 374).

κακός is anything unpleasant to the party affected. Therefore an unkind or rude attitude or conduct are described as κακός. Achilles' stubborn heart is κακὸς θυμός to the Achaeans (*Il.* 9. 636-7); harsh or rude words are κακὸν ἔπος (*Il.* 24. 767), κακὸς μῦθος (*Il.* 5. 650) or ἔπεα κακά (*Il.* 23. 492-3, *Od.* 24. 161; cf. εἴ τι κακὸν νῦν εἴρηται *Il.* 4. 362-3); shortage or excess of hospitality is κακόν (*Od.* 15. 72-3); Odysseus' cowherd says that to leave Odysseus' household while his son is still alive is κακόν (*Od.* 20. 218-20). These examples reflect evaluation of human conduct from specific points of view.

κακός sometimes describes objects which show inferior qualities typical of lowly people, such as base, poor, and unseemly, as counterparts of noble and wonderful, implied in ἀγαθός/ἐσθλός. It is often used of poor clothing: σπεῖρα κακά (*Od.* 4. 245 of Odysseus), κακὰ εἵματα (*Od.* 11. 191 of Laertes; 14. 506, 17. 24, 19. 72, 23. 115, 24. 156 of Odysseus), ῥάκος κακόν (*Od.* 13. 434, 14. 342), κακὰ εἱμένος (*Od.* 19. 327). Filthy smoke to make Odysseus look like a 'κακός' is κακὸς καπνός (*Od.* 13. 435). Spiders' webs which make an unused bed look miserable are κάκ' ἀράχνια (*Od.* 16. 35). As we have seen above, begging is ἔργα κακά (*Od.* 17. 226, 18. 362), not in the sense that it is an evil of the society, but that it is a job of a κακός, a miserable person.

κακός is applied to 'useless, cowardly' persons, items, and conduct as an antonym to ἀγαθός/ἐσθλός meaning 'useful, competent, valorous'. κακοὶ δόλοι (*Il.* 4. 339) are not 'bad' tricks, but cowardly tricks, characteristic of cowardly, inglorious persons. Sarpedon is taunted by his opponent saying that he has a κακὸς θυμός, cowardly heart (*Il.* 5. 643). It is κάκιον, harder (more harmful to Achilles) to help the Achaeans when their ships are set on fire, Phoenix says to Achilles, trying to persuade him to join the battle again (*Il.* 9. 601-2). It is *not* κακόν, it is profitable, to be a king (*Od.* 1. 392; not κάκιστον 391). ἀνεμώλια βάζειν is κακόν, useless (*Od.* 4. 837,

11. 464). The neighbouring island to the Cyclopes' would be 'οὐ κακή', not fruitless, if cultivated (*Od.* 9. 131). αἰδοῖος ἀλήτης is κακός, i.e. a shy beggar does not gain much (*Od.* 17. 578).

κακότης

An abstract noun formed from κακός, κακότης, is very often synonymous with the neuter noun κακόν or κακά, when it means 'sufferings', 'death', 'destruction', etc. The only meaning of κακότης which is not found in the usage of κακόν and κακά is 'cowardice'. This aspect of κακός is, however, well represented in the usage of κακός describing persons, as we have seen.

κακότης means or implies death in the following passages: *Od.* 5. 414 of the possible death of Odysseus; *Od.* 9. 489, 10. 129 death to be avoided by Odysseus and his companions; *Od.* 3. 175 death to be avoided by Nestor and his crew; *Od.* 16. 364 death escaped by Telemachus; *Od.* 17. 364 destined death of the suitors; *Od.* 23. 238 death avoided by safe landing. Casualties caused by Diomedes (*Il.* 11. 382), which is his glory from the Achaeans' point of view, are described as κακότης by Paris. On the other hand, casualties to be caused by Glaucus and Sarpedon are κακότης for the Achaeans (*Il.* 12. 332). Damage done to Menelaus by Paris (*Il.* 3. 366) is also κακότης. Any damage, whether or not it is a glorious thing in somebody's eye, is κακότης for the affected party.

κακότης means troubles and sufferings in the following examples: of Odysseus (*Od.* 5. 290, 379, 8. 182, 13. 321, 17. 517); of Telemachus at home (*Od.* 4. 167); disease (*Od.* 5. 397); of Argos the dog (*Od.* 17. 318); κακότης makes a man older than his age (*Od.* 19. 360); Zeus throws men into κακότης (*Od.* 20. 203); Zeus gave Agamemnon and Menelaus κακότης at their birth (*Il.* 10. 71).

κακότης means 'cowardice, weakness' in the following examples: possible cowardice of the Achaeans (*Il.* 2. 368); of the Achaean leaders who have held their host back (*Il.* 13. 108); of the Trojan elders who have held their host back (*Il.* 15. 721); of the Ithacans who failed to check the suitors (*Od.* 24. 455). In contrast with the highest virtue of heroic courage, it is treated as the worst moral defect for Homeric man.

κακῶς

κακῶς reflects almost all the spectrum of the meaning of κακός. It is generally translatable as 'badly' in various senses, such as rudely,

unkindly (*Il.* 1. 25, 379, *Od.* 17. 394, 23. 56), hatefully, i.e. intending great harm (*Il.* 5. 164 Diomedes kills two sons of Priam; *Od.* 18. 168 the suitors intend harm to Telemachus; so Achilles intends κακὰ ἔργα at *Il.* 23. 176), terribly or exceedingly (implying unpleasant excess) (*Od.* 2. 203 Telemachus' property being devoured terribly; *Od.* 2. 266, 4. 766 the suitors are terribly overbearing; Odysseus suffers terribly *Od.* 16. 275); painfully, wretchedly (*Il.* 5. 698 Sarpedon gasps out his breath, 9. 324 life goes for a parent bird; *Od.* 18. 75 Irus terribly frightened), disadvantageously (*Il.* 9. 551 the war goes for the Curetes); unluckily (*Od.* 22. 27); miserably and shamefully (*Il.* 21. 459-60 May the Trojans perish in misery!; *Od.* 9. 534, 11. 114, 12. 141 May Odysseus go home in misery!; *Od.* 24. 250 Laertes miserably clothed), shamefully and empty-handed (*Il.* 2. 253 the Achaeans could leave Troy ingloriously).

κακόω

κακόω means 'I put (someone) in the state of being κακός.' Hence, it means 'bring into trouble', 'maltreat', 'disfigure', and so on. The Pylians are oppressed (κεκακωμένοι) by the Epeians (*Il.* 11. 689). Heracles once brought troubles (ἐκάκωσε) to the Pylians (*Il.* 11. 690). The gods have brought troubles (ἐκακώσατε) to Odysseus (*Od.* 20. 99). Laertes is distressed by his misfortune (κακοῦ κεκακωμένον *Od.* 4. 754). Odysseus has been disfigured (κεκακωμένος) by brine (*Od.* 6. 137). The gods can disfigure a man at their will (κακῶσαι v.s. κυδῆναι *Od.* 16. 212).

Conclusion

Who is the 'good' man in the Homeric society?

We have gone through all examples of ἀγαθός, ἐσθλός, κακός and their major derivatives in order to see the whole range of meanings which these words cover, and also to see the proportion of the usage of the terms in different shades of meaning. The overwhelming majority of the examples point to the observation that ἀρετή of Homeric man consists of his physical strength, i.e. excellence in battle. This ἀρετή is closely connected with his noble birth and wealth, which alone can afford him expensive and effective weapons and armour.

The class of people called ἀγαθοί/ἐσθλοί/ἄριστοι with such ἀρετή are, indeed, good, useful people for the community, because they

will defend their territory against the aggression of other communities and, whenever opportunity arises, they can plunder other communities and so increase the property of their own. In this context, a man useful in battle is a good man, a man like Achilles and Ajax, for example, who fights fiercely and ruthlessly in battle, with his tremendous might and courage. He may be short-tempered or blunt in speech, but as far as he is 'useful', he is 'excellent'.

However, in time of peace, the most useful thing for the community is its harmony which, as we saw in Chapter 5, is maintained by θέμις and δίκη administered by ἀγαθοί in the capacity of βασιλῆες. Although a man of noble birth and wealth will not lose his title ἀγαθός by murdering someone in the community, or by violating other social codes such as ξεινίη (as the suitors of Penelope do), he is perceived by the community as not behaving in a suitable way for an ἀγαθός. From our small collection of sporadic examples of ἀγαθός and related terms referring to good and bad behaviour in peaceful contexts, we can reconstruct what kind of manner is appropriate to an ἀγαθός in time of peace. He is expected to entertain his visitors generously, to talk politely, to care for his wife, and to have an understanding, placable mind.

This corresponds to the image of the 'good' man depicted in previous chapters. The problem in discussing Homeric morality, however, is that this type of moral virtue does not have a name of its own. All of these chivalrous attributes are only an auxiliary part of heroic ἀρετή, and when the word ἀρετή (ἀγαθός etc.) is used, it always evokes as its primary meaning the warrior's virtue, prowess and aggressiveness. Heroes' characters are therefore inevitably double-sided. They talk nicely, respect ladies and foreign visitors, behaving in every respect like modern 'gentlemen' in their court life. In time of war, however, they have a tough spirit: shouting in dirty words, raping women, slaughtering enemies supplicating at their knees, and even killing young children. All of these are part of one concept, ἀρετή of the warrior class.

As far as the line between his friends and his enemies is clear, and as far as he recognises you as a friend, an ἀγαθός is indeed 'good' to you, namely, useful, helpful, and pleasant to deal with. In this sense, the use of the word ἀγαθός for persons is not different from that for objects, where it generally denotes the goodness as observed by the affected party. However, once you are registered as his enemy, he will become a source of your κακόν. Friends can change

into enemies ever so suddenly, once the situation concerning τιμή between them goes wrong. An ἀγαθός, however, will remain an ἀγαθός even though he is your enemy, in so far as it is his class title. As a result, the word has nothing to do with what he does or how he affects you. Therefore ἀγαθός cannot function as a term of moral commendation valid in a peaceful context. To be reasonable to one's friends is part of being ἀγαθός, but the word is used in that sense extremely rarely. When the poet especially wants to commend good aristocratic manners, he must resort to expressions such as πεπνυμένος (*Od.* 4. 204, 18. 125 etc.), ἐπητής (*Od.* 13. 332, 18. 128) or ἀμύμων (esp. *Od.* 19. 109, 332)[28] or a whole passage to specify the sort of ἀρετή he means. As we saw in previous chapters, there is no doubt that polite manners, thoughtfulness, etc. have a high profile in Homeric morality, but Homeric man does not have an exact word for it.

Who is the 'bad' man in the Homeric society?

κακός and its related terms are even less useful as moral terms than ἀγαθός and its related terms. κακοί are very often simply 'not ἀγαθοί', denoting either 'everybody except the ruling class' or 'cowardly men (not behaving like brave warriors)'. The latter of course contains a moral reproach, but not in the sense that the persons labelled as κακοί are criminals. Another category of κακοί are those who possess κακόν/κακά, namely miserable, unfortunate. They are to be pitied, not to be condemned. The fourth category of κακοί are those who bring κακόν/κακά to somebody else. They are harmful, and cause pains to the party affected who would indeed criticise them for being 'bad'. However, a κακός is not a criminal, for there is no law to criminalise those who harm others. He is simply described, either by the poet or by the affected character, as harmful (κακός) to him/her/me etc. There is no objective moral observer (such as the Christian God) to judge the harm done to this particular person as good or bad. Even the poet does not take up this role when he simply says 'A did κακά to B'. It is up to us, either to sympathise with A, and say that B is justly punished, or to sympathise with B, and say that A has unjustly harmed B.[29]

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[28] But see Αἴγισθος ἀμύμων said without any commendation on his 'quiet virtue'. Cf. A. A. Parry, *Blameless Aegisthus* (Leiden 1973).

[29] Cf. Griffin's comment on the phrase 'ἡ θέμις ἐστίν' in *JHS* 106 (1986), 38-9:

Similarly, when something other than a person is ἀγαθός, it is good only in the eye of the affected party (such as users or recipients of the object), and if it is bad, it is bad, again, only in the eye of the affected party.

The only constant logic we see throughout the usage of the words related to ἀγαθός and κακός, whether applied to men or items, is that anything useful, profitable for the affected party is 'good', and anything which is not useful, or which is positively harmful, for the affected party is 'bad'. The most significant implication of this nature of Homeric good and bad is that one and the same person or thing can be described as 'good' and 'bad' at the same time, depending on the perspective of the speaker. ἀγαθοί are categorically 'good' for the community, and therefore always retain the title, but when they are cowardly in actual battle, they could be called κακοί. Telemachus is κακόν for the suitors, but by doing κακόν to them, he wins κλέος ἐσθλόν and becomes a grown-up ἐσθλός. The Greek terms ἀγαθός and κακός can be translated as good and bad, respectively, only in reference to a specific point of view.

Beside this relativity, there is another factor which makes the use of the terms amoral. One gets born into either one category or another, according to one's lot, and if one possesses an exceptional ἀρετή, either in physical strength or in certain skills, it is considered to be a gift of the gods. And the gods dispense ἀρετή to men in their own way, guided by their favouritism and nepotism, certainly not because of men's observance of δίκη and θέμις. Possession of ἀρετή is not the proof of one's moral quality. It could be, partially, a sign of piety, for the gods do value offerings, but piety does not help the Phaeacians when Poseidon decides to take their ἀρετή away. The gods grant ἀρετή—competence, but whether ἀγαθοί behave in a suitably aristocratic manner or not does not seem to concern them.

The most outstanding characteristic of ἀρετή is that it is double sided, being the ability to be good to friends on the one hand and bad to enemies on the other. Therefore ἀγαθός or κακός means different things for different people and in different contexts. Homer does not judge who is the good man and who is the bad man, but he offers us a comprehensive view of the human world, where the glory of one party often means suffering for another.

'the poet never commits himself to expressing, from his own mouth, the idea that something is correct, in line with timeless usage'; 'The narrator depicts events in a way which leaves the understanding of their moral significance to the audience.'

CHAPTER ELEVEN

SEEMLY AND UNSEEMLY

ἀγαθός and κακός mean 'good' and 'bad' respectively for the party affected. There is another pair of words, καλός and αἰσχρός, to describe 'good' and 'bad' situations. The point of reference of these words, however, is not the effect of the object so described, but its appearance, namely, whether it *looks* good or bad. These words presuppose the speaker's aesthetic judgement, and could be used to commend or to criticise certain behaviour. In this chapter, we will examine the use of καλός and αἰσχρός and their derivatives in detail in order to see what is considered seemly or unseemly in the Homeric world.

καλός

The primary sense of καλός is 'beautiful', i.e. looking good.[1] It is undoubtedly a reflection of the speaker's aesthetic judgement. The majority of examples of καλός point to external beauty of persons, animals or material objects.

The noun κάλλος is most often used to denote beauty of persons. It can be either masculine or feminine beauty.[2] It is used twice for material objects, once for a luxurious mixing-bowl (*Il.* 23. 742) and once for a sort of divine cosmetics to maintain or recover beauty (κάλλος ἀμβρόσιον *Od.* 18. 192-3). There is no mention of the 'beauty' of abstract ideas or of conduct.

The adjective καλός is used to describe masculine and feminine beauty, and the pleasing appearance of animals, especially flocks of sheep and cattle seen as part of property.[3] It is sometimes applied

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[1] For a more concise classification of the use of the word, cf. *LfrgE*, καλός.

[2] Masculine beauty: *Il.* 3. 392, 6. 156, 20. 235, *Od.* 6. 237, 15. 251, 18. 219, 23. 156; feminine beauty: *Il.* 9. 130, 272, 389, 13. 432, 23. 742, *Od.* 6. 18, 8. 457, 11. 282.

[3] Masculine beauty: *Il.* 3. 169, 21. 108, *Od.* 1. 301, 3. 199, 6. 276, 8. 310, 9. 513; καλλίων *Od.* 10. 396; κάλλιστος *Il.* 2. 673, 20. 233, *Od.* 11. 310, 522; feminine beauty: *Il.* 8. 305, 9. 556, 707—Eos, 16. 175, 180, 18. 383—Charis, 22. 155, *Od.* 3. 464, 4. 404, 6. 108, 8. 320, 11. 271, 13. 289—Athena, 15. 418,

to beauty of specific parts of a human body, such as skin, faces, cheeks, eyes, ankles, thighs, and tresses.[4]

More than two hundred examples are applied to various material objects, such as water, streams, washing-pits, trees, groves, glens, fair winds, stars, clouds, harbours, temples, offerings, islands, cities, city walls, battlements, estates, tilled lands, vineyards, houses, doors, enclosures, courtyards, dancing floors, niches, tables, chairs, chests, keys, bread baskets, cups, pitchers, caldrons, mixing-bowls, clothes, tunics, mantles, girdles, sandals, veils, blankets, garlands, wands, chariots, wagons, yokes, breast straps, armour, shields, helmets, greaves, swords, battle axes, bows, ships, balls, wool, lyres, gifts and treasure.[5]

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16. 158—Athena; κάλλιστος *Il.* 9. 140, 282; flocks of sheep: *Il.* 18. 528, *Od.* 11. 402, 12. 129, 24. 112; rams: *Od.* 9. 426; cattle *Od.* 12. 262, 355; Argos the dog *Od.* 17. 307.

[4] Skin: *Il.* 5. 354, 858, 11. 352, 14. 175, 21. 398, 22. 321, 23. 805, *Od.* 2. 376, 4. 749, 13. 398, 430, 19. 263, 24. 44; faces: *Il.* 19. 285, *Od.* 8. 85, 15. 332, 18. 192; cheeks: *Od.* 19. 208; eyes: *Il.* 23. 66, *Od.* 1. 208, 16. 15, 17. 39, 19. 417; ankles: *Il.* 4. 147; thighs: *Od.* 18. 68; tresses: *Il.* 14. 177.

[5] Water: *Od.* 6. 87; streams: *Il.* 16. 229, 21. 238, 244, 352, 354, 361, 365, 382, *Od.* 11. 240; washing-pits: *Il.* 22. 154; trees: a plane tree *Il.* 2. 307; a shoot *Il.* 17. 55; groves:*Il.* 20. 8; glens: *Il.* 18. 588; fair winds: *Od.* 14. 253, 299; stars: *Il.* 6. 401; clouds: *Il.* 14. 351; harbours: *Od.* 6. 263; temples: Poseideion *Od.* 6. 266; offerings: ἱερά *Il.* 11. 727, 23. 195, 209, *Od.* 4. 473, 7. 191, 11. 130, 23. 277; ἱερήϊα *Od.* 17. 600; islands: Crete *Od.* 19. 173; cities: *Il.* 18. 491; Aipeia *Il.* 9. 152, 294; city walls: *Il.* 21. 447; battlements: *Il.* 22. 3; estates: *Il.* 6. 195, 12. 314, 20. 185; tilled lands: ἔργα *Il.* 5. 92; ἀγρόν *Od.* 24. 205-6; vineyards: *Il.* 18. 562; houses: *Il.* 6. 314, 11. 77, *Od.* 3. 387, 8. 41, 10. 13, 252, 15. 454, 16. 109, 17. 264, 19. 580, 20. 122, 319, 21. 78, 22. 495, 24. 361; doors: *Od.* 21. 49, 22. 137; enclosures: *Od.* 20. 164; courtyards: *Od.* 14. 7; dancing floors: *Od.* 8. 260, 12. 318; niches: *Od.* 19. 37, 20. 354; tables: *Il.* 11. 629, *Od.* 8. 69; chairs: *Il.* 14. 238, 18. 390, *Od.* 1. 131, 10. 315, 367; chests: a chest *Il.* 16. 222; lids of chests *Il.* 24. 228; keys: *Od.* 21. 7; bread baskets: *Il.* 9. 217, 24. 626, *Od.* 20. 255; cups: ἄλεισον *Il.* 24. 429, *Od.* 4. 591, 22. 9; δέπας *Il.* 24. 101, *Od.* 3. 63; pitchers: *Od.* 1. 137, 4. 53, 7. 173, 10. 369, 15. 136, 17. 92; caldrons: *Il.* 23. 268; mixing-bowls: *Od.* 21. 145; clothes: *Od.* 6. 27, 111, 7. 235, 13. 218, 14. 154, 15. 369, 16. 79, 210, 17. 550, 21. 339; tunics: *Il.* 2. 43, *Od.* 8. 441; mantles: *Il.* 24. [231—φάρεα καλά with a variant reading φάρεα λευκά, cf. *OCT* ad loc.], 588, *Od.* 3. 467, 8. 455, 10. 365, 19. 242, 23. 155, 24. 277, 367; girdles: *Od.* 5. 232, 10. 545; sandals: *Il.* 2. 44, 10. 22, 132, 14. 186, 24. 340, *Od.* 1. 96, 2. 4, 4. 309, 5. 44, 15. 550, 17. 2, 20. 126; veils: *Il.* 14. 185; blankets: *Il.* 24. 644, *Od.* 3. 351, 4. 297, 7. 336, 10. 352; garlands: *Il.* 18. 597; wands: *Od.* 24. 3; chariots: *Il.* 5. 194, 23. 533; wagons: *Il.* 24. 267, *Od.* 6. 252; yokes: *Il.* 5. 730; breast straps: *Il.* 5. 731, 19. 393; armour: τεύχεα *Il.* 3. 89, 328, 5. 621, 7. 103, 11. 110, 247, 798, 13. 241, 510, 17. 91, 130, 760, 18. 84, 137, 466, 19. 11, 21. 301, 317, 22. 323, *Od.* 22. 114, 162, 23. 366; ἔντεα *Il.* 10. 34, 472, 11. 755, 17. 162, 187, 18. 130, 191, *Od.* 19. 18; shields: *Il.* 11. 33, 12. 295, 19. 380, 22. 314; helmets: *Il.* 18. 612, *Od.* 22. 183; the plume of a helmet *Il.* 22. 315;

In many of these examples, καλός reinforces the grandeur of heroic life, but in some, it describes the beauty of nature or usefulness of tools. Persons, animals and material objects described as 'καλός' are, all in all, pleasant figures or objects to look at, and at the same time expected to function well. In other words, good appearance is generally taken as a hallmark of good quality. Paris, however, is καλός in form (*Il.* 3. 44-5) and therefore, says Hector, could be taken for the best warrior (ἀριστεύς 44) of the Trojans by the enemies, while this is in fact questionable. Similarly, a good form of a dog is not always a guarantee of its competence in hunting (*Od.* 17. 309-10). καλός denotes primarily agreeable appearance, and the indication of quality only to a limited extent.

καλός refers not only to objects pleasant to the eyes, but also to the ears. Divine singing voices are invariably beautiful (*Il.* 1. 604, *Od.* 5. 61, 10. 221, 24. 60) and it is καλόν, agreeable, to listen to the song of a bard of god-like voice (*Od.* 1. 370-1, 9. 3-4). However, there is no example of καλός applied to pleasant taste, smell or touch. Therefore we can conclude from this that the Homeric sense of beauty, like its English equivalent, works dominantly in the realm of sight, and at times in that of hearing, but not normally elsewhere.

The visuality of the sense of καλός is inherent in the sense of honour as well. The ghost of Odysseus' mother reports to her son how Telemachus holds his καλὸν γέρας (*Od.* 11. 184), retaining his estate (185), and being invited to banquets which (186):

ἐπέοικε δικασπόλον ἄνδρ' ἀλεγύνειν.

The attendance at banquets is conceived as something 'seemly', or a proper situation to 'look at' (ἐπί + ϝέϝοικα). The sense of shame is also dominated by καλός by sight. When imploring Hector not to face Achilles alone, Priam recounts the misery that an old man like himself will face at his death, in contrast with a young man's death (*Il.* 22. 71-6):

νέῳ δέ τε πάντ' *ἐπέοικεν*
ἀρηϊκταμένῳ, δεδαϊγμένῳ ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ,
κεῖσθαι· πάντα δὲ *καλὰ* θανόντι περ, ὅττι φανήῃ·

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greaves: *Il.* 3. 331, 11. 18, 16. 132, 18. 459, 19. 370; swords: *Il.* 15. 713, 23. 808; battle axes: *Il.* 13. 611; bows: *Od.* 21. 117; a bow's curved end *Od.* 21. 138, 165; ships: *Il.* 15. 705; balls: *Od.* 8. 372; wool: *Il.* 3. 388; lyres: *Il.* 9. 187; gifts: *Il.* 6. 218, 18. 408, *Od.* 1. 312, 318, 15. 76, 18. 301; treasure: *Il.* 18. 290, *Od.* 10. 40.

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ πολιόν τε κάρη πολιόν τε γένειον
αἰδῶ τ' *αἰσχύνωσι* κύνες κταμένοιο γέροντος,
τοῦτο δὴ οἴκτιστον πέλεται δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν.

Even dead, everything is seemly for a young warrior, but an old man's dead body is most terrible to look at when being disfigured—made αἰσχρός—by beasts. There is no consideration of the circumstances in which a man dies. All that matters is the appearance of the body.

On the other hand, to retain one's dignity is certainly part of aristocratic duty. A princess and her family are supposed to be dressed in beautiful (καλά) clothes (*Od.* 6. 27), not unseemly (ἀκηδέα) ones (26), at her wedding. For a king like Odysseus, it is an object of νέμεσις (*Od.* 22. 489) to be dressed in rags, once he has revealed his true identity. καλός in social contexts is very close in meaning to English 'seemly', as 'acceptable' or 'commendable' in the eye of the public. It is set in a perspective involving values of the community which is often different from that of an individual who judges human conduct in terms of ἀγαθόν and κακόν on the ground of his own interests.

For example, death in general terms is κακόν for Hector as for any other man, but if he is to die in an honourable combat, his death is καλόν in the public eye. As he himself says, using the word 'ἀεικής', a synonym of αἰσχρός, it is not 'unseemly' to die in defence of one's country (*Il.* 15. 496-7):

οὔ οἱ ἀεικὲς ἀμυνομένῳ περὶ πάτρης
τεθνάμεν.

It may be ἄμεινον (*Od.* 2. 141) for the suitors to continue consuming Odysseus' property, but it is not καλόν (οὐ . . . καλῶς *Od.* 2. 63), not seemly, in terms of social codes.

As we see in these examples, καλόν as a neuter adjective is sometimes used to describe seemly or unseemly behaviour. In the Theomachy, Poseidon urges Apollo to begin their combat, for it is not καλόν for an elder person, who knows things better, to start aggression (*Il.* 21. 439-40). On the contrary, Menelaus is much offended when challenged by Panthous, who is much younger and less experienced than him, and says that it is not seemly (καλόν) for one to exult insolently (*Il.* 17. 19) to the extent that even a leopard, a lion or a wild boar would not (20-1). Menelaus apparently finds the young man's speech lacking aristocratic grace. It is his 'aes-

thetic' comment, his opinion on what is socially proper or improper. Similarly, when a young Phaeacian called Euryalus taunts Odysseus for being reluctant to join the games, Odysseus angrily replies (*Od.* 8. 166):

ξεῖν', οὐ καλὸν ἔειπες· ἀτασθάλῳ ἀνδρὶ ἔοικας.

The way the young man talks is not seemly—not considered proper in the social convention, namely, θέμις, and by speaking in that manner, he *looks* like a wanton man.

In an example we saw in our discussion of ἐσθλός, Antinous, who has complained about Eumaeus' introduction of a beggar into Odysseus' house, is criticised by Eumaeus for not speaking properly (*Od.* 17. 381):

οὐ μὲν καλὰ καὶ ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἀγορεύεις.

We can probably paraphrase this line with its social implications as follows: 'I admit that your social status is high (compared with mine), but I dare say that what you have said is not socially acceptable and not suitable for a man of your status.' Certainly the phrase 'ἐσθλὸς ἐών' does not imply that an ἐσθλός qua ἐσθλός has a right to speak insolently, but quite the reverse.[6] There is an invisible higher authority which we may call θέμις or δίκη, in more familiar terms 'customs' or 'good manners', behind Eumaeus' statement. It is evident from this passage that ἀγαθός/ἐσθλός is not a moral term, but καλός is.

The connection between θέμις/δίκη and καλός can be seen in other examples in which καλός is used for behaviour of characters. Antinous requests Penelope to receive presents from the suitors saying it is not καλόν to refuse them (*Od.* 18. 287). This reflects the custom of present-giving as part of courting, just mentioned by Penelope as 'δίκη' of the suitors (275-9). What Antinous means by saying it is 'not καλόν' is that it is 'not in accordance with δίκη/θέμις', echoing Penelope's earlier statement. Namely, since it is δίκη for the suitors to give presents to the courted lady, it is also δίκη for Penelope to receive them, and if she does not, it is not socially proper.

ξεινίη, another category of δίκη/θέμις, also comes into the defini-

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[6] For the ἀγαθός equivalent, 'ἀγαθός περ ἐών', see A. A. Long, 'Morals and Values in Homer' in *JHS* 90 (1970), 121-39, 127-8.

tion of 'propriety'. Ctesippus (though with a malicious intention) and Penelope say that it is neither καλόν nor δίκαιον to disappoint a visitor to Telemachus' house (*Od.* 20. 294-5, 21. 312-3). καλός and δίκαιος are used synonymously in this sentence. In other words, deeds in accordance with δίκη are 'seemly', καλός.

Another example involves a manner at a public assembly. After Achilles has spoken, renouncing his wrath at Agamemnon, Agamemnon stands up where he has been sitting (or still remains seated) and says (*Il.* 19. 79-80):

ἑσταότος μὲν καλὸν ἀκούειν, οὐδὲ ἔοικεν
ὑββάλλειν.

The rest of line 80 has been an object of dispute which obscures the meaning of this sentence, but we can be sure at least that he is talking about a certain aspect of manners at a public assembly, to speak and to listen in an orderly fashion.[7] Again, καλόν is contrasted with ἔοικεν, both connected with sight.

Achilles talks about another δίκη, the way friends should behave to one another, when complaining that Phoenix among the Embassy speaks for Agamemnon and not for Achilles. He says (*Il.* 9. 615):

καλόν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὸν κήδειν ὅς κ' ἐμὲ κήδῃ.

The idea is that it is not seemly to betray one's friend and work for his enemy.

Telemachus' long absence from home is not καλός (*Od.* 15. 10), but an object of νέμεσις, because it amounts to negligence in his duty to defend his home and family.

Further examples of καλός denoting 'seemly' are found in the use of καλόν as an adverb and καλῶς. καλόν as an adverb, of course, primarily means 'beautifully', and is in fact used most often in this sense in the expression 'sing beautifully' (*Il.* 1. 473, 18. 570, *Od.* 1. 155, 8. 266, 10. 227, 19. 519, 21. 411). It indicates completeness or accuracy in the example at *Il.* 24. 388 where Priam says that the stranger has recounted Hector's fate accurately (καλά). These examples focus on the agreeable and desirable effect of things that are done 'beautifully', rather than 'righteously'.

The rest of the examples convey moral evaluations. For warriors,

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[7] For the dispute over the meaning of the whole passage, see W. Leaf on ll. 76-80.

it is not seemly to desist from the struggle of battle (*Il.* 13. 116). It is not seemly, therefore, for Paris to have retired from battle in resentment at the other Trojans (*Il.* 6. 326). On the other hand, it is not seemly for Zeus to fight with his wife and daughter (*Il.* 8. 400). These are matters of νέμεσις.

When Antinous grudges a morsel of food for a beggar, and tells the other suitors not to be so generous, Telemachus reproaches him, beginning with sarcastic words of gratitude (*Od.* 17. 397):

> 'Αντίνο', ἦ μευ καλὰ πατὴρ ὣς κήδεαι υἷος,

which reminds us of his words to Athena-Mentes at *Od.* 1. 307-8:

> ξεῖν', ἦ τοι μὲν ταῦτα φίλα φρονέων ἀγορεύεις,
> ὥς τε πατὴρ ᾧ παιδί, καὶ οὔ ποτε λήσομαι αὐτῶν.

The superficial meaning of this sentence is that what Antinous has said is agreeable to Telemachus, but what he in fact means is that 'What you have said is not καλόν.' Antinous is criticised again later by his fellow-suitors for maltreating the beggar-Odysseus (*Od.* 17. 483-4):

> 'Αντίνο', οὐ μὲν κάλ' ἔβαλες δύστηνον ἀλήτην,
> οὐλόμεν', εἰ δή πού τις ἐπουράνιος θεός ἐστι.

The idea of καλά here is connected with θέμις that commands us to protect foreigners on the one hand, and is in contrast with οὐλόμεν(ε),[8] connected with possible divine anger, on the other. It is an act condemned by both human and divine societies, according to the speaker.

The only example of καλῶς is also used in the context of the convention of ξεινίη. Telemachus complains that his house is being consumed 'not in a seemly way' (οὐ καλῶς *Od.* 2. 63), i.e. not in accordance with θέμις and δίκη, which, in Telemachus' opinion, ought to cause νέμεσις and αἰδώς within the community (64-5).

The superlative κάλλιστος is used only for the most beautiful men, women, animals and material objects. The comparative of καλός, καλλίων, on the other hand, is very often used in reference to morally becoming situations. It means literally 'more beautiful'

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[8] I follow Ameis-Hentze's reading of οὐλόμεν' here. It is interesting to see that in the Italian edition by J. Russo, *Omero: Odissea*: Volume V (Libri XVII-XX), ad loc., the editor takes it as neuter plural while the translator, G. A. Privitera, translates the word as vocative.

only at *Od.* 10. 396 (of masculine beauty) and at *Od.* 18. 255 = 19. 128 where Penelope says that Odysseus' return would have made her situation far more praiseworthy. κάλλιον means 'more seemly, more pleasant in the eye of the observer' at *Od.* 6. 39 (riding on a wagon is more suitable than walking for a princess) and at *Od.* 17. 583 (it is more seemly for Penelope to talk to the beggar in the absence of the suitors.).

Some other examples of καλόν point to θέμις concerning ξεινίη. After dinner, Nestor thinks it is a more appropriate (κάλλιον) time—than before the meal, presumably—to ask his visitors their names (*Od.* 3. 69). Similarly Alcinous advises Odysseus after dinner and entertainment that it is 'better' (κάλλιον), more in conformity with θέμις, to reveal his identity and homeland, for, after all, he has to tell his escorts where his home is (*Od.* 8. 549). It is more seemly, more appropriate for the guest to sleep in the host's house than on his ship (*Od.* 3. 358). It is not κάλλιον nor does it ἔοικε that a suppliant remains sitting in the ash of the hearth (*Od.* 7. 159). It is much more appropriate that both guests and hosts enjoy the banquet and entertainment than that only one party does (*Od.* 8. 542-3). These are particularly good examples to show that things connected with good manners and customs are described as καλός.

A single Iliadic example of κάλλιον is used in Apollo's criticism of Achilles' maltreatment of Hector's body (*Il.* 24. 52):[9]

οὐ μήν οἱ τό γε κάλλιον οὐδέ τ' ἄμεινον.

This juxtaposition of κάλλιον and ἄμεινον is instructive of the difference between καλός and ἀγαθός. He means that it is neither *seemly* nor *profitable/honourable* for Achilles to maltreat the lifeless body of Hector. Besides, this act could incur νέμεσις among the gods (53), as νέμεσις is often directed to conduct which is 'not καλόν'. ἀγαθός is connected with the value of ἀρετή and presence of τιμή, while καλός is connected with the value of δίκη/θέμις and absence of νέμεσις.

αἰσχρός

καλός and αἰσχρός can be regarded as antonyms, but in a similar way to that in which graceful and disgraceful can be considered

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[9] Cf. Long, *JHS* 90 (1970), 127-8.

antonyms. While the former of both pairs is mainly concerned with visual beauty, often beauty of material objects, the latter is almost exclusively concerned with human behaviour.[10]

αἰσχρός and its cognate words are never applied to material objects. Its superlative αἴσχιστος is applied to a physically 'ugly' man, namely Thersites, at *Il.* 2. 216, but even then, it is preceded by a description of his disorderly manners which make his words ἄκοσμα (213) and make him quarrel with kings 'οὐ κατὰ κόσμον' (214). He is not only ugly, but also unseemly in behaviour.

The word αἰσχρός is most often applied to cowardice and negligence in war. Agamemnon says that it is αἰσχρόν for the Achaean army not to have captured Troy after fighting against a population so outnumbered for as long as nine years (*Il.* 2. 119). It is disgraceful, because it will be seen as the result of the incompetence and negligence of the Achaeans. Odysseus expresses a similar view at *Il.* 2. 298, that it is αἰσχρόν to go home without capturing Troy after so many years of war. He criticises Agamemnon again later when the king has completely lost his confidence and seriously suggests evacuation of the ships, saying that he is only worthy of the generalship of an 'ἀεικέλιον στρατόν', an unseemly, inglorious army (*Il.* 14. 84). Although the situation is less serious, Poseidon echoes the same concern when speaking to Apollo in their encounter (*Il.* 21. 436-8):

Φοῖβε, τίη δὴ νῶϊ διέσταμεν; οὐδὲ ἔοικεν
ἀρξάντων ἑτέρων· τὸ μὲν αἴσχιον, αἴ κ' ἀμαχητὶ
ἴομεν Οὔλυμπόνδε Διὸς ποτὶ χαλκοβατὲς δῶ.

It is not seemly (οὐ ἔοικεν) to stand apart from one another like cowards, and it is even more unseemly to go home without fighting at all. It is not so shameful to fight and to be defeated, but to be a coward and useless fighter, κακός, is αἰσχρόν. Therefore Hector reproaches Paris, as often as three times with αἰσχρὰ ἔπεα, i.e. words which pour shame on others, when he spots his brother running away or staying away from battle (*Il.* 3. 38, 6. 325, 13. 768).

The adverb αἰσχρῶς is twice used to describe a person rebuking somebody else with unseemly words. One example is at *Il.* 23. 473 where Ajax rebukes Idomeneus starting a quarrel between them which is to be settled by Achilles who says it is not seemly, 'οὐ . . .

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[10] Cf. *LfrgE*, αἰσχρός.

ἔοικε' for them to exchange bad (κακός) words (492-3). αἰσχρῶς here refers to the manner of Ajax's speech as an object of νέμεσις. The same is true of another example at *Od.* 18. 321 where Melantho rebukes the beggar-Odysseus with harsh words, urging him to go away. This is countered by Odysseus' verdict 'κύον', i.e. 'shameless bitch!' (338). αἰσχρῶς clearly describes a manner considered improper, an object at which αἰδώς should be felt by the individual and νέμεσις should be felt by society.

The noun αἶσχος denotes objects or manifestation of νέμεσις, public indignation. Helen notices the absence of her brothers, the Dioscouroi, among the Achaeans and wonders if they did not come fearing αἴσχεα and ὀνείδεα they might get because of her, their sister, whose elopement was the cause of all the troubles (*Il.* 3. 242),[11] and is referred to as ἔργον ἀεικές (*Od.* 23. 222), an unseemly deed.

Paris also receives many αἴσχεα from the Trojans (*Il.* 6. 524-5) which distresses Hector, but Paris himself does not seem to care. Both Hector and Helen are annoyed by his indifference to his own responsibility, and Helen wishes she had married a better man than Paris who (*Il.* 6. 351):

ᾔδη νέμεσίν τε καὶ αἴσχεα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων.

The close connection between νέμεσις as public indignation, and αἴσχεα as its expression, is very clear in this line. In these examples, αἴσχεα denotes the expressions of νέμεσις which imposes disgrace upon their recipients.

αἶσχος is applied also to objects of νέμεσις. Menelaus rebukes the Trojans (more specifically Paris), calling them 'κακαὶ κύνες', i.e. 'shameless creatures' and saying that they have no shortage of λώβη nor αἶσχος by which they have done outrage (λωβήσασθε) to him (*Il.* 13. 622-3). Clytemnestra's murder of her husband Agamemnon, says the ghost of Agamemnon, is a great cause of αἶσχος, not only to her, but to the whole of womankind (*Od.* 11. 433-4). The same incident is described with a synonym of αἰσχρός, ἀεικής, too. Clytemnestra's adultery (*Od.* 3. 265) and murder of her husband (*Od.* 11. 429; cf. 4. 533) are both ἔργα ἀεικέα, ugly deeds.[12]

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[11] Cf. Leaf ad loc.: 'αἴσχεα, ὀνείδεα in objective sense, *the insults and revilings* of men.'

[12] I am inclined to agree to J. Griffin's view that ἀεικέα ἔργα at *Il.* 22. 395 does not mean 'wrong' (for Achilles to commit), but 'shameful' (for Hector to

Furthermore, Agamemnon calls her κυνῶπις (dog-faced, shameless *Od.* 11. 424) and says she is κύντερον (more dog-like, shameless 427) than any other women. As the use of 'dog-words' (which are almost the strongest possible terms of rebuke in Homer) indicates, such extreme cases of αἶσχος and ἀεικέα as above are considered deeds not of human beings, but of subhuman creatures.[13]

As Menelaus is indignant at his guest's outrage (*Il.* 13. 622-3), any breach of ξεινίη is considered a serious matter of αἶσχος. Having observed the insolent manners of the suitors at Odysseus' house, Mentes-Athena asks Telemachus who would not feel νέμεσις (νεμεσσήσαιτο) when looking at such αἴσχεα (*Od.* 1. 228-9).[14] When they start teasing the beggar-Odysseus with taunts and violence, Penelope reproaches Telemachus for not checking them, saying that such outrage at home might result in his own disgrace, if the guest is harmed (*Od.* 18. 225):

σοί κ' αἶσχος λώβη τε μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλοιτο.

This αἶσχος is clearly the result of νέμεσις directed towards Telemachus' shortcomings as a host.

When Eurycleia guesses the reason for which the beggar-Odysseus refuses to have his feet washed by younger servants, she says that he must be trying to avoid the λώβη and αἴσχεα from them (*Od.* 19. 372-4). In this case, the beggar is not the author of the λώβη and αἴσχεα, but their victim. The maidservants are nothing but 'shameless bitches' (κύνες 373) in Eurycleia's eye. The behaviour of the suitors and their mistresses among Odysseus' maidservants is

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endure) (*Homer on Life and Death*, Oxford 1980, p. 85, n. 9). However, I think that the interpretation that ἀεικέα, like αἰσχρός, is 'unseemly' in the eye of the third party, is valid also in this case. Certainly whether Achilles' behaviour is justifiable or not is not an issue, but there is no doubt that the third party does not enjoy the sight of Hector's body being dragged around.

13 For 'dog-words' as terms of rebuke, cf. M. Faust, 'Die künstlerische Verwendung von κύων 'Hund' in den homerischen Epen', *Glotta* 48 (1970), 8-31, esp. 26.

14 Adkins would argue (cf. *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 41-2) that it is Telemachus' condition that is αἰσχρόν in this passage as in the following example of Penelope's reproach. However, we have another key word, νέμεσις, to point to the direction of denigration. While Penelope at 18. 225 feels νέμεσις at Telemachus, Mentes-Athena feels νέμεσις at the suitors. The audience of any age should have known whose conduct was against θέμις and δίκη, and deserved νέμεσις, and therefore deserved to be classified as αἰσχρόν, unpleasant to the eye of the public. Cf. Long, *JHS* 90 (1970), 130.

further condemned as 'unseemly' repeatedly with the word ἀεικής (of the suitors *Od.* 16. 107 ἀεικέα ἔργα; 109 ἀεικελίως; 20. 308 ἀεικείαι; 317 ἀεικέα ἔργα; 319 ἀεικέλιως; 394 ἀεικέα; of the maid-servants 22. 432 ἀεικέα).

The verb αἰσχύνω basically means 'I put someone in a state of being αἰσχρός', and its use tells us what sort of behaviour disgraces a man. It denotes disfigurement of dead bodies at *Il.* 22. 75 and 24. 418. Therefore it is also disgrace, a matter of σέβας and λώβη, to let the dead body of one's friend be disfigured by enemies (*Il.* 18. 178-80). Self-disfigurement is a means of mourning (*Il.* 18. 24, 27), as temporary renunciation of the joy and pride of one's life in the honour of the dead. Attaching αἶσχος to oneself by this means is part of θέμις.

If bloody strife occurred among the suitors, that would disgrace Penelope's wedding (*Od.* 16. 293, 19. 12). The adultery of Aphrodite and Ares disgraces Hephaestus (*Od.* 8. 269). However, the greatest disgrace for the warrior class is to get a bad name of being a coward and lacking ἀρετή. Therefore fathers instruct their sons to be brave and not to disgrace the honour of their family (*Il.* 6. 209, *Od.* 24. 508, 512). Menelaus is offended by Antilochus' trick which forced him to finish third in the chariot race, especially because it defiled his ἀρετή (ᾔσχυνας ... ἐμὴν ἀρετήν *Il.* 23. 571). In his attempt not to let the beggar-Odysseus try the bow, Eurymachus complains to Penelope that if the beggar does succeed in stringing the bow, someone κακώτερος might insult the suitors (*Od.* 21. 324). Penelope answers that it is no ἐλέγχεα compared with the disgraceful deeds that the suitors have already done to their host's household (331-3). They can never expect ἐϋκλεῖαι among people. Accusing someone falsely to make him an object of νέμεσις is also αἰσχύνειν. Antinous complains that Telemachus accuses the suitors wrongly, putting disgrace on them (αἰσχύνων *Od.* 2. 86).

Just as one can feel νέμεσις towards oneself, αἰσχύνομαι in the middle can denote 'be ashamed', i.e. imposing shame on oneself. Irus says, though probably not wholeheartedly, that he feels ashamed of removing an old beggar (Odysseus) from the house of his host by force (*Od.* 18. 12). Odysseus explains (in his diplomatic lie) why he did not follow Nausicaa to the palace of Alcinous, saying that he was afraid and ashamed (αἰσχυνόμενος) to do so in case he might anger Alcinous (*Od.* 7. 305). αἶσχος implied in these expressions is a strong sense of νέμεσις felt towards oneself.

As we have seen, καλός and αἰσχρός belong to the sphere of αἰδώς and νέμεσις, but ἀγαθός and κακός belong to a completely different set of values. When one chooses between things ἀγαθόν and κακόν, the question is 'Which is more useful, profitable?', but when one chooses between things καλόν and αἰσχρόν, the question is 'Which is more becoming for a person of my position?'[15] Of course, the two questions can mean the same thing in many cases, since honour and fame are eventually one's profit, and also doing ἀγαθόν itself often means living up to heroic ideals, playing one's role expected by society. However, the grounds of judgement are significantly different. One is more concerned with what others would think of oneself, while the other is to promote one's own interest, sometimes even in defiance of the pressure of society.

This explains why we find Homeric characters describe anti-social behaviour as 'not καλόν' rather than 'not ἀγαθόν', for the former means 'not becoming', 'a matter of public disapproval', while the latter only means 'It is not good for *you*' or 'It is not good for *me*.'

Homeric man does, therefore, possess terms to commend good manners and to criticise bad, anti-social behaviour. Like νέμεσις, 'οὐ καλός' and 'αἰσχρός' work as fairly effective terms of condemnation to deter one from behaving in anti-social manners in time of peace, or in unheroic manners in time of war. Homeric morality centres around public opinion, how others will view one's behaviour, and in this context, καλός and αἰσχρός are more relevant signs than ἀγαθός and κακός of the evaluation of one's behaviour in society.

The terms 'οὐ καλός' and 'αἰσχρός', however, share the limitation of νέμεσις that they function only within the reach of the public eye, and only on those who are capable of feeling αἰδώς. In principle, if nobody sees you to say it is unseemly, it does not matter what you do. Or whatever people say, if your social standing is high enough, you can just ignore their voice, as Paris always does. In so far as you are strong enough and lack αἰδώς responding to νέμεσις, whether others complain about your laziness in battle or about a breach of θέμις, you are not affected. Paris is the best counter-

[15] I consider this question to be functionally equivalent to the question implicit in modern morality, 'What is my duty in these circumstances?', which Adkins claims to be impossible in Homeric morality (*Merit and Responsibility*, p. 2).

example to refute the thesis of Adkins that 'quiet virtues' can be ignored by strong warriors because the 'competitive virtues' that they possess are so much more important that they make 'quiet virtues' irrelevant.[16] The truth is that, if a man is strong and shameless enough like Paris, he can ignore even 'competitive virtues', because nobody dares to punish him. However, even Hector wishes Paris' death, and no Trojan would help him escape from Menelaus. The fact that Agamemnon, Paris, or the suitors of Penelope can at times behave in defiance of their community does not mean that the community thinks that 'quiet virtues' are irrelevant.

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[16] *Merit and Responsibility*, pp. 37-8.

CONCLUSION

We began our sketch of Homeric morality with the observation of the behaviour of the gods, which led us to the conclusion that the gods cannot be relied upon as the protectors of justice in human society. Divine behaviour is mostly unpredictable because the gods dispense the fortunes of mortals according to μοῖρα, which has nothing to do with the moral virtues of individuals. Men know for certain only that the gods will take action against those mortals who injure their honour, whether knowingly or unknowingly. Therefore men try their best to honour the gods and not to offend them. The gods do take heed of men's worship and are favourable to them sometimes, but that is the case only when μοῖρα permits. Although Zeus is fond of Troy and appreciates its piety, he cannot save the city from its ruin, since it is fated to be destroyed in the current war. True, he reluctantly yielded to his wife's demand to destroy it, but he would not have done so had it not been μοῖρα of Troy. The gods' morality is μοῖρα-oriented, and has little to do with human behaviour. However, human characters *believe* that the gods reward righteous and pious men and punish bad ones. As a result, the readers or audience see in the epics the ironical picture of pious men and indifferent gods, which was to become the object of criticism by many later Greeks.

However, the Homeric gods are clearly not capricious tyrants who manage the world by the whim of their fancy. One common principle that rules both men and gods is the idea that each individual has his own 'lot' (μοῖρα/αἶσα). Each man and each god has his own position in his particular society. Each position gives the individual certain responsibilities and privileges. Behaviour suitable to one's position is praised, and that unsuitable is criticised, by society. Each person is entitled to his share of honour as his lot. If one damages another person's honour, τιμή, the latter will take revenge on the former. Homeric man calls a person who shares his τιμή a friend and one who damages his τιμή an enemy. It has often been said that in Greek morality, virtue is to help one's friends and harm one's enemies. But this is tautological, for friends are, by definition, those who help and benefit one another, and enemies are, also by definition, those who harm one another.

Responsibility of Homeric man (the aristocracy especially) among friends in time of peace is greatly different from that among enemies in time of war. The fact that the warrior-class is called ἀγαθοί is based on the assumption that they are useful members of the community. Their responsibility is to solve conflicts within their community as judges in time of peace, and in time of war to fight in the front rank to defend the community, or to enrich it by getting as many spoils as possible.

Homeric moral rules in peace are fairly clearly defined by θέμις and δίκη. They are manners and customs concerning offerings and festivals for the gods, marriages, funerals, reception of visitors, public meetings, and so on. They regulate how an individual should behave towards other members of society. They are not written law, but are known in full to mature members of the aristocracy, and the aristocracy as a whole has an obligation to hand them down to posterity. They have such universality that whenever one person says that such and such is δίκη/θέμις, the listener normally accepts it without contention. The aim of the king as administrator of δίκη and θέμις is to maintain the harmony of his community. If a member of a community harms other members, he goes beyond the boundary of his lot allotted by θέμις and δίκη and is met by the community's νέμεσις. However, the anticipation of νέμεσις often generates αἰδώς which restrains him from harming others. Behaviour in accordance with θέμις and δίκη is praised as καλός (rather than ἀγαθός), beautiful, seemly, and that against them is met by νέμεσις and criticised as αἰσχρός (rather than κακός), ugly, unseemly.

The virtue of heroes is to keep pace with θέμις and δίκη, fearing the anger of the gods and criticism of people (νέμεσις), and having αἰδώς towards the people around them. However, this virtue is conceived only as part of warrior-virtue, ἀρετή, and has no separate name of its own. This side of ἀρετή, which will become the dominant meaning in later Greek philosophy, is not highlighted in the epics of Homer. However, the central themes of the epics themselves illustrate that violation of θέμις and δίκη does not pay, even when the offender was ἀγαθός and needed by the community. Agamemnon acts in the most thoughtless way towards Achilles and gets into trouble. Paris abducts his host's wife and invites war against his country. The suitors of Penelope, who have been consuming Odysseus' property in defiance of all θέμις and δίκη of society, pay a very dear price in the end. A remarkable thing, how-

ever, is that in all of these cases, although the Achaeans, the community of Ithaca or, in the case of Paris' offence, the Trojans, know that the deed concerned is an offence against θέμις, and feel νέμεσις towards it, they cannot step forward to punish the offender because they lack a social convention to do so.[1] Helen is ashamed of her elopement with Paris, and knows that she deserves public indignation, but there is nobody, no institution, to punish her. She only suffers from her own sense of shame and people's accusation. Sanctions against those who damage the τιμή of others are usually just revenge from the affected party itself. The Trojan War, despite its magnitude, is still essentially the private vengeance of Menelaus, and if he dies the cause of the conflict will disappear with him.

Therefore man is restrained from selfish behaviour by a collection of different forces, including fear of divine sanctions, fear of revenge, fear of public indignation (νέμεσις), sense of shame, and respect (αἰδώς) towards senior or stronger members of the community or persons under divine protection. Women, who are not strong, nor under divine protection, are protected by the sense of αἰδώς of the community by convention. Homeric man also has a sense of ἔλεος towards weaker and helpless members of the society in general.

The virtue of man during peacetime, in short, is to behave politely and suitably to the position which he holds in society, to honour the gods, to be thoughtful to those with whom he deals (especially persons in weaker positions such as women, the elderly, and foreign visitors), to try to win a good name from society, and to be a good and understanding judge for his people. Those who are under the protection of such an aristocrat are supposed to have their own virtue, that is to behave suitably to their position, to be loyal and grateful to the head of their house, and perform their household tasks.

In war, however, the virtue required from heroes is completely different from that in peace. Patroclus, who pleads with Achilles to pity and save the Achaean army, and who used to console the captured Briseis gently, is a bloodthirsty killer on the battlefield when trying to scale the city wall of Troy. Hector, another humane figure, who is such a loving husband, father, son and even brother-in-law

[1] Cf. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, p. 60, n. 22: 'But everything depends on feeling, not organization; normally each household must look after itself, and the suitors can rely on being undisturbed.'

(to Helen) in his family life, becomes a ruthless killer in battle. And it is precisely for his cruelty in battle that Andromache and the Trojans lament his death so much. Here, on the battlefield, to be mild with, or cowardly in front of, one's enemies is the object of νέμεσις and αἰδώς. One does not have to fear Zeus' punishment even if one kills a supplicating enemy. Dirty words thrown at one's enemies are not counted as the sign of bad manners. However, even in time of war, moral rules remain those of the time of peace among one's own comrades.[2] It is utterly wrong to assume that the morality of war is at work even in one's own camp. It is an unthinkable moral mistake of Agamemnon that he takes Briseis away from Achilles. It is such a shocking event, indeed almost beyond belief, that it serves as the beginning of the extraordinary story to follow. If incidents of this sort were commonplace among heroes, any military expeditions, either great or small, would be bound to fail. Even a band of thieves need justice among them. The behaviour of the suitors in the house of Odysseus is also an unthinkable example of defiance against νέμεσις. Therefore they are going to meet an extraordinary end by the hand of Odysseus. It is fair to say that the social system of Homeric society lacks a police force to enforce θέμις and δίκη, especially when the head of the community as arbitrator is absent or unreasonable himself, but it is obvious that neither Agamemnon's behaviour against Achilles, nor the suitors' behaviour in the house of Odysseus, nor any behaviour which annoys another member of one's own community, is justified by public opinion, as both Agamemnon and the suitors know well themselves. The society as a whole does not believe that might is right, and that the strongest man can do anything he likes.

The problem, therefore, is that punishment of offenders against social codes is left to the hand of the party affected. Capable heroes will take revenge themselves, but when a powerless person is wronged by a stronger one, all he can do is to pray to the gods and hope that they will one day punish the person who has wronged him. The poet himself, however, does not seem to share the belief that the gods are avengers for the righteous and wronged. The gods, in 'reality', give good and bad fortunes to men according to individuals'

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[2] See Peleus' double advice to Achilles that he must fight bravely and excel among his comrades in battle (*Il.* 11. 784), but among his friends, φιλοφροσύνη is better than quarrels and will make him more honoured (9. 256-8).

'lot', μοῖρα, and that is the gods' δίκη and θέμις, that is their justice, which does not often coincide with what human beings believe to be just. Nevertheless, men can still believe in the gods, and the effect of offerings, because they know that the honour of the gods heavily depends on the offerings and respect that men pay them, and that the gods and men share the sense of pity. Homeric man sometimes even has such sensitivity as to pity his enemy on the battlefield as a helpless fellow human. Achilles knows that Agamemnon was in the wrong, and that the Achaeans should suffer to make the king realise his own wrongdoing, but he is uneasy about letting them die, especially when being criticised by Patroclus and others. It is this Achilles who sympathises with Priam as an unhappy father like his own and who therefore treats him kindly.

Homeric morality consists of two major sub-categories, divine morality based on μοῖρα, and human morality based on θέμις and δίκη. The latter is further divided into morality in peace among one's friends and that in war among one's enemies. However, there is one, though small, element which overrides the boundary between men and gods, and that between friends and enemies, namely, ἔλεος, which is an outstanding characteristic of Homer and is completely absent in Hesiod. We are moved by the Hector-Andromache scene in *Iliad* Book 6, and by the pitiful pleas of Priam and Hecuba to their son Hector who is about to face Achilles, because here we see the dilemma of Hector, who has to choose the morality of war which commands him to die gloriously, rather than his true feeling which urges him to pity his family and live.

Homer never criticises the double-sided morality of the heroes. He simply presents the reality of heroic morality, which demands the best of gentleness and the worst of cruelty from a single individual. He does this by describing the unhappiness of Hector who lives, kills, and dies in the name of glory, Achilles' sympathy with Priam, and the ugliness of the arrogant suitors exulting in their power. Homer cannot imagine a world without war. The shield of Achilles tells us most eloquently that war and peace coexist in his world all the time.

However, the poet knows that each war is only a passing event and, although each individual is also a passing being, friendship between families survives the wars and the deaths of the family members. Glaucus and Diomedes promise to be a host and a guest to each other one day when they have gone home after the war. Men's

generations are like the leaves of trees which flourish in one moment and die away in the next, but as far as the family tree lives, it produces new lives to inherit heroic names and virtues. Although Nestor has lost Antilochus in the war, his younger son makes good friends with the son of his former comrade Odysseus. Achilles in Hades longs for any miserable life on earth rather than kingship in the underworld, but is delighted by the glory and valour of his son who, though Achilles himself does not know, is going to marry the daughter of Menelaus. The continuation of life, family and friendship is a bright hope for a dying hero (probably more so than his eternal glory won in battle) and is guaranteed through δίκη and θέμις that regulate the fair exchange of τιμή and αἰδώς among friends and members of a family. As far as there is life, there is always hope in Homer. Even Troy is going to be rebuilt by Aeneas and his offspring. On the other hand, the poet does not fail to describe the irreparable misery of the bereaved, of widows, orphans, and parents who have lost their sons, and of terminated family trees. He does not say who is good or bad, but merely presents the comprehensive view of the world where glory of one party often means suffering for another.

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